Information exchange efficiency in criminal investigation in European Union by Fiodorova, Anna
 
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE EFFICIENCY 
IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IN 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
Autor: 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
 
Director/es: 
Helena Soleto Muñoz 
 
Tutor: 
Helena Soleto Muñoz 
 
 
DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO PENAL, PROCESAL  
E HISTORIA DEL DERECHO   
 
Getafe, noviembre 2015 

  
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
Information Exchange Efficiency in Criminal Investigation  
in European Union 
 
 
   Autor: Anna Fiodorova 
 
Director: Helena Soleto Muñoz 
     
 
Firma del Tribunal Calificador: 
 
                                                                                                      Firma 
Presidente:  
 
 
Vocal:  
 
 
Secretario:  
 
 
Calificación: 
   
Getafe,        de                          de             
 
~ 5 ~ 
INDEX OF CONTENT 
INDEX OF CONTENT .............................................................................................................................. 5 
INDEX OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................. 9 
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................................. 11 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 13 
PART I: THE ORIGINS OF TRANSNATIONAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE. 
INFORMATION USE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 19 
CHAPTER 1: POLICE AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE. EUROPEAN UNION INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE POLICY  ............................................................................................................................. 21 
1. Territorial limits of law enforcement institutions’ competence and the need for co-
operation ................................................................................................................................................................ 21 
2. Crimes and factors that gave rise for international police co-operation ................................... 24 
2.1. Reasons for the rise in co-operation within the European Communities ............................ 26 
2.2. The current situation ............................................................................................................................... 31 
3. The legal framework of police cooperation within the EU ............................................................... 34 
4. Principle of availability - the cornerstone of information exchange ............................................ 41 
5. Information, intelligence and personal data ........................................................................................... 49 
CHAPTER 2: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER CONSIDERATION ........................ 55 
1. Security deficit vs. democracy deficit......................................................................................................... 57 
2. Information exchange and due process .................................................................................................... 62 
3. Privacy ..................................................................................................................................................................... 65 
3.1. Content of the right to privacy ............................................................................................................. 65 
3.2. Limitation of right of privacy................................................................................................................ 68 
3.3. Privacy and electronic communications .......................................................................................... 71 
4. Data protection .................................................................................................................................................... 74 
4.1. Relation between right to privacy and right to data protection ............................................ 74 
4.2. Origins and development of right to data protection ................................................................. 75 
4.3. European legal framework for right to data protection ........................................................... 78 
5. Brief summary and evaluation ...................................................................................................................... 90 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
~ 6 ~ 
PART II: POOL OF TOOLS: DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATION AND PROBLEMS 
ASSOCIATED WITH SOME INFORMATION EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS ............. 93 
CHAPTER 3: INFORMATION EXCHANGE UNDER SCHENGEN ACQUIS ............................................ 95 
1. From multilateral Agreement to Schengen Acquis .............................................................................. 95 
2. Schengen Information System ................................................................................................................... 102 
2.1. From reporting to investigation ........................................................................................................ 103 
2.2. From SIS to SIS II ..................................................................................................................................... 104 
2.3. Content and functionalities of SIS II ................................................................................................. 107 
2.4. SIRENE Bureaux ....................................................................................................................................... 127 
3. Information exchange under Articles 39 and 46 of the CISA ....................................................... 129 
4. Police and Customs Cooperation Centres ............................................................................................. 135 
5. Liaison officers: within the Schengen Agreement and beyond ................................................... 141 
6. Data protection ................................................................................................................................................. 146 
6.1. Persons included ...................................................................................................................................... 147 
6.2. Access ........................................................................................................................................................... 148 
6.3. Third parties .............................................................................................................................................. 149 
6.4. Data subject’s rights ............................................................................................................................... 150 
6.5. Supervising authorities ......................................................................................................................... 151 
7. Brief summary and evaluation ................................................................................................................... 152 
CHAPTER 4: EUROPOL ................................................................................................................ 155 
1. From ministerial agreement to regulation by the TFEU ................................................................ 156 
1.1. Ministerial agreement ........................................................................................................................... 157 
1.2. Europol Convention ................................................................................................................................ 158 
2. Europol – EU agency ....................................................................................................................................... 163 
2.1. Information exchange tools ................................................................................................................. 165 
2.2. Information exchange with EU institutions and other entities, third states and 
international organisations ................................................................................................................ 171 
2.3. European Cybercrime Centre .............................................................................................................. 176 
2.4. Efficiency ..................................................................................................................................................... 177 
3. Data protection ................................................................................................................................................. 180 
3.1. Persons included ...................................................................................................................................... 181 
3.2. Access ........................................................................................................................................................... 183 
3.3. Third parties and onward transmission ......................................................................................... 184 
3.4. Classified information ............................................................................................................................ 186 
3.5. Data subject’s right to access .............................................................................................................. 187 
3.6. Supervising authorities ......................................................................................................................... 189 
4. Brief summary and evaluation ................................................................................................................... 191 
CHAPTER 5: SWEDISH INITIATIVE ............................................................................................. 195 
1. First attempt to implement the principle of availability: the Commission’s proposal ..... 195 
2. Swedish Initiative – compromise on information availability ..................................................... 199 
2.1. Scope of information exchange .......................................................................................................... 201 
2.2. Deadlines for reply .................................................................................................................................. 201 
Information Exchange Efficiency in Criminal Investigation in European Union 
 
~ 7 ~ 
2.3. Data exchange and reasons for denial ............................................................................................ 203 
2.4. Practical use .............................................................................................................................................. 205 
3. Data protection ................................................................................................................................................. 208 
4. Brief summary and evaluation ................................................................................................................... 209 
CHAPTER 6: EXAMPLE OF NETWORKING: FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS AND ASSET 
RECOVERY OFFICES .......................................................................................................................... 211 
1. Network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) .................................................................................. 212 
2. Network of Asset Recovery Offices (AROs) .......................................................................................... 215 
3. Data protection ................................................................................................................................................. 218 
4. Brief summary and evaluation ................................................................................................................... 219 
CHAPTER 7: INFORMATION EXCHANGE UNDER PRÜM DECISIONS ........................................... 221 
1. From multilateral convention to European instrument ................................................................. 222 
1.1. Between Multilateral and Enhanced Co-operation.................................................................... 222 
1.2. Transformation into EU instrument ................................................................................................ 225 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
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Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at 
their common borders 
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EU – European Union 
FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit  
FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights  
INTERPOL – International Criminal Police Organization  
IOCTA – Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment1 
LIBE – Civil Liberties and Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament  
OCTA – Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
SIRENE – Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry  
SIS – Schengen Information System 
SIS II – Second generation of the Schengen Information System 
SOCTA – Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
TEEEC – Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community  
TE-SAT - Terrorism Situation and Trend Report  
TEU – Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union2  
TFEU – Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union3  
                                                        
1  At EU level, since 2004, Europol has produced comprehensive threat reports that include analysis 
of the current situation, both inside and outside the EU, and deduction of future threats to the EU’s 
internal security. 
2  OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 13-46. 
3  OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 47-199. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. 
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories,  
Instead of theories to suit facts.”  
Arthur Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes 
nformation is a primary and indispensable background to any conclusions, 
whether of scientific research, business plans, political decisions or the 
performance of justice. 
Except on those occasions when the offender is caught in the act, the starting point 
of any police investigation is obtaining information about the crime, and on this 
basis making, deductions, as glorified by Sherlock Holmes. It is also one of the main 
elements in crime prevention, given that its timely possession precludes damaging 
consequences and contributes to the security and protection of human rights and 
the legitimate interests of individuals and society. 
Information is obtained from different sources, beginning with inquiries to victim 
and witnesses, and finishing with the inspection of crime scene, reviewing 
surveillance camera records and consulting data bases. It is very seldom that one 
piece of information is just one link in a chain, which guides competent authorities 
to the next links; and there is no certainty whether this chain will end in the same 
country where the investigation is taking place or not. 
Cross-border information exchange became more relevant a few decades ago, 
when organised crime, moving “in the rhythm of time”4, identified globalisation 
and the facilitated movement of persons as an opportunity for new criminal 
markets. It was especially perceived in the EU and the Schengen zone with the 
establishment of the free movement of persons, goods, capital and services, the 
                                                        
4  STORBECK, Jürgen, “La cooperación policial europea”, in MONTERO, Julián, ROMERO, Francisco 
and VALIENTE, Elena, ¿Hacia una Policía Europea? (Madrid: Fundación Policía Española, 2002), p. 
155. 
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abolition of internal borders and the introduction of a single currency in the 
majority of the Member States. 
Notwithstanding, these negative side effects have not been led automatically by 
their antidote – the free movement of investigation and prosecution. Actions of law 
enforcement, prosecution and judicial authorities remained limited to state 
territory; this meant a high probability of impunity in the case of transnational 
crimes. 
In these circumstances, when EU policies had endangered security by 
unintentionally giving wider possibilities to criminals than to prosecuting 
authorities, a need to introduce effective co-operation tools that would overcome 
the obstacle of the existence of border in investigation and prosecuting criminal 
deeds (including measures for information exchange) emerged. 
As a result of this, as well as of some other particular incidents (such as terrorist 
attacks), the EU has developed a wide range of mechanisms for information 
exchange that include data bases, networks of experts or contact points, agencies 
and a purely legal basis for the information exchange process. 
As shown by a study, carried out in 2009, by the International Centre for Migration 
Policy Development, countries exchanged approximately 13 million messages5 
(requests and transmissions of information) through INTERPOL and within five 
years, in 2014, this number increased to 17 million.6 INTERPOL’s data bases (such 
as those on suspected or wanted persons, on dactyloscopics, on DNA profiles, and 
stolen and lost travel documents) were consulted 1.7 billion times in 2014.7  
Within the EU, in 2009, one quarter of all investigation information requests were 
sent to other Member States.8 Comparing only information submitted to EIS in 
2009 and 2014, a number of records were doubled.9 
                                                        
5  See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPEAN 
PUBLIC LAW ORGANIZATION, “Study on the status of information exchange amongst law 
enforcement authorities in the context of existing EU instruments”, European Commission, 2010, 
p. 45, accessed February 20, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/doc_centre/police/docs/icmpd_study_lea_infoex.pdf. 
6  See INTERPOL, “Annual Report 2014”, p. 13, accessed May 17, 2015, 
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/Publications. 
7  Ibid, p. 14. 
8  See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPEAN 
PUBLIC LAW ORGANIZATION, “Study on the status of information…”, loc. cit., p. 46. 
9  Council document 8082/15, p. 42, 43. 
 As revealed by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, the most frequent 
exchange data categories are: 
 “Data about persons; perpetrators, suspects, unidentified persons (name, date of birth, jobs, 
identification data of fingerprinted criminals for true identification, confirmation of identity, 
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Thus it became a very dynamic field of EU policy and new initiatives, but 
sometimes it lacked consistency and clear indications of use, and police officers 
faced plurality of legal basis, channels and procedures and different tools for 
different categories of information. In addition, the European legislator has 
established a variety of regulations on the storage of information, its transmission 
to third states and onward transmission, as well as on data subject rights towards 
the processing of their personal data. 
For example, data such as fingerprints can be introduced and found in SIS, 
Europol’s EIS, Europol’s AWFs, national dactyloscopic data bases which are 
accessible on the basis of Prüm Decisions; but subjects’ data and the purposes for 
which it is stored, can be different or overlapping. Information on suspicious 
financial transactions or bank accounts can be requested trough Europol, network 
of FIUs, bilaterally between competent authorities on the basis of Swedish 
Initiative, also found in AWFs. 
It brings law enforcement officers to confusion, initially at the moment of 
requesting or submitting information: which mechanism should be used, how 
should it should be used, whether it will result only in cross-checks or direct access 
to information, how long can it take to get information, is it possible to request or 
submit information directly or shall it be done through the designated authority? 
Secondly, during the processing of such data and last but not least – at the moment 
of considering whether it is consistent with the due process. 
Facing such babel, the aim of the thesis is to analyse: Which information exchange 
tools under which circumstances can be used? Do they overlap? How are they 
compatible with human rights?  
Tools used in work as responsible as investigation, should result in a perfectly 
assembled puzzle, in which each piece corresponds to its due process. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
residence, DNA, fingerprints, verification of personal data, criminal convictions, passports, IDs, 
photographs); 
 Data about vehicles; vehicles used to transport suspects, perpetrators; vehicles located at the 
crime scene or recorded by surveillance cameras, registration details, owner and operator of a 
vehicle, chassis numbers, purchase documents, export and import documents; 
 Financial data; company information, banking information, property relationship, bank accounts, 
transaction details, account holders, company board of directors, share capital, income and wealth 
information, unusual or suspicious money transactions, asset tracing data payment cards, data for 
POS terminal device; 
 Communication data; subscribers’ details (particularly for mobiles), IT addresses, billing details, 
outgoing/incoming calls, emails, wiretapping, interceptions; 
 Data about objects, confiscated objects, objects related to committed crimes are often exchanged 
while data about firearms (licensing data, lost weapon, weapon used for crimes) and other 
“explanatory” data are seldom exchanged (e.g. interrogations, home searches, seizure of evidence, 
trends, statistics, customs documents, modus operandi, and fines).” 
 Source: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPEAN 
PUBLIC LAW ORGANIZATION, “Study on the status of information…”, loc. cit., p. 49. 
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Having said that, it is no less important to highlight the limits of this research; it 
addresses information exchange between law enforcement authorities while 
performing one of the core functions –the investigation of a crime. For the purpose 
of this work, information exchange in crime investigation will mean its processing 
in pre-trial investigation, operational activities, as well as within the stage of 
traditionally understood investigation, as a stage of the penal process when pieces 
of exchanged or transmitted data do not involve the authorisation of a judge or a 
prosecutor. It should also be pointed out that what is treated, as a general, rule as 
“police data” in some Member States can in fact belong to “judicial data”; for 
example, DNA data bases in Denmark. 
In any case, information exchange between judicial authorities through Eurojust 
on the basis of rogatory letters, mutual recognition of evidence or other tools of 
judicial co-operation remains out of the scope of the thesis. 
Summarising, it can be defined as analysis of the mechanisms to exchange “raw 
material” for police investigation, which at the latter stage, and when it is 
necessary and following relevant procedure, can be considered as evidence. 
From geographical perspectives, it limits only to the EU tools and those applied to 
Schengen area, not entering in comparisons with international information 
exchange tools, first of all provided by INTERPOL. 
The work is divided into three parts:  
 The origins of transnational information exchange. Information use for law 
enforcement and fundamental rights; 
 Pool of tools: development, application and problems associated with 
some information exchange instruments; 
 Projects in the pipeline: reasons, content, problems, state of play. 
The first part analyses circumstances that led to the necessity of law enforcement 
authorities to look for information beyond state borders, and how European 
politics evolved in this respect. It also scrutinises the impact of information 
exchange on fundamental rights and marks the difference between their limitation 
and violation. Special attention is drawn to the right to data protection and its 
regulation, as it is inalienable element of any piece of data and largely exposed to 
violation. 
The second part is devoted to the analysis of different information exchange tools 
between law enforcement authorities. A selection of tools has been made, applying 
three criteria: to analyse each type of information exchange mechanisms, and 
Information Exchange Efficiency in Criminal Investigation in European Union 
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when there is more than one of each type, to analyse the most important or the 
most controversial one. 
On this basis, SIS and SIS II have been chosen as the centralised data base, Europol 
as agency, Swedish Initiative as general the legal basis for any information 
exchange, FIUs and AROs as networks and Prüm Decisions as a decentralised data 
base with direct access. 
A slight deviation from these criteria makes necessity to analyse the entire part of 
the CISA which corresponds to information exchange, i.e. Liaison officers, police 
and customs co-operation centres and general the regulation of cross-border 
assistance foreseen in Articles 39 and 46. This was carried out taking into account 
that not only SIS and SIS II, but all the mechanisms envisaged in CISA are 
compensatory measures for the abolition of internal borders within the Schengen 
area, and represented the first appearance of real police co-operation tools. 
Besides, study of the Swedish Initiative would not be comprehensive without its 
comparison with the regulation, foreseen on Articles 39 and 46 of the CISA. 
The order of analysis is not random either, and it reflects the chronological 
evolution of the EU information exchange regulation. A partial discrepancy from 
this chain are FIUs and AROs networks, as FIUs were established before the 
adoption of the Swedish Initiative, but for the sake of the explanation of the 
functioning of ARO it was more convenient to discuss it later. 
The third part presents new projects under development, but only those related to 
information exchange between law enforcement authorities, not entering into 
judicial co-operation and such initiatives as the establishment of the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office. The research is oriented to the identification of our level 
of need for them and coherence with the developed information management 
policy. 
  
 
  
 
PART I:   
THE ORIGINS OF TRANSNATIONAL 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE. 
INFORMATION USE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 
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CHAPTER 1:   
POLICE AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE. EUROPEAN 
UNION INFORMATION EXCHANGE POLICY 
nformation is a raw material and an indispensable element of any 
investigation and with the developments of recent decades, its transmission 
and receipt “crossing” state borders has become vital in order to conclude 
successful legal action. Not to overlook unpunished crime whose detection and 
effective investigation would be impossible without cross-border information 
exchange. 
Within such a framework, this chapter of research sets out to identify reasons for 
the outspread of “transnationality” of crime, to analyse the EU political 
developments in this respect, and specific steps carried out in this area. 
1. Territorial limits of law enforcement institutions’ 
competence and the need for co-operation 
Guarantees of security (both internal and external) and justice are the core 
functions of any modern state10 and so called state monopoly.11 As in the case of 
any public institution within any state, the competence of law enforcement 
institutions is pre-established by national law and as a global rule “do not generally 
                                                        
10  See ALMAGRO NOSETE, José; CÓRTEZ DOMÍNGUEZ, Valentín; GIMENO SENDRA, Vicente et al., 
Derecho Procesal. Parte general proceso civil (1) (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 1989), p. 47; 
MONTERO AROCA, Juan, Introducción al Derecho Procesal. Jurisdicción, acción y proceso (Madrid: 
Tecnos, 1979), p. 18; MONTERO AROCA, Juan; GÓMEZ COLOMER, Juan Luís and BARONA VILAR, 
Silvia, Derecho Jurisdiccional I. Parte General (20th ed. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2012), p. 85; 
MITSILEGAS Valsamis; MONAR, Jörg and REES, Wyn, The European Union and Internal Security: 
Guardian of the People? (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 8. 
11  See DE LA OLIVA SANTOS Andrés and DÍEZ-PICAZO GIMÉNEZ, Ignacio, Derecho Procesal. 
Introducción (3rd ed. Madrid: Ramón Areces, 2004), p. 164-165. 
I 
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transcend national borders.”12 It means that other persons or entities than the 
state constitute institutions (private parties or institutions of other states) are not 
allowed to implement law.13 
There are not as many sources referring to territorial limits of law enforcement 
institutions’ competence as those dedicated to the same topic in relation to judicial 
jurisdiction. In any case, the scope of competence of the law enforcement 
authorities in crime investigation is closely linked to the scope of jurisdiction as 
crime investigation does not have an end in itself, but is an indispensable step to 
perform jurisdiction. 
The main elements that determine limits of jurisdiction and law enforcement 
competence are sovereignty and the principle of territoriality. 
Penal law is an essential piece of classical understanding of sovereignty14. National 
sovereignty grants its jurisdiction exclusively to its Judicial Power and no other 
power (neither other branches of power, nor the judicial power of another state) 
can legitimately perform justice.15 A judgment by a foreign tribunal admitted 
without any previous verification on the basis of the international agreement in 
force, would mean cession of sovereignty.16 It also establishes what has to be 
treated as a criminal act on its territory and foresees sanctions. These limits are 
also reflected in crime investigation. That results in the principle of “no 
intervention” (or in other words non-application of national ius puniendi) in extra-
territorial cases, as it would be an infringement of the sovereignty of another 
state.17  
The principle of territoriality implies that judicial and law enforcement authorities 
are the only ones that are able to implement their judicial, administrative and 
coercive powers within the territory of the state to which they pertain, and, 
“Country borders normally provide a sufficient signal that one legal order is being 
left and another is being entered.”18 As judicial and law enforcement authorities 
                                                        
12  BANTEKAS Ilias and NASH Susan, International Criminal Law (2nd ed. Coogee: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 265. 
13  See MONTERO AROCA, Juan, Introducción al Derecho Procesal…, op. cit., p. 35. 
14  See ARNÁIZ SERRANO, Amaya, “Evolución de la Cooperación Judicial Penal Internacional: en 
especial, la Cooperación Judicial Penal en Europa” in CARMONA RUANO, Miguel; GONZÁLEZ 
VEGA, Ignacio U, and MORENO CATENA, Víctor, Cooperación Judicial Penal en Europa (Dykinson: 
Madrid, 2013), p. 10.  
15  See GIMENO SENDRA, Vicente, Manual de Derecho Procesal Penal (Madrid: Colex, 2008), p. 9. 
16  DE LA OLIVA SANTOS Andrés and DÍEZ-PICAZO GIMÉNEZ, Ignacio, Derecho Procesal. 
Introducción, op. cit., p. 165. 
17  See AMBOS, Kai, Temas de Derecho Penal internacional y europeo (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006), p. 
80. 
18  DE HERT, Paul, “Division of Competencies between National and European Levels with regards to 
Justice and Home Affairs” in APAP, Joanna, Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. Liberty and Security 
Issues after Enlargement (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 57.  
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are submitted to their national law (with some exceptions foreseen in 
international conventions or agreements), their actions on the territory of another 
state would be lacking legality.19  
Nevertheless, due to the facilitated movement of persons and goods in the last 
thirty years, as well as other factors that will be discussed in the following section, 
frequently investigative or preventive measures of one state require some 
investigative activities in another; or are related to an investigation held by 
competent authorities of another state as well. For instance, when a perpetrator 
has moved to another country or has contacts with its residents and they are 
suspected to be involved in the commission of or occultation of a crime or the 
laundering of criminal actives. The last well-known examples are the escape of 
Sergio Morate (a suspect in the murder of two girls) from Spain to Romania20 and 
the dismantling of Chinese criminal network that was involved in smuggling illegal 
immigrants from China to Spain and then onwards to Canada, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and other countries.21 
In both cases, internal security of Spain was affected, but bearing in mind the 
territorial limits of the competence, its law enforcement authorities had not been 
authorized to perform any investigative activities on the territory of other 
countries and therefore needed the assistance of Romania, China, Canada and 
other countries in order to apply Spanish ius puniendi. At the same time, the 
application of ius puniendi in Spain contributed to the security of those countries 
by allowing the prevention of the criminal activities of the above-mentioned 
persons on their territory. 
In these examples, the countries involved could either have performed all the 
necessary actions themselves, or their national laws could have allowed Spanish 
competent authorities to act within their territory; this would have meant limiting 
their own sovereignty and permitting the expansion of Spanish sovereign powers 
on their territory. Any of the two options would first require contacts between 
competent authorities of the countries involved (providing information about 
committed crimes, movements of suspects, their detection on the territory of the 
other state) and then interaction in performing necessary procedural actions. All 
these elements together form a co-operation or engagement to assist. 
                                                        
19  See GARCÍA BORREGO, José Antonio and FERNÁNDEZ VILLAZALA, Tomás, Introducción al 
Derecho Procesal Penal (Madrid: Dykinson, S.L., 2007), p. 21. 
20  See “La Justicia rumana aprueba la entrega definitiva a España de Sergio Morate”, Europapress, 
September 3, 2015, accessed September 7, 2015, http://www.europapress.es/nacional/noticia-
justicia-rumana-aprueba-extradicion-definitiva-espana-sergio-morate-20150902172359.html. 
21  See ORTEGA DOLZ, Patricia and CONGOSTRINA, Alfonso L., “Detenidas 80 personas de una red de 
tráfico ilegal de ciudadanos chinos”, El País, May 4, 2015, accessed May 15, 2015, 
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/05/04/actualidad/1430738360_410640.html. 
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The origins of co-operation can be found in the middle of the XIX century, with the 
aim of keeping travelling political agitators under surveillance. This intensified at 
the end of XIX century after the assassinations of the Russian Emperor Alexander II 
in 1881, the President of France, Sidi Carnot in 1894 and Austrian Empress Sissi in 
1898.22  
At the beginning of the XX century, the first attempts at legal regulation and 
institutionalisation took place. Thus in 1905, an International Police Convention 
between the authorities in Buenos Aires, La Plata, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, and 
Santiago de Chile was signed. In 1914 the first international police meeting in 
Monte Carlo took place, and an idea to establish a cooperation institution was 
raised. But due to the First World War it was not implemented until 1923, with the 
establishment of the International Criminal Police Commission that in 1956 was 
transformed into INTERPOL that nowadays counts with the membership of 190 
states. 
Currently, co-operation and its different mechanisms are widely used both at 
regional and global level and they cause the gradual softening of the principles of 
sovereignty and territoriality.23 
2. Crimes and factors that gave rise for international 
police co-operation  
As stated by Rebollo Delgado, regulation emerges from already existing conflict or 
social necessity.24 Thus, the state’s response to any new criminal phenomenon is 
also re-active, i.e. First it occurs and only then legal, organisational, technical and 
other necessary measures to combat it and to prevent its recurrence in society are 
taken. One of the latest examples in this respect is cybercrime that only originated 
with the introduction of the World Wide Web which besides leading to enormous 
facilitation of communications, became a tool of unfair trade, access to information 
or accounts belonging to other persons, radicalization and other criminal offences. 
25 As stated in in the report published by the Computer Science and 
                                                        
22  See MADSEN, Frank G., Transnational Organised Crime (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 65.  
23  See LLORENTE SÁNCHEZ-ARJONA, Mercedes, Las garantías procesales en el espacio europeo de 
justicia penal (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2014), p. 76. 
24  See REBOLLO DELGADO, Lucrecio, Vida privada y protección de datos en la Unión Europea 
(Madrid: Dykinson S.L., 2008), p. 83.  
25  The first computer-related infringements of privacy appeared in the sixties, but were a matter of 
civil and public rather than criminal law. In the seventies computer manipulation, sabotage, 
espionage became known and in the eighties – illegal copies of soft-ware, music and movies. But 
the development of Internet computer networks in the nineties became really attractive for those 
offering illegal or harmful content, radicalisation, gambling, etc. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
Organised crime in Europe: the threat of cybercrime (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 
2005), p. 84-85. 
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Telecommunications Board of the USA in 1991, “The modern thief can steal more 
with a computer than with a gun.”26 
The same philosophy can be applied to international co-operation, where first a 
need occurs and then corresponding measures are developed. Besides, such a need 
or a reason must be very significant and co-operation indispensable in order to 
convince independent countries to take common measures that could, to some 
extent, affect their sovereignty. 
The most general clue about the reasons for co-operation tools is given by Albrecht 
who has stated that “First of all terrorism, then drugs and finally transnational or 
international crime gave an impulse to the demand to strengthen police co-
operation.”27  
Before continuing the analysis, the terms “transnational” and “international crime” 
deserve a special mention. In this thesis the theory that transnational and 
international crime are different terms with different content will be followed. 
Thus international crime will be understood as crime foreseen in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court,28 i.e. Genocide, crime against humanity, war 
crime and crime of aggression.29 The international community considers these 
crimes to be violations the highest values of mankind and expresses global interest 
to repress them. Some authors (Cassese, Vacas Fernández, Johnson, Sandoz, 
Bianchi, Naqui30) believe that some forms of terrorism and torture also have to be 
treated as international crime as they are included as subcategories of four 
international crimes covered by the Rome Statute.31  
                                                        
26  COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, “Computers at Risk: Safe 
Computing in the Information Age”, The National Academies Press, 1991, accessed January 21, 
2015, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1581.  
27  ALBRECHT, Hans-Jörg (translation GUERRERO PERALTA, Oscar Julián). Criminalidad 
transnacional, comercio y lavado de dinero (Bogota: Universidad externado de Colombia, 2001), p. 
40. 
28  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-
4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf. 
29  See Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
30 See CASSESE, Antionio, International Criminal Law (2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 11-13; BANTEKAS, Ilias and NASH, Susan, International Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 1-21; 
VACAS FERNÁNDEZ, Félix, El terrorismo como crimen internacional. Definición, naturaleza y 
consecuencias jurídicas internacionales para las personas (Valencia: Tirant lo blanch, 2011), 
p. 254–255; SANDOZ, Yves, “Lutte contre le terrorisme et droit international: risques et 
opportunités” in Revue suisse de droit internationale et de droit européen, 2002, No. 2, p. 347; 
PAULUSSEN, Christophe, “Impunity for international terrorists? Key legal questions and practical 
considerations” (research paper, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012), p. 7, 
accessed 21 January, 2015, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Paulussen-Impunity-April-
2012.pdf. 
31  For instance torture as an element of crime against humanity (Article 7(1)f) as well as of crime of 
war (Article 8(2)a(ii). Terrorism is not directly mentioned in the Rome Statute, but Vacas 
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Besides negotiating the draft of the Rome Statute, the proposal to endow the 
International Criminal Court with jurisdiction on terrorism had been considered; 
but finally, due to strong opposition from some countries, Belgium, Brazil , France, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United States of America, for 
example, it was left aside.32 
Some international treaties establish other crimes (explicitly providing with their 
elements) that have to be criminalised in the national law of participating states. 
One of the best known examples is organised crime established by the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.33 Some authors (like 
Bassiouni, Bantekas and Nash) ascribe them to international crimes, equally as 
those established by the Rome Statute34. Nevertheless, in this research they will be 
understood in line with Madson’s explanation that those crimes that cross the 
border of one country are transnational (or cross-border) and require measures of 
global governance, but it does not convert them into international crimes in the 
sense of the Rome Statute.35  
This research will focus on transnational or cross-border crime that affects more 
than one state by its preparation, direction or commission, by involvement of 
international organised crime36 as well as by nationality of active and passive 
subjects or proliferation of the effects of crime.37  
2.1. Reasons for the rise in co-operation within the 
European Communities 
Although the original policies of the European Communities had not included 
security and justice topics and were purely oriented to post-war economic growth 
and the development of Europe, some global and regional factors as well as socially 
important events impelled its Members to start co-operation in these matters, and 
to adjust it to socially determined necessities. Over 40 years, an evolution took 
place from an informal agreement through an intergovernmental one and finally 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Fernández understands that it could have consequences foreseen in its Article 7, for instance such 
as assassination, grave deprivation of liberty or other inhuman acts. See VACAS FERNÁNDEZ, 
Félix,  El terrorismo como crimen internacional..., op. cit., p. 223.  
32  Ibid, p. 60. 
33  United Nations, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20 
Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. 
34  BASSIOUNI, Cherif, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley, New York: Transnational 
Publisher, Inc., 2003), p. 114-118. 
35  MADSEN Frank G., Transnational Organised Crime, op. cit., p. 95. 
36  Article 3(2) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime provides 
with the comprehensive definition of transnational crime.  
37  See PÉREZ MARÍN, María Ángeles, La lucha contra la criminalidad en la Unión Europea (Barcelona: 
Atelier, 2013), p. 204. 
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with the Treaty of Lisbon became supranational (for information in relation to the 
development of the European legal basis for co-operation, see the following 
subsection). 
Circumstances that urged Member States of the European Community towards 
closer co-operation can be conditionally divided into three groups that are 
presented below. 
2.1.1. Socially relevant milestones  
The first informal and intergovernmental forum for co-operation on security 
between some Member States of the European Communities was created in 1975; 
this was as a consequences of the terrorist attack during the Olympic Games in 
Munich on 4th September 1972, and other threats of terrorism that had occurred 
in Europe: partly coming from the Middle East and partly activities of national-
based terrorist groups. Even if the latest case seems to be a purely national 
problem, a tendency to co-operation among terrorist groups from different 
Western countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom) in sharing intelligence, preparing attacks, procurement of arms and even 
training had been observed.38  
At the European Council of Rome on 1st–2nd December 1975, at the proposal of 
the United Kingdom, it was agreed that “Community ministers for the Interior (or 
Ministers with similar responsibilities) should meet to discuss matters coming 
within their competence, in particular with regard to law and order.”39  
This informal co-operation forum was named TREVI Group which is an acronym 
(in French) for terrorism, radicalism, extremism and international violence.40 
In parallel, the President of France, Giscard d’Estaing, proposed the creation of an 
area of judicial co-operation in criminal matters, based on simplified extradition 
procedure, transmission of penal procedures, recognition of judicial decisions and 
common rules for transmission of detainees between the Member States. Since 
1984 Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs have met twice a year to deal with 
                                                        
38  See MITSILEGAS, Valsamis; MONAR, Jörg and REES, Wyn, The European Union and Internal 
Security..., op. cit., p. 22. 
39  Summary of the Conclusions of the Meeting of the European Council held in Rome on 1 and 2 of 
December, 1975, accessed September 20, 2013, http://aei.pitt.edu/1407/. 
40  In some sources TREVI firstly is associated with the famous Trevi fountain of Rome (where the 
Council took place). See MITSILEGAS, Valsamis; MONAR, Jörg and REES, Wyn, The European 
Union and Internal Security..., op. cit., p. 23. 
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matters of police, judicial and customs co-operation and free movement of 
persons.41 
At the same time, Europe faced a problem of increased consumption of heroin, LSD 
and cocaine as a result of drug trafficking. This situation per se carried a cross-
border element and needed a coordinated international response both within and 
outside the European Community.42  
More than two decades later, other terrorist attacks (11th September 2001 in the 
United States, intensified after the attacks of 11th March 2004 in Madrid and 7th 
July 2005 in London) had created social and security shocks to both society and 
security organisations, and impelled a more active EU approach to the speeding up 
of judicial and police co-operation and information exchange. 
2.1.2. Global factors facilitating criminal activities 
Rapid development of financial markets became a great opportunity for many 
enterprises and entrepreneurs. But fast movement of big amounts of money 
around the world also meant great opportunities for rapid and well-masked 
money laundering with an estimation of one billion every day.43  
Financial Action Task Force, founded in 1989 by G-7 estimated that in the late 
nineties, in the USA and Europe alone, laundered money accounted for around 2% 
of global GDP (US$ 0.34 trillion). 
Almost ten years later, the International Monetary Fund calculated that money 
laundering accounted for between 2 and 5% of global GDP and had resulted in the 
following money equivalents: in 1996 between US$ 0.6 and 1.5 trillion; in 2005, 
between US$ 0.9 and 2.3 trillion and in 2009, between US$ 1.2 and 2.9 trillion.44 
On the other hand, new technologies of transportation and political commitment to 
free or facilitated trade enabled organised crime to carry out its usual activity of 
                                                        
41  See G. VIADA, Natacha. Derecho penal y globalización. Cooperación penal internacional (Madrid: 
Marcial Pons, 2009), p. 118-119; MORENO CATENA, Víctor and CASTILLEJO MANZANARES, 
Raquel, La persecución de los delitos en el Convenio de Schengen (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 1999), 
p. 13. 
42  On international level co-operation in combatting drug trafficking began with the establishment 
of International Opium Commission in 1909. See more. MADSEN Frank G., Transnational 
Organised Crime, op. cit., p. 27-28.  
43  VLASSIS, Dimitri, “The Global situation of transnational organized crime, the decision of the 
international community to develop an international convention and the negotiation process”, in 
Resource Material Series, 2002, no. 59, p. 476.  
44  See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, “Estimating Illicit Financial Flows 
Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crimes: Research Report 
(Vienna, October 2011)”, p. 18-19, accessed September 20, 2013, 
www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_ financial_flows_2011_web.pdf. 
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smuggling much more effectively and in more sophisticated ways; as Felsen and 
Kalaitzidis stated, “it heightened cross-border linkages and made national frontiers 
seem more permeable than ever.”45 
Taking advantage of this situation at the beginning of the 1990s organised crime 
changed significantly and became much more transnational in nature. As pointed 
out by Reinares and Resa, “This type of organised crime has three basic differences 
with respect to previous manifestations of the phenomenon: it tends to operate at 
a regional or global level, mobilizing extensive cross-border connections and, 
above all, has the ability to challenge both national and international authorities.”46  
Geopolitical changes caused by the end of the Cold War and the start of the Balkan 
War also had a significant influence on the augmentation of organised crime. These 
circumstances gave raise to new criminal organisations involved in illegal 
migration, the trafficking of human beings, illegal sale of arms as well as 
integration of criminal elements into politics and economies.47  
Free movement not only has its physical dimension, but its virtual dimensions as 
well. As already mentioned, the last decades were marked with the development 
and increase in the use of cyber space for criminal purposes. In addition to 
commissioning such crimes as malware, phishing, data breach and network 
attacks, child sexual exploitation online, payment fraud, attacks on critical 
infrastructure, the Internet is used “as a communication tool, information source, 
marketplace, recruiting ground and financial service.”48 It facilitates authors of 
crimes to remain more anonymous, to conceal criminal deeds, to eliminate traces 
or evidences and to reduce investigative capacities of competent authorities.49 
                                                        
45  FELSEN, David and KALAITZIDIS, Akis, “A Historical Overview of Transnational Crime” in 
REICHEL, Philip, Handbook of transnational crime and justice (California: Sage Publications, Inc., 
2005), p. 12.  
46  REINARES, Fernando and RESA, Carlos, “Transnational organized crime as an increasing threat to 
the national security of democratic regimes: assessing political impacts and evaluating state 
responses”, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1997, p. 6, accessed February 1, 2015, 
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/reinares.pdf. 
47  See FELSEN, David and KALAITZIDIS, Akis. “A Historical Overview of Transnational…”, loc. cit., 
p. 13-15. 
48  EUROPOL, “OCTA 2011: EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment”, p. 45, accessed September 26, 
2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/octa-2011-eu-organised-crime-
threat-assesment-1465. 
49  See exceptionally comprehensive information on this topic in VALLÉS CAUSADA, Luís Manuel, La 
Policía judicial en la obtención de inteligencia sobre comunicaciones electrónicas para el proceso 
penal. (PHd diss., National Distance Education University, 2012), p. 32-35, accessed March 20, 
2015, http://e-spacio.uned.es/fez/eserv/tesisuned:Derecho-Lmvalles/Documento.pdf. 
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2.1.3. Side effects of the internal policies  
Crime rates in the EU between 1990 and 2001 in the same number of Member 
States rose by 20.9% from 20,734,870 crimes to 25,061,214. Of course, part of this 
can be due to the changes of national Penal Codes and the criminalisation of some 
acts, but not to this extent.50 Thus there are other factors influencing such a 
criminality rate. 
Global factors related to free trade and open financial markets made even stronger 
influence in the European Communities due to the creation of the internal market 
and the introduction of the single currency. In this respect, Occhipinti states that 
“As European leaders hastened their preparations for “E-Day”, so too did 
organized-crime groups, especially potential money launderers, armoured-car and 
safe robbers, and counterfeiters.”51 
The single currency eliminated a need to exchange money received from criminal 
activities in order to circulate said money in other Member States. Furthermore, 
the 500-euro note had become one of the highest-value internationally circulating 
notes and it facilitated cash laundering and, as indicated by Europol’s EU 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment OCTA 2011, “Due to overwhelming evidence 
that the 500 euro note is almost exclusively the preserve of criminals, banknote 
wholesalers have stopped supplying the note in the UK: however, it remains legal 
tender.”52 
Abolishment of internal border controls and free movement of people and goods 
also meant the abolishment of obstacles and risks to moving criminal activities to 
other Member States, as well as allowing the free circulation of criminals, either to 
commit crime or to hide from the law enforcement and justice authorities of other 
Member States were crime had been committed. As defines Storbeck, the EU has 
become “fertilising territory for criminality”.53 In this way, at the beginning of the 
nineties a big “migration” of Italian organised crime was noticed in Germany and 
Austria. At the same time in Belgium, it was found that almost half of organised 
groups had contacts with organised crime in neighbouring countries. 
                                                        
50  See SERRANO GÓMEZ, Alfonso and Vázquez GONZÁLEZ, Carlos, Tendencias de la criminalidad y 
percepción social de la inseguridad ciudadana en España y la Unión Europea (Madrid: Edisofer S.L, 
2007), p. 126.  
 Although Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Communities in 1995, the figures 
from 1990 include crime rates from these countries as well.  
51  OCCHIPINTI, John D., The Politics of EU Police cooperation. Towards a European FBI? (Colorado, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 120. 
52  EUROPOL, “OCTA 2011: EU Organised Crime…”, loc. cit., p. 42.  
53  STORBECK, Jürgen, “La cooperación policial europea”, loc. cit., p. 156. 
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In addition to the internationalisation of organised crime, another phenomenon 
called mobile criminality arose as a result of the free movement of people and 
goods. Even if it made an impression of being less dangerous than organised crime, 
it directly affects the everyday life of European citizens and “There is an inverse 
correlation between the seriousness and the incidence of victimisation.”54 
A positive democratisation processes in Central and Eastern Europe had also had 
its negative effect on the European Communities as the restructuring of heavy 
industry, an “engine of communist block”, had left a lot of people without work and 
vulnerable to criminal influence. That led to the gathering in organised groups, 
illegal entrance to the European Community or just tolerance of the black market. 
New democracies with new economic changes and imperfect laws also allowed 
assets of criminal activities to be laundered through the privatisation of public 
property and conversion into legal businesses, with the desire to set up them in 
more stable and safer European Communities. On the other hand, new states were 
also in need of foreign capital and this opportunity was widely used to legalise 
western criminal proceeds. 
All these factors contributed to the establishment of international co-operation 
and of common measure within the Member States of the European Community 
(and later, the European Union) against terrorism and crime. 
2.2. The current situation 
Just as time and evolution do not stand still, crime phenomenon is also changing 
and transforming into more sophisticated forms and new threats. Consequently, it 
is analysed and evaluated by competent authorities: at international level, the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and in, the EU – Europol. 
As revealed by Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment from 2010, 
trafficking in human beings annually means 70,000 victims and a profit of US$ 3 
billion in smuggling migrants – US$ 6,75 billion, drug trafficking – US$ 105 billion, 
trafficking in natural resources – over US$ 3,5 billion, trafficking in arms –US$53 
million, product counterfeiting –US$ 9,6 billion, maritime piracy - US$ 100 million, 
cybercrime – US$ 1,25 billion.55 
                                                        
54  BENYON, John, “Policing the European Union: The Changing Basis of Cooperation on Law 
Enforcement” in International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), July 1994, 
vol. 70, no. 3, p. 500.  
55  See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, “The Globalization of Crime. A 
Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assesment. 2010”, p. 16-17, accessed September 27, 
2013, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_ 
res.pdf. 
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As these criminal activities generate such high profits, they are under constant 
development: change modus operandi, use of new technologies and other 
opportunities. This means that they will not disappear, but become more 
elaborate.56  
SOCTA 2013, reveals increasing internationality of organised crime and “Criminals 
act undeterred by geographic boundaries and can no longer be easily associated 
with specific regions or centres of gravity”.57 From an estimated 3,600 organised 
groups, 70% are multinational, and 30 % are involved in multiple crime areas.58  
In comparison with the previous situation, this is a novelty, because even five years 
ago, organised crime in the EU was more of a regional phenomenon. Thus earlier 
Europol reports revealed the existence of regional hubs within the EU. For 
instance, Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2009 revealed 5 hubs: 
North-West, South-West, North-East, Southern, and South-East and their 
“specialisation” in some crimes.59 
Among actual crime-relevant factors, SOCTA 2013 distinguished: 
 The economic crisis (that does not increase crime rates, but transforms 
them into other types, such as counterfeiting of daily consumer goods). 
 Social tolerance to some crimes, such as consumption of psychoactive 
substances, purchase of counterfeited goods. 
 Transportation and logistical hotspots that facilitate any type of 
transportation both within and outside the EU. 
 The use of diaspora communities across the EU to facilitate irregular 
migration, property crime as well as entrance into countries’ markets and 
legal business. 
 Corruption with attempts (and some of them successful) to infiltrate 
organised crime into public and private sectors, to obtain information and 
to make beneficiary manipulations. 
 Internet and e-commerce as a place for the circulation of illicit 
commodities.60 
                                                        
56  Ibid, p. 1. 
57  EUROPOL, “EU Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA 2013)”, p. 45, accessed 
September 30, 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/eu-serious-and-organised-crime-
threat-assessment-socta. 
58  Ibid, p. 33. 
59  EUROPOL, “OCTA 2009: EU Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment”, p. 13-14, accessed 
September 30, 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/octa-2009-eu-
organised-crime-threat-assessment-1463. 
60  EUROPOL, “EU Serious Organised Crime…”, loc. cit., p. 11-19. 
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With respect to terrorism, during recent years, the threat fostered by Al Qaeda 
became even stronger with the pronouncement of the Islamic State; as the threat is 
both outside and inside Western Countries, and as Jenkins reveals, “The current 
cohort of jihadist volunteers may differ from previous cohorts in the level of their 
commitment to jihadist ideology and their attraction to unlimited violence as a 
motive for volunteering, as well as in the level of military skills they may 
acquire.”61  
According to TE-SAT 2014 elaborated by Europol, “AQ [Al Qaeda] and IS [Islamic 
State] retained their capability to recruit jihadists from Europe, intensifying the 
threat posed to the EU. In 2014, Member States also reported an increase in 
women and children travelling to the region. This phenomenon may eventually 
lead to the emergence of a new generation of jihadist terrorists in Europe. The 
number of fighters that have returned to the EU has increased.62  
It also indicates that the risk of being kidnapped (especially when travelling to 
West Africa or the Middle East) has increased, especially taking into account such 
declaration as those of Al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri that in 2012 
encouraged the kidnapping of “British, French, Italian or US citizens [...] with a 
view to influencing negotiations regarding prisoners in Afghanistan.”63 In 2013, 22 
EU citizens were kidnapped in risk areas, a third of them – journalists.64  
An IOCTA carried out at the end of September 2015 by the European Cybercrime 
Center revealed that “Cybercrime is becoming more aggressive and 
confrontational. Various forms of extortion requiring little technical skills suggest 
changes in the profile of cybercrime offenders, and increase the psychological 
impact on victims.”65  
                                                        
61  JENKINS, Brian Michael, “When Jihadis Come Marching Home. The Terrorist Threat Posed by 
Westerners Returning from Syria and Iraq” (Perspective, RADN Corporation, 2014), p. 2, 
accessed August 3, 2015, http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE130-1.html. 
62  EUROPOL, “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015”, p. 6, accessed August 10, 2015, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-
2015. 
63  EUROPOL, “TE-SAT 2014 - European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014”, p. 24, 
accessed August 10, 2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2014-european-
union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2014. 
64  Ibid. 
65  EUROPOL, “The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2015”, p. 45, accessed 
October 9, 2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/internet-organised-crime-threat-
assessment-iocta-2015. 
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3. The legal framework of police cooperation within 
the EU  
Since its origin in 1975, police and judicial co-operation had been out of the formal 
framework of the European Communities for around 20 years. 
For the first time, the notion of public security was mentioned in the Community 
legislation in the Solemn Declaration on the European Union66, signed on 19th June 
1983, including as one of its objectives (but still in the form of intergovernmental 
co-operation) “A common analysis and concerted action to deal with international 
problems of law and order, serious acts of violence, organized international crime 
and international lawlessness generally.”67 
Judicial and police co-operation has obtained greater relevance in the Single 
European Act since it was signed on 17th February 198668, when it received the 
role of compensatory measure for the establishment of the internal market of the 
Community. 
As pointed out by Moreno Catena, the Treaty of Maastricht signed on 7th February 
1992 had gone beyond the pure economic idea of the old European Economic 
Community, and bet on the integration policy, making the EU something more than 
a common market and including the Second and the Third Pillars (common 
security as well as police and judicial co-operation). 69 Different from the First 
Pillar (supranational nature of common market), the Second and the Third Pillars 
were driven by the principles of intergovernmental co-operation, meaning 
different legislation, supervision and implementation procedures. 
The intergovernmental and non-supranational nature of these Pillars is related to 
their previously discussed relationship with sovereignty, and as explained by 
Walker, “The longstanding macro-political distinction between those who are 
more or less reluctant to cede authority to the European level tends to be 
reinforced and highlighted in a policy area – internal security – which is a 
traditional preserve of the state, and, indeed, which many would see as part of [...] 
the indispensable raison d’être – of state sovereignty.”70  
                                                        
66  Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 6/1983, p. 24-29. 
67  Ibid, p. 25. 
68  OJ L 169, 29.6.1987, p. 1-19. 
69  See MORENO CATENA, Víctor, “El cambio de paradigma d el principio de reconocimiento mutuo y 
sus implicaciones. Perspectivas del Tratado de Lisboa” in CARMONA RUANO, Miguel; GONZÁLEZ 
VEGA, Ignacio U. and MORENO CATENA, Víctor, Cooperación Judicial Penal…, op. cit., p. 43-44.  
70  WALKER, Neil, “In Search of the Area of Freedom, security and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey” 
in WALKER, Neil, Europe’s Area of Freedom, security and Justice (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2004), p. 16. 
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Thus according to Article K.3 (2), of the Treaty of Maastricht, Member States were 
enabled to propose joint positions or joint action and conventions to prevent and 
combat terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of 
international crime. To ensure that none of the Member States can be overruled by 
the rest, a unanimous decision for all mentioned legal acts was required and in the 
case of conventions - also ratification by each Member State according to its 
national rules. The only exceptions to this rule are measures that implement 
conventions and they are adopted by the qualified majority of Member States 
(unless otherwise provided in the convention that is subject to implementation). 
At that time, the role of the European Parliament in the Third Pillar was limited to 
consultation on the principal aspects of activities and taking its opinion “into 
consideration” by the Council of the EU.71 
The Treaty of Maastricht has foreseen the minimum regulation of the Third Pillar 
and was quite insufficient in its proper development. It was criticised by WALKER 
as “the AFSJ [Area of Freedom, security and Justice], even if part of its initial 
Maastricht inspiration was the attempt to supply a menu of compensatory 
measures concerning the control of movements across the EU’s external borders 
and the development of new capacities for the internal monitoring of populations 
[...], has no finalité other than continuing adherence to a highly abstract 
triumvirate of values.”72 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2nd October 1997, introduced significant 
modifications to the Third Pillar that allowed progress in this area. As noticed 
Fazekas “A great leap forward has been taken in the area of cooperation. Perhaps 
not the legislative aspect is the most important outcome here, but the fact that a 
common way of thinking and acting became accepted at a Union level regarding 
issues of internal security.”73 
First of all, its scope in justice and home affairs was changed into a “broader 
project of establishing an area of Freedom, security and Justice (AFSJ) throughout 
the EU”74 meaning the establishment of balance between security, justice and 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Secondly, the former Third Pillar’s areas of asylum, internal borders, migration and 
co-operation in civil matters were all moved to the First Pillar (i.e. Under 
                                                        
71  Article K.6 of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
72  WALKER, Neil, “In Search of the Area of Freedom …”, loc. cit., p. 5. 
73  FAZEKAS, Judit, “Development of Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation between 2004 and 2009 
in the European Union” in European Integration Studies, 2009, vol. 7, no 1, p. 8. 
74  LONGO, Francesca, “Justice and Home Affairs as a New Dimension of the European Security 
Concept” in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2013, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 39. 
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supranational regulation), remaining under the intergovernmental co-operation of 
the Third Pillar only areas of police and judicial co-operation. 
Thirdly, the legislative procedure of the Third Pillar underwent important 
modifications. 
As had been foreseen in Article K.6 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, acting 
unanimously on the initiative of any Member State or of the Commission, the 
Council could adopt common positions, framework decisions,75 decisions76 and 
conventions. New regulation laid down that every draft framework decision, 
decision and convention should undergo consultation with the European 
Parliament, although in practice its opinion has been taken into account only few 
times. The Commission was given the right to take the initiative in developing 
policy in this Pillar. 
The need for the Council’s unanimity resulted in a loss of ambitious content of 
many legislative initiatives due to the different interests of Member States. In many 
cases, the initial legal drafts with comprehensive regulation for the European 
police and judicial co-operation at the end of consensus, were converted into 
“light” co-operation instruments, in order not to modify national legislations or to 
make minimum of them.77  
The Third Pillar in general was without effective control of the European 
Commission and European Court of Justice, i.e., the European Commission did not 
have the competence to start infringement procedures for non-implementation or 
erroneous implementation by the Member States Communities’ instruments; 
additionally, the Court of Justice had had very limited jurisdiction in this area. Thus 
Article K.3 (2)c of the Treaty of Maastricht foresaw the competence of the Court of 
Justice only to interpret provisions of conventions adopted within the EU, and to 
rule on any disputes regarding their application, but only if expressly foreseen in 
them. 
Article K.7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam also prevised the “peculiar ad hoc system 
whereby the member states had to opt in to judicial control by the ECJ”78 meaning 
that any Member State could make a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice in order to give preliminary rulings on the validity and 
                                                        
75  In order to approximate laws and regulations of Member States. 
76  For any purpose consistent with judicial and police co-operation, excluding approximation of 
laws and regulations that shall take the form of framework decisions.  
77  See Chapter V “Swedish Initiative”. 
78  GUILD, Elspeth and GEYER, Florian, “Introduction: The Search for EU Criminal Law – Where is it 
Headed?” in GUILD, Elspeht and GEYER, Florian (eds.) Security versus Justice? Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), p. 6. 
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interpretation of framework decisions.79 Nevertheless, the question of what effect 
decisions of validity would have on other Member States which had not made such 
a declaration still stood. Could they apply a framework decision recognised as 
invalid and not applied in other Member State?  
By the Treaty of Amsterdam, on the initiative of Member States (but not the 
Commission, as in other areas), the Court of Justice has been endowed to review 
the legality80 of framework decisions and decisions in general, in order to solve 
disputes between Member States on the interpretation or the application of 
common positions, framework decisions, decisions and conventions as well as 
between Member States and the Commission in cases of application of 
conventions. 
Regarding information exchange, Article K.2(9) of the Treaty of Maastricht had 
only envisaged the creation of the Union wide information exchange system 
Europol. The Treaty of Amsterdam was more comprehensive on this issue, stating 
in Article K.2 that common actions within police co-operation should include “the 
collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, 
including information held by law enforcement services on reports on suspicious 
financial transactions, in particular through Europol, subject to appropriate 
provisions on the protection of personal data.”81 
Thus the Treaty of Amsterdam had foreseen close co-operation with Europol in 
general, information exchange in particular and establishment within 5 years:  
 Measures allowing the use of Europol’s coordination and support capacity 
in specific investigative activities (such as joint investigation teams),  
 Europol’s right to ask Member States to conduct and coordinate their 
investigations when the case, the same organised group or other aspect 
involves investigations or operational activities of more than one Member 
State. 
 Development of Europol’s specific expertise to assist Member States in 
investigating cases of organised crime. 
                                                        
79  See VILABOY LOIS, Lotario, “El sistema jurisdiccional comunitario”. In MARIÑO, Fernando M.; 
MORENO CATENA, Víctor and MOREIRO, Carlos, Derecho procesal comunitario (Valencia: Tirant lo 
Blanch, 2001), p. 39-42.  
80  As a result of a lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirements, 
infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. 
81  OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 17. 
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By the Protocol on the location of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies 
and departments of the European Communities and of Europol82 of the latter 
Treaty, political steps were taken by establishing Europol’s seat in The Hague. 
Articles K.15-K.17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam also envisaged a close co-operation 
procedure (as a tool to avoid the proliferation of cooperation outside the legal 
framework of the EU), that later was modified and developed by the Treaty of 
Nice83 (signed on 26 February 2001) as enhanced co-operation. 
Article 43a of the Treaty of Nice foresaw that “Enhanced cooperation may be 
undertaken only as a last resort, when it has been established within the Council 
that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable 
period by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties.”84  
In such cases, a Member State could address a request to the Commission asking to 
submit a proposal of enhanced co-operation measure to the Council. If the 
Commission refused it, the proposal could be submitted to the Council by at least 8 
Member States. The Council, acting by a qualified majority and after consulting the 
European Parliament, could grant authorisation of enhanced co-operation.85 
The Treaty of Nice did not include any more novelties regarding police co-
operation and information exchange, as its provisions were focused on ensuring 
smooth procedural and institutional functioning of the European Union after its 
significant enlargement by 10 new Member States in 2004. 
Thus for the creation of the area of Freedom, security and Justice, not only legal, 
but also institutional resources were put in place86 and as very well defined by 
Fijnaut, “The hard core of Member State Sovereignty was [...] gradually surrounded 
by the soft shell of the Community institutions.”87 
The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13th December 2007, raising the area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice to the level of supranational co-operation. It meant 
that the former Third Pillar reached its legal consolidation and became a part of 
the shared competence between the EU and Member States where Member States 
can only exercise the competence that is not assigned to the EU, or the latter has 
                                                        
82  OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 112. 
83  Articles 40-44 of the TEU. 
84  OJ C 80, 10.3.2001, p. 12. 
85  Since the Treaty of Lisbon, there is a requirement for at least o 9 Member States (instead of 8) for 
enhanced co-operation. It also modified a procedure of the authorisation of enhanced co-
operation that foresees a need for the consent of the European Parliament instead of its pure 
consultation. See Article 329 of the TFEU. 
86  See ARNÁIZ SERRANO, Amaya, Evolución de la Cooperación Judicial…, op. cit., p. 25.  
87  FIJNAUT, Cyrille, “Police Co-operation and the Area of Freedom, security and Justice” in WALKER, 
Neil,  Europe’s Area of Freedom…, op. cit., p. 244.  
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decided to cease it execution.88 As a consequence, the system of decision-making 
and implementation control was changing “making them subject to proper 
parliamentary and judicial control, in order to improve the balance between 
security and the judicial protection of citizens.”89 
Thus by means of the Treaty of Lisbon, the procedure of consultation in almost all 
areas was substitute by the ordinary procedure (also known as co-decision 
procedure) called by Peers “Two chamber legislation”90, i.e. Approved by the 
European Parliament and a qualified majority of votes in the Council in the form of 
decisions, directives or regulations. 
Articles 69 F and 69 H (Articles 87 and 89 of the consolidated version of the TFEU) 
of the Treaty of Lisbon maintains the procedure of consultation (renamed into 
special legislative procedure) for the measures concerning operational co-
operation as well as for the establishment of the conditions and limitations under 
which the law enforcement authorities of the Member States may operate in the 
territory of another Member State. Article 69 B (article 83 of the consolidated 
version of the TFEU) foresees that acting unanimously, and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, the Council may establish minimum rules on 
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in other areas of crime than those 
foreseen in the Article 69 B (1) part 2. 91  
Regarding the control system, Article 10 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions 
of the Treaty of Lisbon92 foresaw that not later than five years after the date of its 
entry into force, the Commission and the European Court of Justice should apply 
their full competence to the field of police co-operation and judicial co-operation 
in criminal matters, i.e. Infringement procedure and relative sanctions in cases 
of non-transposition, incorrect transposition or non-application of the EU legal 
provisions.93 Thus since 1st December 2014, full EU control mechanism is 
applied to the transposition and implementation of the EU legal instruments. 
                                                        
88  See LLORENTE SÁNCHEZ-ARJONA, Mercedes, “La cooperación judicial penal en el Tratado de 
Lisboa” in DE LOS SANTOS MARTÍN OSTOS, José El Derecho Procesal en el espacio judicial 
Europeo: estudios dedicados al catedrático Faustino Gutiérrez-Alviz y Conradi (Barcelona: Atelier 
Libros S.A., 2013), p. 325.  
89  PIRIS, Jean-Claude. The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 178. 
90  See PEERS, Steve, “Guide to EU decision-making and justice and home affairs after the Treaty of 
Lisbon” (Statewatch publication, December 2010), p. 3, accessed September 14, 2014. 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-115-lisbon-treaty-decision-making.pdf. 
91  See PEERS, Steve, “Guide to EU decision-making and justice…”, loc. cit., p. 3. 
92  Protocol 36 of the consolidated version of the TFEU. OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 322-326. 
93  See PIRIS, Jean-Claude, The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political..., op. cit., p. 188-189. 
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Nevertheless, as with previous Treaties, Article 240b94 of the Treaty of Lisbon 
reiterates that “the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no 
jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by 
the police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State, or the exercise of 
the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.”95 
Article 69 G96 of the Treaty of Lisbon regulates Europol very comprehensively, i.e. 
By establishing its mission, excluding the application of coercive measures from its 
competence, foreseeing that its structure, operation, field of action, tasks, scrutiny 
of its activities shall be established within a new legal basis, adopted in accordance 
with ordinary legislative procedure.97  
As evaluation of modifications introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in relation to 
police and judicial co-operation, the following observations can be made: 
 Changes in the Council’s voting system can allow the approval of more 
ambitious co-operation instruments, even if not all Member States are in 
favour of them; 
 The European Parliament’s full participation in decision making 
introduces more transparency, although during the first years of its 
application, the European Parliament had been somehow “taking revenge” 
for its ignorance over the years in the process of consultation and blocked 
or delayed some initiatives. 
 Application of control measures by the Commission and the Court of 
Justice of the EU ensures better implementation of EU instruments at 
national level.98  
Summing up the trajectory of legal development of the area of Freedom, security 
and Justice and its growing importance, it can be said that it is no less an important 
issue than the introduction of Economic and Monetary Union and a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.99  
                                                        
94  Article 276 of the consolidated version of the TFEU. 
95  OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 110-111. 
96  Article 85 of the consolidated version of the TFEU. 
97  More about the modifications introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon See MARISCAL, Nicolás, Más allá 
de Lisboa: Horizontes europeos (Técnos: Madrid, 2010), p. 174-177. 
98 About unequal implementation read more in Section 2.4 of the Chapter V and “Swedish Initiative” 
and Section 2 of the Chapter VI. 
99  See MITSILEGAS, Valsamis; MONAR, Jörg and REES, Wyn, The European Union and Internal 
Security..., op. cit., p. 6.  
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Nevertheless, some Member States still retain strong defence of sovereignty100 
and try to protect it with different means. For example: 
 Protocols 21 and 22 of the Lisbon Treaty101 entail that Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom will not take part in the adoption of measures 
within the area of Freedom, security and Justice and will not be bound by 
them. Ireland and the United Kingdom maintain the possibility of "opting-
in” by notification addressed to the President of the Council, informing him 
/ her of their wish to participate in the adoption of proposed measures 
within the area of Freedom, security and Justice. Such a declaration has to 
be submitted within 3 months of the presentation of the relevant proposal. 
 Protocol 30102 foresees that no court has competence to analyse whether 
Polish or British legal and administrative provisions are in accordance 
with the provisions of the of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union103 (hereinafter – EU Charter). 
The latest example of state self-protectionism is reflected in deliberations on the 
creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. Member States tend to endow 
it with competence only for the prosecution of criminal offences affecting the 
financial interests of the Union, and not those directly affecting EU citizens such as 
trafficking in human being, terrorism, cybercrime, drug trafficking and child 
pornography. This comes about due to the fear that the establishment of a 
powerful investigation entity would mean weakening the competences of each 
Member State.104  
4. Principle of availability - the cornerstone of 
information exchange 
In addition to the provisions of the primary EU law, establishing the main 
principles and aspects of EU politics, since 1999 the area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice has been developed by following the political guidelines of multiannual 
strategic programmes and their implementation plans. 
After the entrance into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, on 16 October 1999, the 
Presidency Conclusions “Towards a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
                                                        
100  See VON BOGDANY, Armin; CRUZ VILLALÓN, Pedro and M. HUBER, Peter, El Derecho 
Constitucional en el espacio jurídico europeo (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2013), p. 93.  
101  OJ, C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 295-303. 
102 OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 313-314. 
103  OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p. 1-22.  
104  See MORENO CATENA, Víctor, Fiscalía Europea y Derechos fundamentales (Valencia: Tirant lo 
Blanch, 2014), p. 13-14. 
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Tampere Milestones” (hereinafter - Tampere Conclusions) were adopted and 
became the first multiannual programme. Their “jewel in the crown” was the 
establishment of the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and 
judgments as well as pre-trial orders. Besides, they also expanded the institutional 
background of the police and judicial co-operation foreseeing creation of:  
 Eurojust – a unit with the mission to facilitate the coordination of national 
prosecuting authorities and to support criminal investigations of 
organised crime. 
 European Police College (hereinafter – CEPOL) – a unit for the training of 
senior law enforcement officials.105 
With regards to information exchange, it did not include any general guidelines, 
only stressing the need for its exchange between existing financial intelligence 
units and sending operational data from the Member States to Europol. 
The importance of effective cross-border information exchange had become an 
object of political discussion after the terrorist attack of 11th September 2001 in 
the United States and intensified after the attack of 11th March 2004 in Madrid.106 
As Guile states, “These events have allowed many initiatives, which had previously 
encountered many difficulties in their development because of legal challenges, to 
see the light and be implemented in practice.”107 
Thus terrorism had been an accelerator for the constitution of the TREVI group in 
the 1970s’ and after almost 30 years, gave a commencement to a new era of co-
operation and “The "trigger" for formalising the "exchange" of information 
between law enforcement [...]”108 
                                                        
105  Nowadays converted into a training unit for all law enforcement officials, not only senior ones. 
106  See GALÁN MUÑOZ, Alfonso, “La protección de datos de carácter personal en los tratamientos 
destinados a la prevención, investigación y represión de delitos: hacia una nueva orientación de la 
política criminal de la Unión Europea” in COLOMER HERNÁNDEZ, Ignacio and OUBIÑA 
BARBOLLA, Sabela. La transmisión de datos personales en el seno de la cooperación judicial penal y 
policial en al Unión Europea (Navarra: Aranzadi, 2015), p. 45.  
 LEINIUS, Katharina, “An Imbalance between Security and Liberty? An Analysis of Cross-Border 
Information Exchange and Data Protection in the Context of the EU’s Third Pillar since 9/11”. 
(PhD diss, University of Twente, 2009), p. 9-10, accessed May 20, 2013, 
http://essay.utwente.nl/60243/1/BSc_K_Leinius.pdf; GUILLE, Laure, “Policing in Europe: An 
Ethnographic Approach to Understanding the Nature of Cooperation and the Gap between Policy 
and Practice”, in Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 6, no. 2, 2010 p. 257, accessed 
January 30, 2013, http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/192. 
107  GUILLE, Laure, “Policing in Europe: An Ethnographic Approach…”, loc. cit., p. 257. 
108  BUNYAN, Tony, “The “principle of availability”, Statewatch, December 2006, p. 2, accessed January 
26, 2013, http://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved 
=0CCEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.statewatch.org%2Fanalyses%2Fno-59-p-of-a-art.pdf 
&ei=7Jm_VLbDMYWuU9izgoAP&usg=AFQjCNFrlX_0fUkEc9zczWLutuiVFAblgA&bvm=bv.838295
42,d.d24.  
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In less than one month after the attack of 11th March in Madrid, the European 
Council adopted a Declaration on combatting terrorism, emphasising among other 
measures:  
 The simplification of the information and intelligence exchange between 
the law enforcement authorities of the Member States in as extensive 
manner as possible;  
 Reinforcement of Europol;  
 Focus on proactive intelligence;  
 Bringing proposals on the retention of communication traffic data, on the 
exchange of DNA profiles and dactyloscopic data;  
 The establishment of a European criminal records database. 
In May-June of the same year, the Commission presented two communications: 
“Enhancing police and customs co-operation in the European Union”109 and 
“Towards enhancing access to information by law enforcement agencies”.110 
In the first one, the Commission identified six general obstacles for EU wide police 
co-operation: 
 Nature of police work – co-operation is possible as long as its 
arrangements do not encroach on national sovereignty and, as pointed out 
by Andersen, “Professional police agencies were an integral, and 
fundamentally important, part of the building of the sovereign nation state 
in Europe. For the police, whose function requires a simple focus of 
loyalty, this is a difficult legacy to eliminate.”111  
 Lack of strategic approach – as police and judicial co-operation had fallen 
under the Third Pillar, i.e. Intergovernmental co-operation, the Council’s 
Presidency, changing every 6 months had been raising its own priorities 
without proper coherence with the previous or following Presidencies. 
 Proliferation of Council conclusions and recommendations that have 
limited added value, and different interpretations on their obligatory 
nature. 
 Decision making procedures in the Third Pillar – unanimity has made 
legislative process slow at all levels in the Council structures. 
 Insufficient implementation of legal instruments at national level – the 
intergovernmental and not supranational nature of the Third Pillar has 
                                                        
109  COM(2004) 376 final. 
110  COM(2004) 429 final. 
111  ANDERSON, Malcolm, “Trust and Police Co-operation”, in ANDERSEN, Malcolm and APAP, Joanna, 
Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European Borders (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), p. 41.  
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excluded the application of control mechanisms that act as warranties of a 
correct and timely implementation of European instruments. 
 Lack of empirical research in this area.112 
The Commission outlined two axes to improve police and customs co-operation in 
the EU: the flow of information and actual cross-border co-operation. 
Following this path in the following Communication (“Towards enhancing access 
to information by law enforcement agencies”) specific obstacles for information 
exchange were described, for example “Compartmentalisation of information and 
lack of a clear policy on information channels.”113 
The Commission proposed establishing EU Information Policy for law enforcement 
based, first of all, on the improvement of information exchange and secondly to 
introduce the concept of intelligence-led law enforcement at EU level. In order to 
improve information exchange, a principle of equivalent access has been 
introduced as a right of “Access to data and databases within other EU Member 
States on comparable conditions as law enforcement authorities in that Member 
State. The corollary to that right is the obligation to provide access to law 
enforcement officials of other Member States under the same conditions as 
national law enforcement officials.”114 
Although in the introductory part of the communication “Towards enhancing 
access to information by law enforcement agencies”, the Commission referred to 
the Council’s Declaration on Combatting Terrorism, the proposed scope of the 
principle of equivalent access to information went beyond the fight against 
terrorists and includes serious and organised crime.115 It can be explained by two 
reasons: 
a) The high probability of links between terrorism and organised crime; 
b) Reference to Article K.2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam to information 
exchange is not limited to fighting against terrorism, but to common 
actions on the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of 
relevant information for law enforcement purposes. 
The Commission’s proposal “saw daylight” and political support in the second 
multiannual strategic programme – The Hague Programme that established the 
principle of information availability, applicable from 2008 onwards. 
                                                        
112  COM(2004) 376 final, p. 36-40. 
113  COM(2004) 429 final, p. 3. 
114  COM(2004) 429 final, p. 7. 
115  And even more than that, the Commission has envisaged that “[...] it should be borne in mind 
that often criminal activity that would not appear to come within the category of “serious or 
organised” can well lead or be connected to it”, COM(2004) 376 final, p. 4. 
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Equally to the principle of equivalent access, availability has converted the 
voluntary nature of transmitting of information into “Obligation to fulfil the 
information requests of other Member States.”116 
In this way it promoted a “space favouring the collectivisation of data”117 as 
information became a property of all the authorities that need it in fighting 
criminal offences118 and “the sociological norms regulating the practices of 
repressive authorities among themselves”119 were changed. 
Although, as Cabezudo Bajo points out, following the idea of the Commission, the 
principle of availability means direct on-line access to the information,120 the 
Hague Programme does not mention it explicitly, leaving a question of access form 
open for further discussion. 
Differently from the principle of equivalent access proposed by the Commission, 
the principle of availability is led by the list of conditions based on rational and 
necessary striking the balance between security and privacy. Thus The Hague 
Programme established that: 
 Information is exchanged only in order to perform legal tasks of law 
enforcement;  
 The warranty of the integrity of the exchanged data shall be applied;  
 Protection of information sources and confidentiality of data at all stages 
of data processing shall be ensured;  
 Common technical and access standards shall be introduced;  
 Data protection shall be controlled;  
 Protection of individuals from abuse of data shall be provided;  
                                                        
116  ACED FÉLEZA, Emilio, “Principio de Disponibilidad y protección de datos en el ámbito policial” in 
Noticias Jurídicas, April 1, 2010, accessed September 25, 2013, http://noticias. 
juridicas.com:8080/articulos/15-Derecho-Administrativo/322-principio-de-disponibilidad-y-
proteccin-de-datos-en-el-mbito-policial-.html.  
117  BIGO, Didier; BRUGGEMAN, Willy; BURGESS, Peter et al., “The principle of information 
availability”, Challenge Liberty & Security, 2007, accessed January 26, 2013, 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1376.html.  
118  See BONN, Marjorie, “EL Programa de La Haya. El espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia en la 
Unión Europea” in ARROYO ZAPATERO, Luis and NIETO MARTÍN, Adán, El Derecho Penal de la 
Unión Europea. Situación actual y perspectivas de futuro (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha: 
Cuenca, 2007), p. 34; BIGO, Didier; BRUGGEMAN, Willy, BURGESS, Peter et al. “The principle of 
information availability”, loc. cit.; NIETO MARTÍN, Adán, “Modelos de organización del sistema 
europea de Derecho penal” in ARROYO ZAPATERO, Luis and NIETO MARTÍN, Adán. El Derecho 
Penal de la Unión…, loc. cit., p. 170. 
119  BIGO, Didier; BRUGGEMAN, Willy, BURGESS, Peter et al. “The principle of information availability”, 
loc. cit. 
120  CABEZUDO BAJO, María José, “La protección de datos personales tratados en el marco de la 
cooperación policial y judicial en materia penal”. In DE LA OLIVA SANTOS, Andrés (dir.); 
AGUILERA MORALES, Marien and CUBILLO LÓPEZ, Ignacio (coord.), La Justicia y la Carta de 
Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea (Madrid: COLEX, 2008), p. 328.  
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 The right to seek correction of incorrect data shall be assured.121 
The principle of availability became a cornerstone for police co-operation122 in a 
similar manner to the principle of mutual recognition, established by the Tampere 
Conclusions, for judicial co-operation123 and “The general political and practical 
guideline for the exchange of law enforcement information in the European 
Union.”124 Although some scholars, for example Ruggeri, say that availability 
derives from mutual recognition as free movement of data and information is a 
variation of the principle of mutual recognition.125 In this respect, it can be said 
that both the principle of mutual recognition and the principle of availability have 
a common denominator – the free movement across state borders of elements. 
Which, during long periods of time, were considered as reflections of national 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the nature of the recognition of judicial decisions in 
other Member States, and access to information, is different as in the first case, 
Member States are asked to recognise the results of foreign judicial processes and 
to execute them, and in the second case they are asked to “open” their deposits of 
information for foreign use. 
For its implementation, the Commission has adopted an action plan “The Hague 
Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for European 
renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice”126 foreseeing fourteen 
measures for the improvement of information exchange, in particular: a general 
legal basis to implement the principle of availability, relevant data protection 
framework, mechanism on the use of passengers’ data for law enforcement 
purposes (both at EU level as well as with the third countries, such as the United 
States of America, Canada, and so on ), instruments on mutual consultation of DNA 
and fingerprint databases. 
Despite the political boost for information exchange, two years later Bruggeman 
noticed that, “A lack of confidence [...] still blocks the exchange of information and 
raises questions concerning the protection of privacy in the use of the many 
electronic databases with personal data. Transnational crime often moves easily 
                                                        
121  See OJ C 53, 3.3.2005, p. 8. 
122  See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPEAN 
PUBLIC LAW ORGANIZATION, “Study on the status of information…”, loc. cit., p. 35.  
123  Ibid. 
124  Council document 10333/12. 
125  RUGGERI, Stefano, “La transmisión de datos personales en cooperación judicial penal y policial en 
la UE. La perspectiva italiana” in COLOMER HERNÁNDEZ, Ignacio and OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, 
Sabela, La transmisión de datos personales…, op. cit., p. 280.  
126  COM(2005) 184 final.  
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across internal borders, while police and justice still hardly provide an effective 
and common approach.”127 
Five years later, the deadline of implementation of the principle of availability was 
not met because of the slow decision making process, delays with some proposals 
on the part of the Commission, information protectionism by some Member States, 
sensitivity to some issues. 
Thus the principle of availability had not lost its relevance and was reiterated in 
later strategic documents: 
 The Stockholm Programme of 2009 pointed out that the principle of 
availability will continue to give important impetus to the flow of 
information and acknowledged “the need for coherence and consolidation 
in developing information management and exchange.”128  
 The European Council Conclusions of 26-27 June 2014 (approved instead 
of new multiannual strategic programme)129 reiterated that reinforced 
exchanges of information between the authorities of the Member States is 
required and that “intensifying operational cooperation while using the 
potential of Information and Communication Technologies’ innovations, 
enhancing the role of the different EU agencies and ensuring the strategic 
use of EU funds will be key.”130  
According to the Stockholm Programme and Action Plan on its implementation,131 
the Commission had been tasked to evaluate the need of the European Information 
Exchange Model, and in 2012 came out with the conclusion that there was no need 
to propose any new instrument of initiative as “cross-border information exchange 
generally works well” and “a strong effort is still needed to ensure relevant 
                                                        
127  BRUGGEMAN, Willy, “A Vision of Future Police Cooperation with Special Focus on Europol”, in W. 
DE ZWAAN, Jaap and A.N.J. GOUDAPPEL, Flora, Freedom, security and Justice in the European 
Union: Implementation of The Hague Programme (Asser Press: The Hague, 2006), p. 207.  
128  OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p.18. 
129  After the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 68 of the TFEU establishes that the European Council shall 
define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Notwithstanding, it does not foresee either term for which such guidelines 
shall be established nor obligation to approve them in the form of a programme. Thus in 2014, 
the European Council went back to the origins of strategic planning in the area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice and approved the strategic guidelines in the form of European Council 
Conclusions. In the area of security, it makes much more sense than a general programme, 
because almost in every area (for instance, drug trafficking, cybercrime, trafficking in human 
beings) there are individual multiannual programmes. And in case of the Stockholm Programme 
there was some overlapping and sometimes even contradiction to each other.  
130  Council document EUCO 79/14, p. 2.  
131  COM(2010) 171 final.  
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information is shared at Europol so as to create an EU-wide picture of cross-border 
criminality.”132 
In its Conclusions of June 2013133, the Council agreed that there is no need for new 
legal instruments in this area, but better use of existing ones. 
Besides multiannual strategies in the whole area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
specialised strategies, such as “Information Management Strategy for EU Internal 
Security”134 (hereinafter – IMS) and “Internal Security Strategy for the European 
Union. Towards a European security model” (hereinafter – ISS), also deserve a 
special mention.135 
Thus in parallel with the development of the Stockholm Programme, in November 
2009 the Council adopted the IMS that “aims to support, streamline and facilitate 
the management of information necessary for the competent authorities to ensure 
EU internal security, but excluding the responsibilities of Member States in 
safeguarding their national security.”136  
To this end, the IMS has foreseen eight steps in the planning and development of 
any new information exchange mechanisms: 
a) To evaluate business needs and requirements, to analyse how existing 
solutions could be used for this purpose. 
b) To follow already agreed law enforcement workflows and criminal 
intelligence models in new developments. 
c) To ensure the balance between data protection requirements and business 
operational needs. 
d) To ensure interoperability and co-ordination, both of business processes 
and technical solutions. 
e) To share and re-utilise sustainable solutions whenever is possible. 
f) To involve Member States from the very beginning of the process. 
g) To establish clear responsibility for each part of the process. 
h) To ensure multidisciplinary coordination within the Justice and Home 
Affairs area. 
                                                        
132  Ibid, p. 14. 
133  Council document 7226/2/13, p. 2. 
134  Council document 16637/09.  
135 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. “Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. 
Towards a European security model”, accessed September 2014, https://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf. 
136  Council document 16637/09, p. 6. 
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The IMS included a clause on its revision in 2014, and in November 2014 the 
Council re-affirmed the strategy and its implementation, introducing only minor 
wording changes and giving one new task to the Commission, “To examine the 
possibility of consolidating and increasing the efficiency of the existing legislation 
on law enforcement information exchange.”137  
In March 2010, ISS, foreseen in the Stockholm Programme, was approved with the 
aim of using a more integrated approach in tackling common threats and risks. 
With regard to information exchange, ISS has reiterated the Stockholm 
Programme, in relation to the need to strengthen mutual trust between competent 
law enforcement authorities, and use of the IMS for the development of the 
European Information Exchange Model. 
As a continuation of ISS, in April 2015 the Commission approved “The European 
Agenda on Security”138 which foresees better use of existing information exchange 
tools, such as the Schengen Information System, Prüm Decisions and Europol, as 
well as finding a political compromise on the European Passenger Name Records 
system. 
Summing up the evolution of information exchange, we can refer to the reflexion of 
Leinius that “Security activity usually is characterized by a clandestine and insular 
thinking that makes cooperation even between different security actors of the 
same member state difficult; the principle of availability therefore is no less than 
revolutionary in its intention.”139 
It gave a political acceleration to development in this area, and served as a basis for 
numerous initiatives, some of which will be analysed in the following chapters. 
Nevertheless, its full and proper implementation took much longer than was 
forecast at the beginning and it is still in the process. 
5. Information, intelligence and personal data 
Although the title of the thesis only contains the term “information” and the above 
mentioned principle talks about availability of information, during the analysis of 
specific legal terms, “information”, “intelligence” and “personal data” or 
“intelligence” will be frequently met. For example, legislation related to Europol 
includes all three terms and applies different regulations, the Swedish Initiative 
talks about information and intelligence, all mechanisms differentiate between 
                                                        
137  Council document 15707/1/14, p. 9. 
138 COM(2015) 185 final.  
139  LEINIUS, Katharina, An Imbalance between Security and Liberty?…, op. cit., p. 15. 
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information in general, and personal data. Thus the principle of availability covers 
all three categories. 
The most general and laconic explanation of information is knowledge of learned 
facts or details about something or someone.140  
A more comprehensive definition is provided by the Business Dictionary, which 
understands information as “data that is accurate and timely, specific and 
organised for a purpose, presents within a context that gives it meaning and 
relevance and can lead to an increase in understanding and decrease in 
uncertainty”.141 
EU legislation on police and judicial co-operation does not foresee a definition of 
information with the exception of the Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA 
of 18th December 2006, on simplifying the exchange of information and 
intelligence between the law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the 
European Union (hereinafter –Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA).142 
Nevertheless, its Article 2.d gives a single definition to “information and/or 
intelligence”, and describes it as “(i) any type of information or data which is held 
by law enforcement authorities; (ii) any type of information or data which is held 
by public authorities or by private entities and which is available to law 
enforcement authorities without the taking of coercive measures, in accordance 
with Article 1(5).” Such a definition is erroneous as to determine the term 
“information” in its definition also include the term “information” and therefore 
cannot be used as a background for analysis. 
In these circumstances, there is a need to establish the meaning of information 
within the context of police investigation, and it should be understood as a piece of 
data that allows the re-establishment of a wide picture of a crime, and all the 
related circumstances, and when necessary, to follow pre-established 
requirements to obtain consideration of evidence. 
Unlike poor discussions on the term “information” within police investigation, 
much more attention is paid to the term “intelligence”. 
                                                        
140  See MacMillan Dictionary, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british 
/information; Oxford Dictionary, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english 
/information. 
141  Business Dictionary. http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/information.html#ixzz 
3orOh5ddk. 
142 OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89-100. 
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As the Spanish National Intelligence Centre explains, information is a news or a 
fact and is a starting element to develop intelligence that is considered as a result 
of evaluation, analysis, integration and the interpretation of information.143 
But before defining criminal intelligence, two things should be pointed out. First of 
all, a difference should be made between “intelligence” as an element of the work 
of the national security services and “intelligence” in the meaning of police 
investigation. In cases of performing functions of national security services, it will 
be the analysis of “information related to capacities, intentions or activities of 
foreign governments as well as of organisations and persons that acts against 
national interests.”144 Thus, as pointed out by Bruggeman, “The term intelligence 
can be limited to authentic intelligence services or be understand broader and 
include all law enforcement authorities. CIA presents it in a very simple way: 
intelligence is knowledge and previous knowledge of the world that is surrounding 
us.”145 Secondly, it should be taken into account that the terms “information” and 
“intelligence” in road meaning are mostly used in common law countries, and in 
Eastern Europe, intelligence is very often still understood in a narrow way in 
association with national security services; criminal intelligence is referred to 
simply as the result of the analytical work of the criminal police. 
A very comprehensive comparison between information and criminal intelligence 
is provided by Marica, who understands information as material that includes non-
evaluated observations, communications, reports, rumours, images and sources 
from which criminal intelligence is made.146 For example, when a competent 
authority asks for information about an organised group, it could include 
information (criminal facts, number of members, etc.) As well as intelligence 
(analysis of behaviour, probable future crimes, etc.). 
Díaz-Pintado Moraleda explains intelligence simply as “mutation of information 
through the process of integration and interpretation.”147  
In the process of making intelligence, whether or not information has “material 
value or potential material value”148 for the police or not is evaluated, and 
                                                        
143  See CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA, ”¿Qué diferencia hay entre información e 
inteligencia?”, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.cni.es/es/preguntasfrecuentes 
/pregunta_010.html?pageIndex=10&faq=si&size=15. 
144  DÍAZ MATEY, Gustavo, “Hacia una definición de Inteligencia” in Revista Inteligencia y Seguridad, 
no. 4 (July – November 2008), p. 71.  
145  BRUGGEMAN, Willy, “Los procesos de construcción de una inteligencia europea” in MONTERO, 
Julián; ROMERO, Francisco and VALIENTE, Elena ¿Hacia una Policía Europea?, op. cit., p. 215. 
146  See MARICA, Andreea, Manual de Europol (Navarra: Aranzadi, 2014), p. 121-122. 
147  See DÍAZ-PINTADO MORALEDA, Pedro, “El modelo de inteligencia en la organización policial” in 
MONTERO, Julián; ROMERO, Francisco and VALIENTE, Elena, ¿Hacia una Policía Europea? op. cit., 
p. 231.  
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therefore it is considered that intelligence is qualitatively different from 
information.149As pointed out by O’Neill, “It should lead to “informed decision 
making”, allowing for the “targeting of offenders” as the “best way to use our 
scarce police resources”.”150 
Notwithstanding, it does not mean that intelligence is necessarily more important 
than information. Sometimes there is no need of intelligence, but just information; 
for example, when there is a need to know a person’s location at a certain moment 
or whether his or her mobile phone was switched on, or who is the owner of 
vehicle that was used to commit a crime, and so on. 
The last example of information about the owner of the vehicle includes two types 
of information: information about the vehicle and information about the person. 
The last one is personal data and the object of stricter protection. Information 
about the color of the vehicle, its technical characteristics, or traces of accidents for 
example, will be general or depersonalised information and that about the owner, 
his or her driving license or address - will be personal data. 
Unlike information and intelligence, personal data is defined by the European 
legislator in many legal acts; for example beginning with the Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27th November 2008, on the protection of personal 
data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters (hereinafter – Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI)151, the Council 
Decision 2009/936/JHA of 30th November 2009 adopting the implementing rules 
for Europol analysis work files152 (hereinafter – Decision 2009/936/JHA), the 
Council Decision 2009/934/JHA of 30th November 2009 adopting the 
implementing rules governing Europol’s relations with partners, including the 
exchange of personal data and classified information153 (hereinafter –Decision 
2009/934/JHA), Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the 
establishment, operation and use of the second generations Schengen Information 
System (SIS II)154 (hereinafter – Decision 2007/533/JHA). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
148  INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC 
LAW ORGANIZATION, “Study on the status of information…”, loc. cit., p. 16. 
149  See DÍAZ-PINTADO MORALEDA, Pedro, “El modelo de inteligencia en la organización…”, loc. cit., p. 
231. 
150  O’NEILL, Maria, “The Issue of Data Protection and Data Security in the (Pre-Lisbon) EU Third 
Pillar”, in Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 6, issue 2, 2010, p. 229, accessed July 
15, 2014, http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/264/206. 
151  OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p. 60-71. Also applied to Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein and United Kingdom.  
152  OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 14-22. 
153  OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 6-11. 
154  OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63-84. 
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All of the above mentioned legal acts coincide in defining personal data as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); 
an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly”.155 All 
acts except Decision 2007/533/JHA specify that direct or indirect identification 
can be made “in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or 
more factors specific to his or her physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity”. 
Not all legal acts on information exchange that will be analysed regulate all three 
categories; but definitely in all of them, the difference between the processing of 
depersonalised and personal data is highlighted. The last one is always subject to 
stricter regulation, but the level of restriction varies depending on the information 
exchange mechanism. 
                                                        
155  Article 2 of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, Article 1 of Decision 2009/936/JHA, Article 
1 of Decision 2009/934/JHA, Article 3 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA. 
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CHAPTER 2:   
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER 
CONSIDERATION  
n the very recent European Data Protection Supervisor Strategy 2015-2019 is 
emphasised that “Our [EU] values and our fundamental rights are not for sale. 
The new technologies should not dictate our values, and we should be able to 
benefit both from new technologies and our fundamental rights.”156 
As stated in the “European Agenda on Security”, reiterating case law of the 
European Court of Justice “Security and respect for fundamental rights are not 
conflicting aims, but consistent and complementary policy objectives.”157 
Security alone, has one of the aims to ensure full and free enjoyment of 
fundamental rights without fear that something like a terrorist attack or crime can 
impede it and deprive, for example, from the right to live, the right to physical or 
moral integrity. On the other hand, ensuring security legislators endows some 
institutions, including the judiciary and the police, with administrative power that 
comprises coercive or other measures over citizens that also leads to the limitation 
of some fundamental rights. Notwithstanding, such limitation of fundamental 
rights should be balanced and always subject to legitimacy, proportionality and 
some additional conditions.158 
Nevertheless, Barona Vilar asserts that with the terrorist attack of 11th September, 
the “honey moon” between the world and fundamental rights came to an end.159 
Also Gascón Inchausti points out a tendency towards change in the penal process, 
                                                        
156  EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, “The European Data Protection Supervisor 
Strategy 2015-2019”, p. 11, accessed September 30, 2015, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publi
cations/Strategy/15-02-26_Strategy_2015_2019_EN.pdf 
157 COM(2015) 185 final, p. 3.  
158  See for example GIMENO SENDRA, Vicente, Manual de Derecho Procesal..., op. cit., p. 46. 
159  See BARONA VILAR, Silvia, Seguridad, celeridad y justicia penal (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), 
p. 75. 
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from a process of “humanization” (based on warranties to the accused ) into a 
process as an instrument for individual or collective security.160 Although he 
makes general reference to “new techniques of investigation”,161 information 
exchange and its processing could be interpreted as such, due to the fact that all 
related measures were adopted as measures to increase security. 
Therefore, this Chapter sets out to analyse existing interrelations and balance 
between security and fundamental rights, and freedoms in general, and to look in 
depth at rights directly related to information exchange in police investigation, i.e. 
Privacy and data protection.162  
It should be taken into consideration that limitation of privacy occurs at the 
moment of data is obtained in one Member State or another, and is always subject 
to national regulation. Thus the question of the legality of limitation of privacy will 
be solved according to the legislation of that Member State and in cases of 
violation, the state will be responsible for its infringement. However, responsibility 
for data protection lies with every Member State or agency involved in its 
processing. For example, law enforcement or the justice institutions of one 
Member State are empowered to collect and further process data on a person’s 
itineraries. This is the moment of interfering in privacy and, depending on the 
national legislation of the Member State that is interfering, can be treated as a valid 
limitation or a violation. Data obtained is subject to data protection that has to be 
applied during the entire processing procedure, both inside and outside of that 
Member State. Consequently, the greater part of this Chapter is dedicated to 
research on the data protection rules applied when personal data is “crossing the 
border”. 
In contrast to the other Chapters, where only the EU legal framework is analysed, 
this one will also include legislation and case law of the Council of Europe as:  
 All Member States are part of the ECHR. 
 Article 6(3) of the TFUE foresees that the Fundamental rights foreseen in 
the ECHR are treated as general principles of the EU. 
                                                        
160  GASCÓN INCHAUSTI, Fernando, “Los procesos penales en Europa: líneas de evolución y 
tendencias de reforma”, in Revista de Derecho Procesal, 2009, no. 1, p. 47. 
161  Ibid, p. 48.  
162  Of course, depending on information type, other fundamental rights can be under consideration, 
for example, in processing of DNA data questions about non-self-incrimination, non-
incrimination of descendants or relatives, the right of children to personal development. See more: 
SOLETO MUÑOZ, Helena and FIODOROVA, Anna, “DNA and Law Enforcement in the European 
Union: Tools and Human Rights Protection” in Ultrecht Law Review, January 2014, vol. 10, issue 1, 
p. 154-158; SOLETO MUÑOZ, Helena, “DNA data in criminal procedure in the European 
fundamental rights context” in Recent Advances in DNA and Gene Sequences, 2014, 8(2), p. 91-97. 
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 Article 52(3) of the Charter envisages that when it and the ECHR establish 
the same rights, their meaning and scope shall be equal to the Convention, 
except where the Charter provides. 
 Case law of the ECtHR shall be taken into account when interpreting the 
Charter.163 
It has to be mentioned that Article 6(2) of the TEU (modified by the Treaty of 
Lisbon) establishes that “the Union shall accede to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall 
not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.”  
Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice in its opinion 2/13 came to the 
conclusion that “the agreement on the accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms is not compatible with Article 6(2) TEU or with Protocol (No 8), relating 
to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to 
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.”164 This conclusion was made due to the consideration that it will affect 
the specific characteristics of EU law and its autonomy, as well as the division of 
the power established in Article 344 of the TFEU. For example, there would be an 
overlap of the competence between the ECtHR and the European Union Court of 
Justice, in the case of the interpretation of human rights established in the ECHR 
and the EU Charter. 165 
1. Security deficit vs. democracy deficit 
As revealed by a Eurobarometer survey carried out this year, “Europeans’ attitude 
towards security”, 79 % of the Europeans think that the EU is a safe place to live. 
But asked about the main challenges to security, people mostly mentioned 
terrorism, secondly, the economic and financial crisis and thirdly organised crime, 
corruption and poverty. Besides, both terrorism and organised crime are seen as 
increasing threats in the future.166  
                                                        
163  COM(2015) 191, p. 11. 
164 Opinion of the Court of 18 December 2014, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU - Draft 
international agreement - Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Compatibility of the draft agreement 
with the EU and FEU Treaties, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475.  
165  See ETXEBERRÍA GURIDI, José Francisco. “Los derechos fundamentales en el espacio de libertad, 
seguridad y justicia penal”, in Revista Vasca de Administración Pública. 2008, no. 82, 2, p. 160-163. 
166 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Special Eurobarometer 432. “Europeans’ attitude towards security”, 
April 2015, accessed July 10, 2015, p. 4, 6, 9, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion 
/archives/ebs/ebs_432_sum_en.pdf.  
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Threats to security mean threats to the enjoyment of all the freedoms and rights 
endowed on a person, and they cannot be prevented or combatted without social 
order that depends on effective policing167 and as noted by Bruggeman “In order to 
safeguard the enjoyment of liberties and efficient protection, it is necessary, to 
obtain it, that those charged with that protection must be empowered with the 
adequate means and the possibility of action.”168 
As already mentioned, those necessary security tools sometimes mean limitations 
of human right and provoke a paradox: to guarantee the security to enjoying 
liberties and rights in general, there is a need to limit some fundamental rights. 
And in these circumstances, the question stands: what prevails? Where should we 
be able to find the limit or balance between the State’s role as guardian of rights 
and arbiter in security? Or as pointed out precisely by Vallés Causada, “What 
fundamental rights would remain to people if the criminal tumor exceeded State’s 
surgical capacities?”169 
From first sight, it seems that there is no doubt about the priority of fundamental 
rights as they are a primary necessity,170 but which fundamental rights? A person’s 
right to life (in the case of a victim), or the right to privacy of communication (in 
the case of a suspect)? The right of hostages to live, or the right of the physical 
integrity of a kidnapper?  
The answer to these questions will not be the same, not even when making 
comparisons among democratic states which strongly apply the Rule of Law. For 
example, in the case of Sweden or Norway, greater consideration would be given to 
rights of a suspect or kidnapper than in the United States of America or the United 
Kingdom where, in the light of new circumstances (basically the threat of 
terrorism), and the State’s duty to protect residents (and first of all their right to 
live), the process of re-prioritisation of human rights takes place.171 For example, 
after 11th September, on 19the November, the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
adopted the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act that foresaw a petition to the 
House of Commons to derogate Article 5 of the ECHR (the right to liberty and 
security), and established the possibility of indefinite detention of foreign suspects 
of terrorism who could not be expelled, and broader possibilities on intervention 
of communications or financial data, limited possibilities of a lawyer to receive 
                                                        
167  See CRAWSHAW, Ralph; DEVLIN, Barry and WILLIAMSON, Tom, Human Rights and Policing. 
Standards for Good Behaviour and a Strategy for Change (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 
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168  BRUGGEMAN, Willy, “Policing in a European Context” in APAP, Joanna, Justice and Home Affairs…, 
op. cit., p. 152. 
169  VALLÉS CAUSADA, Luís Manuel, La Policía judicial en la obtención…, op. cit., p. 84. 
170  See BARONA VILAR, Silvia.,Seguridad, celeridad y justicial…, op. cit., p. 78. 
171 See MCGHEE, Derek, Security, Citizenship and Human Rights. Shared Values in Uncertain Times 
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information about all evidences.172 In the draft project it was also proposed to 
repeal Article 5 of the ECHR related to liberty and security.173 The Act was in force 
until 2004 and was then substituted by a more flexible act, but one which still 
allowed the limitation of fundamental procedural rights. Such regulations tend to 
make a division between law for citizens and “law of enemies”.174 Biondo explains 
that such exceptional situations brought into question the efficiency of state 
institutions and constituted a threat to State sovereignty and therefore, as a 
consequence, fundamental rights and the system of warranties are challenged.175  
On the other hand, in Norway, even after the massacre of Breivik on 22nd July 
2011 legislative changes giving more powers to law enforcement authorities were 
not made; furthermore, “Terrorism legislation remains the same and there have 
been no special provisions made for the trial of suspected terrorists.”176 
The position of Norway is almost unique as many countries, even not directly 
affected by the terrorist attacks in the United States, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, have strengthened security measure that have resulted in bigger or 
broader restrictions of some fundamental rights. 
With respect to human rights, the British Government’s position in general 
deserves special attention. It underlines a deficit of public security and considers 
approval of a Modern Bill of Rights to define core values. As a consequence, the 
United Kingdom could stand back from the ECHR and the obligation to obey ECtHR 
judgments, as some of them have been found by the British authorities to 
misinterpret the ECHR, especially those on banning “sending home foreign 
criminals”.177  
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177  See MCGHEE, Derek, Security, Citizenship and Human Rights…, op. cit.¸ p. 97, 99; “David Cameron: 
British bill of rights will 'safeguard legacy' of Magna Carta”, The guardian, 15 June 2015, accessed 
September 8 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jun/15/david-cameron-british-bill-
of-rights-safeguard-legacy-magna-carta; “David Cameron Won't Rule Out Ditching European 
Convention On Human Rights”, The Huffington Post, 3 June 2015, accessed September 8 2015, 
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One of the judgments that urged the taking of such a decision was the case Chahal v 
United Kingdom in 1996. In this case the Government of the United Kingdom took a 
decision to deport Mr Chahal (who was a leader of the Sikh community, a 
separatist movement for independence in one of the regions of India – Khalistan) 
to India, as it had considered his behaviour “unconducive to the public good for 
reasons of national security, and other reasons of a political nature, namely the 
international fight against terrorism.”178  
The ECtHR (with 12 votes to 7), found that the right to not be subjected to torture 
or inhuman treatment (established in Article 3 of the ECHR) is absolute and 
therefore, the Government’s decision on deportation to India was contrary to this 
Article, as there was a high probability that in India, Mr Chahal, being a separatist, 
would be subject to torture or inhuman treatment and “in these circumstances, the 
activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot 
be a material consideration.”179  
In respect to this and similar cases, a few aspects have to be highlighted: 
 Decisions to expel are taken by the State’s Executive Power and the 
Judicial Power cannot always overrule them (as in the quoted case). 
 The deficit of security starts to prevail over the deficit of fundamental 
rights and liberties. 
 Recognising the correctness of such ECtHR judgments, there is still a 
pending question: What should competent authorities do with respect to 
similar persons, bearing in mind their potential threat to the security and 
rights of other residents?  
The British Conservatives also questioned ECtHR carrying out interpretations of 
the ECHR, making it a “live instrument” and considered this to be going far beyond 
the meaning that had been given to some rights. For example, with respect to 
prisoners’ right to vote, the Conservatives declared “the issue of the franchise in 
elections was deliberately excluded from the text of the Convention. The 
Strasbourg Court has, however, now decided that it falls within the Convention’s 
ambit.”180  
They also stated that “another clear example of ‘mission creep’ came in a 2007 
ruling by the Court that required the UK Government to allow many more 
prisoners the right to go through artificial insemination with their partners, in 
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order to uphold their rights under Article 8. This is not what the originators of the 
Convention had in mind when they framed that article.”181  
After the re-election of the Conservatives in spring 2015, the question of a new 
British Bill of Rights has been raised again. 
From first sight, it seems that possible “re-prioritisation” would limit the rights of 
suspects or convicted persons. Nevertheless, taking into account that the United 
Kingdom already applies the processing of passenger name records for security 
purposes (about PNR see section 3 of Chapter VIII), some limitation will cover all 
of society in general. 
The position of the United Kingdom in relation to this and to other questions, 
including remaining or not in the European Union, can seem radical in comparison 
to the rest of Europe, but it is in fact something that could serve as a precedent in 
the future. 
Nevertheless, going back to the majority of western countries, restriction of 
fundamental rights takes place within the limits established by international 
conventions and national Constitutions that are also justified by the ECtHR. 
Nevertheless, there are also signs of gradual expansion of purposes, categories of 
persons and facilitation of the procedure. For example, in France categories of 
crimes for which DNA profiles can be stored in national data base have been 
expanded from sexual offences to serious crimes and then less serious. Originally 
only DNA profiles of convicted persons were processed, but later legislator has 
permitted to process those of suspects. In Germany categories of data crimes also 
has been expanded and previous obligation of judicial authorisation has been 
made more flexible.182 The key issue of limitations has to be respect to principle of 
proportionality that will be discussed later. For example, in the case of B.B. v. 
France, the ECtHR recognised that processing the data of a convicted sex offender 
interferes with the right to data protection, but with adequate data safeguarding, 
limited storage and access, the public interest in that data can be ensured.183 Many 
European countries directly apply principles of proportionality, establishing that 
the limitation of fundamental rights can take place depending on the type of crime 
or punishment.184 
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With respect to EU policies, the security deficit felt after the terrorist attacks of 
2001, 2004 and 2005 prevailed over the democracy deficit for some time and 
resulted in the adoption of different measures to combat terrorism and crime that 
intervene in fundamental rights, reducing their protection to secondary 
importance.185 An attempt to re-establish the balance was made in the Internal 
Security Strategy by envisaging that freedom, justice and security policies would 
have to be developed, “Respecting fundamental rights, international protection, the 
rule of law and privacy.”186  
To end with this issue it would be biased not to mention the view of Vallés 
Causada, that judicial police activities reflect an adaptation of the complexity of the 
evolution of technology, and sometimes help us to assure less interference with 
fundamental rights than before; for example, using state-of-the-art metal detectors 
and scanners instead of carrying out intrusive searches.187 
2. Information exchange and due process 
Information exchange between law enforcement authorities for the purpose of 
crime investigation has another, wider aim – to contribute to the performance of 
justice. In this respect, each element of investigation and each piece of information 
has to be considered as a source of evidence in the judicial process. This 
circumstance approximates information exchange to procedural warranties, and 
allows the estimation of its impact on the due process, although their direct 
relationship is maybe not so clear. 
To show the interrelationship between information exchange and the due process, 
there is a need for the analysis of the elements of the latter, which will gradually 
show its link to information exchange. 
Firstly, the due process is a fundamental warranty for each person facing a judicial 
process, and it consists of presumption of the innocence, the inviolability of 
defence and pre-judgement. 
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Secondly, as indicated by López Ortega in the understanding of the classical school 
of Criminal Law, the presumption of innocence is the crucial element and starting 
point of the criminal process.188  
Thirdly, every international and regional declaration of human rights considers 
that in order to abolish the presumption of innocence, “proof of guilt” is needed.189 
Thus it is directly related with evidence.190 
Fourthly, proof of guilt or non-guilt is achieved by presenting evidence that 
demonstrates the truth. In the process, the truth has two sides: material and 
formal and therefore is called procedural truth,191 i.e., in order to be admitted as 
evidence in a process, it is not enough to find out the truth, it has to be done 
according to legal requirements in order to ensure security of legal traffic.192 
Therefore evidence is not just a truth, but also legal construction.193 Among 
requirements for truth it is foreseen that it cannot produce violations of 
fundamental rights, such as the right not to be tortured, to physical integrity, 
personal liberty, privacy or secrecy of communications.194 That puts some limits of 
freedom of investigation by prohibiting or disregarding some means of evidence. 
Thus if evidence was collected and processed and fundamental rights were 
violated during the process, the evidence would be prohibited195 and the collection 
violating procedural requirements – illicit.196 In addition to elements of violation of 
fundamental rights in the collection of evidence, there has to be one more element 
– the connection between violation and collected evidence.197  
In some countries (Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and United States) illicit 
evidence being will provoke a domino effect on other evidence that originating 
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from it that will be disregarded as the “fruits of a poisonous tree”.198 Nevertheless, 
at least in Spain, beginning with judgment 81/1998 of the Constitutional Court, in 
order to follow this concept, there should be a connection of “anti-legality” 
between the original illicit evidence and the following.199  
Such a limitation of liberty of evidence exists as a consequence of the application of 
Rule of Law, as in parallel to the function of ius puniendi, the state shall guarantee 
the fundamental rights of persons that are subject to trial. 
Therefore, information that can be used in the future as evidence, has to be 
processed according to legal requirements and without violation of human rights. 
It is applied both to information processing at both national and transnational 
level. 
Having said that, as a continuation it has to be said that despite the establishment 
of “proof of guilt”, international instruments do not go into details of what is 
considered illegal or illicit evidence, leaving it to the national legislation of each 
country. In this manner, although the due process is guaranteed by every state that 
follows Rule of Law, and within the EU “All EU Member States have their own rules 
of evidence, governing fact-finding in criminal trials.”200  
Although the topic of licit evidence is directly related to the correct application of 
Article 6 of ECHR,201 the latter does not regulate the admissibility of evidence or 
their evidential value.202 ECtHR in its case law keeps silence about what has to be 
treated as illicit evidence and what consequences it can have on the process, 
precisely because evidential process is primarily regulated by domestic law.203 And 
as Gless points out, “ECHR very often lacks an answer as to whether a certain piece 
of evidence – collected legally or illegally – in one country – may be admitted in a 
court in another country.”204 
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The position of the ECtHR in relation to the evidential process is expressed in the 
judgment of a case Kostovski v. The Netherlands, “The admissibility of evidence is 
primarily a matter for regulation by national law [...] as a general rule it is for the 
national courts to assess the evidence before them.” 
Going back to the topic of the thesis, the following conclusion has to be made: as at 
some stage in the process, information exchanged can become evidence, it has to 
be processed according to legal requirements and respect for fundamental rights. 
As among all fundamental rights, the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection are the most exposed to be violated during information processing, they 
will be objects of further analysis. 
3. Privacy 
As mentioned, in order to use exchanged information as evidence, it has to be 
processed with respect for fundamental rights. The biggest risk in this respect is to 
privacy. 
It is established in all international charters and declarations on fundamental 
rights, dating from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948205 to the 
more recent Charter of 2000, which, along with the entrance into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, was granted the same legal values as those accorded to 
Treaties.206  
3.1. Content of the right to privacy 
According to international conventions, privacy is understood as the respect for 
private and family life, home and correspondence, respect for dignity, personal 
integrity or reputation. It derives from an understanding, developed at the end of 
XIX century,207 that everyone has a right to share or not information about his/her 
private life, habits, acts, and relationships with others,208 freedom from intrusion 
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and privacy of information,209 and the right to know about and dispose of his/her 
personal data210. 
Santolaya and Lezertua defend that right to privacy as being equal to the right to 
intimacy established in Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution,211 although other 
authors, for example del Castillo Vázquez, Murillo de la Cueva and Nogueira Alcalá 
defend that all intimate data is private data, but that not all private data is 
intimate.212  
The Spanish Constitutional Court interprets personal and family intimacy as a 
personal area reserved from actions and knowledge of the rest,213 or from those 
that fall outside of the area of trust of the person concerned and also covers some 
aspects of other people’s lives. 214 
López Ortega states that due to technological developments, the right to privacy 
acquires new characteristics and nowadays, one of its varieties is informative 
privacy. If previously privacy was more understood as a person’s right to decide to 
share or not to share information, and he or she could control it, with automated 
processing of information this control is lost, and privacy needs other measures of 
protection that prohibit the use of facilitated information.215 This right derived 
from privacy is also known as the right to informative self-determination.216 
Together with scientific developments, the right to privacy has given rise to the 
right to genetic privacy that has developed with the greater use of DNA, and the 
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need to give a data subject the right to determine conditions to access his or her 
genetic information.217  
Ultimately, it is also interpreted as the right to be alone218 and even the “right to be 
forgotten” and has a tendency to develop into a separate right.219 The last point has 
witnessed an interesting development in case law of the European Courts of 
Justice. In its judgment in case C-131/12, where Google Spain SL and Google Inc. 
Were recognised as data controllers and as such responsible for data processing, 
although they are search engines and not databases. The Court’s reasoning was the 
following: “The operator of a search engine ‘collects’ such data which it 
subsequently ‘retrieves’, ‘records’ and ‘organises’ within the framework of its 
indexing programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ 
and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of search results. As those 
operations are referred to expressly and unconditionally in Article 2(b) of 
Directive 95/46, they must be classified as ‘processing’ within the meaning of that 
provision, regardless of the fact that the operator of the search engine also carries 
out the same operations in respect of other types of information, and does not 
distinguish between the latter and the personal data.”220 And, “it is the search 
engine operator which determines the purposes and means of that activity and 
thus of the processing of personal data that it itself carries out within the 
framework of that activity and which must, consequently, be regarded as the 
‘controller’ in respect of that processing pursuant to Article 2(d).”221 
Very recently, on 15th October 2015, the Spanish Supreme Court reiterated this 
judgment by saying that a publisher is responsible for the quality of information 
and has possibilities to eliminate it from search codes by using relevant protocols. 
It declared that if data respects quality criteria, a publisher alone does not have an 
obligation to delete it, as it would mean a disproportionate limitation of liberty of 
information. Nevertheless, once the data subject asks for deletion, after reasonable 
time, the “right to be forgotten” has to be ensured, except in cases where data is of 
historic or public interest. 222 
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Together with scientific developments, right to privacy had given the raise to right 
to genetic privacy that has developed with the greater use of DNA and the need to 
give a data subject the right to determine condition to access his or her genetic 
information.223  
At European level, the right to privacy is established in the ECHR (that was opened 
to signature on 4th November 1950 and has been in force since 3rd September 
1953) and since the Treaty of Lisbon also in the TEU, the TFEU and the EU Charter. 
The ECHR in Article 8 envisages that “everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”  
Even if the right to privacy is not directly written down, it derives from this 
provision, in particularly from the “private right”, which, according to the ECtHR, 
“must not be interpreted restrictively. In particular, respect for private life 
comprises the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings; furthermore, there is no reason of principle to justify excluding activities of 
a professional or business nature from the notion of “private life”.224  
In the case of Niemietz v Germany, it also included the concept of labour 
environment225 into the right to private life, and in the case Perry v the United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR declared that the use of cameras in public places for any 
purpose other than monitoring, is interference in privacy as well, and in this 
precise case, “There is no indication that the applicant had any expectation that 
footage was being taken of him within the police station, for use in a video 
identification procedure and, potentially, as evidence prejudicial to his defence at 
trial. This ploy adopted by the police went beyond the normal or expected use of 
this type of camera.”226 
3.2. Limitation of right of privacy 
Right to privacy is not absolute right and Article 8(2) of the ECHR foresees the 
possibility of its restriction that according to Soleto Muñoz are quite wide and 
                                                        
223  See ETXEBERRÍA GURIDI, José Francisco. Los análisis de ADN…, op. cit., p. 61, 190; ETXEBERRIA 
GURIDI, José Francisco, “La protección de los datos de ADN…”, loc. cit., p. 100.  
224  ECtHR, Amann v Switzerland [2000], paragraph 65; Rotaru v Romania [2000], paragraph 43.  
225  ECtHR, Niemetz v Germany [1992], paragraph 29.  
226  ECtHR, Perry v the United Kingdom [2003], paragraph 41.  
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flexible. 227 It allows some level of national assessment to the fundamental right 
and legal establishment of its limitation according to national reality.228 
In any case, according to Article 8(2) of the ECHR, restriction is possible only in 
cases where all three conditions listed below are fulfilled: 
a) Restriction is established by law which is accessible to society, 
foreseeable229 and “formulated with sufficient precision to enable the 
citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with 
appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.”230 
b) It is established for the any of the following purposes: 
 National security;  
 Public safety;  
 Economic well-being of the country;  
 Prevention of disorder or crime;  
 Protection of health or morals;  
 Protection of the rights and freedoms of others.231  
c) It is necessary for democratic society. Such necessity is measured by the 
principle of proportionality that includes:  
 Necessity of restrictive measure in order to obtain the aim established by 
the law; 
 Adequacy;  
 “Cost-benefit” balance, i.e. The proportionality of the measure to the 
aim.232 
From the ECtHR decision in the case of Peruzzo and Martens v Germany, a 
conclusion can be made that the law shall establish “appropriate safeguards 
against the blanket and indiscriminate taking and retention of DNA samples and 
profiles and adequate guarantees of the effective protection of retained personal 
data from misuse and abuse.”233  
                                                        
227  See SOLETO MUÑOZ, Helena, “Parámetros europeos de limitación de Derechos Fundamentales en 
el uso de datos de ADN en el proceso penal”, article submitted for publication. 
228  See SANTOLAYA, Pablo, “Limitación de la aplicación de las restricciones de derechos. Art. 18 
CEDH”, in GARCÍA ROCA, Javier and SANTOLAYA, Pablo, La Europa de los Derechos. El Convenio…, 
op. cit., p. 658.  
229  See ECtHR, Amann v Switzerland [2000], paragraph 55. 
230  ECtHR, Sunday Times v United Kingdom [1979], paragraph 49. 
231 ECHR, Article 8(2). 
232  See ARENAS RAMIRO, Mónica, El Derecho Fundamental a la protección de datos personales en 
Europa (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2000), p. 121. 
233  ECtHR, Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany [2013]. 
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In addition to the mentioned elements of the principle of proportionality, Gimeno 
Sendra adds necessity and motivation in each case of limitation of fundamental 
right.234  
If the restriction does not meet any of these conditions, it becomes a violation of 
the right established in Article 8 of the ECHR. 
Article 18 of the ECHR also entails that limitations can be applied only for the 
purpose that they have been established and their use for any other purpose will 
be treated as a violation. 
In relation to limitation by law, such a limitation has to be very precise, for 
example the ECtHR recognised violation of Article 8 in the case of the French 
authorities which bugged a private flat because it had been out of the scope of the 
Criminal Procedure Code that only regulates the interception of telephone lines.235  
In the case S and Marper v. The United Kingdom, the ECHR reiterated its previous 
judgments stating that the law shall have “clear, detailed rules governing the scope 
and application of measures, as well as minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, 
duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the 
integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction, thus 
providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness”236 
because it was “worded in rather general terms and may give rise to extensive 
interpretation.“237 
Article 7 of the EU Charter establishes the privacy of private and family life, home 
and communications without going into any details about its possible limitation, as 
Article 52(1) envisages possible restrictions on all rights that are not indicated in 
the Charter as absolute ones. Article 52(1) lays down the following requirements 
for limitation: 
 Foreseen by law;  
 Maintaining respect to the essence of the rights under consideration, 
 Proportional;  
 Protecting general interest or rights of others. 
Thus compared with the ECHR, the Charter entails that in any case, the essence of 
right has to be maintained. 
                                                        
234  See GIMENO SENDRA, Vicente, Manual de Derecho Procesal..., op. cit., p. 46. 
235  See ECtHR, Vetter v. France [2005], paragraphs 23, 24. 
236  ECHR, S and Marper v. the United Kingdom [2008], paragraph 99.  
237  Ibid.  
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The European Court of Justice pronounced that limitations are acceptable “as long 
as these limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union, or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”238 
Regarding the balance between the well-being of a country and some aspects of 
privacy, Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 deserve some attention. 
In these cases the European Court of Justice recognised that information relating to 
salaries (including identification of persons), gathered by the public entity in order 
to ensure non-discrimination in salaries and appropriate use of public funds, falls 
within its scope and makes a justified element of the limitation of the right to 
privacy (although at the same time, necessity and proportionality also have to be 
taken into account).239 
3.3. Privacy and electronic communications 
Protection of privacy was directly established by the Directive 2002/58/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12th July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector240 (hereinafter – Directive 2002/58/EC). On the one hand, 
Article 1 excludes from its scope activities related to public security and criminal 
law, but on the other hand, Article 15 allows the limitation of rights and obligations 
established by this Directive for the same purposes. The European Court of Justice 
in Case C-275/06 explained that it neither eliminates the possibility nor obliges the 
disclose of such data in civil processes,241 but foresees that while transposing 
Directive 2002/58/EC, “Member States take care to rely on an interpretation [...] 
which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights 
protected by the Community legal order.”242 
The Directive 2002/58/EC was amended by the Directive 2006/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15th March 2006, on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
                                                        
238  Judgment of the Court of Justice in Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert, C-92/09 
and C-93/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 50. 
239  See  judgment of the Court of Justice in Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others and 
Christa Neukomm and Joseph Lauermann v Österreichischer Rundfunk, C-465/00, C-138/01 and 
C-139/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:294, paragraph 81. 
240  OJ L 201, 31.07.2002, p. 37-47. 
241  This precise case was about the infringement of rights to intellectual property. 
242 Judgment of Court of Justice in Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de 
España SAU, C-275/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, paragraphs 54, 55 and ruling.  
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electronic communication services, or of public communication networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC (hereinafter – Directive 2006/24/EC). 
New legislation foresaw an obligation on the part of providers of communication 
networks and services to retain some categories of data, and to make it available 
for detection, investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. That meant storing 
data of every user despite its potential relationship or not with serious crime. The 
data retained243 is data related to communication that allows identifying a person 
with whom communication took place, its time and location, but not its content or 
the information consulted. 
As stated by the European Court of Justice, this data “taken as a whole, may allow 
very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons 
whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or 
temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, 
the social relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented 
by them.”244 
Interpreting Article 52(1) of the EU Charter (possible limitation of fundamental 
rights), the Court came to the conclusion that as the content of the communications 
is not revealed, the essence of the right to privacy is not affected,245 and as it is for 
the purpose of combatting serious crime, the interference is for general interest.246 
But with respect to proportionality (understood as not exceeding the limits of 
appropriate and necessary interference), data retention was found to be a 
“valuable tool for crime investigation” and therefore an appropriate tool, but the 
question of necessity was raised as “Article 7 of Directive 2006/24 does not lay 
down rules which are specific and adapted to (i) the vast quantity of data whose 
retention is required by that directive, (ii) the sensitive nature of that data and (iii) 
the risk of unlawful access to that data, rules which would serve, in particular, to 
govern the protection and security of the data in question in a clear and strict 
manner in order to ensure their full integrity and confidentiality. Furthermore, a 
                                                        
243  Data categories listed in Article 5 include: data necessary to trace and identify the source of a 
communication and its destination, to identify the date, time, duration and type of a 
communication, to identify users’ communication equipment, and to identify the location of 
mobile communication equipment, data which consist, inter alia, of the name and address of the 
subscriber or registered user, the calling telephone number, the number called and an IP address 
for Internet services. See judgment of Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and 
Others, C-293/12 and C-594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, paragraphs 26.  
244  Ibid, paragraph 27. 
245  Ibid, paragraph 39. 
246  Ibid, paragraph 41, 44. 
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specific obligation on Member States to establish such rules has also not been laid 
down.”247 
On this basis, the Directive 2006/24/EC was recognised as a disproportionate 
measure and invalid as a whole. It was declared invalid without any temporary 
continuation of its application. 
As is the case with every directive, Directive 2006/24/EC had to be transposed 
into national law and the term for that came to an end on 15th September 2007. 
That meant that between September 2007 and April 2012, according to Article 258 
of the TFEU, the Commission was able to start infringement procedure for Member 
States that had not obeyed the obligation of the transposition. In effect such 
procedure had been started against Germany, but withdrawn due to the 
recognition of the directive as void. But in case of Sweden, the consequences were 
more serious as in 2010, the European Court of Justice had recognised Sweden’s 
failure to carry out the transposition248, and in 2013 ordered a lump sum payment 
of 3 million euros to be made.249 After the judgment declaring the directive void, 
this fine was returned to Sweden. 
The High Courts of Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany and Romania 
have recognised the transposition laws of Directive 2006/24/EC in total 
(Romania250), or partially void (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Germany).251They did not mention anything about the validity of the Directive, as 
they do not have jurisdiction to pronounce over EU law. But being in the same 
position, the courts of Ireland and Austria asked the European Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling in this respect.252  
As a result of the judgment of the European Court of Justice, Constitutional Courts 
of Austria, Slovenia and Romania253 declared national transposing laws void. 
From these examples a few conclusions should be made: 
                                                        
247  Ibid, paragraph 66. 
248  See judgment of Court of Justice in European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden, 185/09, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:59. 
249  Judgment of Court of Justice in European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden. C-270/11, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:339. 
250  See BOEHM, Franziska and COLE, Mark D., “Data Retention after the Judgement of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union” (study, Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament, 2014), 
p. 16, accessed September 17 2014, http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente 
/Boehm_Cole_-_Data_Retention_Study_-_June_2014.pdf. 
251  Ibid, p. 15-18.  
252  In the case of Austria, actions before national courts were brought by more than 11 000 
applicants. See judgment of Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd…, loc. cit., paragraph 19. 
253  After declaring the law void in 2009, a new one was adopted in 2012 and in 2014 also declared 
void.  
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 In the case of the infringement started against Sweden, the European 
Court of Justice took a technical decision, revising only the question of 
transposition of the Directive 2006/24/EC, but not its content. 
 The courts of only two of the 27 Member States addressed this issue to the 
European Court of Justice, questioning the content and compatibility of the 
directive with human rights. The rest of the countries in the worst-case 
scenario transposed it automatically, and in the best-case scenario their 
high courts recognised transposing provisions as void. Thus Member 
States swear by the legality of European legislation. 
Despite negative experience, electronic communication is so complex and 
overwhelming that it has to be compensated by appropriate procedural regulation 
to have benefits for investigation.254  
4. Data protection  
4.1. Relation between right to privacy and right to data 
protection 
Although privacy and data protection are closely interrelated, their content is quite 
different. 
It would be hard to find a better explanation of the interrelation between privacy 
and data protection than one provided by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor, “'Data protection' is broader than 'privacy protection' because it also 
concerns other fundamental rights and freedoms, and all kinds of data regardless 
of their relationship with privacy, and at the same time, more limited because it 
merely concerns the processing of personal information, with other aspects of 
privacy protection being disregarded.”255 
Thus the right to privacy protects persons against disclosure of personal 
information, and establishes some exceptions when they are allowed. Data 
                                                        
254  See VALLÉS CAUSADA, Luís Manuel, “Usos delictivos no comunicativos...”, loc. cit., p. 228. 
255  HUSTINX, Peter, "EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed 
General Data Protection Regulation" (article based on the course given at the European University 
Institute's Academy of European Law in July 2013), p. 5, accessed January 20, 2015, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publi
cations/Speeches/2014/14-09-15_Article_EUI_EN.pdf. Similar explanation is given by KOKOTT 
and SOBOTTA, “The distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence of the 
CJEU and the ECtHR”, in International Data Privacy Law, 2013, vol. 3, no 4, p. 225, 
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/4/222.full.pdf+html as well as by GARRIGA 
DOMÍNGUEZ. See GARRIGA DOMÍNGUEZ, Ana, Tratamiento de datos personales y Derechos 
Fundamentales (Madrid: Dykinson, 2009, 2nd ed.), p. 24. 
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protection establishes rules for the use of all types of data, including the one 
already disclosed under the exception of privacy, or with the consent of the data 
subject. 
The Spanish Constitutional Court defines data protection as a fundamental right to 
agree that a person’s data would be collected, obtained, accessed and recently 
processed by the State or person.256  
Looking at the content of the right to a private life and the right to data protection, 
the last one is not the only right to be defended, but also the right to demand 
certain action from others.257 It includes not only the right not to disclose personal 
data, but also the right to be informed about its use, the right to access to such data 
and the right to correct or delete it. 
Countries, as parties to numerous conventions, normally have developed both 
legislation protecting privacy and regulating data protection with special 
regulations in exceptional areas, such as the limitation of privacy for public 
security purposes, medical reasons, and so on. 
At the beginning, the right to data protection was understood as an element of the 
protection of private life258 and as a separate concept, was developed in the mid-
sixties of the XX century as a consequence of the development of information 
processing technology. 
The first laws on data protection are dated in the early seventies with the first law 
adopted by the German State of Hessen in 1971 and followed by the first state-
wide law, adopted by the Swedish Parliament in 1972. 
4.2. Origins and development of right to data protection 
As already mentioned, data protection (also called habeas data or informative self-
determination)259 as an independent right started to develop in the United States 
in the sixties and in Europe, in the seventies. That is the reason why it is not 
included as a separate right in the ECHR. 
Although the ECHR has a static nature, the ECtHR (and previously the European 
Commission of Human Rights) interprets its provision according to the current 
                                                        
256  Judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal 292/2000. 
257  See ARENAS RAMIRO, Mónica, El Derecho Fundamental a la protección…, op. cit., p. 96. 
258  See REBOLLO DELGADO, Lucrecio, Vida privada y protección de datos en la Unión Europea 
(Madrid: Dykinson S.L., 2008), p. 55-56, 223.  
259  See DEL CASTILLO VÁZQUEZ, Isabel-Cecilia, Protección de datos: cuestiones constitucionales..., op. 
cit., p. 75.  
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social reality in a “progressive, evolutionary and teleological way, considering it as 
a “living instrument” that must be analysed according to the actual conditions”.260 
Within the context of the interpretation of the right to protection of private rights, 
data protection issues began to be addressed. For the first time, data protection 
was concerned in the case X v the United Kingdom in 1982. It was not mentioned 
directly as such, but with a reference to the need for protection of private life in 
relation to the development of new technologies. For the first time, data protection 
was recognized as a part of the right to private life in 1987 in the Judgment 
Leander v Sweden.261 
Seeking to establish data protection rights as individual rights, the Committee of 
Ministers did not choose the possibility of signing additional protocol to the ECHR, 
but opted for an individual convention, despite close links of this right with the 
right of protection of private and family life.262 
Thus with the technical developments and increased processing personal data, the 
Committee of Ministers recognised the necessity of its regulation and on 28th 
January 1981, the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (hereinafter – Data Protection Convention) 
was opened for signature and came into force on 1st October 1985. 
Though the Data Protection Convention does not explicitly exclude the processing 
of data by the police, in 1983 the Committee of Ministers established a working 
party to elaborate specific recommendations for the police on use of personal data. 
The Committee of Ministers finally adopted them on 17th September 1987 as 
Recommendation No. R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States, 
regulating the use of personal data in the police sector (hereinafter – 
Recommendation R (87)15).263  
Within the European Communities, the process of regulation of data protection can 
be defined as bottom-up, because firstly, it was regulated by the secondary law and 
in primary law it was just mentioned. It was included in the Charter in 2000, but as 
all rights became obliged to respect only with the entrance into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon in 2009 that, as already mentioned, equalized its status to that of a 
Treaty. 
                                                        
260  THE LISBON NETWORK, “The Right to a Fair Trial: Analysis of the Condemnations of the 
Portuguese State due to the Violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, 
Council of Europe, 2008, accessed October 30, 2014, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation 
/lisbonnetwork/Themis/ECHR/Paper4_en.asp. 
261  ECtHR, Leander v Sweden [1987].  
262  See DEL CASTILLO VÁZQUEZ, Isabel-Cecilia, Protección de datos: cuestiones…, op. cit., p. 87. 
263  “Data protection”, Compilation of Council of Europe texts, accessed October 30, 2014, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/dataprotcompil_en.pdf. 
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In this way data protection has been transformed from an element of 
harmonization of the single market regulated by the secondary law, into a 
fundamental right.264  
Article 16 of the TFEU directly establishes the individual right to personal data 
protection and specifies that relevant EU level rules have to be approved and 
applied by the EU institutions and entities as well as by the Member States, while 
transferring such data and performing activities within the scope of EU law. It also 
includes institutional provision, establishing that the accomplishment of this 
regulation has to be controlled by independent authorities. 
Article 8 of the EU Charter envisages that personal data can be processed only with 
the consent of the subject of the data or on the basis specifically established by the 
law and in any case it is possible only for specific purposes. The consent has to be 
explicit or tacit, reasonably concrete, given by a person with legal capacity, without 
pressure and with information relating to the consequences. 265 Equally, as in the 
case of privacy, some legal limitations of the right to data protection are possible 
according to Article 52(1). Thus, for example, in case C-291/12, the European 
Court of Justice explained that both the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection “are not absolute rights, but must be considered in relation to their 
function in society”.266 In the same judgment it was stated that taking both face 
images and fingerprints for the issuing of identity documents is proportional to the 
objective of preventing the falsification of passports, and does not mean bigger 
interference in the right to privacy and to data protection.267 
Establishment of the fundamental right to data protection at EU level means an 
obligation to assess it (as any other fundamental right) before adopting any 
European legislation. For this purpose the Commission has elaborated 
“Operational Guidance on taking account of Fundamental Rights in Commission 
Impact Assessments.”268  
According to López Guerra, with the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
rights established in the Charter became obligatory to call upon in the 
                                                        
264  PARIENTE DE PRADA, Iñaki. “La reforma de la protección de datos en el ámbito europeo” in 
GOIZUETA VÉRTIZ, Juana; GONZÁLEZ MURUA, Ana Rosa and PARIENTE DE PRADA, Iñaki, El 
Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia: Schengen y Protección de Datos (Navarra: Aranzadi, 
2013), p. 127.  
265  See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Handbook 
on European Data Protection Law, 2014, p. 56, accessed October 30, 2014, 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2014/handbook-european-data-protection-law 
266 Judgment of Court of Justice in Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum, C-291/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:670, 
paragraph 33.  
267 Judgment of Court of Justice in Michael Schwarz v Stadt…, loc. cit., paragraph 41, 50. 
268  SEC(2011) 567 final. 
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implementation of EU Law and can be voluntary applicable in any area of national 
competence.269 
The following subsections are dedicated to European legal instruments applicable 
to data processed by the police, and therefore they do not include the Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data (hereinafter – Directive 95/46/EC) in which 
Article 3(2) foresees exclusion of areas of public security and activities related to 
criminal law. 
4.3. European legal framework for right to data protection 
4.3.1. European Convention on Data Protection (CETS 108) 
The Data Protection Convention was the first obligatory data protection 
instrument establishing its basic principles, but on the other hand, it is criticised 
for being a legal basis with indirect application that needs further development at 
national level. 270 
Its Article 1 envisages that data protection is a warranty of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including privacy. It goes in line with the 
previously quoted European Data Protection Supervisor that the scope of data 
protection is broader than privacy. 
Article 2 entails the scope of the Data Protection Convention as “Automated 
personal data files and the automatic processing of personal data in the public and 
private sectors.”271 Implementing it at national level, the States’ parties have the 
possibility:  
 To limit this scope;  
 To expand it to groups of persons, companies, etc. Despite the fact whether 
they have a status of legal person or not;  
 To apply it to non-automated data processing. 
                                                        
269  LÓPEZ GUERRA, Luís María, “Derechos e integración europea” in UGARTEMENDÍA 
ECEIZABARRENA, Juan Ignacio and JÁUREGUI BERECIATU, Gurutz, Derecho Constitucional 
Europeo (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2011), p. 24-25. 
270  GUASCH PORTAS, Vicente, Las transferencias internacionales de datos en la normativa española y 
comunitaria (Madrid, Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, 2014), p. 25.  
271  “Details of Treaty No. 108”, Council of Europe, accessed November 3, 2014, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm. 
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Article 5 foresees the main principles – the conditions for automated data 
processing:  
 Accuracy – a controller must have reasonable certainty about data quality 
and reliability. For example in the case Khelili v Switzerland the ECtHR 
recognised that inclusion of the definition of “prostitute”, only on the basis 
of deduction from information on a calling card272, is not a sufficient 
background for its maintenance in the data base and “could damage Ms 
Khelili’s reputation and make her day-to-day life more problematic, given 
that the data contained in the police records might be transferred to the 
authorities. That was all the more significant because personal data was 
currently subject to automatic processing, thus considerably facilitating 
access to, and the distribution of, such data.”273 
 Lawfulness –law (in a clear and comprehensive manner)274 has to 
envisage data processing. It must be subject to necessity275 and done for a 
legitimate aim (to protect the general interest or rights of others).276 
 Specified and legitimate purposes – as explained in the Handbook on 
European Data Protection Law, “Every new purpose for processing data 
must have its own particular legal basis and cannot rely on the fact that 
the data were initially acquired or processed for another legitimate 
purpose.”277 
 Relevancy – amount of data and their categories have to be proportionate 
to their purposes, without including unnecessary data. 
 Limited storage – only for the time that is necessary for the purpose for 
which it was collected. Additionally, data storage has to be proportional to 
the purpose for which it was collected and in any case there shall be time 
limit.278 
                                                        
272 “Nice, pretty woman, late thirties, would like to meet a man to have a drink together or go out 
from time to time. Tel. no. …” 
273  ECtHR, Khelili v Suisse [2012], paragraph 63-64. 
274  ECtHR in case Rotaru v. Romania concluded that the law shall define the type of information, 
categories of peoples and circumstances that allows limitation. See ECtHR, Rotaru v. Romania 
[2000]. 
275  In case Leander v. Sweden the ECtHR recognised proportionate secret check of persons to be 
employed in posts related to national security. See ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden [1987]. 
276  In case Peck v. the United Kingdom, CCTV camera fixed an attempt to suicide and the police after 
rescuing of the applicant, passed video information to the media. That was recognised by the 
ECtHR as lack of legitimate aim and a need of person’s consent was declared. See ECtHR, Peck v. 
the United Kingdom [2003]. 
277  EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Handbook on 
European Data…, op. cit., p. 68. 
278  See ETXEBERRÍA GURIDI, José Francisco, “La protección de los datos de ADN…”, loc. cit., p. 114.  
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 Fair processing – society, in reasonable terms, shall be provided with 
information about lawful and transparent data processing and with a copy 
of the file concerned.279  
 Depersonalisation - when it is no longer required for the purposes that it 
was stored, and for proper data control. 
A very important article is Article 6, which permits the processing of special data 
categories (racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as 
personal data concerning health or sex life and criminal convictions), but only with 
safeguards established in national law. 
Comparing the possibilities of derogations from the Data Protection Convention 
established in its Articles 5, 6 and 8 (a person’s access to his or her data) and the 
limitation of the right to privacy, envisaged in Article 8(2) of the ECHR, some of the 
bases coincide and some are different.  
Derogation from Article 5, 6 and 8 of 
the European Data Protection Convention 
Limitation of the right to privacy of 
the ECHR 
National security 
Public safety 
Protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
Economic well-being of the country Monetary interests of the State 
Prevention of disorder or crime Suppression of criminal offences 
Protection of health or morals Protecting the data subject 
Table 1: Derogations from the right to data protection according to the European Data 
Protection Convention and the ECHR. 
As a result of this comparison, it can be said that the scope of limitations of data 
protection is more narrow than that of limitations of privacy; as in the case of data 
protection only monetary interests figure instead of the broad concept of economic 
well-being; and instead of the prevention of disorder or crime only the suppression 
of criminal offences. 
Article 12 is very important in relation to the topic of this analysis; this article 
establishes, as a general rule, no limitation of cross-border information 
transmission between parties to the Data Protection Convention. Only two 
exceptions from this right are foreseen: 
 When some categories of data are subject to specific protection by national 
law;  
 In the case of onward transmission from a receiving party to a third state. 
                                                        
279 See ECtHR, K.H. and Others v. Slovakia, [2009], paragraph 47. 
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Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data regarding 
supervisory authorities and transborder data flows280, establishes the possibility of 
data transfer to a third state only if it ensures satisfactory data protection level, 
and envisages the following exceptions of that rule: the interests of either the 
subject of the data or public interests; special arrangements between the data 
controller and the receiving authority on application of adequate data protection. 
Article 3 of the Data Protection Convention does not directly envisage that it is 
applied to data automatically processed by police and judicial authorities, but on 
the other hand, it foresees its application both for private and public authorities. As 
no exception is established in respect to application for police and judicial 
authorities, it can be presumed that without a special declaration of derogation 
from the State Party, the Data Protection Convention will be applied to those 
authorities.281  
4.3.2. Recommendation R (87)15 
A working group consisting of experts from Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom elaborated 
the recommendations adopted on 17th September 1987 at the 410th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies as Recommendation R (87)15. 
It established that, “The expression "for police purposes" covers all the tasks which 
the police authorities must perform for the prevention and suppression of criminal 
offences and the maintenance of public order.” Thus it also covers information 
processing and exchange. 
Equally, as in Data Protection Convention, Recommendation R (87)15 foresees the 
possibility of extending the application of the Recommendation to non-automated 
data processing as well as to groups of persons, associations, and so on, despite 
having legal personality or not. 
Recommendation R (87)15 established 8 principles of data protection: 
                                                        
280  Opened for signature on 8th November 2001 and came into force on 1st July 2004. Not signed by 
Azerbaijan, Malta, San Marino and Slovenia. Not ratified yet by Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Norway, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom. See “Details of Treaty No. 108”, loc. cit. 
281  Similar conclusion is made in the Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R (87) 15 of 
the Committee of Ministers to member states regulating the use of personal data in the police 
sector, Council of Europe, accessed October 13, 2014, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref 
=ExpRec(87)15&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&Ba
ckColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383 
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 The Independent supervisory authority has to control data processing. Its 
consultation before introducing new automatic processing methods and 
notification about automated databases kept. 
 Data can be collected only in order to prevent real danger or to suppress 
specific criminal offences and, as an exception, for other purposes foreseen 
by national law. Data collection on the basis of specific data (except when 
it is necessary for a particular inquiry) is prohibited, expect when it is 
indispensable for specific inquiry. 
 Only accurate and necessary data has to be stored. While storing data, it 
has to be categorized by degree of reliability. 
 It can be used exclusively for police purposes. 
 Data can be transmitted to other police institutions only on the basis of a 
legitimate interest. Its transmission to other public bodies and private 
parties is subject to special conditions. International transmission is 
permitted only to police bodies and on the basis of national or 
international legal provisions or for the prevention of imminent danger or 
suppression of serious crime, and having reasoned request. 
Interconnection of data bases is allowed under provisions of national 
legislation in general, or permission of the supervisory body for a 
particular case. 
 To provide public information about the existence of data bases and the 
right to access, rectification and appeal. 
 The storage period cannot be longer than is necessary for the purpose for 
which the data was stored. 
 Proper secure measures of access, storage, communication and other 
processing shall be applied. 
It reiterates some principles of the Data Protection Convention (such as definition 
of personal data, principle of data quality, use of special categories of data, data 
subject right to access, etc.) As it was thought that those members of the Council of 
Europe that had not ratified the Convention could be interested in joining and 
implementing this Recommendation.282 Currently, the only such country is Turkey, 
but at the moment of the adoption of Recommendations Data Protection 
Convention, it was in force only in France, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden and 
very close to entry into force in the United Kingdom.283 
On the other hand, being soft law,284 Recommendation R(87)15 established a more 
ambitious data protection system, going beyond the European Convention on Data 
                                                        
282  See GUTIÉRREZ ZARZA, Ángeles, “Conceptos básicos. Marco…”, loc. cit., p. 78.  
283 See “Details of Treaty No. 108”, loc. cit. 
284  LÓPEZ GUERRA describes “soft law” as international instruments that multilaterally are not 
binding, but in which parties express wishes or proposals how to regulate certain issues in the 
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Protection and already being established in 87 supervising authorities that was 
only introduced to the Convention with the Additional protocol in 2001. 
Although, as mentioned, Recommendation R(87)15 is soft law, ECtHR gives it ratio 
decidendi in the case S. And Marper v the United Kingdom and states that principles 
foreseen in the European Convention on Data Protection and Recommendation 
R(87)15 are “core” and have to be “Consistently applied by the Contracting States 
in the police sector.”285 
4.3.3. Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI 
Although police and judicial co-operation, including information exchange in the 
EU, can be counted for a few decades, general data protection rules in this area 
were approved only in 2008, as Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI. 
As pointed out by Gutiérrez Zarza, the importance of this legislative act is great as , 
“no other rules are limiting the powers of law enforcement authorities to ensure 
the protection of the fundamental rights of the individuals concerned by the access, 
processing, exchange [...] of police information.”286  
4.3.3.1. Scope of application 
It received a lot of criticism due to being very watered down, with a limited 
application and leaving a patch system because at the very beginning of the text, in 
its recital 39, it is recognised that it shall not affect data protection provisions of 
the European Police Office, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System, Customs 
Information System and information exchange under Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA of 23rd June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (hereinafter –Decision 
2008/615/JHA) and some other instruments. It is declared that the above 
mentioned instruments have completed a coherent set of rules on data protection. 
At the same time, data protection rules for other co-operation mechanisms are 
considered as not exhausted and can be applied only when they establish more 
restrictive rules than the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.287  
                                                                                                                                                                  
future. See LÓPEZ GUERRA, Luis, “Soft law y sus efectos en el ámbito del Derecho Europeo de los 
Derechos Humanos”, in Teoría y derecho. Revista de pensamiento jurídico, 2012, 11, p. 151.  
285  ECtHR, S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008], para 107. See LÓPEZ GUERRA, Luis, “Soft law y 
sus efectos…”, loc. cit., p. 157-158.  
286  GUTIÉRREZ ZARZA, Ángeles, Exchange of Information and Data Protection in Cross-Border 
Criminal Proceedings in Europe (Berlin: Springer, 2015), p. 158.  
287  See recital 40 of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI.  
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One more exception is found in Article 1(4) where it is stated that it does not 
interfere in cases related to national security. 
As stated by O’Neill, “Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA appears to give a 
unitary response to the issue of data protection for EU law enforcement activities, 
but its provisions are subject to so many exceptions that the question does arise as 
to its actual applicability.”288 
Besides, the Council of the European Union has decided that it will be applied only 
to cross-border information exchange (between the Member States, Member 
States and EU authorities or information systems), but not to information 
exchange between competent authorities within one Member State. On the one 
hand, it allows application within Member States at a higher level of data 
protection (where it exists), but does not require raising it where the safeguards 
are lower. 
As pointed out by Oubiña Barbolla, it gives double vision on the same data 
depending on its national or cross-border processing, and complicates the work of 
law enforcement officers who have to be always aware of which data protection 
rules have to be applied and makes protection weaker.289  
4.3.3.2. Principles applied to data protection 
Article 3(1) of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA establishes principles of 
lawfulness, proportionality and purpose for information transmission and 
processing, saying that, “Personal data may be collected by the competent 
authorities only for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes in the framework of 
their tasks and may be processed only for the same purpose for which data were 
collected.”290 But as Etxeberría Guridi noticed, no criteria to measure 
proportionality are included.291 
Thus, on the one hand, it envisages a strong relationship between data collection 
and processing, but on the other hand. Article 3(2) foresees very flexible deviation 
from this general rule by permitting its processing to any purpose that is not 
incompatible with the original one, its proportional and competent authority is 
                                                        
288  O’NEILL, Maria, The Issue of Data Protection and Data..., op. cit., p. 218.  
289  See OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, Sabela, “Cambio de enfoque en la cooperación judicial penal y policial 
en la UE en relación con la transmisión de datos personales: las nuevas propuestas normativas y la 
STJUE de 8 de abril de 2014”, in COLOMER HERNÁNDEZ, Ignacio, OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, Sabela, La 
transmisión de datos personales…, op. cit. p. 83. 
290  OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p. 65. 
291  ETXEBERRÍA GURIDI, José Francisco, “Principio de disponibilidad y protección de datos 
personales: a la búsqueda del necesario equilibrio en el espacio judicial penal europeo” in 
Eguzkilore: Cuaderno del Instituto Vasco de Criminología, 2009, no 23, p. 365.  
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authorised by the law.292 Article 11 specifies three circumstances of further 
processing293 of data, and foresees the fourth one as open to any other purposes, 
but with the requirement of the prior consent of the transmitting party or the 
subject of the . Article 12 establishes the obligation of the receiving Member State 
to follow restrictions on data processing that are established in the national law of 
the transmitting Member State, and about which it has previously been informed. 
On the other hand, the transmitting Member State cannot ask for restrictions that 
would not be applied to its national competent institutions. Here, we can find d 
indirect allusion to the principle of availability that can be interpreted as the right 
to process received data equally to the scope of processing that would be applied 
in the transmitting Member State. But in reality it goes far beyond the principle of 
information availability that establishes equal access to information, but not its 
transmission. 
Thus exceptions that seem to be very limited finally convert into almost infinite 
possibilities of data transmission and, as noticed by Oubiña Barbolla, totally 
disrespect principles of purpose.294 
Quoted Article 3(1) enters, to some extent, into contradiction with Article 1 as it 
foresees the application of principles for information collection and not only its 
transmission and further processing. Principles established in Article 3(1) could be 
for information that is collected for transmission to other Member States. But what 
if it has been collected for national use and then, just by coincidence, another 
Member States asks for it? In this case, collection for internal purposes falls out of 
the scope of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA according to its Article 1. 
Thus application of the principles of the Article 3 should be more precise, making 
emphasis on the collection of personal data with the purpose of its transmission. 
4.3.3.3. Regulation of data storage 
Regulation of data storage is very diluted as in Article 5, a general rule of 
“appropriate time limits” is established; this indeed does not provide any clarity or 
safeguard. In Article 9 a little more detail can be found: 
                                                        
292  Data can be also used for historical, statistical and scientific purposes once it is depersonalised 
(made anonymous). 
293  “1. The prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties other than those for which they were transmitted or made available; 
 2. Other judicial and administrative proceedings directly related to the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties; 
 3. The prevention of an immediate and serious threat to public security.”  
 OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p. 67. 
294  See OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, Sabela. “Cambio de enfoque en la cooperación …”, loc. cit., p. 87-88. 
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 The transmitting authority can indicate storage time, which can be 
extended by the receiving Member State if it is still needed for on-going 
investigation, prosecution or enforcement of criminal penalties. 
 If the transmitting authority does not give any indication, data can be 
stored according to the national provisions of the receiving Member State. 
With the last provision, European legislators seem to accept the refutable 
approach of the transmitting Member State, allowing that it does not indicate rules 
on personal data storage. The European law should not establish such provision 
that permits negligence in data transmission. What should be done is to impose an 
obligation on the transmitting Member State, to indicate storage and processing 
conditions and national provisions for the receiving Member State. The regulation 
of receiving Member State should be applied only when it foresees a shorter 
storage term. If such obligation would be a disproportionate burden to provide 
such information with every data transmission, a handbook with relevant data 
relating to all Member States could be drafted. 
4.3.3.4. Special categories of data and onwards data transmission 
Another watered down provision of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA is the 
related processing of special categories of data295 that, according to Article 6, is 
allowed when it is strictly necessary and with adequate safeguards of national law. 
It would be understandable, to some extent, if Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
would be applicable to Europol instead of its own data protection regulation and 
the legislator would like to maintain already applicable provision on the possibility 
of including sensitive data into analysis work files. But as mentioned in subsection 
5.3 of the Chapter II, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA is not applicable to 
Europol. In these circumstances, such a provision in lex generalis of data protection 
raises a lot doubts. Besides, both expressions “strictly necessary” and “adequate 
safeguards” ideally need to be more precise and descriptive as data concerned can 
be the background for violation of the fundamental right of non-discrimination, 
and effectively mean the breach of the principle of legality.296 Besides, in Europol’s 
regulation of sensitive data, its processing is allowed only in indispensable cases 
and with a previous existence of other data on that person in the AWF, i. E. It is 
forbidden to start collecting special data without having previously collected 
general data. 
                                                        
295  Racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union 
membership and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. 
296  See EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPEAN DIGITAL 
RIGHTS, ”Report on Privacy and Personal Data Protection in the European Union”, December 
2009, p. 10, accessed October 13, 2014, http://www.ldh-france.org/IMG/pdf 
/legislation_Europeenne.pdf. 
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Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA also allows controversially treated 
onwards data transfer to third states, or to international bodies and to private 
parties. On the one hand, the fact that this issue is not left without regulation can 
be valued positively; but then the question about necessity arises. As will be 
explained later, onward data transmission is permitted within the framework of 
Europol, i.e. Europol can transmit information received from Member State 
onward to third parties. Transmission is restricted only to third parties with whom 
Europol has an operation agreement that allows personal data exchange and 
establishes at least basic data protection warranties.297 Thus the question stands 
whether it is really indispensable to allow broader data transmission outside the 
EU. Of course it makes sense in other areas to which Directive 95/46/EC is 
applied.298 Leaving aside this question, Article 13 of the Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JAI establishes 4 conditions for onward data transmission: 
a) Purpose limitations – equal to general purpose of this legislative act, i.e. 
“prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or 
the execution of criminal penalties.” 
b) Receiving authority is responsible for such a purpose;  
c) Consent of Member State of data origin according to its law;299 
d) Adequate level of data protection in the third party. 
The notion of adequacy time was undefined for a long, but the Advocate General 
Yves Bot, in Case C-362/14 considered that, “Although the English word ‘adequate’ 
may be understood, from a linguistic viewpoint, as designating a level of protection 
that is just satisfactory or sufficient, and thus as having a different semantic scope 
from the French word ‘adéquat’ (‘appropriate’), the only criterion that must guide 
the interpretation of that word is the objective of attaining a high level of 
protection of fundamental rights, as required by Directive 95/46. Examination of 
the level of protection afforded by a third country must focus on two fundamental 
                                                        
297  See Subsection 2.2 of the Chapter IV. 
298  In this case, information can be transmitted to the State when a relevant decision on adequate data 
protection level is approved by the Commission. For the time being, the Commission has 
recognised the following states as having such an adequate data protection level: Andorra, 
Argentina, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Israel, Jersey, New Zealand, United States of 
America, Uruguay and Switzerland. See GUASCH PORTAS, Vicente, Las transferencias 
internacionales de…, op. cit., p. 22, 81-84. This statement is not applied so much to the area of 
police and judicial co-operation as in general. 
299  Article 13(2) foresees an exception to this condition in cases “Essential for the prevention of an 
immediate and serious threat to public security of a Member State or a third State or to essential 
interests of a Member State and the prior consent cannot be obtained in good time”. 
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elements, namely the content of the applicable rules and the means of ensuring 
compliance with those rules.”300 
Although this Case C-362/14 is based on Directive 95/46/EC and data transfer to 
the United States under the Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26th July 2000 
pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles, 
and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of 
Commerce301 (hereinafter – Decision 2000/520/EC), it is also interesting in the 
context of this research because it reveals the position of the Advocate General and 
the European Court of Justice on ”(un)limited” personal data use for law 
enforcement. Thus even as a general rule, safe harbour principles have to be 
applied to data transferred from the EU to the US for commercial purposes; 
national law has “primacy pursuant to which self-certified United States 
organisations receiving personal data from the European Union are bound to 
disregard those principles without limitation where they conflict with those 
requirements and therefore prove incompatible with them”302 and therefore, 
entities that possess information are obliged to share it with intelligence and law 
enforcement institutions. Additionally, there are no effective supervisory 
mechanisms to ensure proper use of transferred information. 
In these circumstances the Advocate General understands that such data transfers 
can cover “in a generalised manner, all persons and all means of electronic 
communication and all the data transferred, including the content of the 
communications, without any differentiation, limitation or exception according to 
the objective of general interest pursued”303 and is totally contradictory to the 
right to privacy and right to data protection. 
Going back to the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, closer analysis deserves 
exceptions from the requirement of the ensuring of an adequate level of data 
protection. Such exceptions refer to the national law of the data transmitting 
authority; national law; not to the law of the Member State where the data was 
obtained. Thus Article 13(3) establishes that if the third party does not have 
relevant data protection legislation, data can be transmitted if, according to the law 
of the transmitting Member State, it is necessary to protect the data subject’s 
interests or public interests, and furthermore, that the receiving state provides 
data safeguards (but not stable legislation) which is acceptable by the transmitting 
                                                        
300  Opinion of the Advocate General in Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 
C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:627, paragraphs 142, 143.  
301  OJ L 215, 25.08.2000, p. 7-47. 
302  Judgment of the Court of Justice in Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 
C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, paragraph 86.  
303  Opinion of the Advocate General in Maximillian Schrems v Data…, loc. cit., paragraphs 198, 200.  
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Member State. It means that Member States where information was obtained 
would face the situation that their data will be transmitted to third parties without 
adequate levels of protection and with assessments made on the basis of the law of 
the transmitting one, will totally lose control of protection of data.304 Such a 
regulation can be assumed to be redundant and lacking logic. It should be the 
Member State where data has originated which decides on the sufficiency of 
safeguards in the third party, and makes assessment according its national law. 
Article 14 of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA foresees onward 
transmission to private parties, but does not specify whether they can be only 
within the transmitting Member State or outside as well. 
Article 14(1)c(ii)-(iv) entails transmission of data to private bodies when 
necessary for crime prevention, investigation, prosecution or execution of criminal 
penalty, protection of public security from imminent threat or individual rights 
from serious damage. Data transmission in such situations is justifiable. But it is 
not clear why data obtained by the competent authorities for crime prevention, 
investigation or prosecution purposes can be forwarded to private entities in order 
to perform their lawfully assigned tasks as established in Article 14(1)c(i). 
4.3.3.5. Other particularities 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA does not mention any difference in treatment 
and processing of different categories of persons, such as convicted persons, 
suspects, witnesses, victims and others. The processing of data of different 
categories of persons should be subject to different rules, especially in such 
questions as its storage or onward transmission to third or private parties.305  
In respect of the control of data protection, application of relevant national 
provisions has to be supervised by the independent supervisory authorities of 
each country. Such authorities shall have powers to investigate, intervene and 
participate in legal proceedings. In this regard, O’Neill makes a very precise 
observation that supervisory authorities shall have security clearances as data 
exchanged that is subject to control, can be classified or belong to special 
categories. 
                                                        
304  BOSCH MOLINÉ, Alba, “La dimensión exterior de Europol desde el punto de vista de la protección 
de datos. El caso del acuerdo TFTP” in PI LLORENS, Montserrat and ZAPATER DUQUE, Esther, La 
dimensión exterior de las agencias del espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia (Madrid: Marcial 
Pons, 2014), p. 134. 
305  For critics of the Council Decision 2008/977/JAI also see GUASCH PORTAS, Vicente, Las 
transferencias internacionales de datos…, op. cit., p. 290-292. 
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Summing up weak points of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, it is the 
example of the result of legislative procedure under the Third Pillar, where the 
unanimity of all Member States was required, and when final the result seems to 
be more of a “wish list” of exceptions and flexible provisions than aspiration to 
proper and comprehensive data protection. 
As pointed out, the European Data Protection Supervisor in the Third opinion of 
the European Data Protection Supervisor of the Proposal on the draft of this 
Framework Decision, “The decision-making procedure cannot justify a lowest 
common denominator approach that would hinder the fundamental rights of EU 
citizens as well as hamper the efficiency of law enforcement.”306 and “In many 
aspects the revised proposal even falls below the level of protection afforded by 
Convention 108. It is thus both unsatisfactory and will even be incompatible with 
international obligations of the Member States.”307 
But even this absolutely weak data protection regime had not been implemented 
in every country by the end of 2014, when there were still nine Member States that 
had not notified the Commission or the Council about transposition measures.308  
With the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission took the 
initiative to revise the European data protection system and in 2012, presented a 
package of measures that have to substitute current weak regulations. New 
regulations for the area of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters will 
be discussed in the part, “Projects in the pipeline”. 
5. Brief summary and evaluation 
Side or negative effects of globalization, technological progress, terrorism, liberties 
of movement that came out in the form of crime, resulted in the need to abolish 
borders in such purely national function as ius puniendi and to introduce and 
                                                        
306  OJ C 139, 23.6.2007, p.3. 
307  OJ C 139, 23.6.2007, p.2. 
 In the same opinion, a very valuable example of the patchwork system created by the Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA is given: 
 “[...] a law enforcement body at national or EU level, when dealing with a criminal file — 
consisting of information originating from various national, other Member States' and EU 
authorities — would have to apply different processing rules for different pieces of information 
depending on whether: personal data have been collected domestically or not; each of the 
transmitting bodies has given its consent for the envisaged purpose; the storage is compliant 
with time limits laid down by applicable laws of each of the transmitting bodies; further 
processing restrictions requested by each of the transmitting bodies do not prohibit the 
processing; in case of a request from a third country, each transmitting body has given its consent 
according to its own evaluation of adequacy and/or international commitments. In addition, 
citizens' protection and rights will vary enormously and be subject to different broad derogations 
depending on the Member State where processing takes place.”  
308  Council document 11902/15, p. 4.  
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prosecution some elements of free transnational movement to investigation as 
well. 
Within the EU, it has resulted in a separate area of policy – Freedom, Security and 
Justice that with the entrance in force of the Treaty of Lisbon, has been 
transformed from intergovernmental co-operation into supranational policy, 
subject to the control of the European Court of Justice and infringement procedure. 
In the field of information exchange, a crucial stimulus to establishing the principle 
of information availability were the terrorist attacks at the beginning of 
millennium. 
As stated by the European Parliament, after the terrorist attacks of 11th 
September, two tendencies in information processing and exchange can be 
distinguished, “Data processing in EU internal security policies is increasingly 
moving towards mass processing […] Automated processing and datamining with 
the aim of profiling categories of person.”309 
It has shaken the sensitive balance between security and fundamental rights, 
moving towards the overweighting of security. Some fundamental rights can be 
indirectly affected by this tendency, but on the right to data protection it can have a 
direct effect 
In these circumstances effective data protection systems have even greater 
importance, including at least common minimum standards applied in all states 
under consideration as well as independent and effective supervision systems. 
Both have been attempted within the frameworks of the Council of Europe and of 
the European Union. Bearing in mind the wide membership of the Council of 
Europe, regulation does not reach much farther than the establishment of general 
principles. On the other hand, the European Union has intended to carry this out 
with more precise obligations, although the final result approved by Member 
States is quite perfunctory. 
Nevertheless, one of the last political declarations of JHA Council on this topic 
allows us to expect better regulation in the future because it states that, “Privacy 
and security are possible and that there is no need to choose between being free 
                                                        
309  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Directorate General for Internal Policies, “Developing an EU Internal 
Security Strategy, fighting terrorism and organized crime” (study, 2011), p. 102, accessed August 
13, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/ 
20120627ATT47777/20120627ATT47777EN.pdf. 
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and being safe and that the necessary and appropriate processing of personal data 
is vital in keeping the public safe.”310 
And as pointed out by Mitsilegas, “The development of the right to a privacy – 
linked to autonomy, freedom, dignity and personhood – has the potential to raise 
standards by placing the individual and the Self at the heart of protection.”311 
                                                        
310  Council conclusions on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council - A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union 
3071st JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 24 and 25 February 2011. 
311  MITSILEGAS, Valsamis, EU Criminal Law (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009), p. 279. 
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CHAPTER 3:   
INFORMATION EXCHANGE UNDER SCHENGEN 
ACQUIS  
he Schengen area is a symbol of liberty of movement with checks on 
common borders abolished.312 The political will of free movement existed 
since the Treaty establishing the EEC was signed in Rome on 25th March 
1957. Its Article 3 foresaw the abolition of obstacles to the freedom of movement 
for persons, services and capital. But due to the difficulties in reaching agreement 
between all the Member States, firstly it was put into practice by the multilateral 
agreement and not by communitarian legislation.  
Opening of the internal borders carried some risks to security and therefore it was 
accompanied by compensatory measures, part of whose were dedicated to fluent 
information exchange between law enforcement authorities. 
This Chapter presents the analysis of the SIS and its second generation, functioning 
of police and customs cooperation centres, role of liaison officers as well as of 
general legal basis for cross-border information exchange envisaged in Articles 39 
and 46 of the CISA.       
1. From multilateral Agreement to Schengen Acquis 
Despite the general EEC commitment to create the area of free movement, some 
Member States had not been able to agree on the abolition of checks on common 
borders for more than 25 years and it impelled intergovernmental initiatives out of 
the EEC framework. On 13th July 1984, France and Germany signed the 
                                                        
312  In the Schengen Agreement and the CISA term “common borders” is used, but in the EU law, 
especially Treaties, more frequent term “internal borders” is met. 
T 
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Experimental Convention of Saarbrücken.313 As the Benelux countries (Belgium, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands) had created a Customs Union and had abolished 
checks at their borders in 1962, on 12th December 1984, the Governments of the 
Benelux Economic Union signed a Memorandum expressing interest in the 
Experimental Convention of Saarbrücken. Thus it was rewritten and it resulted in 
the Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic 
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders (hereinafter – the Schengen 
Agreement), signed on 14th June 1985 in Schengen –a Luxembourg border town 
with France and Germany. According to Hreblay, these five countries wanted to 
give a very strong political signal demonstrating the real image of a united and free 
Europe.314 According to Moreno Catena and Castillejo Manzanares, it was the fruit 
of pragmatism that allowed the creation of the true free movement of persons.315  
The Schengen Agreement was largely negotiated by the ministers of transport and 
foreign affairs. However, an envoy from the German Ministry of Interior raised the 
question of compensatory measures for security in the case of abolition of internal 
borders that were part of the security mechanism. 
Article 9 of the Schengen Agreement establishes that in the short term, “Parties 
shall reinforce cooperation between their customs and police authorities, [...]. To 
that end and in accordance with their national laws, the Parties shall endeavour to 
improve the exchange of information and to reinforce that exchange where 
information which could be useful to the other Parties in combating crime is 
concerned. Within the framework of their national laws the Parties shall reinforce 
mutual assistance in respect of unauthorized movements of capital.” 
Different opinions can be found in this respect. For example, Parkin believes that 
the broad police and justice cooperation measures foreseen in the CISA have 
secondary meaning and are exaggerated.316 Nevertheless, other authors like 
Alvargonzáles San Martín and Luengo Alfonso, have stated that weakness on 
                                                        
313  See CALESINI, Giovanni, European Police Law Handbook (Roma: Laurus Robuffo, 2007), p. 20-21; 
SCHATTENBERG, Bernd, “Schengen Information System: Privacy and Legal Protection” in 
SCHERMERS, Henry G.; FLINTERMAN, Cees; KELLERMANN, Alfred E. et al. Free Movement of 
Persons in Europe (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 43; DONAIRE VILLA, Francisco Javier, 
La Constitución y el Acervo de Schengen (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2002), p. 44. 
314 HREBLAY, Vendelin, Les accords de Schengen: Origine, Fonctionnement, Avenir (Brussels: Bruylant, 
1998), p. 15. 
315  MORENO CATENA, Víctor and CASTILLEJO MANZANARES, Raquel, La persecución de los delitos en 
el Convenio…, op. cit., p. 11. 
316  See PARKIN, Joanna, “Difficult Road to the Schengen Information System II: the legacy of 
‘laboratories’ and the cost for fundamental rights and the rule of law” (report, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 17 June 2011), p. 3, accessed September 9, 2013, 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/schengen-information-system-and-eu-rule-law. 
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interior borders can result in a rise in illegal migration, evasion of national 
legislation and crime.317 
Talking about long-term measures that allow total abolition of internal border 
controls, Article 18 of the Schengen Agreement foresaw that “parties shall open 
discussions, in particular on the following matters, account being taken of the 
results of the short-term measures: (a) drawing up arrangements for police 
cooperation on crime prevention and investigation; (b) examining any difficulties 
that may arise in applying agreements on international judicial assistance and 
extradition, in order to determine the most appropriate solutions for improving 
cooperation between the Parties in those fields; (c) seeking means to combat crime 
jointly, inter alia, by studying the possibility of introducing a right of hot pursuit 
for police officers, taking into account existing means of communication and 
international judicial assistance.” 
Long-term measures were supposed to be in force and applied by 1st January 
1990; 318 but due to the merging of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic, and the opening of their inner borders on 9th 
November 1989, the signing of the CISA had been postponed319 and eventually 
took place after the foreseen deadline on 19th June 1990. On 25th June 1991, 
Portugal and Spain also joined the Schengen Agreement and the CISA. 
Implementing the CISA, checks at common borders was finally abolished on 26th 
March 1995. 
In parallel, the signing of the Schengen Agreement was immediately echoed at the 
Fountainebleau European Council on 25th-26th June 1985, asking the Council and 
the Member States to study the measures for the abolition of “all police and 
customs formalities for people crossing intra-Community frontiers”.320  
Further steps towards the abolition of checks on internal borders of EEC were 
made with the Single European Act321 signed on 17th322 and 28th323 February 
1986. It supplemented the TEEC by the new Article 8A, foreseeing that the area 
without internal frontiers had to be established over a period expiring on 31st 
                                                        
317  See ALVARGONZÁLES SAN MARTÍN, Fernando, “Hacia un nuevo escenario de cooperación en 
asuntos de justicia e interior”. In MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, El espacio europeo de libertad, 
seguridad y justicia (Madrid: Secretaría General Técnica, 2000), p. 16; LUENGO ALFONSO, Luis, 
“Cooperación Policial y Europol” in ibid, p. 103. 
318 See DONAIRE VIILA, Francisco Javier, La Constitución y el Acervo de Schengen, op. cit., p. 46. 
319 See SCHATTENBERG, Bernd, “Schengen Information System…”, loc. cit., p. 44. 
320 Conclusions of the European Council 22/84, Fontainebleau, June, 28, 1984.  
321 OJ L 169, 29.6.1987, p. 1-19. 
322 Signed by Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
United Kingdom. 
323 Signed by Denmark, Greece and Italy. 
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December 1992. The Justice and Home Affairs policy introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty meant that real free movement would be reached with the accompanying 
measures in this area.324 
But it was not enough, and finally a Protocol of the Amsterdam Treaty, signed on 
2nd October 1997, incorporated the Schengen acquis325 into the EU legal system. 
That meant the application of the existing regulation of the Schengen area to all of 
the EC and putting all future measures related to the Schengen area under EU 
decision-making procedures.326 The Schengen acquis327 became a part of EU law 
on 1st May 1999 with the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Notwithstanding, membership of the EU did not mean automatic membership of 
the Schengen area. According to Art. 2.2 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen 
acquis into the framework of the EU, EU Member States not signatories to the 
Schengen Agreement and the CISA could become members of the Schengen area 
only after a unanimous decision of the Council. Such a decision was (and still is) 
based on evaluations of the conditions that every country has to meet before 
joining the Schengen area: application of common visa issuing policy; common 
asylum granting policy; operational readiness of N-SIS and its interoperability with 
C-SIS; police cooperation; protection of external land, sea and air borders and data 
protection. 
Going back to compensatory measures, the CISA foresaw a long list of security 
measures applied together with the abolishment of common borders, most of them 
in the Title III “Police and Security”: 
                                                        
324 See ALVARGONZÁLES SAN MARTÍN, Fernando, “Hacia un nuevo escenario de cooperación…”, loc. 
cit., p. 15. 
325 According to the Annex of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of 
the European Union of the Amsterdam Treaty, Schengen acquis consists of:  
 “the Schengen Agreement,  
 the CISA,  
 Agreements on Accession,  
 Decisions and declarations of Executive Committee, acts adopted for the implementation of the 
Convention by the organs upon which the Executive Committee has conferred decision-
making powers.” 
326 At the time of the adoption of Schengen acquis (due to the existence of the three pillars system 
abolished by the Lisbon Treaty) different EU / ECC decision-making processes were applied. The 
Schengen acquis provisions on free movement of persons fell under the Community decision-
making (former First Pillar) and supposed to be regulated by the TEEC and the police and 
judicial cooperation fell intergovernmental cooperation (former Third Pillar) and supposed to be 
regulated by the TEU. Precise EU / ECC legal basis for the different provisions of the Schengen 
acquis was determined by the Council Decision 1999/436/EC determining, in conformity with 
the relevant provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on 
European Union, the legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the 
Schengen acquis, OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 17-29. 
327 The Schengen Acquis as referred to in Article 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 
1999, OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 1-473. 
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 Information exchange and or police assistance (Art. 39, 46); 
 Cross-border surveillance (Art. 40); 
 Cross-border pursuit (Art. 41); 
 Liaison officers (Art. 7, 47);  
 Supplement to the existing acts on mutual assistance (Art. 48-53);  
 Application of ne bis in idem (Art. 54-58);  
 Supplement to the existing acts on mutual assistance (Art. 59-66);  
 Transfer of the enforcement of criminal judgments (Art. 67-69);  
 Cooperation in combating drug trafficking (Art. 70-76);  
 Cooperation in control firearms and ammunition (Art. 77-91). 
Although from the title, a conclusion that only police measures were envisaged can 
be drawn, the content also included instruments of judicial co-operation as well. 
But due to the quick development of the cooperation in the area of justice in the 
last 15 years, the CISA’s provisions related to mutual assistance, enforcement of 
criminal judgements, combating drug trafficking and controlling firearms and 
ammunition were derogated by more comprehensive and modern EU 
legislation.328  
Another and more important compensatory measure, the SIS, was established in 
Title VI of the CISA. SIS was described as a system of obligatory use on external 
borders and a direct tool for the law enforcement authorities and for criminal 
investigation. 
The following parts of this chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of those 
compensative measures used for information exchange among law enforcement 
authorities: SIS, Art. 39 and 46 and their relation with the aforementioned 
Framework Decision 2006/960, liaison officer corps as well as police and customs 
cooperation centres. 
But before that, let’s have a look at membership of the Schengen area, as it 
deserves some attention and at least a basic explanation, given its geographical 
difference from the EU membership area. 
                                                        
328 Articles 59–66 were replaced by the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA o the European 
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (hereinafter – Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA), OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1-18. Articles 77 to 81 and Articles 83 to 90 of 
the implementing Convention have been superseded by the Council Directive 91/447/EEC on 
control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, OJ L 256, 13.9.1991, p. 51-58, with the 
following amendments (OJ L 179 of 8.7.2008, p. 5-11). Articles 49(a), 52, 53 and 73 by the 
Convention established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ L 197, 12.7.2000, p. 3-23. 
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Currently, the Schengen area consists of 26 countries: 22 EU Member States and 4 
non-Member States and with the special partial Schengen acquis application to 
Ireland and specific to the United Kingdom and access of Bulgaria and Romania to 
SIS II, but for the moment without abolishment of the control on internal borders. 
EU Member State Member of Schengen Area 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria329  
Croatia  
Cyprus  
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland330  
Italy 
 Iceland331 
Latvia 
 Liechtenstein332 
                                                        
329 But already using SIS II. 
330 According to Article 4 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the 
European Union of the Amsterdam Treaty, Ireland is not bound by the Schengen acquis, but has a 
right at any time to request partial or entire participation in it. Such participation has to be 
approved by the unanimity of the Council (OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 95). According to the requests 
of the Government of Ireland, of 16th June 2000 and 1st November 2001, to participate in certain 
provisions of the Schengen acquis and the Council Decision 2002/192/EC concerning Ireland's 
request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis it is participating in the police 
and judicial cooperation established by the Schengen acquis, except cross-border hot pursuit and 
surveillance (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20-24). Never less those provisions of the CISA are still not 
applicable in Ireland. 
331 On 12th July 1957 Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark signed Convention on the 
Abolition of Passport Controls at Intra-Nordic borders and created Nordic Union of Passports. As 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark joined the EU and the Schengen area, in order to assure further 
functioning of the Nordic Union of Passport, on 19th December 1996, the Agreement between 
the thirteen Member States of the European Union, signatories to the Schengen Agreements and 
the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway was signed. Therefore, Article 6 of the 
Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union of the 
Amsterdam Treaty established that Iceland and Norway shall be associated with the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis and its further development. It was reflected in the 
Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of 
the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and 
the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, 
application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.07.1999, p. 1-16). 
332 On 28 February 2008 a Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the 
Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of 
Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the 
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Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
 Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania333  
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
 Switzerland334 
United Kingdom  
Table 2: Belonging to EU and Schengen Area. 
In the same way as Ireland, according to Article 4 of the Protocol integrating the 
Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the United Kingdom was not bound by the Schengen acquis, but had a right 
at any time to request partial or entire participation in it. 
According to the request of 22nd May 1999 (and its further modifications on 9th 
July and 6th October) and to the Council Decision 2000/365/EC concerning the 
request of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take part 
in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, the United Kingdom participates 
in police and judicial cooperation established, except cross-border hot pursuit.335 
On 22nd December 2004, the Council Decision 2004/926/EC on putting into effect 
of parts of the Schengen acquis by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland was adopted.336 Partial participation in the application of the 
CISA also entailed the United Kingdom in the participation of the SIS, with regard 
to criminal law and policing information; but due to the difficulties with N.SIS, it 
was decided to wait until the second generation of the SIS is created and to join 
that.337 The United Kingdom became operational in April 2015 and was granted 
temporary access to SIS II as a Council Decision with regard to evaluation is still 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, 
application and development of the Schengen acquis was signed (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21–36). 
333  But already using SIS II. 
334 On 26 October 2004 Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the 
Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, 
application and development of the Schengen acquis was signed (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52-79). 
335 OJ L 131, 1.6.2000, p. 43-47. See FERNÁNDEZ-PITA Y GONZÁLEZ, Rafael, “El Tratado de 
Amsterdam y el Acervo de Schengen” in MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR El espacio europeo de 
libertad…, op. cit., p. 93.  
336 OJ L 395, 31.12.2004, p. 70-80. 
337 See HOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE “Schengen Information System II (SIS 
II)” (Report with Evidence, 2007), p. 12-14, accessed January 18, 2013, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/49/49.pdf. 
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pending. As it does not apply Schengen acquis with respect to free movement, it has 
not abolished its border controls. 
2. Schengen Information System  
Before abolishment of the control of common borders, each country was 
responsible only for its own security and chose who it was going to send 
information about real or potential threats to.338 But within the obligation to 
contribute to the security of all the Schengen area, as noticed by Hreblay, the 
privileged partner does not exist anymore as all of them have be equally aware of 
all threats and receive the same information.339  
With the abolishment of common borders, more thorough control of persons and 
goods and additional measures were moved to the external border. The tool that is 
obligatory in the protection of external borders (land, air and maritime) and 
issuing visas for the Schengen area is SIS. It can also be used in internal checks 
performed by the law enforcement agencies when a person or an object raises 
suspicions. 
SIS is one of very few centralized systems340 of the EU and the biggest in terms of 
content. It allows the sharing of information about persons that can be a threat to 
internal security or need special attention and he objects of crime or investigation 
in the form of alerts among all Schengen Member States. 
The core element of the SIS is alert – a set of data on a person or object that 
requires special attention from the authorities performing the check. An alert sent 
by one country is automatically seen by the rest of the partners. 
Nowadays, SIS is an information exchange tool used most widely within the 
Schengen area.341  
On 31st December 2013 SIS II contained 50 279 389 alerts with the following “Top 
5” of the countries entering alerts: Italy (32.2% of all alerts), Germany (15%), the 
Netherlands (7.9%), Spain (7.8%) and France (5.5%).342  
Since the beginning of the functioning of SIS II (9th April 2013) until 31st 
December 2013, SIS II was consulted 1 284 512 470 times. The countries that 
                                                        
338  See HREBLAY, Vendelin, Les accords de Schengen: Origine…, op. cit., p. 149-150. 
339  Ibid. 
340  Apart from the Eurodac and the Visa Information System (VIS). 
341  See COM(2015) 185 final, p. 4. 
342  See EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE IT SYSTEMS 
IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE. “SIS II – 2013 Statistics” (Report, June 
2014), p. 9, accessed July 16, 2014, http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Pages/SIS-II-statistics.aspx. 
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more often consulted the system were Spain(26.75%), Germany(18.62%), Poland 
(10%), Romania (5%) and Czech Republic (3.89%).343 
2.1. From reporting to investigation 
At the moment of its establishment in the nineties SIS was viewed as a “form of 
computerized cooperation – a novelty in the international field”,344 a “vertebral 
column”345 of free movement of people within the Schengen area. 
As i mentioned before, looking structurally at the CISA, the provisions on SIS are 
laid out in the Title IV, i.e. Separately from the provision on police and judicial 
cooperation laid out in the Title III. First of all, it was seen as a tool for police 
controls on external borders and for the administration of foreigners346  
Nevertheless, let’s analyse it from different perspectives: 
 Primary legal regulation: Article 93 of the CISA foresaw that the purpose 
of SIS is to maintain public order and safety, including State security, and 
to implement the provisions on the movement of persons in the territory 
of the Member States, but it did not make direct reference to police and 
judicial cooperation. 
 The EU political approach: after transposing the Schengen acquis into EU 
legal framework, the European Commission considered SIS as “a vital 
factor in the smooth running of the Schengen frontier-free area and 
indispensable both in applying the Schengen arrangements on the 
movement of persons and in ensuring police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters”347 and move “from a reporting system to a reporting and 
investigation system”348. 
 Practical implementation: granting the right of the access (although it is 
not yet in use) to the United Kingdom and Ireland which at the beginning 
applied only the part of Schengen acquis related to police and judicial 
cooperation and called data stored in it “policing and criminal data”349 also 
shows that the SIS was not only a tool for external border controls and the 
assurance of free movement of persons. 
                                                        
343  Ibid, p. 7. 
344 SCHATTENBERG, Bernd, “Schengen Information System…”, loc. cit., p. 47. 
345 ALVARGONZÁLES SAN MARTÍN, Fernando, “Hacia un nuevo escenario de cooperación …”, loc. cit., 
p. 20. 
346 See DONAIRE VILLA, Francisco Javier, La Constitución y el Acervo de Schengen, op. cit., p. 114. 
347  COM(2001)720, p. 3.  
348 Ibid, p. 7. 
349  HOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE “Schengen Information System II (SIS II)”, 
loc. cit., p. 12. 
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 Scholar opinions: Peers describes SIS as the system firstly used by law 
enforcement institutions for checks at external borders or within 
Schengen states;350 Recuero indicates that SIS was established to improve 
coordination between police, customs and judicial services;351Hayas states 
that it is a powerful apparatus for surveillance and control.352 
 Current legal regulation of SIS II: Art. 2 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA says 
that the information exchange tools are in place for the purpose of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
Thus it could be concluded that a lot of indications demonstrate the use of SIS as a 
tool for the police and justice cooperation, although it was only established directly 
in the EU regulation in 2007 with the approval of the legislation for SIS II. 
2.2. From SIS to SIS II 
The SIS is based on interaction of the central system C.SIS353 and national systems 
N.SIS of every Schengen area state. 
Competent authorities of the countries insert alerts on persons or goods into their 
N.SIS from where they are transmitted to C.SIS that has a mirror reflection of all 
existing alerts of the States. Other countries, performing checks, directly consult 
the C.SIS (and not the N.SIS of other countries) and see all alerts issued in the 
Schengen area. When a performed check of a person or object results in a match 
with the alert (a so called “hit”), the system automatically informs that issuing 
country and national SIRENE354 offices of the searching and issuing State’s 
exchange. SIRENE offices continue with the exchange of all additional information 
(confirmation of its existence and actuality, additional information that could help 
to identify the person or object). 
Information exchange through the SIS started in 1995 between seven countries: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
                                                        
350  PEERS, Steve, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 2011), 
p. 908. 
351  RECUERO, Paz, “La protección de datos y Schengen: Una visión desde la experiencia española” in 
GOIZUETA VÉRTIZ, Juana; GONZÁLEZ MURUA, Ana Rosa and PARIENTE DE PRADA, Iñaki 
(directors), El Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad…, op. cit., p. 198. 
352  HAYES, Ben, “SIS II: fait accompli? Construction of EU’s Big Brother database underway” 
(Statewatch Analysis, May 2005), p. 1, accessed October 14, 2013 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/sisII-analysis-may05.pdf. 
353  It is located in Strasbourg (France) with the back-up system in Sankt Johann im Pongau near 
Salzburg (Austria). 
354  SIRENE - Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries, Supplément d'Information 
Requis a l'Entrée Nationale. 
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Since then, the SIS has technically been extended to SIS I+ in order to cope with the 
connection of eighteen States. In 2000 fifteen countries355 were connected, with 
the perspective to connect United Kingdom, Ireland and keeping one extra 
connection. The accession of 10 new countries to the EU in 2004 also meant the 
future extension of the Schengen area and a need for a technical solution for the 
connection of new countries to the SIS.356 
On 28 September 2001, the Commission decided to take responsibility both for the 
funding of SIS II and for the development work carried out under Community 
funding.357  
Council Decision 2001/886/JHA of 6th December 2001 on the development of the 
second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)358 foresaw a deadline for 
the development of the SIS II - December 2006. Besides the technological 
development of the central system and the need to adjust or to create new N.SIS, 
there was a need to adopt new legislation under the EU decision-making process in 
order to replace Articles 92-119 of the CISA. 
The legislative basis for the operation of the SIS II were adopted in 2006 
(Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II)359 (hereinafter – Regulation 1987/2006)) and Decision 
2007/533/JHA. 
Art. 1 of the above mentioned legal instruments establishes that the purpose of the 
SIS II is “to ensure a high level of security within the area of Freedom, security and 
Justice of the European Union including the maintenance of public security and 
public policy and the safeguarding of security in the territories of the Member 
States [...].”  
Although SIS II legal bases were adopted with only a slight delay, the technical 
development of the SIS II faced much bigger problems and setbacks. As noticed by 
the European Court of Audits, “The delay and overspending resulted partly from 
the challenging governance context which limited the Commission’s ability to 
                                                        
355  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
356  The idea of the SIS II was already raised in 1997 in the Decision of the Executive Committee of 7 
October 1997 on the development of the SIS (SCH/Com-ex (97) 24) (OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 442). 
357  COM(2001)720 final, p. 4. 
358  OJ L 328, 13.12.2001, p. 1-3. 
359  OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 4-23. 
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address operational issues and partly from weaknesses in the Commission’s 
management.”360 
This delay meant keeping EU “newcomers” outside the Schengen area and created 
a two speed EU. Nevertheless, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council 
held on 15th and 16th June 2006 expressed a political commitment to enlarge the 
Schengen area in April 2007.361  
In mid-2006, the future Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union362 came up with the proposal of an interim solution to use a clone of the 
Portuguese system to connect new countries to SIS and then make the transition of 
all to SIS II. 
On 5th December 2006 the Council adopted the Conclusions on the SIS II, the SIS 
1+ and the enlargement of the Schengen area.363 It was agreed to apply the 
intermediate solution proposed by Portuguese experts, “A clone of the Portuguese 
national system and developed by experts from Portugal’s Border and Foreign 
Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, relied upon extending the current 
version of the SIS to enable access by the new member states”364 named 
“sisone4all”. It allowed nine newcomers to the EU (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) to lift checks on 
their internal borders.365  
As pointed out by BERTOZZI, “Adding another difficult task such as the 
development of a parallel system to the workload of member states and the 
Commission hardly makes things easier - but the Portuguese idea immediately 
                                                        
360 EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITS, “Lessons from the European Commission’s development of the 
second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)” (Special Report, 2013), p. 6, accessed 
July 16, 2014, http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR14_03/SR14_03_EN.pdf.  
361  Council document 10633/1/06, p. 2.  
362  Art. 16(9) of the Treaty on European Union establishes that the Presidency of Council 
configurations, other than that of Foreign Affairs (which means General Affairs Council, 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council, Justice and Home Affairs Council, The Employment, 
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council, Competitiveness Council, Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy Council, Agriculture and Fisheries Council, Environment Council, 
Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Council), shall be held by Member State representatives in the 
Council on the basis of equal rotation. Thus every 6 months, the presidency of the Council of the 
European Union is taken over by another Member States. The second semester of 2015 is 
presided by Luxembourg. From January 2016, the presidency will be respectfully held by the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Malta, United Kingdom, Estonia, Bulgaria, Austria, Romania, Finland. See 
Council Decision 2009/908/EU laying down measures for the implementation of the European 
Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of 
preparatory bodies of the Council establishes presidencies’ rotation until 2020 (OJ L 322, 
9.12.2009, p. 28-34).  
363  Council document 16391/1/06. 
364  PARKIN, Joanna, “Difficult Road to the Schengen…”, loc. cit., p. 6  
365   The only “newcomer”, Cyprus, declared that its national N.SIS would not be ready for 2007, and it 
would join SIS II directly. 
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gained strong currency with the new member states, who decided to throw 
themselves behind what y considered to be a timely and sensible solution. Thanks 
to the Portuguese idea, mutual distrust and anger did not degenerate into 
outspoken hostility to Schengen enlargement, which would have created an 
irreparable rift between the old Schengen member states and “Schengen 
candidates”.366 
As a result of this solution, the integration of the new Member States into the SIS 
1+ through the sisone4all was accomplished by the end of 2007.367 On 6th 
December 2007, the Council Decision 2007/801/EC on the full application of the 
provisions of the Schengen acquis in the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic368 was adopted. It allowed their internal land and sea borders to be 
abolished on 21st December 2007 and air borders on 30 March 2008. 
SIS II finally became operational on 9th April 2013369 with a 6 year delay and 
exceeding the primary budget 8 times.370 
2.3. Content and functionalities of SIS II 
Both the CISA, regulating SIS, and Regulation 1987/2006 and Decision 
2007/533/JHA, regulating SIS II foresee 6 categories of alerts that can be inserted 
and consulted in the system: 
 Alerts on persons wanted for arrest for extradition / surrender purposes;  
 Alerts on refusing the entry of aliens;  
 Alerts on missing persons, including those that need special protection:  
 Alerts on persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure;  
 Alerts on persons and objects for discreet or specific checks;  
                                                        
366  BERTOZZI, Stefano, “Schengen: Achievements and Challenges in Managing and Area 
Encompassing 3.6 million km2” (Working document no. 284, Centre for European Policy Study, 
2008), p. 16-22, accessed October 2, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1337624  
367  See Council document 13540/06. 
368  OJ L 323, 8.12.2007, p. 34-35. 
369  It was established in the Council Decision 2013/157/EU fixing the date of application of Decision 
2007/533/JHA on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 87, 23.3.2013, p. 8-9), and Council Decision 2012/158/EU 
fixing the date of application of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) (OJ L 87, 23.3.2013, p. 10-11). 
370  Final budget was around 500 million euro for the whole project, including 189 million euro for 
the new C.SIS II instead of initially estimated 23 million euro. See European Court of Audits, 
“Lessons from the European Commission’s…”, loc. cit., p. 33-49.  
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 Alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence in criminal proceedings. 
On the basis of the experience from SIS, new legislation foresees some 
improvements related to the content or issuing of alerts, as well as some new 
functionalities and rights of access:  
 Direct insertion of the European Arrest Warrant;  
 The possibility of including not only alphanumeric, but also biometric data 
(photographs and fingerprints);  
 Extension of the list of objects that can be subject to alert (aircrafts, boats, 
industrial equipment, etc.);  
 Possibility to make a link between different alerts;  
 Access of Eurojust and vehicle registration service providers. 
2.3.1. Alerts: content and issuing rules  
As mentioned before, SIS contains alerts on persons and objects that are somehow 
linked to the alternation of internal security. That shows erroneous judgement in 
the common understanding that SIS contains information about everyone. It is true 
that everybody can be subject to alert, despite having citizenship, but a person has 
to be linked to some police investigation or judicial procedure, violation of rules 
allowing entrance into the Schengen area or in need of special attention due to 
his/her age or physical or mental state. 
Additionally, as stated in the report of the European Agency for the Operational 
Management of large-scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(hereinafter - eu-LISA) about SIS II content in 2013, “Alerts on persons 
represented 1.71% (861,900 alerts) of the content of SIS II. The biggest category of 
alert is represented by issued documents (such as passports, identity cards, 
driving licenses, residence permits and travel documents which have been stolen, 
misappropriated, lost or invalidated) with 79.23% (39,836,478 alerts) of the total 
amount of alerts.”371 Therefore the remaining 19.06 % alerts are on other objects. 
The first type of alerts in SIS II is on persons wanted for arrest for extradition or 
surrender purposes. The difference between regulation of the CISA and the 
Decision 2007/533/JHA is that in the CISA, only extradition procedure was 
mentioned and in the Decision 2007/533/JHA both extradition and surrender 
under the European Arrest Warrant are foreseen. Despite this change, the factual 
content of this category of alerts remains the same. 
                                                        
371  See EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE IT SYSTEMS 
IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE. “SIS II – 2013 Statistics”, loc. cit., p. 9. 
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During the drafting and approval of the CISA, the process known as extradition 
procedure was based on the principle of mutual assistance between involved 
states and meant the application of the complicated national process of making a 
decision to surround a person wanted by another country372 (involving judicial 
authorities and authorities of the executive power373). The evolution of judicial 
cooperation in the EU resulted in moving from the principle of mutual assistance to 
mutual recognition374; that means recognition of the judicial decision of other EU 
Member States without complicated internal procedure.375 The first instrument of 
practical implementation of the mutual recognition was the Council Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13th June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States (hereinafter – Decision 
2002/584/JHA)376, adopted on 13th June 2002 and applied instead of the 
extradition procedure among EU Member States since 1st January 2004. Due to 
that Chapter V of the Council Decision 2007/533/JHA refers to the persons wanted 
for arrest for surrender (among the EU Member States members of Schengen area) 
or extradition purposes (when one of the parties (issuing or requested) is a 
member of the Schengen zone, but not one applying the Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA, i.e. Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein). 
In both cases, the basis for the alert is a decision of the judicial authority. The 
novelty is that according to Article 27 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA, in the case of 
surrender on the basis of the European Arrest Order, an alert issuing Member State 
is also obliged to enter in the SIS II a copy of the original of the European Arrest 
Warrant. 
                                                        
372  As extradition very often is accompanied by the detention of a wanted person, it is always based 
on a judicial decision. 
373  Such as Ministries of Justice or even Ministries of Foreign Affairs or governmental committees or 
councils. 
374 As mentioned before, for the first time mutual recognition was established by the Tampere 
Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 15th-16th October 1999 that were adopted in 
order to implement measures of the judicial and police cooperation established by the 
Amsterdam Treaty:  
 “Enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements and the necessary 
approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation between authorities and the judicial 
protection of individual rights. The European Council therefore endorses the principle of mutual 
recognition which, in its view, should become the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both 
civil and criminal matters within the Union. The principle should apply both to judgements and to 
other decisions of judicial authorities. [...] the formal extradition procedure should be abolished 
among the Member States as far as persons are concerned who are fleeing from justice after 
having been finally sentenced, and replaced by a simple transfer of such persons [...]”. 
375  Although it is not an automatic recognition of a foreign judicial decision, but it does mean the 
application of simplified checking procedure by the national judicial authority (only judicial, 
without involving of the Executive Power) if a foreign judicial decision is not opposed to national 
judicial system and legislation.  
376  OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1-18. 
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For example, border guards or police authorities perform checks in the airport and 
detects that a person is a subject to alert on surrender or extradition. A copy of the 
European Arrest Warrant permits immediate access to both information on crime 
committed, and the judicial authority issuing the European Arrest Warrant. The 
issuing country will receive a notification that its alert resulted in a hit in another 
country and SIRENE offices of both of them will exchange all necessary 
information for the decision on further actions. If the issuing state confirms its 
need for a person’s surrender or extradition, then execution of the European 
Arrest Order or extradition request, according to the national law of the requested 
state, will take place. 
In the case of alerts on surrender, it is very important to take into consideration 
the principle non bis in idem. According to the European Court of Justice the same 
act is not understood as the same legal classification, but as “Identity of the 
material acts, understood as the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which 
are inextricably linked together.”377  
As a general rule, Member States assess the existence of non bis in idem only at the 
stage of the authorisation of surrender procedure to the requesting Member State, 
i.e. When a person is detected and possibly detained on the basis of alert. 
Nevertheless, this assessment should take place at the moment of appearance of 
the alert in the system, i.e. Member States receiving a new alert through SIS II 
should check whether a person was already convicted or acquitted for the same act 
on their territory. This would allow many inconveniences and violations of 
fundamental rights of the person concerned to be avoided. 
The second category of alerts is on refusing the entrance of third-country nationals 
to the Schengen area based on the decision of the competent administrative or 
judicial authority of one the members of Schengen area. Only third-country 
nationals can be subject to this category of alert, i.e. According to Article 3 (d), “Any 
individual who is neither citizen of the European Union within the meaning of 
Article 17(1) of the Treaty nor a national of a third country who, under agreements 
between the Community and its Member States on the one hand, and these 
countries, on the other, enjoys rights of free movement equivalent to those of 
citizens of the European Union.” 
This is the only category of alerts regulated by the Regulation 1987/2006 as they 
are directly related to the free movement of persons (former First Pillar of the EU) 
and not to compensatory measures and police cooperation. 
                                                        
377 Judgment of Court of Justice in Jean Leon Van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden and Republiek 
Italië, ECLI:EU:C:2006:614, C-150/05, paragraph 48; in Criminal proceedings against Leopold 
Henri Van Esbroeck, ECLI:EU:C:2006:165 C-436/04, paragraph 36.  
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According to Article 27 of the Regulation 1987/2006, besides police, customs and 
judicial authorities, “The right to search data under this category of alert may be 
exercised by the authorities responsible for issuing visas, the central authorities 
responsible for examining visa applications and the authorities responsible for 
issuing residence permits and for the administration of legislation relating to third 
country nationals in the context of the application of the Community acquis 
relating to the movement of persons.”  
As previously mentioned, this category of alerts and related information exchange 
do not fall under strict understanding of the police cooperation, and is outside of 
police cooperation in crime investigation and, therefore, will not be analysed in 
depth. 
The third category of alerts is on missing persons, including those that need special 
protection (as minors or persons who have to be interned). 
In case of this category of alert, regulation foreseen in the CISA and the Decision 
2007/533/JHA is slightly different in terms but not in content. Article 97 of the 
CISA entails that the basis for alert is a decision of the competent authority or 
competent judicial authority, while Article 32(1) of the Decision 2007/533/JHA 
refers to the request of the competent national authority without emphasising 
judicial ones. Alerts on missing persons can be issued despite their nationality, and 
special attention is paid to missing minors. 
Article 33 deserves special observation; this article foresees that information 
found on an adult missing person (if he/she is not a minor and does not need 
special protection) can be transmitted to others, apart from competent authorities, 
(e.g. His/her family) only with his/her consent. But competent authorities are 
allowed to communicate to the person who reported the disappearance the fact 
that the alert has been erased due to the missing person’s appearance. 
The following categories of alerts are on persons sought in order to assist with a 
judicial procedure. According to the Article 34 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA those 
are: 
 Witnesses;  
 Persons ordered or sought to summoned to appear before the judicial 
authorities for acts for which they are prosecuted;  
 Persons to be served with the sentence or other procedural document of 
the process in which they are prosecuted or summons to carry out the 
penalty. 
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Article 98 of the CISA foresaw that such an alert can be issued on the request of the 
judicial authority, but Article 34 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA broadens the 
concept of the requesting authorities from judicial to competent ones. A new 
regulation also foresee that the alert could be issued not only to serve a summons 
in relation to the penalty applied, but also criminal judgment or other procedural 
documents related to the prosecution of the person in question. From first sight, 
this widening of the reasons to issue an alert could seem unnecessary and 
widening the list of people “under alert”, but from another perspective, it allows a 
prosecuted person to be informed about the process against him / her and to 
ensure his / her procedural warranties (especially those foreseen in the Art. 6 of 
the ECHR, Art. 2-4 of the Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, Chapter VI of the Charter) to 
inform the person about the judgment that will be, or has been taken, in absencia 
and to give him / her the opportunity to seek better defence . 
The fourth category of alerts is for discreet checks (surveillance), or specific checks 
on persons and objects and has experienced the biggest modification in the new 
legislation. 
First of all, it is related to the terms used. The CISA had foreseen “discreet 
surveillance” and “specific check” and the Decision 2007/533/JHA modified 
“surveillance” into “check”, establishing in this way alerts for “discreet checks” and 
“specific checks”. But legal provisions on the performance of “discreet 
surveillance” / “discreet checks” did not undergo any changes: it still remains a 
collection of information when border, other police and customs controls are 
carried out.378 That means that this discreet action is performed only at the 
moment of the border, police or customs check and is not continued afterwards, i.e. 
After this check the person or object is allowed to continue the journey and is no 
longer observed. Therefore, the modification of “discreet surveillance” into 
“discreet check” is reasonable, as “surveillance” is an action more coherent with 
the process of movement after the followed subject and lasting in time. The change 
into “discreet check” also helps to avoid mixing up the category of alert in SIS II 
with the police cooperation instrument “Cross-border surveillance”, foreseen in 
Article 40 of the CISA. In later cases “surveillance is a continuous process with the 
involvement of the competent authority of different Member State and can last 
hours, days or months, depending on the need.”379  
                                                        
378  See Article 99(4) of the CISA and Article 37(1) of the Decision 2007/533/JHA. 
379  Misuse of the term “surveillance” is also pointed out by the Association of Chief Police Officers of 
England, Wales & Northern Ireland who states that, “There is no intrusive, directed surveillance in 
this alert”. See ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICER OF ENGLAND, WALES & NORTHERN 
IRELAND, “Guidelines for the use of the Schengen Information System II to locate people for 
judicial purposes”, version 7, 2010, p. 5, accessed January 16, 2013, 
http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/criminaljustice/2008/200810CJUSIS01.pdf. 
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The following modification is more significant as Decision 2007/533/JHA extends 
the categories of the object that could be under discreet or specific checks and 
besides vehicles, includes boats, aircraft and containers. 
The general purposes of checks remain the same: prosecuting criminal offences, 
the prevention of threats to public security or internal or external national 
security. The table below presents in detail the differences between previous and 
current regulation. 
CISA - Art. 99 Decision 2007/533/JHA - Art. 36 
Such an alert may be issued for the purposes of 
prosecuting criminal offences and for the 
prevention of threats to public security: 
Such an alert may be issued for the purposes of 
prosecuting criminal offences and for the 
prevention of threats to public security: 
(a) where there is clear evidence that the person 
concerned intends to commit or is committing 
numerous and extremely serious criminal 
offences; or 
 
(a) where there is clear indication that a person 
intends to commit or is committing a serious 
criminal offence, such as the offences referred to 
in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA; or 
(b) where an overall assessment of the person 
concerned, in particular on the basis of past 
criminal offences, gives reason to suppose that 
that person will also commit extremely serious 
criminal offences in the future. 
(b) where an overall assessment of a person, in 
particular on the basis of past criminal offences, 
gives reason to suppose that that person will 
also commit serious criminal offences in the 
future, such as the offences referred to in Article 
2(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. 
3. In addition, the alert may be issued in 
accordance with national law, at the request of 
the authorities responsible for national security, 
where re is clear evidence that the information 
referred to in paragraph 4 is necessary in order 
to prevent a serious threat by the person 
concerned or serious threats to internal or 
external national security. 
[...] 
3. In addition, an alert may be issued in 
accordance with national law, at the request of 
the authorities responsible for national security, 
where re is concrete indication that the 
information referred to in Article 37(1) is 
necessary in order to prevent a serious threat 
by the person concerned or serious threats to 
internal or external national security. 
[...] 
Table 3: Difference between regulation of alerts on wanted persons in SIS and SIS II. 
The first modification (from “clear evidence” to “concrete indication”) can raise 
contradictory discussions. From the perspective of fundamental rights, “clear 
evidence” is a more accurate background for the restriction of the right to private 
and family life than is made by the discreet or specific check and the term 
“concrete indication” is much broader and could lead to the violation of the above 
mentioned right. 
From the procedural perspective, evidence is a term more related to the judicial 
trial than to the phase when discreet or specific checks are ordered, i.e. The phase 
of investigation or operational activity. There could be concrete intelligence 
information or indication about the preparation to commit a crime, or about the 
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object being related to a serious crime, but is no evidence as yet. For example, one 
of the countries is gathering intelligence on the group of people that, according to 
police sources (agents, undercover officers, etc.) Are related to the trafficking of 
drugs, but competent authorities are missing information about the modus 
operandi used and the organisers. As trafficking is usually cross-border crime, it is 
logical that the competent authorities have the need to issue an alert for discreet 
checks, in order to find out missing information, e.g. the movement of suspects, 
their contacts and people who they mix with. This can help to reveal drug 
trafficking schemes and also possible relationships with organized crime groups 
from other Schengen area countries. 
The second modification (from “extremely serious criminal offence” to “serious 
criminal offence such as offences referred to in Article 2(2) of the Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA”) brings legal certainty, because there is no definition of 
“extremely serious criminal offence”, but Art. 2(2) of the Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States380 foresees the exhaustive list of criminal acts that 
represent the background for the surrender procedure and are classified as 
serious crimes.381  
                                                        
380  OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 3. 
381 According to Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, there are two conditions for 
treating a crime as serious.  
 1. It has to be one of the following crimes: “participation in a criminal organisation, terrorism, 
trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, illicit 
trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions 
and explosives, corruption, fraud, including that affecting the financial interests of the European 
Communities within the meaning of the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests, laundering of the proceeds of crime, counterfeiting 
currency, including of the euro, computer-related crime, environmental crime, including illicit 
trafficking in endangered animal species and in endangered plant species and varieties, 
facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence, murder, grievous bodily injury, illicit trade in 
human organs and tissue, kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking, racism and 
xenophobia, organised or armed robbery, illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques 
and works of art, swindling, racketeering and extortion, counterfeiting and piracy of products, 
forgery of administrative documents and trafficking rein, forgery of means of payment, illicit 
trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth, promoters, illicit trafficking in nuclear or 
radioactive materials, trafficking in stolen vehicles, rape, arson, crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court, unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships, sabotage.” 
 2. It shall be punishable in the alert issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least three years (without verification of the double criminality 
of the act).  
 As correctly noticed by Oubiña Barbolla, in theory it sounds perfect, but in practice, one or other 
crime will face inexistence in some Member State, or the application of a lesser punishment than 
the maximum of three years; the regulation of the requesting (issuing) authority also has to be 
taken into account. See OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, Sabela “The European Arrest Warrant in Law and 
Practice” in RUGGERI, Stefano, Liberty and Security in Europe. A comparative analysis of pre-trial 
precautionary measures in criminal proceedings (Göttingen: V&R Unipress GmbH, 2012), p. 53-
54. 
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Before this modification, the Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority pointed out 
that the method for selecting criminal offences leading to an Article 99 alert, varied 
between the States. Most of them declared that the decision depends on the type of 
measure and the type of crime. For instance, Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Italy, and 
Norway notified that Article 99 would be applied to serious crimes. In Sweden and 
Hungary, offences punishable with, respectively, more than four and five years of 
imprisonment are regarded as serious criminal offences. Austria applies both 
methods. In Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, no specification 
exists on the category of criminal offences that may lead to an Article 99 alert given 
that any type of crime can be used. As a consequence of this diversity, the Schengen 
Joint Supervisory Authority recommended that “the list of serious crimes for which 
Europol is competent or the Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant can be used for this purpose”.382 
The last category of alerts in SIS II is related to objects for seizure or use as 
evidence in criminal proceedings. Article 38(2) of the Decision 2007/533/JHA has 
widened some of the existing types of objects and added new ones. For the sake of 
clarity, changes are shown in the table below. 
CISA - Art. 100(3) Decision 2007/533/JHA - Art. 38(2) 
Stolen, misappropriated or lost motor 
vehicles (capacity over 50 cc) 
 
Motor vehicles (capacity over 50 cc) 
 
Stolen, misappropriated or lost trailers 
and caravans over 750 kg 
Trailers over 750 kg, caravans 
 Stolen, misappropriated, lost or invalidated vehicle 
registration certificates and license plates 
 Boats and aircraft 
 Industrial equipment, outboard engines and 
containers 
Stolen, misappropriated or lost firearms Firearms 
Stolen, misappropriated or lost blank 
official documents 
Stolen, misappropriated or lost blank official 
documents 
Stolen, misappropriated or lost identity 
documents 
Stolen, misappropriated, lost or invalidated identity 
and travel documents 
Banknotes Banknotes 
 Securities and means of payment 
Table 4: Differences between regulation of alerts on object for seizure or use as evidence in 
SIS and SIS II. 
                                                        
382 JOINT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF SCHENGEN, “Report of the Schengen Joint Supervisory 
Authority on an inspection of the use of Article 99 alerts in the Schengen Information System”, 
2007, p. 8, 12, accessed January 14, 2013, http://schengen.consilium.europa.eu 
/media/135672/07-02%20draft%20report%20article%2099.en08.pdf. 
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Changes brought by the Decision 2007/533/JHA have not only broadened the list 
of the objects that can be subject to the alert, but has also relinquished conditions 
on issuing alerts for vehicles, trailers, caravans and firearms. 
According to Art. 100 of the CISA alerts on vehicles, trailers, caravans and firearms 
for seizure or use as evidence, could only be issued if those objects that were 
“stolen, misappropriated or lost”. Disclaiming these conditions should be regarded 
as a positive change, because in the criminal process a need to seize, or to use as 
evidence, an object used for the commission of a crime appears (e.g. A car or a gun 
used for the robbery, container or caravan used for trafficking), but not necessarily 
stolen, misappropriated or lost. 
The category of identity documents is broadened by the inclusion of invalidated 
documents (in addition to previous categories of those stolen, misappropriated or 
lost) and the addition of new travel documents. This extension makes sense as a 
document could be invalid or out of legal use, not only due to it having been lost, 
misappropriated or stolen, but also due to the decision of the competent authority. 
Inclusion of travel documents is justified by the wide circulation of visas that are 
not identity documents but very relevant in order to enter Schengen area. 
The inclusion of new objects (boats, aircrafts, travel documents, vehicle 
registration certificates, vehicle license plates and payment methods) was 
influenced by changes in crime trends (which objects are used to commit a crime 
or to be the object of a crime) and developments in society (different modalities of 
payment methods). In the first half of the year of using the SIS II, the “champion” 
among the new types of object was payment methods , 99.8 % of which were 
entered by Italy.383 
As alerts on refusing the entry of aliens have little relevance to criminal process, 
the following analysis of functioning and use of SIS II will include only: alerts on 
persons wanted for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes; alerts on persons 
sought to assist with a judicial procedure; alerts on persons and objects for 
discreet checks or specific checks; alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence 
in criminal proceedings. 
From the analysis above, the differences in authorities that are allowed to request 
the issuing of the alert can be noticed, as summarised in the following table. 
                                                        
383 Information provided by KLEIN Dominique, representative of the Unit C3 (Transeuropean 
Networks for Freedom and Security and Relations with eu-LISA) of the Directorate General HOME 
of the European Commission on the Heads of SIRENE Offices Conference in Vilnius on 30 
October, 2013. 
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Category of the alert Background 
Alert with respect to a person wanted for 
extradition or surrender 
Request of judicial authority 
Alert on a missing person Competent authority of the Member State 
Alert on persons sought to assist with a judicial 
procedure 
Competent authority of the Member State 
Alerts on persons and objects for discreet 
checks or specific checks 
Authorities foreseen in national law and 
authorities responsible for national security 
Alerts on objects for seizure or use as evidence 
in criminal procedure 
Not specified 
Table 5: Authorities authorised to request different types of alerts. 
The diversity of authorities is justified by the actions that have to be taken in 
relation to an alert. The most precise requirement (or limitation) is established for 
the alert with respect to a person wanted for extradition or surrender. Only 
judicial authority is permitted to make this request as the consequence of an alert 
is a deprivation of liberty. In other cases, the term “competent authorities of the 
Member State” is used and can include both judicial and law enforcement 
authorities, depending on the national legislation. As an example, a table of 
competent authorities from some countries that have a right to authorise alert 
requests on persons and objects for discreet or specific checks is presented.384 
Member 
State 
Competent authority (-ies) to request an alert for discreet or specific check 
Austria Law enforcement authorities (Directorate-General for Public Security, Land 
Security Directorates, Federal Police Departments, Federal Police Services) 
Belgium  All police and judicial authorities working 24 hours a day 
Cyprus Police and customs authorities 
Czech 
Republic 
Police and intelligence services 
Denmark Police 
Estonia Security Police Board, Tax and Customs Board, the Border Guard authorities, 
police and Prosecutor´s Office 
Finland  Police, customs and border guard services 
France  Police, judicial authorities, authorities of prefectures, special division of the 
Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of France 
Germany Police, customs and intelligence service 
Greece Public Security Division and the State Security Division of the Ministry of Public 
Order 
Hungary Police and customs authorities 
Iceland National Commissioner of the Police 
Ireland National Police 
Italy Main law enforcement authorities (Polizia di Stato – Arma dei Carabinieri and 
Guardia di Finanza) 
                                                        
384  See JOINT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF SCHENGEN, “Report of the Schengen Joint…”, loc. cit., p. 
16-17; Council document 12301/08, p. 2-6. 
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Member 
State 
Competent authority (-ies) to request an alert for discreet or specific check 
Latvia Law enforcement authorities, Military Police, Prison Administration, Constitution 
protections Bureau 
Luxembourg Public Prosecution Office on the request of the police 
Malta Police service and security service 
Netherlands Public prosecutors 
Norway Prosecuting police attorney on request of National Bureau of Crime Investigation 
or district police 
Portugal Public prosecutor and the police. 
Slovenia Public prosecutor on the request of the police 
Spain Law enforcement and judicial authorities; also, those authorities responsible for 
the security of the state 
Sweden Public Prosecutor’s Office, the police, customs and border guard services 
Switzerland  Law enforcement authorities 
United 
Kingdom 
All law enforcement institutions 
Table 6: Authorities of different Member State authorised to request alert for discreet or 
specific check. 
The Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority criticised some countries (such as 
France and Italy) for disproportionate authorization to issue alerts by comparison 
with others where only one authority (in the case of Greece, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands) is permitted to do that.385 As already mentioned, Italy issued 32. 2% 
of all alerts. 
In some cases, even the national law of one country foresees the different 
competencies of the national authorities in relation to the same category of alert. 
For example, according to the legislation of the United Kingdom, in the case of an 
alert for witnesses to seek to assist with a judicial procedure, the alert will be 
issued by the police and in the case of persons that are to be prosecuted – the 
Prosecutor or the Court.386 
For alerts on objects for seizure, or use as evidence in criminal procedure, no 
authority is specified, but it could also be interpreted as a “competent authority”, 
because national rules on SIS II have to indicate the authorities allowed to come 
out with an alert request. 
Every alert contains a certain amount of data on subjects or objects, including 
personal ones. For the sake of personal data protection, Article 94 of the CISA, 
Article 20 of the Council Decision 2007/533/JHA and Article 20 of the Regulation 
                                                        
385  See HAYES, Ben, “EU-SIS Schengen Information System Article 99 report: 33,541 people 
registered in SIS for surveillance and checks” (Statewatch Analysis, February 2008), p. 2-3, 
accessed October 13, 2013, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-67-sis-art99.pdf. 
386  See ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICER OF ENGLAND, WALES & NORTHERN IRELAND, 
“Guidelines for the use of the Schengen…”, loc. cit., p. 5-7. 
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1987/2006 establish limitations on data contained in the system. All three legal 
acts foresee the following categories of data on a person subject to an alert that can 
be stored: 
 Surname and forenames, any aliases possibly entered separately; 
 Any specific objective physical characteristics, not subject to change; 
 First letter of second forename; 
 Date and place of birth; 
 Sex; 
 Nationality; 
 Whether the persons concerned are armed; 
 Whether the persons concerned are violent; 
 Reason for the alert; 
 Action to be taken. 
Article 20 of Decision 2007/533/JHA and Article 20 of the Regulation 1987/2006 
increase the scope of the data included in SISI II by introducing new categories:  
 Photographs;  
 Fingerprints;  
 Authority issuing the alert;  
 A reference to the decision giving rise to the alert;  
 Links to other alerts in SIS II;  
 The type of offence. 
New categories directly related to the person (subject to alert) are photographs 
and fingerprints. Article 22(1b) of Decision 2007/533, and Article 22(1b) of 
Regulation 1987/2006 state that these new categories of data can be used only to 
confirm the identity of a person that has been detected on the basis of the 
alphanumeric data in SIS II. Introducing photos and fingerprints into SIS II allows 
verification with greater accuracy, whether the person subject to an alert and the 
one that is checked are the same. There are numerous cases when the offender 
commits a crime using stolen documents and his/her real identity is not known to 
the law enforcement and judicial authorities, and therefore, an alert is issued in the 
name of the misused identity. In this case, a photo and the fingerprints of the 
offender are the only criteria to verify whether a person checked is a wanted 
person, or the legal owner of stolen documents. Previously, an officer having a hit 
of alphanumeric data had to detain a person and wait to receive the photo or 
fingerprints as supplementary387 information. 
                                                        
387   For supplementary information see subsection 2.4 of this Chapter.  
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Storage of the photos and fingerprints in the SIS II, allows immediate verification of 
the person is checked and to avoid deprivation of the liberty of the innocent 
person. 
In 2015, the countries of the Schengen area agreed that introducing information 
about whether a person is a foreign fighter or a terrorist suspect could be 
mentioned in the alert.388 It is especially applicable to alerts on specific and 
discreet checks. In the case of an alert hit that includes such information 
(irrespective of the category of the alert), the authority that carries out searches 
has an obligation to immediately inform the SIRENE bureau of the State which 
issued an alert. 
According to the general rule, established in Article 40 of the Decision 
2007/533/JHA and Article 27 of the Regulation 1987/2006/EC, access to SIS II 
data and the right to search is granted to the authorities responsible for border 
controls, other police and customs checks. Nevertheless, according to Art. 40(2), 
giving access to the national judicial authorities is allowed, including those 
responsible for the initiation of public prosecutions in criminal proceedings and 
for judicial inquiries prior to charge within the limits that are needed for their 
duties. 
With respect to the purpose, information from alerts can be used for purposes 
other than for which they were issued, only in order to prevent serious threats to 
public policy or security, to national security or to prevent serious crimes. In such 
cases, consent from the Member State that has issued the alert has to be obtained. 
Decision 2007/533/JHA does not provide a definition of serious crime. But as in 
Article 36, a reference to a list of Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA is made; serious crime should be understood as one of offences 
mentioned, or national competent authorities can interpret this provision 
according to their national provisions which can differ a lot. In order to avoid such 
uncertainty, it would be better to include in Article 3(1) a definition of serious 
crime, even if it is not a comprehensive one, than a reference to the Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA. 
According to Articles 41 and 42 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA, Europol and 
Eurojust are also allowed to access some categories of alerts as it is presented in 
the table below. 
 
 
                                                        
388  COM(2015) 185 final, p. 5. 
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Europol Eurojust 
- On wanted persons 
- On persons and objects for discreet or specific 
checks 
- On objects for seizure or use as an evidence 
- On wanted persons 
- On missing persons 
- On persons sought to assist with a judicial 
procedure 
- On objects for seizure or use as an evidence 
Table 7: Categories of alerts that can be issued by Europol and Eurojust. 
Europol’s access to the aforementioned categories of alerts was raised in 1999 as a 
recommendation in the EU “Action Plan on Organised Crime”389, and officially 
foreseen in Article 1(9) of Council Decision 2005/211/JHA of 24th February 2005 
concerning the introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information 
System, included in the fight against terrorism (hereinafter, Decision 
2005/211/JHA).390 
Apart from the limitation in relation to the content of the SIS II, Europol’s and 
Eurojust’s right to access is different from the one granted to the States (and their 
national authorities), from a technical point of view as well. Europol and Eurojust 
are not able to access either N.SIS or C.SIS, but only special SIS II database copies 
with the relevant category articles for which they have an authorisation. These 
copies are updated by the C.SIS. 
The European Data Protection Supervisor in its Opinion on the legislative 
proposals concerning the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
has highlighted that Europol and Eurojust, unlike competent institutions of States, 
are not authorised to take specific actions on alerts (arrest a person, perform 
specific or discreet check, etc.) And therefore these agencies will not use the SIS II 
as a compensatory measure for the abolition of the borders. They will use SIS II for 
their own institutional purposes and moreover, the legislation does not provide 
any specification of the purposes to access and allows “fishing expeditions”391. 
According to Article 41(3) of the Decision 2007/533/JHA, Europol can use the 
information obtained from a search in the SIS II with the consent of the Member 
State that has issued the alert, but it is clear that this use does not derive directly 
from the purpose of the SIS II. 
In the case of Eurojust, Article 42(6) permits access to the SIS II only to the 
national members of Eurojust and their assistants and excludes Eurojust staff. 
According to the Article 2(1) of the Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28th 
                                                        
389 See HAYES, Ben, “From the Schengen Information System to SIS and the Visa Information (VIS): 
proposals explained” (Statewatch analysis, February 2004), p. 10, accessed October 13, 2013, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/analysis-sisII.pdf. 
390  OJ L 68, 15.3.2005, p. 46-47. 
391  Council document 14091/05, p. 12. 
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February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against 
serious crime,392 national members are prosecutors, judges or police officers of 
equivalent competence. And it does not contradict the general right of access to the 
SIS II established in the aforementioned Article 40(2) of Decision 533/2007/JHA. 
Hayes questions Europol’s and Eurojust’s access needs, “With 125,000 access 
points to the SIS, it is surely beyond any credibility to suggest that an EU-level 
information broker is needed. Europol clearly wants the information in the SIS to 
use in conjunction with its own extensive investigative database. Eurojust and 
national prosecuting authorities’ will also use SIS II for investigative purposes; it is 
worth stating again that the use of the SIS is currently limited to police and 
immigration checks. SIS II will be an altogether different proposition with a host of 
law enforcement and ‘security’ functions.”393 
Regulation (EC) 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
regarding access to the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), 
by the services of the Member States responsible for issuing vehicle registration 
certificates394, foresees access of the aforementioned services to alerts for seizure 
or use as evidence in criminal proceedings of the following objects: motor vehicles, 
trailers, data concerning vehicle registration certificates and vehicle number 
plates, in order to check whether the vehicles presented to them are stolen, 
misappropriated or lost, or are sought as evidence in criminal procedure. 
In order to have general understanding in relation to the dimension of the SIS and 
the SIS II, the quantitative information on records is presented below. For this 
purpose, the years 1995 (the beginning of the functioning of the system with the 
first 7 countries), 2007 (functioning with 15 countries), 2008 (the access of new 9 
countries) and latest available information are reflected. 
Year Number of countries Number of records 
1995 7 3,868,529395 
2007 15 17,615,945396 
2008 24 22,933,370397 
2014 26 50, 279, 389398 
Table 8: Figures on alerts issued in 1995, 2007, 2008 and 2014. 
                                                        
392 OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 2.  
393  HAYES, Ben, “SIS II: fait accompli?...”, loc. cit., p. 6.  
394 OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 1-3. 
395  HAYES, Ben, “From Schengen Information System…”, loc. cit., p. 6.  
396  SCHENGEN JOINT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY, “Eight Activity Report – December 2005 – 
December 2008”, p. 9, accessed January 16, 2013, http://schengen.consilium.europa.eu 
/media/135384/8th%20schengen%20act.report%202005-08.en.pdf. 
397  Ibid. 
398  EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE IT SYSTEMS IN 
THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE, Report “SIS II – 2013 Statistics”, loc. cit., p. 9. 
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2.3.2. Relationships between multiple alerts: compatibility, links 
and priorities 
By entering an alert into SIS, a Member State can face a situation of the existence of 
another alert on the same person or subject. It could be an alert of the same or 
another category entered by the other institution of the same or other Member 
State. For example: 
 SIS contains an alert on a person sought to assist with a judicial procedure 
and then, in relation to another (or the same case) judicial authority of the 
same or another Member State, issues European Arrest Order and orders 
the issue of an alert for arrest for surrender procedure. 
 A car is subject to a specific check in the investigation of drug trafficking, 
but in another case, run by another authority, this car figures as a means 
to commit a robbery and an alert for seizure has to be issued. 
For such cases, SIRENE Manual and other implementing measures for SIS II399 
approved by the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/219 (hereinafter 
–SIRENE Manual), foresees the protocol to be followed and establishes 
compatibility of alerts and priorities in cases of multiple alerts. 
Every country is allowed to enter only one alert per person or object, i.e. If one 
institution is looking for a person as a witness to a crime, and another institution of 
the same country has issued a European Arrest Warrant, only one of these issues 
can be announced as an alert in the SIS II. The remaining one is kept at national 
level and can be introduced only when the prevailing alert is deleted from SIS II. 
The Member State has to decide the priority in which its alerts would be entered 
into the SIS II by itself, but the reference rules of the SIRENE manual on priority 
between alerts of different Member States can be applied.  
On persons On objects 
- Arrest with a view to surrender or extradition 
- Refusing entry or stay in the Schengen territory 
- Placing under protection 
- Specific checks with immediate action 
- Specific checks 
- Discreet checks with immediate action 
- Discreet checks 
- Communicating whereabouts 
- Use as evidence 
- Seizure of document invalidated for travel 
purposes 
- Seizure 
- Specific checks with immediate action 
- Specific checks 
- Discreet checks with immediate action 
- Discreet checks 
Table 9: Priority in case of multiple alerts. 400 
                                                        
399  OJ L 44, 18.2.2015, p. 75-116. 
400 Ibid, p. 92. 
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Different Member States can have alerts on the same person if they are compatible 
among themselves according to the rules established by the SIRENE Manual as it 
presented below. 
 Arrest 
Refusal 
of entry 
Missing 
person 
(protection) 
Specific 
check 
(immediate 
action) 
Specific 
check 
Discreet 
check 
(immediate 
action) 
Discreet 
check 
Missing 
person 
(whereabouts) 
Judicial 
procedure 
Arrest + + + - - - - + + 
Refusal of 
entry 
+ + - - - - - - - 
Missing 
person 
(protection) 
+ - + - - - - + + 
Specific check 
(immediate 
action) 
- - - + + - - - - 
Specific check - - - + + - - - - 
Discreet check 
(immediate 
action) 
- - - - - + + - - 
Discreet check - - - - - + + - - 
Missing 
person 
(whereabouts) 
+ - + - - - - + + 
Judicial 
procedure 
+ - + - - - - + + 
Table 10: Compatibility of alerts on persons.401 
Thus alert for arrest is compatible with all categories of alerts except alerts for 
specific or discreet checks. Alerts for specific or discreet checks are neither 
compatible with any other category of checks or among themselves. 
In the case of multiple alerts for arrest, decision about the order of execution has to 
be taken by the executing judicial authority in the country where the arrest has 
occurred. 
If alerts are incompatible, SIRENE bureaux of the countries involved have to 
consult each other and decide, which alert remains in the SIS II. If an agreement 
cannot be reached on the basis of the above mentioned list of priorities, the oldest 
alert is kept in the system. 
In the case of the example with the car, the Member State has to issue an alert for 
seizure and the existing alert to check has to be deleted. If the Member States 
involved cannot reach an agreement, the older alert will be kept in the SIS II, i.e. 
Alert for check. 
In the case of alerts on objects, the rules of compatibility are as presented in the 
table below. 
                                                        
401  Ibid, p. 91. 
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For use as 
evidence 
Invalidated 
doc. for 
travel 
For 
seizure 
Specific 
check 
(immediate 
action) 
Specific 
check 
Discreet 
check 
(immediate 
action) 
Discreet 
check 
For use as 
evidence 
+ + + - - - - 
Invalidated 
doc. for 
travel 
+ + + - - - - 
For seizure + + + - - - - 
Spec. Check 
(immediate 
action) 
- - - + + - - 
Specific 
check 
- - - + + - - 
Discr. 
check 
(immediate 
action) 
- - - - - + + 
Discreet 
check 
- - - - - + + 
Table 11: Compatibility of alerts on objects.402 
Article 52 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA and Article 37 of the Regulation 
1987/2006 bring a novelty that has not been possible in the SIS – links between 
alerts. In cases of operational need, it allows a relationship between two or more 
alerts on different persons or objects to be established. The link can be made only 
if the same Member State enters those alerts. For example, if one Member State 
investigates an organized group that steals cars, it can make a link between alerts 
on stolen cars, persons (members of the organized group) to be subject to discreet 
checks, other persons involved and already wanted for arrest.403 Boehm echoes the 
                                                        
402 Ibid, p. 92. 
403  SIS and SIRENE experts that working on the elaboration of the SIS II foresaw not exhaustive list 
of possible links: 
 gang members + family members wanted for surrender or extradition;  
 EU national offender wanted for surrender or extradition + convicted companion to be refuse 
entry;  
 kidnapper + missing person;  
 (sexual) offender + his child-victim or child-witness to crime;  
 husband wanted terrorist or convicted to be refused entry + specific or discreet check of wife 
suspected accomplice; 
 wanted person + specific or discreet check of his yacht or car; 
 wanted person + stolen object; 
 parent to be refused entry + missing child (third country national); 
 person to be refused entry + stolen identity document; 
 two or more missing siblings; 
 missing person + person wanted for questioning on that missing person; 
 missing child + car used for abduction, etc. 
 See Council document 12573/3/04, p. 3. 
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aforementioned opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor404 and 
interprets this development as transforming the SIS II into an investigative tool, 
“The status of an individual in the SIS II no longer depends solely on his or her 
personal actions, but, when connected to the actions of other people, the person 
concerned might be treated with more suspicion than before. This can easily lead 
to a situation in which a previously innocent individual is linked to an alert of a 
criminal, having as a consequence that the status of the relevant person will be 
negatively influenced.”405 
This reasoning could be criticised from different perspectives: 
 As the SIS II remains, the task of the SIS to be one of the compensatory 
measures to the abolishment of the control of internal borders, the linking 
of the alerts enhances this function by making such an expensive tool as 
SIS II more effective. For example, if a competent authority performs 
specific or discreet checks on a person according to the alert that shows 
links to other persons that form organized crime groups, the officer would 
pay more attention to the persons travelling in the same car or on the 
same flight, etc. If linked persons use new aliases or forged identity 
documents with a different name from the one entered into SIS II, it would 
be impossible to detect them directly in SIS on the basis of alphanumeric 
data. But with the detection of at least one of the linked persons, the officer 
can access not only the alphanumeric data of linked alerts, but also 
attached photos and on this basis identify other persons under alert. 
 A Person’s status does not change by the linking alerts and still depends on 
the category of alert that is issued in relation to him. For example, if a 
person sought as a witness is linked to wanted persons, it is done because 
they figure in the same investigation, but it does not mean that the witness 
becomes more suspicious than before, at least they were detected 
together. In the last situation, first of all it can be considered that witness 
is travelling with the wanted person against his will and relevant 
measures can be taken. If he or she is travelling willingly, then SIRENE 
office of issuing country should be informed, but it does not change the 
status of a witness neither measure that can be applied to him or her. 
                                                        
404 See Council document 14091/05, p. 13.  
405 BOEHM, Franziska, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, security and 
Justice. Towards Harmonised Data Protection Principles for Information Exchange at EU Level 
(Verlag Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), p. 266. 
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2.4. SIRENE Bureaux 
As already mentioned, SIRENE stands for “Supplementary Information request at 
the National Entries”. 
Article 7 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA and Article 7 of the Regulation 1987/2006 
oblige every Member State to designate the authority to verify the quality of the 
information entered into the Schengen Information System, and to exchange all 
supplementary information – the SIRENE Bureau. 
The need of the SIRENE bureaux was pointed out in the feasibility study on the 
CISA, in order to ensure the proper and quick exchange of supplementary 
information on the alerts and on other information. Nevertheless, SIRENE bureaux 
were officially mentioned only in 2005 by the modification of the Article 92 of the 
CISA by the Article 1 of the Council Decision 2005/211/JHA and Article 1 of the 
Council Regulation 871/2004 of 29 April 2004 concerning the introduction of 
some new functions for the Schengen Information System, included in the fight 
against terrorism.406 
Until then, 2 different opinions existed:  
 The basis for the SIRENE bureaux is Article 108 of the CISA that states 
that, “Each Contracting Party shall designate an authority which shall have 
central responsibility for its national section of the Schengen Information 
System…The said authority shall be responsible for the smooth operation 
of the national section of the Schengen Information System and shall take 
the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the provisions of this 
Convention.” 
This point of view was supported by the experts that have drafted the 
SIRENE manual for the functioning of the first generation of the SIS.407 
 There is no legal basis for the SIRENE bureaux in the CISA. This opinion 
was supported by the Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority and reflected 
in its activity reports. 
The statement that Article 108 of the CISA is the basis for the SIRENE bureaux can 
be denied by the systematic analysis of the legal acts regulating Schengen 
Information System:  
                                                        
406  OJ L 162, 30.4.2004, p. 30. 
407  See point 1 of the Council Decision 2003/19/EC on declassifying certain parts of the SIRENE 
Manual adopted by the Executive Committee established by the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (OJ L 8, 14.1.2003, p. 38). 
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 If the legislator has considered that Article 108 is a basis for the 
establishment of SIRENE bureaux it would not adopt changes of Article 92 
in 2004 and 2005, directly introducing SIRENE bureaux and defining their 
purpose and without making any reference to Article 108. 
 Article 7 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA and the Regulation 1987/2006 
stipulate that an authority which shall have central responsibility for its 
national section of the SIS II (equivalent to the wording of the Art. 108 of 
the CISA) is N.SIS II office and is different from the SIRENE Bureau whose 
task is to ensure the exchange of all supplementary information. 
Meanwhile, as stated by Kabera Karanja, “Since the CISA was silent on the issue of 
the SIRENE and at the same time it allowed the application of the national law in 
such circumstances, then the national law was the legal basis of the SIRENE.”408 
The SIRENE bureau is the unique contact point working on a 24/7 basis, in order 
to provide supplementary information not stored in the C.SIS, but related to alerts, 
and is the “human interface” of SIS409. As highlighted by Hayes, “There is no 
effective limit on the data that can be exchanged through the SIRENE bureaux”410, 
but there is a restriction on its use, as, according to Art. 8 of Decision 
2007/533/JHA and of Regulation 1987/2006, it can be used only for the purpose 
for which it was transmitted. 
The importance of the SIRENE Bureau within the functioning of the SIS is 
highlighted by the European Court of Justice in the case Commission v Spain (case 
C-503/03) where is stated that the SIRENE bureau has to be consulted before 
taking any further decision on action with a person that is subject to the alert.411 
According to SIRENE Manual, the supplementary information shall be exchanged: 
 For consultation with other countries whilst entering an alert;  
 To inform about hit;  
 To inform that actions required cannot be performed;  
 For ensuring the quality of the SIS II data;  
 To deal with the exercise of the right to access;  
                                                        
408  KABERA KARANJA, Stephen, Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information 
System and Border Control Cooperation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), p. 204. 
409  See GARCÍA VÁZQUEZ, Sonia, “La cooperación policial y judicial como ejes de consolidación del 
espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia e instrumentos de protección de los derechos 
fundamentales en la Unión Europea” in GOIZUETA VÉRTIZ, Juana and CIENFUEGOS MATEO, Juan, 
La eficacia de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE (Navarra: Aranzadi, 2014), p. 436.  
410  HAYES, Ben, “From Schengen Information System…”, loc. cit., p. 14. 
411  See Judgment of the Court of Justice in Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of 
Spain, C 503/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:74. 
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 To deal with the compatibility and priority of the alerts that will be the 
object of further analysis. 
Thus the SIRENE bureaux can be defined as a dynamic part of the SIS II as it helps 
to solve any question and problem related to the static alert of the C.SIS: to clarify 
uncertainties of alert, to find out whether it is still in force, to assure that the 
person or object detected is the one searched for under the alert, to agree on 
further actions, and so on. 
3. Information exchange under Articles 39 and 46 of 
the CISA  
Article 39 of the CISA establishes the legal basis for the assistance between 
national police authorities. Its content is not explained, but according to Moreno 
Catena and Castillejo Manzanares it can be understand in a broad sense and 
includes any measures, procedures or actions that constitute the competence of 
the requested authority.412 Nevertheless, using a systematic analysis of the CISA, 
from which such assistance has to be excluded, for example, hot pursuit, cross-
border surveillance and controlled delivery, as they have separate specific 
regulation. 
Even if in the first paragraph of Article 39, the broad term “assistance” is used, the 
following paragraphs mainly focus on information exchange for the purpose of 
preventing and detecting criminal offences and establishing the following rules:  
 Police authorities request and reply within their competence regulated by 
the national law;  
 A request or its execution does not imply coercive measures from 
requested party;  
 Only information that is not within the competence of judicial authorities 
can be exchanged;  
 Received information cannot be used as evidence without authorisation of 
judicial authorities;  
 Requests and replies are sent through the central national units 
responsible for the international police cooperation,  
 In case of urgency direct assistance between competent authorities can 
take place, but anyway such information exchange later has to be notified 
to the central authority responsible for the international police 
cooperation of the requested party:  
                                                        
412  See MORENO CATENA, Víctor and CASTILLEJO MANZANARES, Raquel La persecución de los 
delitos en el Convenio…, op. cit., p. 65. 
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Article 39(4) allows stipulating other rules of cooperation by bilateral or 
multilateral agreements for the border areas. 
Article 46 of the CISA foresees almost the same rules for spontaneous information 
exchange, i.e. Providing information without previous request, if it is considered 
useful to combat future crime and prevent offences and threats to public security. 
In the nineties, these provisions were of the utmost importance as they provided 
an opportunity for any kind multinational police assistance, except one demanding 
coercive measures. But the millennium came along with a wide range of specific 
instruments, channels and agencies for police cooperation and the above 
mentioned articles of the CISA lost their significance. 
Moreover, their application has been limited by Decision 2006/960/JHA, which 
develops the provisions of the Schengen Acquis.413 
Article 12 of the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA establishes that the 
provisions of Article 39(1), (2) and (3) and Article 46 of the CISA are replaced as 
far as information and intelligence exchange for the purpose of conducting 
criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations are concerned. 
This formulation means that Articles 39 and 46 of the CISA are not replaced totally, 
and to some extent still stay in force. To find out the scope of current Article 39 of 
the CISA, the following table presents a comparison of its content with the relevant 
provisions of the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. 
 Art. 39 of the CISA Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA 
Action Assistance  Exchange 
Object  Not specified Information and intelligence  
Purpose for 
the exchange 
Preventing and detecting 
criminal offences 
- Art. 1: Conducting criminal investigations414 
or criminal intelligence operations415 
- Art. 5: detection, prevention or investigation 
of an offence 
Competent 
authorities 
Police authorities National police, customs or other authorities 
that are authorised by national law to detect, 
prevent and investigate offences or criminal 
activities and to exercise authority and take 
                                                        
413  SEC(2011) 593 final, p. 3.  
414  A definition is provided in Article 2(b) of the Decision 2006/960/JHA “A procedural stage within 
which measures are taken by competent law enforcement or judicial authorities, including public 
prosecutors, with a view to establishing and identifying facts, suspects and circumstances 
regarding one or several identified concrete criminal acts”. 
415  A definition is provided in the Article 2(c) of the Decision 2006/960/JHA “A procedural stage, not 
yet having reached the stage of a criminal investigation, within which a competent law 
enforcement authority is entitled by national law to collect, process and analyse information 
about crime or criminal activities with a view to establishing where concrete criminal acts have 
been committed or may be committed in the future.” 
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 Art. 39 of the CISA Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA 
coercive measures in the context of such 
activities.  
Limitations - Not applied in the case of a 
need for judicial cooperation 
- Not applied in the case of a 
request whose execution 
demands a measure of 
constraint 
- Provided information cannot 
be used as evidence without 
the consent of the competent 
judicial authority of the 
requested Contracting Party.  
- Request does not impose any obligation to 
obtain information or intelligence by means of 
coercive measures. 
- Provided information cannot be used as 
evidence before a judicial authority without 
the consent or providing Member State. Such 
consent can be given at the time of transmittal 
of the information or intelligence. 
Table 12: Interrelationship between Article 39 of the CISA and Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA. 
Thus the purpose of the information exchange under the Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA is established in two articles using different wording which, from 
the perspective of legal technique, should not be acceptable. Moreover, it seems 
problematic to put an “equal” sign between “conducting criminal investigations or 
criminal intelligence operations” and “detection, prevention or investigation of an 
offence”, especially when talking about crime prevention. From one perspective, 
the definition of “criminal intelligence operations” (see Section 5 of the Chapter I) 
includes criminal acts that “may be committed in the future”, and could be treated 
as prevention, but the same definition determines that criminal intelligence 
operations have “a procedural stage” and this aspect goes beyond the content of 
what is traditionally understood as prevention. A criminal intelligence operation is 
not yet an investigation, but already has its own procedural form and rules to be 
followed and mostly sticks to the gathering of intelligence that leads to 
investigation and prosecution. Prevention by nature is much broader and seeks to 
preclude factors that provoke crime. 
Articles 4.1 and 4.3 of the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA mention exchange 
of information and intelligence in relation to the offences listed in Art. 2(2) of the 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (see footnote 382) and it could lead to 
understanding that this is an area of information exchange regulated by this legal 
act. Notwithstanding, systematic analysis of articles 1 (Objective and scope), 3 
(Provision of information and intelligence), 4 (Time limits for provision of 
information and intelligence), 5 (Request for information and intelligence) and 7 
(Spontaneous exchange of information and intelligence) leads to the conclusion 
that the Member State is free to make any request for information and intelligence 
when its purpose is conducting criminal investigations or criminal intelligence 
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operations, but deadlines for urgent response 416 are applied only when the 
request is related with the offence mentioned in Art. 2(2) of Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA. It makes sense in the view of the flow of requests and the limited 
possibilities to reply within the established deadlines and reference to the 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA which allows prioritisation in the 
workflow.417  
Taking all that into account, the conclusion can be made that the Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA creates a “grey area” in which information exchange for 
crime prevention hangs without certainty, whether it falls within its scope or 
remains under Article 39 of the CISA. 
On the basis of the analysis presented above, a very cautious conclusion can be 
made about the actual scope of Article 39 of the CISA. It has to be applied to:  
a) Police co-operation assistance, other than providing information and 
intelligence in the prevention and detection of criminal offences; 
b) Information exchange on crime prevention when it does not take place 
under the procedure of the criminal intelligence operation. 
The Catalogue of Recommendations for the correct application of the Schengen 
Acquis and Best practices on Police cooperation418 (hereinafter – Catalogue of 
Recommendations), updated in 2011 (more than 2 years after the deadline to 
implement the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA419) does not help too much in 
establishing the line between the application of the Article 39 and the Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA because: 
 Recommendation 6 says that “In the field of public order and public 
security, the central authorities should hold a list of requests for which 
direct assistance can be given in urgent situations”420 and as the best 
practice, the reference to Art. 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA is given. It means that the “equal” sign between 
“assistance” and “exchange” (of information) is made. 
                                                        
416  At the most, 8 hours in case of urgent requests and one week in non-urgent cases when the 
information requested is directly accessible by the requested authority. In other cases – 14 days. 
417  Annex A and Annex B of the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA make clear that urgency in 
reply is applied only in case of the offence that falls under the Art. 2(2) of the Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA. The same line is followed in Guidelines on the implementation of 
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange 
of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the 
European Union (Council document 9512/1/10). 
418  Council document 15785/2/10.  
419  According to the Art. 11 of the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA (See Corrigendum OJ L 75, 
15.3.2007, p. 26) it had to be implemented before 19 December 2008. 
420  Council document 15785/2/10. 
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 Recommendation 28 establishes that all police personnel should have 
basic knowledge of Article 39 of the CISA and Article 12 of the Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA. This introduces even more confusion, because it 
focuses on the article from the CISA dedicated to assistance (including 
information exchange) and on the article from the Framework Decision 
dedicated only to the spontaneous information exchange (without 
previous request), leaving articles on the information exchange on request 
on the margin. 
 Recommendation 36, 37 and 39 on the information exchange on request 
totally refers to the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. 
Even more inconsistency shows recommendations 40-46 on the spontaneous 
information exchange, as they do not make any reference to the Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA and its Article 12, which was mentioned in 
recommendation 28. It seems that Member States are urged to provide knowledge 
on Article 12, but are not urged to use it. 
The latest recommendations lead to the analysis of spontaneous information 
exchange under Article 46 of the CISA, and relevant provisions of the Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA. For the sake of coherence with the analysis carried out on 
Article 39 of the CISA, the table below provides a comparison of the content of both 
mechanisms on spontaneous information exchange. 
 Art. 46 of the CISA Council Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA 
Action Exchange  Exchange 
Object  Information  Information and intelligence 
Purpose for 
the exchange 
Not identified precisely, but the 
Contracting Party has to consider 
it useful to combat future crime 
and prevention of offences against, 
or threats to public policy and 
public security. 
- Article 1: Conducting criminal 
investigations or criminal intelligence 
operations. 
- Article 7: There have to be factual reasons 
to believe that information and/or 
intelligence could assist in the detention, 
prevention or investigation of offences 
referred to in Art. 2(2) of the Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA. 
Competent 
authorities 
Not specified National police, customs or other authorities 
that are authorised by national law to detect, 
prevent and investigate offences or criminal 
activities and to exercise authority and take 
coercive measures in the context of such 
activities.  
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 Art. 46 of the CISA Council Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA 
Limitations Not specified Information and intelligence shall be limited 
to what is deemed relevant and necessary for 
the successful detection, prevention or 
investigation of the crime or criminal activity 
in question. 
Table 13: Interrelationship between Article 46 of the CISA and Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA. 
In this case, the object covered by the regulation of the Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA is even broader (information and intelligence) than the one from 
Article 46 of the CISA (information), but from another perspective, it is not clear, 
whether the provision of the information or intelligence without previous request 
can take place for the sake of any criminal investigations or criminal intelligence 
operation, or is limited only to the detention, prevention or investigation of 
offences referred to in Art. 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA? 
In the first case, the application of Article 46 of the CISA would be redundant; in 
the second case, it could be applied to combat future crime and prevention of 
offences against or threats to public policy and public security when they do not 
fall under Art. 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. 
Within this topic, it is worth drawing attention to the changes that occurred in the 
SIRENE Manuals. Point 3.2.1b of the SIRENE Manual from 1985421 established that 
the SIRENE Bureaux of the Contracting Parties can exchange any useful 
information whilst respecting national measures taken to implement Articles 39 
and 46, and that it is an area of supplementary intervention of the SIRENE 
Bureaux. On the contrary, the SIRENE Manual from 2008422 did not make any 
reference to the above mentioned articles, but established that “exchange of 
information under the SIS II legal instruments shall not prejudice the tasks 
entrusted to the SIRENE Bureaux by national law implementing other legal 
instruments of the European Union, in particular in application of the national law 
implementing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA [...].” 
Even more surprising is that the Commission, in its Communication of 2010, 
“Overview of information management in the area of Freedom, security and 
Justice”423 did not make any reference at all to Articles 39 and 46 of the CISA; it 
only mentions the SIS. 
                                                        
421  OJ L 8, 14.1.2003, p. 1-24. 
422  OJ L 123, 8.5.2008, p. 1-38. 
423  COM(2010) 385 final.  
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On the contrary, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, in its 
Study on the status of information exchange amongst law enforcement authorities 
in the context of existing EU instruments, has stated that “The SIS might be used as 
legal basis more often than it gets credit, as reference might still be made to Arts 
39 and 46 of the Schengen Convention while Art 12 of the Swedish Framework 
Decision largely supersedes these two Articles.”424 
The current SIRENE Manual makes a step backwards and foresees that, “Additional 
tasks may be entrusted to the Sirene Bureaux, in particular, by the national law 
implementing Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, Articles 39 and 46 of the 
Schengen Convention, in as far as they are not replaced by Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA”. 
Such obscurity and overlapping of the legal provisions is not a novelty, either at a 
national or international level. Nevertheless, in the case of Articles 39 and 46 of the 
CISA, it is very important as their application makes a part of the evaluations on 
the implementation of the CISA that take place every five years in each member of 
the Schengen area. This raises a question: How can countries be evaluated on 
something that is not clearly regulated by EU law, and is totally confusing in the 
Catalogue of Recommendations and other explanatory acts?  
Without legal clarity at European level, Member States make different use of these 
Articles. For example, Italy presumes that Article 39 can be applied to provide the 
information following the match (hit) in the SIS. Hungary applies them in co-
operation between law enforcement authorities of border regions, Poland uses it 
only in cases of offences that fall under Art. 2(2) of the Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA. 
4. Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 
Although neither the establishment, nor the functioning of bilateral or trilateral 
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCC) at common borders is directly 
foreseen in the CISA, they are one of the compensatory mechanisms for the 
abolition of control of internal borders.425  
Nevertheless, its Articles 39(4) and 39(5) allow cooperation measures by bilateral 
(or trilateral) arrangements and agreements that give a possibility to make other 
                                                        
424  INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC 
LAW ORGANIZATION, “Study on the status of information…”, loc. cit., p. 40. 
425 Since the very beginning, it should be pointed out that the topic of PCCCs has been almost 
abandoned and with little academic research.  
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co-operation arrangements as compensatory measures to be established, among 
which special attention deserves PCCC. 
PCCC is a centre operative in border areas, usually in the premises of the former 
border checkpoint of one of the contracting parties (or in common premises if 
contracting parties have had common checkpoints), or in the immediate vicinity. 
Located in positions of strategic importance for observing cross-border crime, 
PCCCs play a key intelligence role for the operational services. As stated by del 
Moral Torres, it is a mechanism that has contributed to security improvements in 
border areas where the border control had been abolished but law enforcement 
services maintained exclusively by national competence.426  
According to its nature, PCCC consists of representatives responsible for police, 
border and customs tasks in the border area. Representatives of the relevant 
services must be granted with the access to their national police and customs data 
bases that are used for prevention and detection of crimes. Working in common 
premises, they can rapidly exchange information on suspicious persons or vehicles 
in the border area (both by request and spontaneously), provide assistance to their 
national forces in the case of continuation of hot pursuit or urgent surveillance427 
                                                        
426  DEL MORAL TORRES, Anselmo, Cooperación policial en la Unión Europea: la necesidad de un 
modelo de inteligencia criminal eficiente (Madrid: Dykinson, S.L., 2011), p. 184. 
427 Cross-border hot pursuit and cross-border surveillance are compensatory measures for the 
abolishment of border control, foreseen in Articles 40 and 41 of the CISA.  
 Article 40 previses a possibility to continue the surveillance started in one country of the 
Schengen area on the territory of its neighbouring country of the Schengen area, and Article 41 
establish the same possibility for hot pursuit. Their main feature is the performance of law 
enforcement functions on the territory of the other country, with the general possibility (if it is 
not agreed to the contrary) to use official cars weapons and uniforms. 
 In the case of surveillance, two modalities are possible:  
 Pre-planned surveillance – in which a permission of its continuation and / or take over is 
agreed in advance. 
 Urgent surveillance – that happens unexpectedly (person or object of a surveillance were not 
expected to move towards the border) and the permission is asked “on the spot” of the 
operation. In this case, according to Article 40(2), surveillance shall be ceased when 
neighbouring country which territory was entered requests so or, where authorization has 
not been obtained in 5 hours after crossing the border.  
 In the case of hot pursuit, it is always unexpected and the permission to continue the pursuit is 
requested before the crossing of the border, or at the same moment. Hot pursuit is possible only 
over land borders and shall cease when the neighbouring country, whose territory was entered 
so requests. 
 Surveillance and hot pursuit are allowed in prosecution of any extraditable offence, evasion after 
an accident that has resulted in death or serious injury, escape from provisional custody or while 
serving a sentence involving deprivation of liberty. 
 In both cases, it is forbidden to enter into private homes and places not accessible to the public, 
and to use weapons in situations other that legitimate self-defence.  
 Surveillance and hot pursuit rules established in the CISA can be extended by bilateral agreement 
and in any case, it is up to bilateral agreements to establish the area (distance) or time for the 
surveillance and hot pursuit on the territory of the neighbouring country. 
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on the territory of neighbouring countries, and provide any other assistance that 
can be needed. As a rule, PCCCs should be open 24/7, but for the sake of the 
rational use of human resources, it is common to have only one duty officer 24/7. 
It should be noted that PCCC is an effective cooperation tool in the border areas 
with a high density of towns and population, or even towns divided between 
countries and these PCCCs are mainly open 24/7. In less populated border regions 
there are part-time PCCCs (called by Hufnagel428 “multijurisdictional police 
facilities”), or other compensatory measures, like in the case of the Lithuanian and 
Latvian border, where, in 2009, a bilateral decision to substitute PCCCs with 
Border Region Cooperation Model was taken (the same applies to the Lithuanian – 
Polish border).429  
As noticed by Esain López, PCCC existed before the CISA, as in 1965, Spain and 
France signed the first agreement on National Offices of Juxtaposed Controls.430 In 
1969, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands established Euroregional Police 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 Thus the allowed distance of pursuit between France and Spain is 10 km, between Portugal and 
Spain – 50 km or 2 hours, between Lithuania and Poland – 1 hour or 100 km, between Latvia and 
Lithuania – 1 hour.  
428  HUFNAGEL, Saskia, Policing cooperation across borders: comparative perspectives on law 
enforcement within the EU and Australia (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), p. 189. 
429 After a joint Lithuanian-Latvian study visited the French-German PCCC in Kehl, it was bilaterally 
decided for the time being to not establish a PCCC, but to apply the Border Region Cooperation 
Model. A decision was taken in 2009 and was reasoned by lack of essential problems in cross-
border cooperation, increasing the number of cross-border crimes or of insufficiency of existing 
cooperation means, as well as difficulties with financial and human resources caused by the 
global economic crisis. The Border Region Cooperation Model foresees that the main PCCC 
functions are performed by border area police forces. As a compensation for PCCC, the following 
are applied: 
 Creation of bilingual forms for information exchange that in urgent cases, can be sent directly 
between competent authorities in border areas (informing about that the central authorities); 
 Enhanced use of joint patrolling;  
 Establishment of protocols that have to be followed in the case of cross border surveillance 
and hot pursuit;  
 Exchange of radio communication means and frequencies, and facilitation of other 
communication means;  
 Periodical meetings of different police units’ representative in order to share information 
about crime situation in the border area and to prepare annual analysis;  
 Annual organisation of joint training. 
 See Policijos Departamento prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos ir Latvijos 
Respublikos valstybinės policijos išvados. “Dėl bendradarbiavimo pasienio regione modelio 
įgyvendinimo bei bendrų centrų steigimo”, Biržai, 2009 m. vasario 19 d., accessed, February 3, 
2013, http://www.policija.lt/index.php?id=2603.  
 A similar Border Region Cooperation Model is established for Lithuanian-Polish cooperation in 
the border area. See Policijos Departamento prie Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus reikalų ministerijos 
ir Lenkijos policijos vyriuasiojo komendanto ketinimo protokolas dėl kai kurių Lietuvos ir 
Lenkijos policijos bendradarbiavimo pasienio regione klausimų, 2012 m. spalis, accessed, 
February 3, 2013, http://www.policija.lt/index.php?id=2603. 
430 See ESAIN LÓPEZ, Roberto, Cooperación policial transfronteriza (iniciativas, obstáculos y futuro), 
(Trabajo de investigación fin de CCACES, Aranjuez, 2010), p. 60. 
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Information and Coordination Centres. Within the CISA, the first model of PCCC 
and its agreement was concluded on French-German PCCC (Stasbourg-Kehl). 
For the time being, there are 45 PCCCs, most of them full-time and some (like the 
one on the border between Lithuania and Poland (Budzisko) or Latvia and 
Lithuania (Kalviu)) part-time PCCCs or similar mechanisms. 
Depending on geographical situation, there are bilateral and multilateral centres. 
The biggest centre in terms of the number of countries and institutions involved is 
the Belgian – French – German – Luxembourgish Centre, established in 
Luxembourg. Trilateral centres also see Austria, Hungary and Slovenia (Dolga Vas), 
Austria, Italy and Slovenia (Thörl-Maglern), Austria, Italy and Romania (Oradea), 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (Heerlen). 
PCCCs are also created with the countries of the Schengen area that are not EU 
Member States, e.g. The PCCCs of France, Germany and Switzerland (Basel), Italy 
and Switzerland (Chiasso), France and Switzerland (Geneva), Austria, Lichtenstein 
and Switzerland (Schaanwald). 
Due to its nature in combatting cross-border crime, PCCCs can be also be 
established with the third neighbouring countries that are not members of the 
Schengen area. Such centres exist between Bulgaria and Serbia, Bulgaria and 
Macedonia, Moldova and Romania, Romania and Ukraine. The Bulgarian 
agreements with third countries deserve a closer look, as they are quite recent 
ones. Both agreements make specific emphasis on illegal migration, forgery of 
travel documents and ids, illegal trafficking and smuggling, crimes and violations 
related to motor vehicles. The functions of the PCCC consist of information 
exchange (including surveillance and control along the border) and elaboration of 
common risk analysis.431  
They also foresee comprehensive data protection rules and exchange of classified 
data. 
As pointed out by the Council of Europe “One of the main reasons for the creation 
of se centres was the finding that most international law enforcement structures, 
like Europol and Interpol, give priority to serious and organised crime. However, 
                                                        
431 See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia on Establishment and Functioning of a Common Contact Centre for Police 
and Customs Cooperation, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres 
/41C16B10-5ECE-4969-9846-15EB33272EAE/0/Mac_4_EN.pdf.  
 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia on Establishment and Functioning of a Common Contact Centre for Police and 
Customs Cooperation, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres 
/7BDDF080-4F74-43B0-BCFC-302805781A6C/0/finaltext_en.pdf.  
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trans-national criminality not only concerns organised crime but also thefts, 
burglaries and the like, which are often perpetrated by criminals who live less than 
twenty kilometres away from the scene of the crime.”432  
Although every bilateral or trilateral agreement can foresee different PCCC 
tasks433, European Best Practice Guidelines for Police and Customs Cooperation 
Centres foresee 3 main functions: 
 Information collection and exchange;434 
 Assisting operations in border area;435 
 Perform analysis of cross-border crime.436 
According to the European Best Practice Guidelines for Police and Customs 
Cooperation Centres, “A PCCC’s responsibilities must not encroach on those of the 
                                                        
432  COUNCIL OF EUROPE. “Cross Border Cooperation in the Combating of Organised Crime” 
(Organised crime – Best Practice Survey nº 5, Strasbourg, January 2003), p. 14, accessed, October 
16, 2013 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/BestPractice5E.pdf. 
433 Thus the Council of Europe reveals more functions of PCCCs: 
 Exchange and analysis of information; 
 Enhancement of trans-national cooperation; 
 Support to criminal investigations; 
 Collaboration with requests for mutual judicial assistance; 
 Cooperation in the coordination of operations;  
 Conduction of common crime pattern analyses; 
 Collaboration in educational matters regarding trans-national cooperation. 
 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, “Cross Border Cooperation…”, loc. cit., p 14.  
434  According to the “European Best Practice Guidelines for Police and Customs Cooperation 
Centres”, (Council document 9105/11), information exchanged via PCCCs relates in particular to 
petty and moderately serious crime, illegal migration flows and public order problems. 
Nevertheless, bilateral and trilateral agreements can expand this scope. For example, Article 5 of 
the Convention between The Kingdom of Spain and The Republic of France on Cross Border 
Cooperation in police and customs matters, establishes that PCCCs serve cross-border co-
operation, in particularly for the fight against illegal immigration, cross-border crime, prevention 
of threats to public order and illegal trafficking. 
435  It includes operations foreseen in the CISA (such as surveillance and hot pursuit mention in the 
footnote 432) and agreed among the neighbouring states (such as common patrolling, common 
operational measures or investigations, controlled deliveries, use of undercover officers, etc.). 
436 Analysis is mainly carried out for the law enforcement agencies of the border region, as well as 
for the authorities that develop security strategies and priorities for these territories and consists 
of: 
 Follow-up of criminal events and offences taking place in the border region, falling within their 
competence, e.g. comparison of crime on both side of the border, identification of new risks; 
 Identification of connections between events or present/past facts; 
 Support to the coordination and to the follow-up of cross-border inquiries; 
 On request, follow-up of specific groups of perpetrators and/or specific studies within the 
framework of specific phenomena; 
 The relay between international, national, regional cross-border analyses. 
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national central units (in particular with regard to organised crime and terrorism) 
so as not to compromise the latter’s competences and objectives.”437 
According to the Article 6(2) of the Framework, Decision 2006/960/JHA PCCC are 
obliged to provide exchanged information to Europol and Eurojust if its content 
falls within the competence of the agencies. 
Nevertheless, “local” cases can be much more effectively and rapidly resolved by 
direct co-operation through PCCC, especially when bilateral or multilateral 
agreement allows the use of all legal measures and all communication forms 
allowed by national law in order to achieve PCCC’s goals438; and as foreseen in 
Article 7 of the Agreement of 19th November 2005, between The Kingdom of Spain 
and The Portuguese Republic on cross-border co-operation in police and customs 
matters. 
Due to the prompt process of information exchange, the most discussed question 
related to information exchange through PCCCs are the so-called “chain requests” 
between different PCCCs that take place in practice, but are not formally regulated. 
Let’s imagine that Spain needs urgent information from Poland, and instead of 
sending a request to its central authority, a request is sent through the chain of 
PCCCs: Spain to Spanish-French PCCC, then to French-German PCCC and the latter 
to German-Polish PCCC. 
For this reason, during the fourth PCCC conference in October 2013, it was 
proposed to foresee the possibility of “chain requests” in urgent cases, but only if 
allowed by bilateral / multilateral agreements and the national central authorities 
of the involved countries.439  
From first sight, the process does not seem difficult, but if we take the already 
mentioned example of Spain – Poland information exchange, the possibility of a 
chain request shall be established in bilateral agreements between Spain and 
France, France and Germany, and Germany and Poland. Also, it is not clear which 
National central authorities should be informed: Only those of Spain and Poland or 
also those of France and Germany? The last option does not have too much sense, 
because it means the overloading of information (including personal data) for 
states that are used only as a chain (channel) for the information, but do not have 
any interest in its content. 
                                                        
437  Council document 9105/11, p. 10. 
438  See MARTÍN DIZ, Fernando, “Aspectos recientes de la cooperación judicial y policial hispano-
portuguesa; especial consideración del Acuerdo de Évora” in Revista de Estudios Europeos, 2010, 
no. 56, p. 103.  
439 See Council document 16249/13, p. 2. 
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France and Germany expressed their concern about this initiative, as an opening of 
a new channel for information exchange that has never been foreseen. Though 
France by itself is used by Guile as an example to illustrate such information 
exchange, “If the Spanish authorities need some information from their Italian 
counterparts, they will often go through the French authorities in the French-
Spanish CPCC. Those in turn will contact their French colleagues in the French-
Italian CPCC, who will then ask their Italian counterparts. Other countries which do 
not have CPCCs also use this network to get relevant information (for example, 
Andorra and the UK).”440 
As Guille points out in his research, “Although central authorities were not pleased 
with this increasingly important networking system of information exchange 
through CPCCs441, the high volume of exchanges demonstrated that this network of 
CPCCs responded to real needs, and therefore the central level informally allowed 
this information exchange to take place to a certain extent”.442 
It could be concluded that due to their typical functions, PCCCs contribute to 
common and agreed responses to crime in countries that share borders. All this is 
possible due to the face-to-face work of police, border and customs authorities 
which allows, on a daily basis, familiarisation with the legal system of 
neighbouring countries and so to find out the best possible solution to common 
security challenges. 
5. Liaison officers: within the Schengen Agreement 
and beyond  
Collins Dictionary defines “liaison officer” as a person who liaises between groups 
or units. 443 In the case of international co-operation, a law enforcement authority 
liaison officer is an officer delegated to another country or region, to keep close 
contact with its law enforcement and judicial authorities, to facilitate contact and 
cooperation between sending and hosting countries, or sending country and 
region. Liaison officer can also be sent to international or regional organisations; 
the most important examples of such organisations are INTERPOL and Europol, 
which funding legislation establish that, in the case of INTTERPOL, its members 
can, and in case of Europol, its members shall, delegate liaison officers. 
                                                        
440  GUILLE, Laure, “Policing in Europe: An Ethnographic…”, loc. cit., p. 267. 
441 It has to be noted that in some research, “Police and Customs Cooperation Centres” are called 
“Centres for Police and Custom Cooperation”, although the official name used by the European 
Union is “PCCC”. 
442 GUILLE, Laure, “Policing in Europe: An Ethnographic…”, loc. cit., p. 267.  
443 Collins, English Dictionary, accessed October 16, 
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/liaison-officer. 
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Liaison officers were used for the first time at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries, 
during the Anarchist era, in order to share information and to counter cross-
border political concerns; later, they started to be used to combat drug 
trafficking.444 
Within the Schengen Acquis, Article 47 of the CISA foresees a possibility to 
conclude agreements for the secondment of liaison officers to another state of the 
Schengen area, as well as to the third countries. Although this article mentions 
secondment “to the police authorities of another Contracting Party”, it has to be 
interpreted more broadly than just the police, and to be understood as law 
enforcement authorities that have the function of combatting crime and ensuring 
internal security within the Schengen area. 
In parallel with the CISA, the interior ministers of the Member States of the 
European Community had started discussions on liaison officers within the TREVI 
group and: 
 In 1987, Agreement on the development of a network of drugs liaison 
officers was adopted, to the benefit of European Community Member 
States. 
 In 1996, the Council adopted Joint action 96/602/JHA of 14th October 
1996, on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on the European Union 
providing for a common framework for the initiatives of the Member 
States concerning liaison officers (hereinafter – Joint action 
96/602/JHA).445 
While Joint action 96/602/JHA talks about both intra-community liaison officers 
and those seconded to third states, the Council Decision 2003/170/JHA of 27th 
February 2003 on the common use of liaison officers posted abroad by the law 
enforcement agencies of the Member States446 (hereinafter – Decision 
2003/170/JHA) that repeal it, envisages only posting and common use of liaison 
officers in third countries and international organisations447. Thus it seems that the 
political signal is to use this cooperation tool with the third countries, leaving the 
cooperation within the EU under the auspices of other cooperation instruments. 
                                                        
444  See YON, Hasan, “Police liaisons as builders of transnational security cooperation” in AYDINLI 
Ersel, Emerging Transnational (In)Security Governance: A Statist-transnationalist approach 
(Routledge. New York. 2010), p. 137. 
445 OJ L 268, 19.10.1996, p. 2-4. 
446 OJ L 67, 12.3.2003, p. 27-30. 
447  Decision 2003/170/JHA provides us with the following definition of the liaison officer “A 
representative of one of the Member States, posted abroad by a law enforcement agency to one or 
more third countries or to international organisations to establish and maintain contacts with the 
authorities in those countries or organisations with a view to contributing to preventing or 
investigating criminal offences.” 
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Nevertheless, Decision 2003/170/JHA does not repeal the provisions of the CISA 
on the secondment of liaison officers among Schengen countries. 
The figures on liaison officers posted abroad also show that despite modifications 
brought about by the Decision 2003/170/JHA, Member States still delegate a lot of 
them within the EU and Schengen area. The table below presents figures on EU 
Member States liaison officers posted abroad during the last six years.448  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EU, Andorra, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland 
210 233 229 229 227 222 212 
Central and Eastern Europe  116 120 126 125 116 105 106 
Africa  74 87 78 80 84 83 85 
Asia Pacific 44 45 43 42 44 41 41 
South Asia 18 22 20 20 20 21 20 
Middle East 29 28 28 28 30 30 30 
Americas  81 88 89 89 93 94 95 
Table 14: Figures on liaison officers posted abroad by the EU Member States.449  
As can be deduced from the table, the figures do not vary a lot and the biggest 
“jump” in the number of liaison officers posted within the EU was from 210 to 233 
between 2009 and 2010; but there is no country or region with a more significant 
rise in number. The increases in each country resulted in the posting of between 
one and three more liaison officers. The biggest increase is related to the number 
of liaison officers in the Netherlands, but it has to be taken into account, that the 
Netherlands hosts Europol’s Office, and liaison officers seconded to Europol are 
also accredited to the Netherlands, even if they perform their main functions 
within the framework of Europol. 
In 2013 the decrease in the number of liaison officers seconded to Central and 
Eastern Europe can be explained by the accession of Croatia to the EU and a 
decrease in the number of countries which remain outside the EU in this region. In 
the case of the year 2014, the decreasing tendency was noticed in this region as 
well, but not in any country in particular. The biggest reduction (3 liaison officers) 
took place in Russia. 
                                                        
448 2009 as the beginning is taken not by chance, as it starts a relevantly stable period without bigger 
changes that could have a significant impact on the secondment of liaison officers, for instance 
2004 with the accession of 10 new Member States to the EU, 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria 
and Romania and the extension of the Schengen area by 9 new members. The only significant 
factor during the elected period 2009-2015 had been the global economic crisis and this could 
determine opting for “cheaper” cooperation tools.  
449 Compiled by author from Council documents 10504/2/09, 16389/10, 16560/1/11, 16686/12, 
13129/13, 11996/14, 10597/15. 
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In 2015, a decrease in the number of liaison officers posted to EU Member States 
can be observed; however, closer analysis reveals that per country, the number 
normally varies by one or two liaison officers. 
Decision 2003/170/JHA concentrates on the most efficient, common use of the 
liaison officers seconded to the third countries, and in Article 5 foresees the 
possibility for law enforcement institutions of the Member State that does not have 
them in the third country, to request liaison officers from another Member State, 
with a view to the exchange of relevant information. It also establishes meetings 
between all Member States’ liaison officers posted in third countries or 
international organisations; and with the amendment of the Decision 
2003/170/JHA made by the Council Decision 2006/560/JHA on 24th July 2006, 
amending Decision 2003/170/JHA on the common use of liaison officers posted 
abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member States450 (hereinafter – 
Decision 2006/560/JHA), previses that such meetings are organised by the 
Member State holding the Presidency of the Council or the European Union or on 
the initiative of Member States with liaison officers posted there or, as a novelty, by 
the Member State to which responsibility for coordination (leading) of the EU 
cooperation in a particular country or region has been given. The outcomes of 
meetings are discussed in the preparatory bodies of the Council of the European 
Union, and serve as indispensable input for the policy in judicial and home affairs 
cooperation with third countries. 
Not all third countries or regions have leading Member States, because a Member 
State by itself has to offer to perform such a role. For the time being, Italy has 
accepted (and was granted) the responsibility to coordinate EU Member States’ 
liaison officers in China, the Central Asia Region and Kosovo. Austria has a leading 
role in the Republic of Moldova and France - in West African countries.451 
Decision 2006/560/JHA also foresees information exchange between Member 
States’ liaison officers in the third countries and Europol, as well as between 
Member States’ law enforcement institutions and Europol’s liaison officers posted 
in third countries.452 
Going back to the CISA, its Article 47 does not entail any special scope of action by 
liaison officers, establishing that the purpose is to combat crime by means of both 
prevention and law enforcement. In the case of Decision 2003/170/JHA, its recital 
15 establishes the aim to regulate questions relating to the fight against serious 
cross-border crime. 
                                                        
450  OJ L 219, 10.8.2006, p. 31-32. 
451 Council document 11996/14, p. 5. 
452  Europol has its liaison officers at INTERPOL’s headquarters in Lyons (France) and Washington 
(United States of America). 
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García Vázquez states that liaison officers do not perform operational activities in 
hosting country, but increase the effectiveness of police co-operation by collection 
and exchanging information.453  
But even without operational activities, their role is much more significant and 
comprehensive than just information exchange.454 As pointed out by Block, 
“Requests for information, usually referred to as ‘cases’, are likely to be routed 
through liaison officers instead of through the other available channels whenever a 
case requires more active support than a simple information-exchange because of 
its complexity, sensitivity or urgency.”455 
The biggest advantage of the liaison officer in information exchange is his / her 
familiarity with the system and personal contacts with the law enforcement 
authorities of the hosting country. Also, knowledge of the language and cultural 
particularities play an important role in “breaking the ice” and smoothing contacts 
with representatives of the hosting country, region or organisation. Depending on 
the situation and needs, liaison officers have the possibility to manoeuvre between 
using personal informal contacts, or more official ones within the authorities of the 
hosting country. 
Despite increasing transnational cooperation, a lot of law enforcement authorities 
are quite “possessive” and “jealous” about the information they have, or the 
operations they perform, and do not tend to share it with the rest. But a physical 
presence and the possibility of establishing “face to face” contacts very often 
facilitates exchange of information, as it enhances mutual trust between officers. 
Face to face contact especially helps in sensitive cases and operations, as it allows 
the discussion of some aspects or questions “out of records”, “making deals” and 
finding the best solution for everybody. 
H. Yon defines liaison officers as “masters of informal cooperation practices” and 
says, “Informal cooperation eases up the process of communication about 
particular cases and developments within them. During informal communication 
with counterparts, police liaison officers share their experiences. During those 
information exchanged both parties give each other information about what is 
going on in cases, what kind of developments they are seeing in criminal strategies 
and are able to share ideas about specific problems.”456 
                                                        
453  See GARCÍA VÁZQUEZ, Sonia, “La cooperación policial y judicial…,” loc. cit., p. 433. 
454 See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPEAN 
PUBLIC LAW ORGANIZATION, “Study on the status of information…”, loc. cit., p. 60. 
455 BLOCK, Ludo, “Bilateral Police Liaison Officers: Practices and European Policy” in Journal of 
Contemporary European Research, 2010. vol. 6, issue 2, p. 196, accessed October 16, 2013, 
http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/266/205.  
456 YON, Hasan, “Police liaisons as builders…”, loc. cit., p. 132-133. 
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According to Article 47 of the CISA, it is prohibited for liaison officers to take 
independent police action on the territory of a hosting state, or, in other words, 
they do not have the power to investigation in the jurisdiction where they are 
posted.457 Although there is no other legal act referring to that prohibition, it is 
understood per se, that the mission of the liaison officer is to establish and 
maintain contacts for the exchange of information, and to facilitate cooperation. 
6. Data protection 
As already mentioned in subsection 4.3.3.1 of the Chapter II, the general data 
protection framework established in Decision 2008/977/JHA is not applied to the 
Schengen Information System, neither to SIS and or to SIS II. With respect to other 
information exchange under Schengen Acquis, such as through PCCCs, liaison 
officers, the aforementioned Decision is applied as lex generalis and lex especialis 
can be included in bilateral or multilateral agreements that regulate PCCC and or 
liaison officer as well as the national law of the Member States involved. 
Thus the data protection system applicable to SIS is complicated, fragmented and 
includes both lex generalis and lex specialis. 458  
Lex specialis for SIS data protection previously was included in Chapter III of Title 
IV of CISA, and is actually regulated by Decision 2007/533/JHA and Regulation 
1987/2006. Lex generalis applied for alerts regulated by the aforementioned 
Regulation are Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation 45/2001 of the European 
Parliament, and of the Council of 18th December 2000 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data459 ; for the rest of 
alerts – European Convention on Data Protection.460  
                                                        
457 BLOCK, Ludo, “Bilateral Police Liaison…”, loc. cit., p. 196. 
458  See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Decision 
on the establishment, operation and use of the Second Generation Schengen Information System 
(SIS II) (COM(2005)230 final); the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the establishment, operation and use of the Second Generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) (COM(2005)236 final), and the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council regarding access to the Second Generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) by the services in the Member States responsible for issuing vehicle 
registration certificates (COM(2005)237 final), OJ C 91. 19.4.2006, p. 41.  
459  OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1-22. 
460  See GARCÍA SÁNCHEZ, Manuel, “El Sistema de Información Schengen: estructura, funcionamiento 
y evolución del sistema de supervisión conjunta en protección de datos” in GOIZUETA VÉRTIZ, 
Juana; GONZÁLEZ MURUA, Ana Rosa and PARIENTE DE PRADA, Iñaki, El Espacio de Libertad, 
Seguridad…, op. cit., p. 229. 
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Despite such complexity, a system could be acceptable if it did not lead “either to 
discrepancies between national regimes on fundamental aspects, or to a watering 
down of the present level of data protection.”461 
Thus this Section sets out to establish the level of data protection provided to such 
a wide centralised data base. Due to the scope of this research, in the following 
subsections only data protection related to alerts for crime prevention and 
investigation will be analysed. 
However, before starting, few general remarks should be made. 
First of all, according to Article 56 of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA and Article 
40 of the Regulation 1987/2006, the processing of sensitive data in SIS is 
prohibited; this is understood in different ways. 
In the case of Council Decisions, sensitive data is understood within the meaning 
established by the first sentence of Article 6 of the European Convention on Data 
Protection, i.e. Racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, health 
or sex life. Nevertheless, unlike the above mentioned Convention, SIS II can include 
processed data on criminal convictions. 
In case of Regulation – as is foreseen in Article 8(1) of Directive 95/46/EC and in 
addition to the categories of sensitive data mentioned previously it also includes 
trade-union membership, but on the other hand, it talks only about religious or 
philosophical beliefs and not about beliefs in general. 
Secondly, Schengen acquis does not foresee any processing of classified 
information. It raises some questions given that since 2005, SIS II can include 
counter-terrorism information.462 
6.1. Persons included 
Each category of alerts held in SIS directly indicates persons or objects to which it 
is applied. Thus SIS consists of the following alerts on persons: 
 Wanted for surrender, i.e. Prosecuted or convicted;  
 Missing or in need of special protection due their physical or mental 
condition;  
 Sought for assistance in judicial procedure;  
 Needed to be checked;  
                                                        
461  Ibid, p. 39. 
462  O’NEILL, Maria, “The Issue of Data Protection…”, loc. cit., p. 226. 
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 Not allowed to enter one of the members of the Schengen zone;  
Less specified is the last category of persons, as each State may apply different 
criteria to decide on whether he or she is not allowed to enter its territory. But as 
commented previously, this type of alert is not an object of this research due to its 
dissociation from investigation into crime. In addition to predetermined types of 
alerts, Article 51 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA and Article 36 of Regulation 
1987/2006 allow the inclusion of data on persons whose identity was misused. 
But unlike other categories of persons, for such data inclusion the consent of the 
data subject is needed, and there is a complete list of data that can be entered to 
the SIS II. Therefore, only the following data on a person whose identity was 
misused can be processed: names and surnames, data and place of birth, sex, 
nationality, photographs, fingerprints, any specific and permanent characteristics 
and number of identity documents. 
According to Articles 44.1 and 45.1 of Decision 2007/533/JHA, alerts are stored 
for the period that is necessary to achieve their purpose. But in any case, the State 
that has issued an alert shall make a revision on such a need and inform C.SIS if it is 
necessary to store it longer. If the State does not communicate such a need, an alert 
is automatically deleted after: 
 1 year if it concerns discreet or specific check of person;  
 3 years – other alerts on persons;  
 5 years – discreet or specific check of object;  
 10 years – other alerts on objects. 
The SIRENE office shall delete data exchanged in relation to an alert as soon as the 
purpose of its transfer has been achieved, and in any case, not later than one year 
after the deletion of the alert. This provision can be criticised because of the 
meaninglessness and purposelessness of keeping data when an alert to which it is 
related has been deleted. Besides, from a practical point of view, it is much easier 
to delete data related to an alert once it is withdrawn from the system, than to 
remember it within one year. 
6.2. Access 
As mentioned before, according to Article 40 of Decision 2007/533/JHA, access to 
SIS II is given to law enforcement authorities, i.e. Police, border guards and 
customs, vehicle registration certificates as well as Europol and Eurojust (within 
the scope that is necessary to perform their mandate). When it is allowed by the 
national legislation, judicial authorities participating in investigations and their 
coordinators can also be granted an access. 
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Regarding Europol and Eurojust and their “fishing expeditions” in SIS II, it was 
proposed to restrict their access only to data about individuals and objects that 
have already been included in their own files. From one perspective, this proposal 
seems reasonable, but from another it lacks mechanisms of effective control, given 
that the search in SIS II has really been made on a person or an object that is 
already included in the files of these agencies. 
Talking about persons having access to the SIS II data, each of them shall fulfil 
national rules of confidentiality. At SIRENE level, usually this would be equivalent 
to having security clearance and at other levels – the duty to maintain professional 
secrecy. Breach of secrecy, depending on its severity, can result in disciplinary or 
criminal responsibility. 
According to Articles 12, 18, and 41.4 of Decision 2007/533/JHA, all access to and 
exchanges of personal data shall be recorded and shall include “the history of the 
alerts, the date and time of the data transmission, the data used to perform a 
search, a reference to the data transmitted and the name of both the competent 
authority and the person responsible for processing the data.”  
Its Article 16 establishes Management Authority (since May 2013 is eu-LISA) 
controls access (including facilities and persons) and processing (including input, 
communication and storage). 
6.3. Third parties 
As a general rule established in Article 54 of the Decision 2007/533/JHA, data 
from SIS II cannot be transferred to third parties, meaning neither countries nor 
organisations. The only permitted exception is data submission to the Interpol 
database on stolen or missing travel documents (Article 55). Such transfers include 
only data on the type of stolen, lost, invalid or misappropriated document, its 
number and issuing country, and can be performed only with the following 
conditions: 
a) Interpol and the European Union sign relevant agreement;  
b) Issuing Member States gives a consent for such transfer;  
c) Data shall be accessible only to those Interpol members (third countries) 
that provide with the relevant data protection level. 
Such provision is useful for those countries that do not have a system that allows 
submitting the same information to a different database. Those who have such a 
system do not need an application of the Article 55 as introducing information into 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
~ 150 ~ 
its own system, a competent authority from the same interface chooses in which 
data bases it wants to announce an alert: national, SIS, Interpol, and so on. 
For the time being, this provision is not applicable as the relevant agreement 
between Interpol and the European Union has not been singed. And due to the 
technological developments and constant updates of national data processing 
systems, it probably it will be not needed. 
6.4. Data subject’s rights 
Article 49 of Decision 2007/977/JHA establishes Member State’s responsibility for 
the accuracy of entered data and its correction. 
Its Article 58 entails data subject’s right of access, deletion and correction, but 
more specific regulation on implementation of this right is left to the national 
legislation of each Member State. The European legislator foresees only two 
restrictions: 
 Access shall be denied if it necessary to the performance of tasks related to 
an alert, or in order to protect the rights of third parties. 
 If a request is related to data submitted to SIS II by another Member State, 
it has to be consulted before an answer being given to the data subject. 
Replies shall be provided within the deadlines foreseen by the national law of the 
requested Member State, but not later than within sixty days in cases of 
implementation of the right to access, and within three months in cases of 
implementation of the right to deletion or correction. This is a novelty of the SIS II 
legal basis in comparison with the previous one that did not envisage any 
deadlines for replies.463 
As all N.SIS are identical reflections of C.SIS, the data subject can file a request in 
any Member State.464  
The majority of Member States (e.g. Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom) provide direct access, meaning that the 
data subject can address his or her request directly to the competent authority that 
                                                        
463  See BROUWER, Evelien, “The Other Side of Moon: The Schengen Information System and Human 
Rights: A Task for National Courts” (Working Document No. 288, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, April 2008), p. 4, accessed October 20, 2013, http://www.ceps.eu/publications/other-
side-moons-schengen-information-system-and-human-rights-task-national-courts.  
464  RECUERO, Paz, “La protección de datos y Schengen: Una visión…”, loc. cit., p. 213.  
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handles the data. Very few Member States (e.g. Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Portugal) apply indirect access, meaning that the data subject has to address the 
request to the national supervisory authority (independent data protection 
institution).465  
France and Hungary apply a mixed access system and based of different principles. 
In the case of France, access depends on the category of alert, i.e. Direct access is 
granted in relation to alerts on persons being searched for in relation to family 
reasons, minors and those that are referred to in alerts on stolen vehicles. In the 
case of the remaining alerts, indirect access is used. In Hungary, a request can be 
addressed both to competent and supervisory authorities, but finally the national 
SIRENE office deals with all of them.466  
The system applied by France seems confusing as it can be applied only when a 
person knows what kind of alert is issued in relation to him or herself. And without 
such knowledge, the person will need to use both mechanisms. 
6.5. Supervising authorities 
To ensure the application of data protection, as with any fundamental right, there 
is a need for a control mechanism. 
As SIS II consists of central and national systems, its supervision is divided 
between national and European authorities. 
The European Data Protection Supervisor performs supervision at EU level. 
Controls can be performed in respect to some category of alert, data or specific 
basis or complaint, but in any case, at least once every four years, a comprehensive 
audit of eu-LISA’s data processing activities is performed. Its first audit took place 
at the end of 2014, but the report is still not publicly available. 
To control data processing within N.SIS and SIRENE, each Member State has to 
nominate a national, independent, supervising authority. As with the European 
Data Protection Supervisor, in performing their functions, national supervisory 
authorities shall perform comprehensive national auditing at least every four 
years, and also on an ad hoc basis when necessary. 
                                                        
465  See SIS SUPERVISION COORDINATION GROUP, “A Guide for Exercising the Right of Access”, 
October 2014 (updated October 2015), p. 11-29, 33-38, 41-89, accessed November 3, 2015, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Cooperatio
n/Large_IT_systems/SIS/15-10-12_SIS_II_GUIDE_OF_ACCESS_UPDATED_2015_EN.pdf 
466  See SIS SUPERVISION COORDINATION GROUP, “A Guide for Exercising the Right…”, loc. cit., p. 30, 
39. 
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To ensure smooth and equal data protection, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor and national authorities have to co-operate and meet at least twice a 
year. 
7. Brief summary and evaluation  
Although the direct objective of the multilateral Schengen agreement, the CISA and 
its incorporation into the EU legal system as Schengen acquis, is the free 
movement of persons and goods within the Schengen area, it is the pioneer tool of 
the police and judicial co-operation; it is the first, and for the moment the last, so 
the comprehensive legal framework that regulates the centralised data base, its 
supporting offices and data protection, information exchange and other non-data 
base assistance; the setting up a network of co-operation officers and units, as well 
as cross-border actions, do not have equivalents. 
Despite widely the prevalent consideration of the EU and Schengen area as an 
equal geographical territory, it should be realised that some EU countries are not 
members of the Schengen zone (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania), some EU 
countries are only participating partially (Ireland and the United Kingdom), some 
countries belonging to the Schengen zone are not Member States of the EU 
(Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). 
Despite criticisms of being a “Big Brother” tool, regulation of the SIS followed by 
SIS II is one of the most comprehensive regulations which has ever existed at 
international level, with precise foreseeing of data categories that can be 
exchanged, and the prohibition of exchange sensitive data. 
With respect to rights to privacy and data protection, the Schengen agreement, the 
CISA, incorporation of the Schengen acquis through the primary law of the EU 
(Treaty of Amsterdam), later joining the Schengen area by third countries, 
required ratification by the national parliament of each country, and therefore can 
be treated more as a fulfilment of the legality criteria for restriction of the above 
mentioned fundamental rights. 
Its purpose also seems to be justified as the abolition of control on internal borders 
has meant increased danger to public safety, and compensatory measures used on 
external borders and within the area of free movement were, and still are, needed. 
With respect to proportionality criteria, SIS II includes alerts on limited categories 
of persons and objects. The inclusion of persons wanted for extradition or 
surrender is totally justifiable and proportional to public safety and combatting 
crime. Missing persons, or those needing special protection due their physical or 
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mental conditions, generally do not present a direct threat to public safety. But 
public authorities are responsible for their safety (especially in the case of minors) 
and abolition of the control of internal borders makes this responsibility difficult to 
exercise and therefore requires some additional measures. The introduction of 
persons sought for assistance in judicial procedure can also be justified as their 
detection allows the performance of justice and in some cases, the prevention of 
malicious avoidance of it and in further cases, making a person aware of his or her 
inclusion in it. 
More problematic are alerts on persons that have to be checked, as it is not 
established to what extent information should be gathered and processed, and it 
could, therefore, mean interference into personal and family life. This situation 
could be avoided by indicating in the alert, which precise information is needed, 
for example only the itinerary of his or her journey, means of transport used, and 
so on. Creating the linking of alerts allows the checking officer to pay attention to 
those persons who are also alerted, but who do not interfere with information of 
the rest. 
Although SIS II is equipped with its lex especialis, in relation to data protection that 
is quite comprehensive, taking into account the existence of other centralised data 
bases and the creation of lex generalis for all data exchange within the area of 
police and judicial co-operation, it would be more coherent to apply it to SIS II as 
well, and to ensure the application of the same standards to all data bases. Lex 
especialis could be used for those aspects not regulated by lex generalis, for 
example control measures that have to be taken at national level in relation to 
N.SIS. 
In terms of clarity and difficulty of application, the Schengen acquis and its further 
development can be defined as a quite clear mechanism, although complicated in 
terms of establishment (e.g. Creation of SIS II, establishment of PCCCs). 
The greatest problem causes a perfunctory approach in the creation of new 
mechanisms, overlapping with already existing regulations, and demonstrates the 
need for a philosophy foreseen in the IMS and the Stockholm Programme to revise 
existing cooperation and other instruments before the creation of new ones.
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CHAPTER 4:   
EUROPOL 
he second object of this research is the European Police Office (hereinafter 
– Europol), nowadays an EU agency that aims “to support and strengthen 
action by the Member States’ police authorities and other law enforcement 
services and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime 
affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a 
common interest covered by a Union policy.”467  
The establishment of Europol’s predecessor dates back to the beginning of the 
nineties, but due to the changes introduced by different modifications of TFUE 
throughout the decades, both to the Europol’s status and the area of security, 
liberty and justice, the legal regulation of Europol is still under development. The 
last modifications introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 88(2) of the TFEU) 
foresee an obligation to adopt the regulation that determines the Agency’s 
structure, operation, field of action and tasks. 
The Proposal of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training 
(Europol), and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA468 
(hereinafter – Draft Europol Regulation) was presented by the Commission on 
27th April 2013, but is still under the legislative procedure. The Council of the 
European Union and the European Parliament have finished the first reading and 
now, due to numerous modifications proposed to the original draft by both 
institutions, are in the stage of trilogues (the analysis of the Draft Europol 
Regulation is presented in the part “Projects in the pipeline”). 
Before entering into an analysis of Europol’s role in information exchange, there is 
a need for a clear definition of its competence. 
                                                        
467  Article 88.2 of the TFEU.  
468  COM(2013) 173 final.  
T 
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Although one can encounter comparisons between Europol and the European FBI, 
federal police, or ascribing to it executive powers, its main objectives are 
information exchange, threat analysis, technical assistance to national law 
enforcement institutions and training. 
As pointed out by Bures, Europol, “Is not an executive police force with 
autonomous supranational authority to conduct its own investigations, undertake 
searches, or arrest suspects.”469 
From the very beginning, Germany was in favour of endowing Europol with the 
same coercive and executive competence as the Bundeskriminalamt470, but there 
was little support for this idea from other Member States, and the focus was on the 
improvement of the information flow. Thus, “Without Member State-level follow-
up, Europol’s work cannot be translated into action and results.”471  
As stated by Fijnaut, “While the integration of the 1990 Schengen Convention can 
be described as bottom up cross-border operationalization of police co-operation 
in the EU, the intention to include Europol more closely - in particular through 
joint teams – in criminal investigations of Member States in the field of organized 
crime can be called a top down attempt at cross-border operationalization of the 
actions [...].”472  
The following sections will present development of Europol, its role in information 
exchange and its future. The emphasis will be on very important, specific and 
arguable issue, i.e. Europol’s right to exchange information with third parties 
(third states and international organisations). 
1. From ministerial agreement to regulation by the 
TFEU 
The idea to create a police entity at European level dates back to the beginning of 
the informal, intergovernmental co-operation within the TREVI, where from time 
                                                        
469  BURES, Oldrich, “Europol’s Fledging Counterterrorism Role” in Terrorism and Political Violence, 
2008, vol. 20 (4), p. 501.  
470  This idea was strongly supported by the Germans. For example, German Chancellor Schröder 
proposed to transform Europol into a European police force with the same coercive and 
executive competence as the Bundeskriminalamt. See STORBECK, Jürgen, “La cooperación policial 
europea”, loc. cit., p. 167; BENYON, John, “Policing the European Union…”, loc. cit., p. 500. 
471  DISLEY, Emma; IRVING, Barrie; HUGHES, William et al., “Technical report on Evaluation of the 
implementation of the Europol Council Decision and of Europol’s activities makes a majority of 
information exchange”, Cambrige: RAND Corporation, 2012, p. 51, accessed December 4, 2014, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/evaluation-implementation-europol-
council-decision-and-europol’s-activities-1655. 
472  FIJNAUT, Cyrille, “Police Co-operation and the Area…”, loc. cit., p. 249-250.  
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to time, informally different visions of possible common law enforcement co-
operation body were raised. 
Some modest ideas were suggested with competence limited to some categories of 
crime. The most political and ambitious one sought to become more independent 
from information and intelligence gathered by the Unites States.473  
Nevertheless, it took 15 years for the proposal to create a European police entity to 
be approved by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the highest political levels of 
the European Council of 28th-29th June 1991, where the TREVI ministers were 
asked to submit a report on the possible development of a central European 
criminal intelligence office. After prompt reception of the report, the Summit of 
9th-10th December 1991 agreed on the establishment of the European Police 
Office, beginning with its drug intelligence unit. 
A few months later, Article K1(9) of the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union 
foresaw that one of the areas of common interest would be, “Police co-operation 
for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking 
and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain 
aspects of customs co-operation, in connection with the organization of a Union-
wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office 
(Europol).”474  
Although the Treaty was signed on 7th February 1992, it was obvious that its 
ratification would take some time and that it would take longer to agree on a 
Convention that would regulate Europol’s mandate and activities. 
1.1. Ministerial agreement 
Taking into account the seriousness of the drug threat to the European 
Communities, and realizing the time needed for the preparation and ratification of 
the Convention on Europol, TREVI ministers decided to start with the Ministerial 
Agreement on the Establishment of the Europol Drug Unit that was signed on 2nd 
June 1993 in Copenhagen. 
Consequently, a non-operational team of the liaison officers of all the participating 
countries were sent to the EDU headquarters for the establishment of intelligence 
exchange and analysis was. The EDU’s mandate was limited to actions where the 
crime or organized group affected two or more Member States. Each liaison officer 
                                                        
473  See BIGO, Didier, “EU Police Cooperation: National Sovereignty Framed by European Security?” in 
GUILD, Elspeht and GEYER, Florian (eds.), Security versus Justice?..., op. cit., p. 94. 
474  OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 61. 
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had to perform his or her duties according to the national regulation, including 
that on data protection. The agreement entailed only the following data exchange 
and protection rules: 
 All information exchange takes place on a bilateral basis between 
requesting and requested states. 
 If information related to the request has other than the requested state, 
this information can be transmitted to the requesting state only by that 
other state, and not by the requested one. 
 It is not allowed to transmit personal data to the non-Member State, or to 
any international organisation. 
 No personal information can be stored centrally in the EDU. 
 National data protection authorities supervise the activities of their liaison 
officers. 
Despite giving the first initiative towards a European police co-operation 
institution, the ministerial agreement had been far from sufficient to establish a 
full time functioning international office (defining its structure, competences, 
responsibility, accountability, maintenance, etc.) And therefore, two weeks later,475 
the Summit of Brussels determined that the Ministerial Agreement should be 
replaced by a Convention on Europol before October 1994.476  
1.2. Europol Convention 
Despite the established deadline, Europol had been in “embryonic existence”477 for 
over five years, as ratification of the Convention signed in 1995 lasted until mid-
1998, and Europol only replaced the EDU from 1st July 1999. 
Meanwhile, as indicated by the Report on the Organised Crime Situation of the 
Council of Europe, Albania, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Finland, 
Island, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Sweden and Turkey had between 25 and 100 
organised groups; Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldavia, 
the Netherlands and Slovakia between 100 and 200; Poland, Spain, Switzerland 
and Ukraine between 200 and 500; Germany, Italy, Romania, the Russian 
Federations and United Kingdom – more than 500.478 A large number of them took 
advantage of free movement to get around with their activities and international 
                                                        
475  On 10-11 December 1993. 
476 See BRUGGEMAN, Willy, “Europol and the Europol Drugs Unit: Their Problems and Potential for 
Development” in BIEBER, Roland and MONAR, Joerg Justice and Home Affairs in the European 
Union. The Development of the Third Pillar, (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995), 
p. 220-221.  
477  PEERS, Steve, EU Justice and Home Affairs…, op. cit., p. 931. 
478  COUNCIL OF EUROPE, “Report on the Organised Crime…”, loc. cit., p. 25. 
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police co-operation, and relevant measures were indispensable in order to combat 
this spreading phenomenon. 
As had been supposed, the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office479 (hereinafter - 
Europol Convention) expanded the scope of action foreseen for the EDU, 
establishing as Europol’s objective the prevention and combatting of terrorism, 
unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime when they 
affect two or more Member States. It had foreseen some kind of transitional period 
until full functioning: Europol had to start with the prevention and combatting of 
crimes of trafficking in drugs, human beings, nuclear and radioactive substances 
and motor vehicles as well as illegal immigrant smuggling, and after two years of 
functioning to also cover terrorism and other crimes, if decided by the Council. In 
all cases, Europol’s competence included money laundering and other criminal 
offences related to the above mentioned forms of crime. 
1.2.1. New Information Processing and Exchange Scheme 
Compared with the EDU, Europol had the right to maintain a computerized system 
of collected information, and to notify Member States about information possessed 
which was related to them. 
The information exchange scheme became the following: 
 Every Member State has only one liaison body between its competent 
authorities and Europol – national unit (hereinafter – ENU);  
 Every Member State sends at least one liaison officer to Europol’s 
headquarters in order to maintain contacts and forward information 
between Europol and its ENU. They represent the Member State and their 
mission is “to watch over the defence of Europol National Unit’s interests 
respecting provisions of national law and those related to Europol’s 
functioning.”480 
From another perspective, it should not be forgotten that representing its ENU and 
Member State liaison officer is a first contact point and aid for other Member 
States, and can directly provide other liaison officers of other Member States with 
information from databases to which he or she has access, to consult the national 
rules and possibilities of co-operation, and so on. 
                                                        
479  OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 1-32. 
480  ARROYO ROMERO, Francisco Javier, La influencia de EUROPOL en la comunitarización de la policía 
europea (Madrid: Akal, 2006), p. 40. 
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The Europol Convention, equal to other instruments, did not endow Europol with 
the application of coercive measures. As explained, the first Europol director 
STORBECK, Europol “is not authorised to perform either telephone tapping, or 
searches or detentions or other types of police measures that seldom violate 
citizens’ fundamental rights and therefore in addition to the requirement to be 
performed in conformity with relevant legal provisions, they have to be subject to 
the supervision of a prosecutor or other democratically competent institution.”481 
The third Round of Mutual Evaluations482 has shown that Member States are not in 
favour of granting it operation activities, but to strengthening analytical ones,483 
which by some authors such as Arroyo Romero, is seen as a lack of real efficiency 
of Europol.484  
In 2005, Europol information system (hereinafter – EIS) was created containing 
information contributed by Member States in compliance with their national 
procedures, and received by Europol from third parties. 
With respect to the content of the EIS, it was allowed to process data on: 
 Persons suspected of already committed crime that is subject to Europol’s 
competence or accomplices;  
 Persons suspected in future commission of such crime;  
 Committed crimes, modus operandi;  
 Convicted persons. 
Direct access to the EIS was provided to ENUs, liaison officers and authorised 
Europol staff. 
A possibility was also established by the agreement of two thirds of the members 
of the Management Board to create thematic485 data (work) files, also called 
Analysis Work Files (hereinafter - AWF). The rules of authorisation to open AWFs 
were modified by the Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article 43(1) of the 
Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol 
Convention). Instead of a mandate of the authorization to open AWFs, the 
Management Board was endowed with the right to close it. Thus Europol (the 
Director) became free to open AWFs, sending relevant information to the 
                                                        
481  STORBECK, Jürgen, “La cooperación policial europea”, loc. cit., p. 167.  
482  Member States had agreed to organize evaluations to assess applications of different police and 
judicial co-operation mechanisms, and the third round was dedicated to information exchange 
with Europol.  
483  See Council document 13321/07, p. 35. 
484  See GÓMEZ-JARA DÍEZ, Carlos, “¿Federalsmo jurídico-penal en la Constitución Europea? Un 
diálogo con el profesor Silva Sánchez” in ARROYO ZAPATERO, Luis and NIETO MARTÍN, Adán, El 
Derecho Penal de la Unión…, op. cit., p. 89.  
485  Focused on phenomenon, organised group or region. 
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supervisory body and the Management Board, and to continue its development 
and use until objection was received from the latter. 
The purpose of AWFs was (and still remains) analysis defined by the assembly, 
processing or utilization of data with the aim of helping a(n) (ongoing) criminal 
investigation of all interested Member States and is “one of the main ways in which 
Europol delivers operational support to Member States.”486 
Thus they would provide information and intelligence related to the topic and 
Europol staff, using analytical tools, would compare it with information received 
from other Member States, in order to establish possible links between crimes, 
persons, modus operandi, groups, etc. For example, such an AWF was created to 
combat trafficking in cocaine (to investigate, dismantle laboratories, etc.) And 
sought “to collect intelligence associated with the activities of suspected criminal 
organisations and networks involved in the production, processing or trafficking of 
cocaine, including intelligence relating to precursor chemicals and cutting 
agents.”487  
Unlike the EIS, AWFs can contain not only data on convicted persons and persons 
suspected of commissioning crime, but also data on victims, witnesses, contacts 
and associates, providers of information related to offences under consideration. 
And as mentioned in subsection 5.3 of Chapter II, in indispensable cases for the file, 
it is allowed to process in AWFs, special personal data, such as racial or ethnic 
origin, religion, state of health or sex life. 
AWFs can also contain data on criminal offences, modus operandi, entities 
responsible for the investigation, case reference, even if no references to persons 
exist. 
In addition to information processing, Europol was also endowed with the 
additional tasks of developing specialist knowledge, providing strategic 
intelligence and preparing general situation reports. 
The Management Board – as already mentioned – is Europol’s decisive body. As 
Europol was the result of intergovernmental co-operation, there was the need for a 
body that would ensure the participation of all Member States in approval of 
essential decisions on Europol’s functioning (those not regulated or endowed to 
the Council), and so the Management Board was created as such a unit. It became 
responsible for the definition of rules for liaison officers (their rights and 
                                                        
486  DISLEY, Emma; IRVING, Barrie; HUGHES, William et al. “Technical report on Evaluation…”, loc. cit., 
p. 78. 
487  EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTER FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, EUROPOL, “Cocaine: A 
European Union Perspective in the global context”, 2010, p. 33, accessed, June 7, 2015, 
https://www.google.es/#q=analytical+work+file+Cola. 
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obligations), regulation of security clearance, participation with the Council in the 
extension of Europol’s mandate, appointment of the Director, his or her Deputies 
and financial controller, drawing up the budget ( consisting of Member States’ 
contributions488 and other incidental incomes). 
1.2.2. Way Forward 
The Europol Convention was subject to modification by three protocols signed in 
2000, 2002 and 2003: 
 Council Act of 30th November 2000 drawing up, on the basis of Article 
43(1) of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office 
(Europol Convention), of a Protocol amending Article 2 and the Annex to 
that Convention489 that included money laundering into Europol’s 
competence, as well as any other crime which predicates the crime that 
represents its core competence; 
 Council Act of 28th November 2002 drawing up a Protocol amending the 
Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol 
Convention), and the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of 
Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and the 
employees of Europol490, that spelled out Europol’s possibility to 
participate in joint investigation teams and to request Member States to 
conduct or coordinate investigations. 
 Council Act of 27th November 2003 drawing up, on the basis of Article 
43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office 
(Europol Convention), a Protocol amending that Convention491 that 
established the regulation of Europol’s operational agreements with third 
states for information exchange and their participation in AWFs. 
Due to a long ratification procedure, all three protocols only came into force in 
2007. It was a clear sign that with the application of conventional procedure, 
Europol would not be able to adapt rapidly to changing crime tendencies with 
relevant modifications of its competences, tasks or functions. Under these 
circumstances, it was decided to change the Convention by the Council Decision 
                                                        
488  According to Article 35 of the Europol Convention, “Each Member State’s financial contribution 
shall be determined according to the proportion of its gross national product to the sum total of 
the gross national products of the Member States for the year preceding the year in which the 
budget is drawn up.” In the Ministerial Agreement the cost was borne, “within the limits of their 
budgetary rules and annual procedures, each Ministry’s voluntary annual contribution [...] will be 
determined on the basis of the country’s gross national product.”  
489  OJ C 358, 13.12.2000, p. 1–7. 
490  OJ C 312, 16.12.2002, p. 1. 
491  OJ C 2, 6.1.2004, p. 1-11. 
Information Exchange Efficiency in Criminal Investigation in European Union 
 
~ 163 ~ 
that would be allowed, in case of necessity, to make rapid changes without the 
need to wait for the ratification process of all Member States, especially taking into 
account that since the first decisions on Europol, their number had increased from 
12 to 27. This initiative was presented by the Austrian Presidency of the Council of 
the European Union in 2006, and resulted in the Commission’s proposal on draft 
Council Decision.492  
After more than 2 years of discussions, on 6th April 2009 the Council Decision 
2009/371/JHA of establishing the European Police Office (Europol)493 (hereinafter 
– Europol Decision) was adopted. It has been in force until now, but in the near 
future it will be changed by the Regulation as explained at the beginning of this 
chapter. 
2. Europol – EU agency 
With entrance into force of the Europol Decision, Europol became a European 
agency financed from the EU Budget, and subject to the same staff and other 
administrative requirements as other EU institutions and entities as well as being 
accountable to the European Parliament. Although the title of the Europol Decision 
includes the term “establishment”, it only refers to the change of Europol’s legal 
form, and Article 1(2) states that it “shall be regarded as the legal successor of 
Europol, as established by the Europol Convention.”494  
With respect to its objective, the Europol Decision entails support and 
strengthening action of cooperation and refers to the prevention and combatting of 
organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime affecting two or more 
Member States. According to the Europol Convention, the relation with organised 
crime had been a compulsory condition in assigning crimes of terrorism, drug 
trafficking and other serious crime to Europol’s competence. That meant that 
before the Europol Decision, drug trafficking, terrorism and other serious crimes 
would be Europol’s competence only when these crimes were related to organised 
crime and would affected two or more Member States. With the Europol Decision, 
terrorism and other serious crimes would be within its competence when they 
affected two or more Member States, but are not necessarily related to organised 
crime. 
The Europol Decision retains the same policy in relation to related crimes, given 
that the Europol Convention, i.e. Article 4(3) of the Decision, foresees Europol’s 
                                                        
492  See more explicitly AMICI, Victoria, “Europol et la nouvelle décision du Conseil: entre 
opportunités et contraintes” in Revue du Droit de L’union Européenne, 2010(1), p. 80-81. 
493  OJ L 121, 15.5.2009, p. 37-66. 
494  OJ L 121, 15.5.2009, p. 39. 
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involvement in prevention and combatting other criminal offences committed to 
facilitate those ones that are under its direct competence. 
Regarding the processing of information, changes were not great, as Member 
states remain responsible for making decisions relating to the scope of information 
that can be provided to Europol. The Europol Decision only established the legal 
basis allowing wider access to its data bases in order to ensure better use of 
Europol’s capacities and to enhance trust in it as a partner.495 This novelty will be 
discussed more broadly in the following subsection. 
Although since its establishment, Europol had been carrying out analytical 
functions, only the Europol Decision established the task to elaborate threat 
assessments and strategic analysis. 
Europol’s staff maintains the possibility of participating, in a supporting capacity, 
in joint investigation teams on the basis of arrangements with Europol’s Director 
and the competent authorities of the participating Member States in it. Supporting 
capacity can be carried out within the limits established by the law of the Member 
State where joint investigation team is operating. 
The structure and cooperation mechanism has remained the same, with the 
obligation of Member States to maintain single ENU and to send at least one liaison 
officer to Europol’s Headquarters. 
According to the last available data (September 2015), there were 134 liaison 
officers seconded to Europol by the Member States, and 37 by non-EU partners on 
the basis of cooperation agreements with Europol.496 
Comparing the workflow from 2005 and 2013, the number of cases increased by 
120 % and resulted in more than 18,000 cases.497 
In order to maintain contacts and information exchange with the Member States 
and other partners, Europol has 24/7 operational coordination centre that: has a 
workflow of more than 300 operation messages a day, assesses whether incoming 
data can be included in the Europol databases, is responsible for a centralised 
                                                        
495  See SANTOS VARA, Juan, “Las consecuencias de la integración de Europol en el Derecho de la 
Unión Europea (comentario a la Decision del Consejo 2009/371/JAI, de 6 de abril de 2009)” in 
Revista General de Derecho Europeo, 2010(20), p. 10. 
496  Council document 10597/15, p. 76. 
497  Council document 10426/14, p. 4.  
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cross-checking service, 498 and, if necessary, produces analytical reports that are 
immediately sent to the Member States in question.499  
2.1. Information exchange tools 
Since becoming an Agency, a description of Europol as an information exchange 
hub, a centre of expertise, can be encountered. 
The Europol Decision, like the Europol Convention, directly establishes and 
regulates the Europol Information System and AWFs. It also foresees that the 
Management Board shall approve the creation of a new personal data processing 
system. Consequently, the Management Board agreed on the establishment of the 
Secure Information Exchange Network Application (hereinafter - SIENA). 
Additionally, Europol is granted access to other centralised information systems in 
the EU: SIS II, Customs Information System, Visa Information System and Eurodac. 
The subject of analysis of the following subsections will be the actual regulation of 
these tools. 
2.1.1. Europol Information System 
The functioning of the EIS is based on Articles 11-13 of the Europol Decision. EIS 
continues to be a database that stores information about offences and individuals 
involved, as well as other related criminal data. 
According to Article 12, it contains only that data necessary for the performance of 
Europol’s tasks and, talking about the categories of persons – only those that were 
already subject to inclusion under the Europol Convention.500 
In addition to the data categories foreseen by the previous regulation (surname, 
maiden name, given names, alias, assumed name, date and place of birth, 
nationality, sex and where necessary other characteristics likely to assist in 
identification501), Article 12 of the Europol Decision allows the inclusion of the 
place of residence and whereabouts, profession, social security numbers, driving 
licences and identification documents. In the case of other characteristics, 
                                                        
498  Quick cross-check of all data against criminal intelligence gathered in Europol’s databases. 
499  Thus in 2013, Europol provided 1656 cross-match reports, 220 operational analysis reports and 
385 other operational reports. See Council document 10426/14, p. 25. 
500 As mentioned: persons suspected of already having committed a crime, being accomplices or of 
its future commission, and subject to Europol’s competence as well as information on committed 
crimes and convicted persons. 
501  Article 8 of the Europol Convention. 
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previously not specified, dactyloscopic data and DNA profiles are now 
distinguished. 
Access to the EIS (both for input and retrieval) is granted to duly empowered 
Europol staff (including the Director and his or her Deputies), liaison officers and 
ENUs. A novelty established by Article 13(6) of the Europol Decision is that 
Member States can decide to give EIS access to other competent authorities, but it 
will be limited to the possibility of verifying whether or not requested information 
exists (hit / no hit bases). In the case of a hit, a request for relevant information has 
to be sent through the ENU of that country. 
As in the case of SIS, only the party that submits information has the right to 
modify or delete it.502  
According to data from 2013, EIS contained 245,142 objects, 70,917 suspects or 
convicted persons with 321,429 executed searches.503  
2.1.2. Analysis Work Files 
As already mentioned, in performing its tasks, when necessary, Europol when can 
create AWFs to process and analyse information on some types of crime, organised 
groups or modus operandi. 
The Europol Decision has the same categories of persons that can be included in 
AWFs, i.e. Categories of persons whose data can be processed in the EIS, and data 
of witnesses who can be called to testify, victims, contacts and associates of 
suspects as well as of informers. In order to specify their regulation and establish 
clearer rules about the processing of different categories of personal data, Decision 
2009/936/JHA was adopted. 
Data categories that can be stored in AWFs depend on each category of person and 
vary considerably as shown in the following table. 
                                                        
502  Article 20 of the Europol Decision foresees that data has to be deleted after 3 years (or if the data 
is not necessary – earlier) with a review within 3 months before the deadline of deletion. Within 
the period of review, a decision to leave the data for a longer period during which it remains 
necessary can be taken, but no longer than until the next review. If the review is not carried, data 
is deleted automatically after 3 years of storage.  
503  Council document 10426/14, p. 17. Report on Europol’s activities in 2014 presents only data on 
objects contained in the EIS, but not persons and searches therefore presentation of older, but 
more complete data was elected. 
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Categories of person Categories of data collected 
All categories of persons 1. Present and former surnames (i.e. Real and 
alias, nickname, residence, nationality, parents (if 
it necessary, etc.) 
2. Physical description 
3. Identification means (i.e. Documents, ID and 
other official numbers, images, fingerprints and 
DNA profiles, etc.) 
Suspect of a crime (already committed or 
future), accomplice, convicted persons, 
contacts and associates504 
1. Education, skills, employment (including 
associated legal persons) 
2. Economic and financial information 
3. Information on behaviour data 
4. Contacts and associates 
5. Communication means 
6. Transport means 
7. Criminal activities under the competence of 
Europol (including associated legal persons) 
8. References to other databases 
Victims  1. Identification 
2. Motives for victimisation 
2. Damage suffered 
3. Need to guarantee anonymity 
4. Possibility to participate in a court hearing 
5. Their provided information about crime 
Data categories mentioned in relation to suspect 
also can be collected if it is necessary for analysis 
Witnesses 1. Need to guarantee anonymity 
2. Need to guarantee protection 
3. New identity 
4. Possibility of participating in a court hearing 
5. Their provided information about crime 
Informers 1. Type of information provided 
2. Encrypted personal data 
3. Negative experiences 
4. Rewards 
5. Data categories applied to witnesses 
Table 15: Categories of data stored in AWFs depending on category of person. 
Among the information that can be included on victims, witnesses and informers, 
anonymity, use of new identity, need or application of protection measures 
deserve special attention. These categories can make any AWF a very powerful tool 
                                                        
504  In the case of contacts and associates, previous evaluation on whether such data in necessary to 
analyse their role in relation to suspects, accomplices or convicted persons shall be carried out. 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
~ 168 ~ 
in the wrong hands and therefore, very high standards of secure communication, 
confidentiality and data protection shall be applied. 
The right of direct input to an AWF remains the responsibility of Europol’s analysts 
designated for that file. Thus the role of Member States505 is limited to the 
submission of information to Europol, where it is evaluated before being stored. 
Nevertheless, it is up to Member States to establish a degree of data sensitivity and 
the processing conditions. 
Third parties directly related to AWFs can participate in them and, in the case of 
the existence of a relevant agreement between the third party and Europol, all 
participants agree. 
Every piece of data included in an AWF is categorised according to its source and 
information evaluation codes as is shown below. 
Source evaluation code Information evaluation code 
(A): trustworthy and authentic information 
(B): information from a reliable source 
(C): information from a source which has, in 
most instances, proved to be unreliable 
(X): reliability assessment is not possible 
(1): no doubts about accuracy of information 
(2): the source knows the information 
personally, but not the official passing it on 
(3): the source does not know the information 
personally, but it coincides with already 
recorded information 
(4): the source does not know the information 
and it cannot be corroborated 
Table 16: Evaluation codes of sources and information processed in AWFs. 
Europol can create AWFs of both a general and strategic nature506, and in this case 
information will be available to all Member States. 
In the case of operational AWFs507, information will be available and retrieval can 
be carried out, only by participants and only after Europol’s accreditation and 
special training. Every access to data and its transmission, will be recorded in 
order to identify the entity of the action. According to Article 15, the Director, his 
or her Deputies, Europol’s staff, liaison officers and ENUs who do not participate in 
AWFs are authorised to access the index of the AWF only; this allows them to find 
                                                        
505  ENU or in urgent cases, competent authorities directly. See Article 3 of the Council Decision 
2009/936/JHA. 
506  Article 11 of Decision 2009/936/JHA defines its aim as the processing of relevant information 
concerning a particular problem, or to develop or improve initiatives by the competent 
authorities.  
507  The same article defines its aim as obtaining information on criminal activities in order to 
commence, assist or conclude bilateral or multilateral investigations when two or more Member 
States are involved. 
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out whether or not searched information exists, but does not give them direct 
access to it. 
According to Article 17(1) of the Decision 2009/936/JHA, “All personal data and 
analysis results transmitted from an analysis work file may only be used in 
accordance with the purpose of the file or for the purposes of preventing and 
combating other serious forms of crime.” 
The Europol Decision continues to maintain the same policy on creation and 
closure of AWFs, where the main decisive power belongs to the Director, but the 
Management Board at any moment can order the closure of an AWF or to oppose 
the opening order. 
Data storage terms and conditions depend on the way of closing AWFs: 
 If the AWF was closed as a result of a finished operation, or analysis or 
term for which it was established, the data would be stored for up to 
eighteen months in separate file, for the purpose of internal or external 
control. The result of the analysis of an AWF can be stored in electronic 
form for up to 3 years and afterwards, only as a paper document. 
 If the AWF was closed on the request of the Management Board, all data 
has to be deleted immediately. 
In 2012 Europol, run 23 AFWs and from the years of experience, it came to the 
conclusion that a vertical approach (on one region, group or phenomenon) is not 
always sufficient, and more a generative thinking approach is needed. In these 
circumstances, and basing its decision on Article 18(1)a of Decision 
2009/936/JHA, Europol proposed to participants of all AWFs, that they merge into 
two large AWFs: an AFW for serious and organised crime (AWF SOC), and an AWF 
for counter terrorism (AWF CT). Thus in May – July of 2012, 18 AWFs related to 
serious and organised crime migrated to AWF SOC, and 5 AWFs related to counter 
terrorism – to AFW CT. A characteristic of the new AWFs is that within them, 
different analyses and actions could be carried out. A distinction was made 
between a Focal Point and a Target Group. The first one focuses on a certain 
phenomenon from the perspective of topic, regional angle or commodity, and 
Europol provides it mainly with analysis and support information and intelligence 
exchange. The second one is more operational than a Focal Point, as in addition to 
analysis, Europol designates its team to support an investigation or intelligence 
operation against a specific target. 
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2.1.3. Secure Information Exchange Network Application 
In 2009, Europol’s Secure Information Exchange System (SIENA) was created. 
The system allows the exchange of strategic and operational information within 
the mandate of Europol, assuring a high level of communication, security and 
interoperability with other Europol systems and enabling the secure exchange of 
restricted and confidential information. 
SIENA provides two possibilities: 
 To exchange information using a web browser. 
 Since 2012, to exchange information “system to system” that allows two 
types of connection: simple (to receive SIENA messages) and advanced (to 
receive and send them). The latter means the connection of a national 
system in such a way that it could be used both for national and 
international information exchange. 
SIENA has multilingual user interface in all languages of the EU. Nevertheless, the 
text of a message is not translated and must normally be written in English, except 
in those cases when the parties in question agree to use another language. 
SIENA can be used both for information exchange purely under Europol’s mandate, 
and for bilateral or multilateral communication among Member States that remain 
outside its scope (that according to the technical report on Evaluation of the 
implementation of the Europol Council Decision and of Europol’s activities carries 
out a majority of information exchange).508 But on addressing one of Europol’s 
cooperation partners (third party), Member States will be notified via SIENA that 
this exchange should only take place as far as crimes within Europol’s mandate are 
concerned. 
Depending on national arrangements, SIENA can be used not only by the ENU and 
liaison officers, but other competent authorities as well. Nevertheless, all the 
authorities of one Member State have to be connected through one national 
system. 
Before connecting to SIENA, it has to be ensured that the national system fulfils all 
security and data protection requirements (authentication, access control, input 
and output validation, logging and error handling, infrastructure controls).509  
                                                        
508  See DISLEY, Emma; IRVING, Barrie; HUGHES, William et al., “Technical report on Evaluation…”, loc. 
cit., p. 49.  
509  Council document 10303/14, p. 20-21. 
Information Exchange Efficiency in Criminal Investigation in European Union 
 
~ 171 ~ 
At the end of 2014, SIENA included 573 competent authorities with 4,663 users 
from the Member States; Europol’s operational and strategic partners had an 
average of 50,000 messages exchanged every month.510  
2.1.4. Information handled under Article 10.4 of the Europol 
Decision  
Article 10.4 of the Europol Decision foresees the processing of submitted data for 
no longer than 6 months, in order to determine whether it can be included in EIS, 
AWFs or another system. This provision, in all cases, is applied to AWFs, as only 
Europol specialized staff can enter information regarding ES or other systems 
when it is not directly included by a Member State, EU entity or authorized third 
party. After six months, information shall be either in EIS, AWF, another system or 
deleted. 
Submitted information is automatically cross-checked with the index system of the 
EIS and then evaluated. Nevertheless, evaluation criteria are not clear. One of them 
should be conformity of information with Europol’s mandate. But application of 
only these criteria would be unjustifiably disproportionate. 
Nevertheless, this area stays in the shadow, as there is no publicly available 
document that regulates these Europol activities. 
2.2. Information exchange with EU institutions and other 
entities, third states and international organisations 
Exchange of information between Member States through Europol, or its 
submission to Europol’s databases directly derives from the Agency’s objective to 
support and strengthen the actions of competent authorities, and their 
cooperation. Nevertheless, in achieving this objective and acting against threats to 
the EU internal security information and intelligence from entities other than 
Member States (inside the EU as well as from third states and organisations), can 
be of upmost importance. For example:  
 Information exchange with the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union (FRONTEX). Can help to identify links between 
organised crime, trafficking in human beings and illegal migration; 
                                                        
510  See Council document 8082/15, p. 42. 
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information from Eurojust – to make link with ongoing investigations, and 
so on. 
 Such crimes as drug trafficking, illegal migration and trafficking in human 
beings usually have their origin outside the EU, envisaging its Member 
States as the point of final destination. Therefore, to guarantee EU internal 
security, effective international cooperation with competent authorities in 
countries of origin and transit is indispensable. For example, as big drug 
flows come from West Africa, and South and Central America, a closed co-
operation and effective information exchange with the competent 
authorities in these countries has to take place. In the case of criminal 
organisations of Albanian511 or Russian512 origin which act within the EU, 
information and intelligence from these countries is vital as well. Such co-
operation could be based on reciprocity, that does not guarantee either 
rapidness or effectiveness, or on co-operation agreements. In reference to 
bilateral agreements, it is difficult to imagine that each Member State 
would have the necessary agreements with all important partners outside 
of the EU, because they are usually concluded in line with national 
priorities of co-operation with neighbouring states or specific regions, 
depending on their geographical position, historical links with other 
countries and threats to their security. In these circumstances, the 
optimum would be EU wide possibility of information exchange, which 
would serve to combat threats at EU level.513  
Therefore, the Council has envisaged for Europol, the possibility to exchange 
information with other EU bodies and third parties. 
When it comes to exchange of strategic information and analysis, operational 
analysis, non-personal, personal and confidential data, different regulations are 
applied. In the case of personal data, a general rule of its transmission is an 
objective of“ preventing or combating criminal offences in respect of which 
Europol is competent.”514 
Receiving information, Europol shall ask submitting party to assess it and its 
source, applying the same evaluation codes as Member States providing 
information for AWF. 
                                                        
511  See STORBECK, Jürgen, “La cooperación policial europea”, loc. cit., p. 157.  
512  See ESPIGARES MIRA, Jesús, “Instrumentos internacionales de cooperación” in MONTERO, Julián, 
ROMERO and Francisco, VALIENTE, Elena. ¿Hacía una Policía Europea?, op. cit., p. 119.  
513  See more in RENARD, Thomas, “Partners in crime? The EU, its strategic partners and 
international organised crime” (Working Paper, European Strategic Partnership Observatory, 
May 2014), p. 15-20, accessed June 2, 2015, http://fride.org/publication/1191/partners-in-
crime?-the-eu,-its-strategic-partners-and-international-organised-crime. 
514  Article 8 the Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.  
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The following subsections of this work are rendered to the regulations and 
problems that faced by Europol in information exchange with the EU entities and 
third parties, leaving the personal data protection questions to section 3.515  
2.2.1. Information exchange with EU institutions and other entities 
Article 22 of the Europol Decision permits cooperative relations with all institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the EU, and in particular with those directly or indirectly 
related to the Europol’s activities. It envisages an obligation to conclude agreements or 
working arrangements on operational, strategic, technical and classified information 
exchange with Eurojust, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Frontex, the 
European Police College (CEPOL), the European Central Bank and the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).516 With other bodies, 
agreements can be concluded if the Management Board gives an authorisation for 
negotiations. Once negotiations on agreement or working arrangements are 
finished, before a definitive conclusion is reached, Europol has to obtain the 
approval of the Management Board. 
Europol’s agreements with EU institutions, agencies and other entities can be: 
 Strategic – permitting only the exchange of general information and 
strategic analysis without providing any personal data or confidential 
information. 
 Operative – regulating in depth data protection and allowing the exchange 
of personal data. 
It has to be mentioned that Article 55 of the Europol Decision envisages that with 
this new regulation, previously concluded agreements517 are not affected. 
As for the date, Europol has concluded:  
 Strategic agreements with the European Commission, European Central 
bank, Frontex, CEPOL, EMCDDA, OLAF, as well as the Office for 
                                                        
515  In this context, it has to be mentioned that according to Article 25 of the Europol Decision, it is 
also allowed to receive information from private parties (legal entities, NGOs, etc.) and private 
persons from the EU Member States and third parties with already concluded agreements. This 
can only be done through ENU of Member States or the contact point of third parties. When an 
entity or a person is from a third party with no co-operation agreement, a memorandum of 
understanding between Europol and that party must be concluded. Europol is not allowed to 
contact private parties and persons in the third states with whom it does not have agreement; the 
initiative shall come from the third country or private party/person.  
516  Strengthening of co-operation between the EU agencies is also foreseen in the European Internal 
Security Strategy.  
517  Australia, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and United States of America. 
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Harmonisation in the Internal Market and the European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security. 
 Operational agreement with Eurojust. 
That means that it is only allowed to exchange personal data with Eurojust, and 
with the rest of the European partners, co-operation is of a strategic nature. 
On the other hand, Article 22(3) allows information exchange (without specific 
rules concerning personal data) prior to any the agreement, if it is necessary to 
perform the recipient’s tasks (Europol’s or of other EU institution). This raises a 
question of expedience to start more difficult negotiation processes of operational 
agreement, if in any case there is the possibility of transmitting personal data 
without an agreement, foreseeing such a wide margin of purpose as tasks of 
entities involved in exchange. 
2.2.2. Information exchange with third states and international 
organisations 
Article 23 of the Europol Decision foresees the possibility of establishing and 
maintaining cooperative relations with third countries and organisations. 
Normally such co-operation, the same as in cases of the EU institutions and other 
entities, would be based on strategic or operational agreements. 
The list of countries and organisations with which Europol can conclude 
agreements is established (and can be complemented) by qualified majority of the 
Council of the European Union. Such a list was approved by the Council Decision 
2009/935/JHA of 30th November 2009 determining the list of third States and 
organisations with which Europol shall conclude agreements518 (hereinafter –
Decision 2009/935/JHA) and includes: Albania, Australia, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia519, former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Iceland, India, Israel, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Norway, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United States 
of America, ICPO-Interpol, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World 
Customs Organisation. It should be mentioned that it does not envisage whether 
strategic or operational agreement with one or another country or organisation 
has to be concluded. According to Articles 5 and 6 of Decision 2009/934/JHA, it 
depends on the data protection level of the third country or organisation that is 
subject to evaluation prior to negotiations (see more subsection 3.3.1 of this 
Chapter). On this basis, the Management Board allows Europol to enter into 
                                                        
518  OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 12-13. 
519  The agreement is not necessary since 1 June 2013 as Croatia became EU Member State.  
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negotiations of one or another type of agreement. Once negotiations are finalised, 
the draft is submitted for the endorsement of the Management Board and approval 
of the Council of the European Union (in the case of operational agreement, 
opinion of the Joint Supervisory Body is also submitted). This is a different from 
the approval of agreements with the EU bodies, where the top decisive institution 
is the Management Board. 
Without agreement in force, Europol can receive any data necessary for 
performing its tasks, but is limited to transmitting only non-personal and non-
confidential data to the states and organisations mentioned in Decision 
2009/935/JHA, and if transmitted information has been provided by a Member 
State – only with its consent. The only exceptions are established in Article 23(6) 
and 23(8) and discussed in subsection 3.3.1 of this Chapter. 
In the case of countries and organisations not listed in Decision 2009/935/JHA, 
Europol is allowed to transmit only non-personal and non-confidential data in 
“absolutely necessary individual cases”. In this case, the same question about the 
content of “individual cases” arises, but at least it is not related to the transmission 
of personal data. 
For the time being, Europol has concluded: 
 Strategic agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. 
 Operational agreements with Albania, Australia, Canada, Colombia, 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, 
Republic of Serbia, Switzerland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the 
Principality of Monaco, United States of America. 
It has to be stressed that the scope of purpose of co-operation in agreements 
differs. Thus in agreements with Albania, Australia, Colombia, former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Liechtenstein, the scope of co-operation is all or almost 
all crimes that fell under Europol’s mandate at the date of entry into force of 
agreement. In the case of Iceland, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and United States 
of America, the scope is limited to a few types of crime, such as unlawful drug 
trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant 
smuggling, trade in human beings, motor vehicle crime, crimes committed or likely 
to be committed in the course of terrorist activities against life, limb, personal 
freedom or property, and the forgery of money and means of payment.520  
                                                        
520  See, for example, Article 3 of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European 
Police Office; Agreement between the United States of America and the European Police Office; 
Agreement between the Republic of Iceland and the European Police Office. 
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According to the already mentioned Council Decision 2006/560/JHA, Europol can 
also delegate its employees to one or more third countries, or to international 
organisations. Any Member State can send a request to Europol to use its liaison 
officer for information exchange with the third party. For the time being, Europol 
has liaison officers in Interpol and the United States.521  
2.3. European Cybercrime Centre 
In addition to different information exchange tools, Europol also has units 
specialising in different topics. One of the latest and most significant is the 
European Cybercrime Centre, also called EC3. It developed from the European 
platform on cybercrime established and hosted by Europol on the basis of Council 
Conclusions of the 2,899th Justice and Home Affairs Meeting of 24th October 2008. 
In the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, “The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more 
secure Europe”522 (hereinafter – Communication on Implementation of ISS) within 
the objective of raising security in cyberspace, it was foreseen that by 2013, a 
cybercrime centre will be established “to build operational and analytical capacity 
for investigations and cooperation with international partners” 523 and it will be 
established within existing structures. 
For this purpose, in 2012, RAND Europe performed a feasibility study and after 
comprehensive analysis of the option to allocate the Cybercrime Centre in 
Eurojust, Europol or ENISA, or create it as a virtual centre, a new agency or an 
organisation to be run by one Member State or by a Public-Private Partnership, it 
was proposed to create it within Europol.524 It was recommended, especially 
taking into account that only Europol is a criminal intelligence agency with a clear 
mandate and that “the legal basis of the agency is tailored to its operational role – 
it has an extensive data- protection regime and a complex set of rules governing 
participation in the AWFs.”525  
                                                        
521  Council document 11996/14, p. 73. 
522  COM(2010) 673, final.  
523  COM(2010) 673, final, p. 9. 
524 ROBINSON, Neil; DISLEY, Emma; POTOGLOU, Dimitris et al., “Feasibility Study for a European 
Cybercrime Centre” (Final report, RAND Europe, February 2012), accessed 1 June, 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/pdf/20120311_final_report_feasibility_ 
study_for_a_european_cybercrime_centre_en.pdf. 
525 Ibid, p. 110. 
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Functions foreseen in the Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament “Tackling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a 
European Cybercrime Centre”:526 
 To be a focal point between national competent services, the private 
sector and CERT;  
 To support capacity building of Member States;  
 To support investigations;  
 To act as a point of reference in relation to cybercrime investigations and 
“common voice” in this area.527  
In June 2012, the Council supported the creation of EC3 in Europol, and it became 
operational on 11th January 2013. 
As with Europol, EC3 also has a co-ordination function in relation to transnational 
operations on cybercrime, which involve organised crime; in particular child 
abuse, online fraud and threats to the EU information systems and the critical 
infrastructures of Member States. It is also a “central hub” for information and 
intelligence, produces its own strategic analysis product – Internet Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) - which has already been mentioned in the first 
Chapter; it also ensures forensic support.528  
As there are no specific legal acts regulating EC3 activities, and no restrictions in 
comparison with Europol in general, it can be concluded that general Europol 
regulations are applied to its work, and on the same basis as Europol, it can be part 
of AWFs, access to EIS and communicate through SIENA. Member States can 
address their request exactly in the same way as they do in relation to other crimes 
that fall within Europol’s competence. 
2.4. Efficiency 
According to what has been already presented, since mid-1999, Member States 
have had an opportunity to use a new co-operation tool in combatting cross-
border crime.529 Moreover, the success of this tool depended on the good faith of 
                                                        
526  COM(2012) 140 final. 
527  Ibid. p. 4-5. 
528  See “Combating Cybercrime in a Digital Age”, Europol, accessed June 9, 2015, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3 
529  See AMICI, V., “Europol et la nouvelle décision…”, loc. cit., p. 96. 
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co-operation of national law enforcement agencies, as Europol Convention had not 
established obligations either to submit information or to reply to requests. 530  
In parallel with the entrance into force of the Convention on Europol and the last 
preparatory works, political emphasis on the promotion of the co-operation with 
this entity came with the Amsterdam Treaty, as well as with the statement of the 
Tampere Conclusions, declaring that within five years Europol’s role “should be 
strengthened by means of receiving operational data from Member States and 
authorising it to ask Member States to initiate, conduct or coordinate 
investigations or to create joint investigative teams in certain areas of crime, while 
respecting systems of judicial control in Member States.”531 
But the process of obtaining trust in politically originated law enforcement entity 
was long and complicated, as not all Member States were ready to reveal their 
national investigations and provide Europol with the relevant information. It was 
aptly defined by Castillejo Manzanares that Europol had faced “scepticism of 
police” that did not provide it with sufficient and systematic support.532 After two 
years of functioning, in 2001, Europol’s director, Storbeck, recognised this problem 
and tried to justify it saying that, “Even now when European interests coincide like 
never before, intercultural conflicts and fears of population about the 
establishment of federal super-state very seldom are obstacles for closer co-
operation in a big variety of matters within the European Union. For some of them 
any small progress is a big step forwards.”533  
Six years later, in 2007, only Denmark, France, Germany and Spain had issued 
internal instructions to prioritise the Europol channel for information exchange. In 
other Member States, Interpol remained the preferred channel for day-to-day 
cooperation.534 At the same time, Bruggeman noticed that, “With reference to the 
co-ordinating role [of Europol], it can be said that this is very important from a 
European Perspective, but that the real impact right now is still very limited, since 
many police officers in the field still work bilaterally (the so-called ‘old boys’ 
network).”535  
                                                        
530  See ARROYO ROMERO, Francisco Javier, La influencia de EUROPOL en la comunitarización..., op. 
cit., p. 39. 
531  Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm. 
532  See CASTILLEJO MANZANARES, Raquel, “Europol y las investigaciones transfronterizas” in 
Dereito, 2008, vol. 17-2, p. 95.  
533  STORBECK, Jürgen, “La cooperación policial europea”, loc. cit., p. 158.  
534  See Council document 13321/07, p. 24, 31. 
535  BRUGGEMAN, Willy, “A Vision of Future Police…”, loc. cit., p. 209. The same observation in much 
broader context (any changes brought by the EU law into national system) made MITSILEGAS, 
MONAR, REES saying that it provokes “almost instinctive reaction against such European 
“interference” with well-established national approaches, basic concepts and traditions”. See 
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And even a technical report from 2012 on the Evaluation of the implementation of 
the Europol Council Decision, and of Europol’s activities, reveals that there is a fear 
that submitted information is automatically available to all Member States. 
Therefore, bilateral agreements are used more as they allow better control of the 
provision of information and “national law enforcement officials already have a 
large number of domestic databases in which to enter data. Law enforcement 
officials under time pressure tend to use familiar, national-level systems, and 
might see entering data into Europol systems as too burdensome or time-
consuming.”536 It also reveals both Europol’s and the Commission’s worries about 
data quality and their disappointment in Member States’ actions, taken as a 
consequence of Europol providing information.537 
Nevertheless, during recent years, t more and more information has been 
published about Europol’s assistance and participation in operations, beginning 
with on the spot support to one Member State (as in the case of operation 
Walker538) or multinational operations such as Archimedes or Blackshades. In 
operation Archimedes all Member States participated, along with Australia, 
Colombia, Norway, the United States, Serbia and Switzerland with more than 1,000 
persons were arrested, 339 seizures of 2.1 tonnes of drugs and more than one 
million euros in cash.539 In operation Blackshades (coordinated by Eurojust and 
supported by EC3 at Europol), sixteen Member States took part; it resulted in more 
than eighty arrests and 359 house searches in combatting Blackshades malware.540 
Notwithstanding, it is quite difficult to identify whether co-operation is improving 
or more publicity is being given to the same state of co-operation, in order to make 
it “attractive” to other law enforcement institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
MITSILEGAS, Valsamis; MONAR, Jörg and REES, Wyn, The European Union and Internal…, op. cit., 
p. 10. 
536  DISLEY, Emma; IRVING, Barrie; HUGHES, William et al. “Technical report on Evaluation…”, loc. cit., 
p. 50-51. 
537  Ibid, p. 51, 79. 
538  Europol assisted Spanish police to target an organised group responsible for telecommunication 
fraud in total of at least 2 million euros and its laundering. Although the group acted from Spain, 
victims of their crimes were from all over the EU. See “Europol supports Spanish Police to 
dismantle serious cybercriminal group” (Europol Press Release, 10 July 2015), accessed July 13, 
2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol-supports-spanish-police-dismantle-
serious-cybercriminal-group. 
539  See EUROPOL. “Operation Archimedes infographics”, September 2014, accessed July 6 2015, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/operation-archimedes-infographics. 
540  See EUROPOL. “Worldwide Operation against Cybercrime”, May 2014, accessed July 6, 2015, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/worldwide-operation-against-cybercriminals. 
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3. Data protection 
Protection of data processed in Europol is regulated by an individual set of 
provisions established by the Europol Decision, and other, already mentioned, 
Council Decisions; on some occasions, it is considered as comprehensive and 
exemplary to guarantee the right to data protection.541  
On the other hand there are opinions that, “The adequacy of the current legislative 
framework governing Europol in terms of privacy protection, judicial control, 
transparency and accountability leaves much to be desired.”542 
It should also be pointed out that the national law of the country providing 
information also has to be accomplished, for example,  
 Article 4.2 of the Council Decision 2009/936/JHA envisages that a Member 
State decides on the basis of its national law about what data and to which 
extent can be supplied to AWF; 
 Article 15.1 of the same Decision foresees that information on the use of 
data from AWF shall be transmitted to the Member State of its origin when 
so allows national legislation of the receiving Member State; 
 Article 13.5 of the Europol Decision establishes that transmission of 
information included in the EIS between ENU and competent authorities 
of the same Member States is regulated by its national law; 
 Its Article 17 foresees that other use of information than by the competent 
authorities or for other purpose is allowed only according to the national 
law of transmitting Member State; 
 Its Article 25.3.a and 25.5 envisages fulfilment of national law in 
transmitting information from private parties. 
General data protection rules applicable to Europol are established in Chapter V of 
Europol Decision. Article 27 also makes a reference to the principles established in 
the European Convention on Data Protection, its modifications and 
Recommendation (87) 15 that shall be taken into account in personal data 
processing. Nevertheless, neither an obligation to follow them is established nor 
are they integrated into obligatory provisions. 
                                                        
541  See DISLEY, Emma; IRVING, Barrie; HUGHES, William et al. “Technical report on Evaluation…”, loc. 
cit., p. 91-92; DE HERT, Paul; PAPAKONSTANTINOU, Vagelis and RIEHLE, Cornelia, “Data 
protection in the third pillar: cautious pessimism”, in MAIK, Martin, Crime, rights and the EU: the 
future of police and judicial cooperation (London: Justice, 2008), p. 141.  
542  MITSILEGAS, Valsamis, “The third wave of third pillar law: which direction for EU criminal 
justice?” in European Law Review, 2009, vol. 34, no. 4, p. 552. 
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According to the Article 29, Europol is responsible for data its own processed data. 
Notwithstanding, responsibility for data accuracy, legality and other aspects of its 
collection and transmission to Europol lies within the Member State that has 
submitted it, and within Europol when it was submitted by the third party. 
Europol’s responsibility for the information provided by the third parties raises a 
question: how can Europol be sure about the accuracy, legality and other legal 
aspects of data provided by the third parties? It would be more probable to 
evaluate those third parties with whom Europol has operation agreements, but not 
in other cases. On the other hand, in those cases there is no possibility to establish 
an obligation to the third party to evaluate and be responsible for data provided, 
and the establishment of Europol’s responsibility is the only possible option to 
establish; although it is not perfect. In these circumstances, Europol, receiving 
information from a third party with whom no agreement is concluded, should 
evaluate carefully the received information and classify it according to the codes 
applied to sources and information. 
As there are different opinions about Europol’s data protection regime, the 
following subsections are dedicated to the analysis of its coherence and 
comprehensiveness. 
3.1. Persons included  
As mentioned in previous sections, in Europol’s different information processing 
tools, the data of different categories of persons is processed. Its summary is 
presented in the following table. 
Europol’s information 
system or other 
information exchange 
through Europol 
Categories of persons whose data can be included 
 EIS 
 
- Suspects of already committed crime 
- Suspects of possible future commission of the crime 
- Convicted persons 
AWF - Suspects of already committed crime 
- Suspects of possible future commission of the crime 
- Convicted persons 
- Witnesses 
- Victims 
- Contacts, associates 
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- Informers 
SIENA Not specified by the legislation. Interpreted as “crime-related 
information”543. SIENA can be used both for information exchange 
purely under Europol’s mandate and for bilateral or multilateral 
communication among Member States out of its mandate. 
Table 17: Categories of persons that can be included in EIS, AWFs and SIENA. 
According to Article 12.1 of the Europol Decision, the notion of suspect and 
backgrounds for suspicion of future commitment of a crime are left to the 
definition of the national law of each Member State. Thus they depend on national 
procedural law and vary among themselves. For example: 
 Spanish Criminal Procedure Code does not provide a definition of a 
suspect, and with the modifications of the Criminal Procedure Code that 
enters into force on 6th December 2015, the terms investigated person and 
accused person will be used. The only Article that mentions “suspect” is 
363 which regulates taking samples for DNA analysis.544  
 According to Article 21 of the Lithuanian Code on Criminal Procedure, a 
suspect is a person detained or questioned under suspicion of committing 
a crime, or to whom a notification of suspicion is addressed, or if his or her 
place of residence is not known he or she is recognized as a suspect on the 
basis of the prosecutor’s or pre-trial judicial authority’s resolution. 
 According to Article 71 of the Polish Code on Criminal Procedure, a 
suspect is a person towards whom a resolution on allegation of 
committing a crime is issued, or who is questioned as a suspect without 
the above previously mentioned resolution. 
 According to Article 27 of the Dutch Code on Criminal Procedure, a suspect 
is a person reasonably suspected in commission of offence. 
European legislation on minimum standards in criminal procedure is applied to 
suspects and accused persons, but it does not include their definition, and that 
results in no point of reference on this issue. 
Article 5 of the Europol Decision foresees that in every case, the Director taking the 
decision to open an AWF, also specifies the categories of personal data that can be 
processed, meaning that not all data categories automatically allowed by this 
Council decision will be processed in every AWF, but applying a principle of “need 
                                                        
543  See DISLEY, Emma; IRVING, Barrie; HUGHES, William et al., “Technical report on Evaluation…”, loc. 
cit., p. 78. 
544  See more. SOLETO MUÑOZ, Helena and ALCOCEBA GIL, Juan, “Protección de datos y transferencia 
de perfiles de ADN” in CABEZUDO BAJO, María José, Las bases de datos policiales…, op. cit., p. 338-
339; SOLETO MUÑOZ, Helena and FIODOROVA, Anna, “DNA and Law Enforcement...”, loc. cit., p. 
156.  
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to know”. In cases of special categories of data545 about the victims, witnesses, 
contacts, associates and informers, according to Article 5(2) they can be included 
only upon request by two or more Member States participating in the AWF. 
3.2. Access 
Access rights to Europol’s information systems differ, depending on their nature; 
and they are not equal. 
Thus access to all EIS data is granted to empower Europol staff, liaison officers and 
ENUs. Access on a hit / no hit basis can be granted to national competent 
institutions according to national provisions. This allows broader use of Europol’s 
stored information, making EIS a more useful tool for law enforcement institutions, 
and increasing its efficiency, but at the same time relevant requirements on secure 
connection and data protection must be applied. Third parties do not have access 
to the EIS. If they need information, Europol makes the search on their behalf and 
on the basis of existing operational co-operation agreement. 
Access to strategic AWFs is granted to all Member States, but access to operational 
AWFs is much more restricted and given on a “need to know” basis”, 546 i.e. Only to 
authorised analysts from the Europol, authorised staff of participating competent 
authorities, authorised liaison officers and ENU staff from participating Member 
States. Access to AWF Index System that allow its consultation on a hit / no hit 
basis is given to all liaison officers of Member States, ENUs and competent Europol 
staff. 
Such access restriction in respect to AWF is indispensable due to the possibility of 
processing data of victims, witnesses and informers, as well special categories of 
information. 
Regarding SIENA, it can be used as an information communication tool by 
Europol’s staff, liaison officers, ENUs, competent authorities designated on the 
basis of national law, as well as third parties that have co-operation agreements 
with Europol. In the last case, third parties with concluded operational agreements 
can send request messages directly to the destination (Europol or the Member 
State), but in the case of strategic agreement, messages pass through the Europol 
Operational Centre, where a decision on its acceptance and further transmission or 
rejection is taken. 
                                                        
545  Data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or 
trade-union membership and data concerning health or sex life.  
546  See DISLEY, Emma; IRVING, Barrie; HUGHES, William et al., “Technical report on Evaluation…”, loc. 
cit., p. 83. 
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3.3. Third parties and onward transmission 
3.3.1. Personal data transmission to third parties 
According to Article 10 of the Decision 2009/934/JHA, “Europol shall be 
responsible for the legality of the transmission of data. Europol shall keep a record 
of all transmissions of data under these rules and of the grounds for such 
transmissions. Data shall be transmitted only if the recipient gives an undertaking 
that the data will be used only for the purposes for which they were transmitted.” 
As mentioned before, as a general rule personal data exchange with third countries 
and organisations is possible on the basis of operational agreements with prior 
evaluation of the data protection level. Agreements cannot be finalised without the 
inclusion of relevant data protection requirements and, therefore, it is considered 
that Europol has become the key protagonist in exporting the European model of 
data protection and in achieving that, a lot of the third state modify their legislation 
in order to get access to Europol’s data.547  
Already mentioned Articles 23(6) and 23(8) of Decision 2009/935/JHA establish 
two exceptions when transmission of personal and confidential data from Europol 
prior to agreement is allowed: 
 When it is necessary in individual cases to prevent or combat crimes that 
are within Europol’s competence;  
 When the Director considers that it is necessary to safeguard essential 
interests of the Member State, or prevent imminent danger of terrorist 
attack and assesses the level of data protection in that country or 
organisation. 
In the first exception, there is a lack of strict criteria of how individual cases have 
to be understood: individual investigations or operations, exclusively important 
investigations or operations; is that individual Europol case interest or third party? 
Due to such uncertainty, it would be appropriate to specify or to eliminate this 
provision. Of course, one can argue that unpredictable situations can always 
happen, but between establishing an unpredictable situation and soft wording, 
there is a possibility to regulate it in such a manner that prevents misuse. Even 
envisaging subsequent reporting of transmitted information to the Management 
Board and Joint Supervisory Body is not a sufficient measure, as personal or 
                                                        
547  See BLASI CASAGRAN, Cristina, “El papel de Europol como actor normativo de la UE en el 
intercambio de datos con terceros estados” in PI LLORENS, Montserrat and ZAPATER DUQUE, 
Esther, La dimensión exterior de las agencias..., op. cit., p. 111.  
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confidential data is already in the possession of the third party and out of Europol’s 
control. 
3.3.2. Onwards transmission of personal data 
Articles 17 and 18 of Decision 2009/934/JHA establish the possibility of onward 
transmission of personal data by other EU bodies or the competent authorities of a 
third State. This is allowed only when Europol and the onwards transmitting party 
has concluded the operational agreement. Nevertheless, different agreements 
establish different regulation of this issue. Thus agreements with: 
 Canada, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland do not allow data transmission 
to third states;  
 Albania, Liechtenstein and Serbia permit it in both directions (onward by 
this third country or Europol) with the previous consent of the 
information provider;  
 Australia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Monaco permit it 
only from this third state to another third party and with the previous 
consent of Europol, 
 United States of America does not regulate this question. 
In any case few different situations of onward transmission are possible and have 
to be analysed: 
 Further transmission within the same third party. In this case it is not 
quite clear whether it is applied to third states, third parties or also EU 
bodies as the first two parts of Article 17 mention only third states where 
onwards transmission is possible, and only to those competent authorities 
listed in the agreement with Europol. Nevertheless, in part 3 we find 
reference to EU bodies and third parties (both states and organisations) 
and their obligation to ensure that onward transmission “Will take place 
under the same conditions as those applying to the original 
transmission.”548 
 Further transmission by the EU body or third party to another EU entity or 
third party. 
As Article 17 establishes requirement to intra-state onward transmission, it is 
logical and coherent not to skip application of the same requirements for onward 
transmission to another EU body or third party. Then it also depends on the 
relationship between Europol and the final recipient of data: 
                                                        
548  OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 10.  
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 If they have operational agreement, Europol has to give prior consent to 
such transmission; 
 If they do not have operational agreement, it can only take place in 
exceptional cases after authorisation by the Director of Europol, when it is, 
according to Article 18(2)b, “Absolutely necessary (i) to safeguard the 
essential interests of the Member States concerned which are within the 
scope of Europol’s objectives; or (ii) in the interests of preventing 
imminent danger associated with crime or terrorist offences.” 
The chain of information transmission: Member State – Europol – Third party with 
operational agreement – other third party seems to be quite long in order to assure 
proper data protection on all levels. Finally, there is no effective mechanism to 
control data at the final destination and to guarantee that its further onward 
transmission will not occur. 
3.4. Classified information 
Among different types of exchanged information (both within and outside the EU) 
classified information deserves special attention; defined by the Council Decision 
2009/968/JHA of 30th November 2009, adopting the rules on the confidentiality 
of Europol information549 (hereinafter –Decision 2009/968/JHA), as “any 
information and material in any form, an unauthorised disclosure of which could 
cause varying degrees of prejudice to the essential interests of Europol or of one or 
more Member States, and that requires the application of appropriate security 
measures.” 
In order to ensure exchange of such information, a highly secure mechanism has to 
be applied that includes a secure communication system, limited and controlled 
access, equally high physical protection measures both in Europol and Member 
States, as well as other partners with whom exchange of such information is 
allowed, and only in the case of the conclusion of relevant agreements. Some 
agreements just foresee such a possibility, others (such as with Colombia or former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) dedicate 15 article long Annexes to regulate this 
process. 
Transmission of classified information to other third parties (without relevant 
agreement) is allowed only when, according to the consideration of the Director of 
Europol, it is indispensable to guarantee the essential interests of the Member 
States or to prevent imminent danger from crime of terrorism. About such 
                                                        
549  OJ L 332, 17.12.2009, p. 17-22. 
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transmission the Management Board and the Security Committee550 has to be 
informed as soon as possible. 
Comparing these rules with ones on personal data transmission to the third 
country discussed in previous subsection, regulation of classified information is 
more precise and narrow. 
3.5. Data subject’s right to access 
Article 30 of the Europol Decision establishes the data subject’s right to “obtain 
information on whether personal data relating to him or her are processed by 
Europol and to have such data communicated to him or her in an intelligible form, 
or checked.” 
The data subject can address his or her request to the designated authority of any 
Member State who shall forward it to Europol. Such a system facilitates the 
implementation of the data subject’s rights, giving possibility to apply in Member 
States that are more convenient to a person due to his or her interests, language, 
place of residence or other motives. 
According to Article 30.4, Europol, analysing the request, has to consult the 
“Member State concerned” before giving an answer without specifying which 
Member State it is: one that has forwarded the request or one that has submitted 
information (that in many cases will not be the same one that received the 
request). As such the Member State should be understood as one that has provided 
Europol with data as, despite of transmission, it remains responsible for personal 
data and besides, would probably have, or had, an investigation open. It can also be 
any other Member State that carries out investigation with a person who asks for 
the processing of his or her data. 
Article 30.5 of the Europol Decision foresees that in some cases information cannot 
be given to the data subject. Such an obligation falls to Europol when it would 
jeopardise: the proper fulfilment of Europol’s tasks, crime prevention, security, 
public order, national investigation and rights and freedoms of third parties. From 
this provision a conclusion can also be made that, “Member States concerned” 
which Europol has to consult are the ones that have submitted data and one that 
keeps investigation on that person. If the provision of information is forbidden, 
Europol notifies the data subject that checks have been carried out in such a 
                                                        
550  The Security Committee is an advisory body to the Management Board and the Director in 
questions of information security. It consists of representatives of all Member States and Europol 
and meets at least twice a year.  
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manner that it would be impossible to verify whether the person’s information is 
processed or not. 
According to Article 30(7), requests for the processing of personal data can also be 
addressed to the Joint Supervisory Body, but its competence is limited only to the 
provision of the answer that relevant checks have been made. It would make sense 
if the reply to the request would jeopardise the performance of Europol’s tasks or 
other interests mentioned above. But using systematic analysis of Article 30, a 
conclusion can be made that the Joint Supervisory Body can be requested in the 
same way as any authority of any Member State, and for any data processing; but it 
is authorized to limit answer as each request jeopardises Europol’s tasks or 
national investigation. 
A different situation arises when the Joint Supervisory Body is consulted as an 
appeal institution when the data subject: 
 Is not satisfied with Europol’s answer;  
 Has not received any answer within four months551. 
In this case, before giving a response to the data subject, the Joint Supervisory 
Body has to consult: 
 As a general rule, national supervisory bodies or competent judicial 
authority from Member State from which data was received or other 
Member State concerned; 
 Europol, if information was introduced to the EIS by Europol or is in AWF. 
If Europol opposes to provide with data subject with information, the Joint 
Supervisory body only by qualified majority of its members can overrule 
such decision. 
In relation to data correction or deletion, the responsibility rule is the same as for 
data accuracy, i.e. Europol corrects or deletes data received from third parties and 
Member States – submitted by them. In any case, Europol shall inform data subject 
in writing about the correction or deletion that has been carried out upon his or 
her request. 
Despite the establishment of the data subject’s access right, and the system of its 
implementation, for many years it could not be considered comprehensive due to 
the lack of clear judicial protection rules, as there was no judicial authority to 
whom Europol’s decisions or those of its Joint Supervisory Body could be appealed. 
                                                        
551  The designated authority has to forward a request without undue delay and in any case, not later 
than within one month. Europol shall answer without undue delay as well, and but not later than 
within three months. 
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It was of utmost importance, especially when taking into account that Europol 
tends not to reveal information to the data subject, motivated by the reason that it 
could be requested by organised crime members and therefore jeopardise 
investigation. Besides, the Joint Supervisory Body overruled such a decision / reply 
only in a very few cases. 552 The situation has changed, but only with the entrance 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon; Article 263(1) of the TFUE allows individual 
claims to the Court of Justice of the EU against acts of all EU institutions and 
entities, including those of the former Third Pillar.553 Nevertheless, no case has 
been filed yet. 
3.6. Supervising authorities 
In relation to the data processed by Europol, a three step mechanism supervising 
data protection is established: 
 An independent national supervisory body in each Member State that 
monitors data input, retrieval and communication to Europol, and 
supervises the activities of its ENU and liaison officers when they are 
related to data protection. 
 A Data Protection Officer established at the level of Europol554 that acts 
independently and supervises compliance of the data protection 
provisions at Europol’s level, by advising its staff and unit on data 
protection and by starting procedure relating to breach of data protection 
rules.555 In the case of incompliance of rules, he or she informs the Europol 
Director about the need to resolve it. In case of non-resolution, the Data 
Protection Officer has the right to address this issue to the Management 
Board, and if the problem is not resolved– to the Joint Supervisory Body. 
 A Joint Supervisory Body established at the level of the Europol and 
consisting of up to two representatives of each National supervisory body, 
supervising data subjects’ rights in relation to the data held in Europol and 
monitoring its transmission. But when the data is exchanged between 
liaison officers for bilateral exchange, although on Europol’s premises, the 
Joint Supervisory Body does not intervene, as such national and not 
Europol’s data protection rules regulate the exchange.556 When the Joint 
Supervisor Body detects any breach of data processing rules in Europol, it 
                                                        
552  See MARICA, Andrea, Manual de Europol, op. cit., p. 218, 229-231. 
553  See ESQUINAS VALVERDE, Patricia, Protección de datos personales en la Policía Europea (Valencia: 
Tirant lo Blanch, 2010), p. 98-101.  
554  Appointed by the Management Board. 
555 See DREWER, Daniel and GUTIÉRREZ ZARZA, Ángeles, “Intercambio de información y protección 
de datos personales en el ámbito de Eurojust, Europol y OLAF” in GUTIÉRREZ ZARZA, Ángeles, 
Nuevas tecnologías, protección…, op. cit., p. 178. 
556 See BOEHM, Franziska, Information Sharing and data…, op. cit., p. 200.  
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informs the Director. According to Article 34(2)c, decisions related to 
breach are obligatory to implement. If the Director does not provide the 
problem’s resolution, an issue is addressed to the Management Board. 
All supervisory authorities shall be provided with access to the information stored 
by the authorities that are subject to their control: 
 National supervisory bodies: to the data input to Europol’s databases and 
premises of its ENU and liaison officers. 
 Data Protection Officer and Joint Supervisory Body: to data held by 
Europol and on its premises (but not by liaison officers). 
Despite multilevel data protection supervision, some kind of closed circle system 
than impugns its effectiveness can be observed. As already mentioned, the Data 
Protection Officer addresses data protection incompliance issues to the following 
authorities and in the following order: the Director, the Management Board and 
the Joint Supervisory Body. Thus it can be concluded that the Joint Supervisory 
Body is the highest authority in this chain to which issues, not resolved by the 
Director and the Management Board, are communicated. Nevertheless, as already 
mentioned, the Joint Supervisory Authority refers to the Director and to the 
Management Board, i.e. The same authorities that were consulted before. 
On the other hand, problems arise when the responsibility of data stored in EIS 
belongs to Member States and not to Europol, because nowhere obligatory by the 
Joint Supervisory Body’s decisions to Member States has been established.557 In 
this case, the Joint Supervisory Body should have an opportunity to forward an 
issue to the national supervisory body of the Member State concerned, if it is 
related to sporadic infringement of data protection. In the case of repetitive 
infringement of data protection, or non-application of European legislation, there 
should be a possibility to address the issue to the European Data Protection 
Supervisor or to the European Court of Justice. 
In the Draft Europol Regulation, the substituting Joint Supervisory Authority by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor changes this circuit. Thus a three level 
institutional system remains, but is headed by the authority with more power in 
the data protection area.558 
                                                        
557  Ibid, p. 201. 
558  See Council document 10033/14, p. 97, 99. 
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4. Brief summary and evaluation  
During the twenty years of its existence (counting from the establishment of the 
EDU), Europol has gone through development from a politically inspired 
organisation559 established by a top-down decision560, with a not very clear future 
in terms of its effectiveness and possibilities, to being granted with executive 
powers by the EU Agency, with precisely defined competence and reference in the 
primary EU legislation with the primordial task of “Information management 
together with the capacity to generate intelligence.”561  
Although EDU was created at the same time, when implementation of the CISA 
took place; further developments of Europol and Schengen Acquis have taken 
different paths. In the case of Schengen Acquis, it was more related to 
improvement of its functioning and embracing more new Members, and in the case 
of Europol – dynamic widening of its competence both in meaning of scope and co-
operation methods and entities. A summary of what has been said in this Chapter 
about the scope of Europol’s activities is presented in the following table. 
Legal basis 
(signed/into 
force) 
Type of crimes Conditions 
Treaty of 
Maastricht 
(1992/1993) 
- Terrorism  
- Unlawful drug 
trafficking  
- Other serious forms of 
international crime 
 
Ministerial 
Agreement (1993) 
- Illicit drug trafficking 
- Criminal organisations 
involved 
- Associated money 
laundering  
Affecting two or more Member States 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997/1999) No changes of scope 
Europol 
Convention 
(1995/1998) 
- Terrorism, 
- Unlawful drug 
trafficking 
- Other serious forms of 
international crime 
+ 
- Money laundering and 
other crimes related 
the above mentioned 
 
Possibly affecting 2 or more Member States and 
Organised crime involved. 
                                                        
559  ANDERSON, Malcolm, “Trust and Police Co-operation”, loc. cit., p. 41. 
560  BURES, Oldrich, “Europol’s Fledging Counterterrorism Role” in Terrorism and Political Violence, 
2008, vol. 20 (4), p. 501. 
561  MARICA, Andreea. Manual de Europol, loc. cit., p. 119. 
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Legal basis 
(signed/into 
force) 
Type of crimes Conditions 
Council Decision 
2009/371/JAI 
- Organised crime,  
- Terrorism,  
- Other forms of serious 
crime 
+ 
- Related offences 
Affecting 2 or more Member States. 
Lisbon Treaty 
(2007/2009) 
- Serious crime Affecting 2 or more Member States or Terrorism 
and forms of crime which affect a common 
interest covered by a Union policy. 
Commission’s 
Proposal of 
Regulation 
- Equally as Lisbon 
Treaty 
- Related offences 
Equally as Lisbon Treaty 
Parliament’s 
Proposal 
- Organised crime 
- Terrorism  
- Other forms of serious 
crime  
Affecting 2 or more Member States in such a way 
to require a common approach by the Member 
States taking in account the scale, significance 
and consequences of the offence 
Table 18: Development of Europol’s competences. 
With respect to the information exchange scheme, if at the beginning it took place 
only directly between Member States, later the scheme was changed, establishing 
co-operation in a chain: Europol – liaison officer – ENU and finally giving hit/no hit 
access to all interested law enforcement institutions. Forthcoming regulation 
foresees the possibility of direct co-operation between Europol and national law 
enforcement agencies as well. Thus Europol evolved from facilitating direct 
contacts between competent national authorities to the entity in possession of 
information and intelligence, and has become a much more active partner in 
combatting crime.562 
With respect to the right to privacy and data protection in Europol’s activities, the 
question is quite controversial. 
First of all, referring to the establishment of restrictions by law, this requirement 
can be treated as fulfilled when democratically elected institutions have 
participated in its adoption. Thus provisions established by means of Convention 
or Treaties, fulfil this requirement due to their ratification by national parliaments. 
Future approval of Draft Europol Regulations will also be considered sufficient 
legal basis as the European Parliament is directly participating in the decision-
making process. Europol Decision deserves a special mention. Even if it was 
approved according to existing legislative procedure, neither the European 
                                                        
562  PEERS, Steve, EU Justice and Home Affairs..., op. cit., p. 873.  
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Parliament nor national parliaments directly participated563 and ratification 
procedure was not applied. 
Secondly, data processing for the purpose of combatting transnational terrorism, 
organised and serious crime can be treated as protection of general interest and be 
justifiable reasons to restrict fundamental rights. 
Thirdly, proportionality of the processing of information to the purpose is a more 
complicated and versatile issue. 
In the case of EIS, it contains information on very few categories of persons: 
suspects and convicted and besides includes limited categories of data. Such 
information is indispensable to combat cross-border crime and its processing is 
proportional to the purpose. 
Nevertheless, the question stands in the case of the collection of special categories 
of data in AWFs, data transmission to third parties as well as onward transmission. 
Special categories of data perhaps could help to identify the risks of radicalisation 
or extremism, but certainly do not have too much impact on combatting serious or 
organised crime. Therefore, its processing shall be, if not totally forbidden, used 
only in counter terrorism AWFs. 
With respect to information transmission to third parties, on the one hand, it is 
understandable that if Europol needs information from them in order to ensure 
internal security of the EU, third parties will expect reciprocal actions from 
Europol. But such practice should be based solely on the basis of operational 
agreements, with the unique exception of combatting terrorism. In the case of 
onward data transmission, a third party that does not have an agreement with 
Europol, should not be able to receive it from another third party. As a general rule, 
it should send a direct information request to the Agency, and receive a direct 
response. The only exception could be when a transmitting third state proves that 
sharing information with another third party is indispensable for joint 
investigations in which both third parties are involved. 
                                                        
563  The European Parliament had been consulted, but as according to legislative procedure that was 
in force, its opinion was not obligatory, the Council did not take it into account. 
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CHAPTER 5:   
SWEDISH INITIATIVE 
he established principle of availability would stay only a sound political 
declaration, without its proper implementation. For this purpose, a new 
mechanism was needed; one that would establish reasonable balance 
between obligations, in order to provide information, minimum possibilities to 
deny it and maximum data protection. 
This Chapter presents how the Commission understood the principle of availability 
(treating it as an opportunity to create an integrated and comprehensive 
information exchange tool) how Member States (that still, even at the sight of a 
potential threat of terrorism, showed their protectionism and limited wish to share 
information) understood the same. 
1. First attempt to implement the principle of 
availability: the Commission’s proposal 
Following the guidelines of the Hague Programme and implementing the Council 
and Commission Action Plan, implementing the Hague Programme on 
strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union(564), in October 
2005 the Commission presented a Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on 
the exchange of information under the principle of availability(565) (hereinafter – 
the Commission’s Proposal). 
                                                        
564  OJ C 198, 12.8.2005, p. 1-22.  
565  COM(2005) 490 final. 
T 
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The proposal is worthy of appreciation as it is both comprehensive and 
ambitious.566 
Comprehensive because of the intention to present it in the package with a 
proposal for a legislative act on the protection of data exchanged for the purpose of 
police and judicial co-operation in penal matters. But after the terrorist attacks of 
7th July 2005 in London, the Council of Ministers of the Interior called the 
Commission to present the proposal on the implementation of the principle of 
availability, as soon as possible, leaving the data protection proposal for later. 
Ambitious because of the attempt to create “direct online access to the available 
information and to index data for information that is not accessible online”567 or in 
other words, complete implementation of the principle of availability. 
It would oblige each Member State to grant direct access to its databases to 
competent authorities of other Member States, and to create index systems when 
some category of data is not available online. The Annex II of the Commission’s 
Proposal has included exhaustive lists of the categories of data that are supposed 
to be directly accessible among Member States: DNA profiles, fingerprints, 
ballistics, vehicle registration information, telephone numbers and other 
communications data (excluding traffic and content), and persons’ identification 
data. 
Information availability would be limited to the exchange of already collected data, 
without the obligation to collect new data. 
According to Articles 2 and 7 of the Commission’s Proposal, the information 
exchange would take place before the commencement of a prosecution, and for the 
purposes of prevention and detection as well as investigation of crimes for which 
information has been provided. 
As already mentioned, the proposed mechanism would include on-line access to 
existing databases and to databases of indexes, in cases of information not being 
stored in automated databases. That would result in the establishment of two 
modalities of information availability: 
 Direct availability: direct access to the information in online databases of 
other Member States (Article 9);  
                                                        
566  Although, for example VERVAELE calls it very general. See VERVAELE, John A. E., “Medidas de 
investigación de carácter proactivo y uso de información de inteligencia en el proceso penal” in 
PÉREZ GIL, Julio, El proceso penal en la sociedad…, op. cit., p. 35. 
567 COM(2005) 490 final, p. 2. 
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 Indirect availability: direct access to the index system of data not available 
online and in cases of an index match with the searched data information, 
receiving upon request and sent to the competent authority of the Member 
State whose index system was searched (Article 10). According to the 
Article 11, the requested authority would be obliged to respond within 12 
hours.568 
Article 14 of the Commission’s Proposal has foreseen the ending of the list of 
motives to refuse the provision of information:  
 To protect the security of persons and their fundamental rights;  
 To protect sources of information or confidentiality; 
 Not to prejudice of the on-going investigation;  
The application of the aforementioned limitations would be completely possible in 
cases of indirect availability, as in this case, information would be forwarded by 
the possessing authority that at any moment can assess whether there are motives 
of refusal. But the question arises, how to apply these limitations in case of direct 
access to databases? It would be possible only with the application of a relevant 
technical solution in a database: either to withdraw information temporally from 
the database or to block access to it. But in both cases, it would be an additional 
burden to the data owning authority. 
Kietz and Mourer have contemplated that “this decision, if adopted, would replace 
the reliance on national legal provisions for the exchange of personal data with 
common criteria that would apply to all EU member states. In contrast to the Prüm 
provisions, this would overcome the diversity of national legal assistance 
provisions, which so far have hampered the efficient exchange of information.”569 
But despite sound support for the principle of availability, Member States have 
refused this ambitious draft as “the regulation of the six key areas of information 
(DNA; fingerprints; ballistics; vehicle registrations; telephone numbers; other 
telecommunications data and minimum data for the identification of persons 
(identity, address) must be developed gradually, one by one.”570 
Both objective and subjective reasons for this rejection can be outlined. 
                                                        
568  If there is a need for authorisation to provide the information, it has to be supplied within 12 
hours of it being received. 
569  KIETZ, Daniela, MAURER, Andreas, “From Schengen to Prüm” (Comments, German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs, May 2006), p. 2, accesses November 14, 2014, 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/Com15_06_Ktz_Mrr_Ks.pdf. 
570  FAZEKAS, Judit, “Development of Justice and Home…”, loc. cit., p. 8. 
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Among the subjective reasons, protectionism of national databases and lack of 
mutual trust can be pointed out as the main ones. The comprehension of the 
protection of internal security as a part of a State’s sovereignty has been already 
mentioned in this work, and now we are facing one of the examples: Member 
States’ have wished to keep direct access to their national database only to 
themselves. But the determining reasons for this refusal have been lack of trust 
that direct access would be used in a proper way, and only for the pre-established 
purposes. It would not be precise to talk about absolute mistrust, but more about 
differentiated treatment among Member States or different levels of mutual trust, 
as in 2005 seven States (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands and Spain) granted such access among themselves for DNA profiles’, 
dactyloscopic’s and vehicle registration databases (see the following chapter). 
Regarding the objective reasons, of course implementation of such a mechanism 
would be very expensive and long-lasting due to the need to establish new 
databases or modify existing ones, and to ensure EU wide interoperability and 
technical capacity to deal with all searches. For example, the dactyloscopic 
database of one of the smaller countries would need technical capacity to provide 
access to the rest of the Member States and handle their requests on a daily basis. 
Moreover, on 14th April 2005, the Council of Ministers of the Interior called for the 
evaluation of technical modalities that would be proper to every one of six 
information categories, recently included in the Commission’s Proposal. As a 
result, in November 2005 a Report by the Friends of the Presidency on the 
technical modalities to implement the principle of availability571 (hereinafter – 
Report) was issued. Report envisaged that in the case of telephone numbers and 
related data, as well as data for the identification of persons’ direct access, it is not 
feasible because in many cases, the relevant databases are held by other entities 
than law enforcement agencies. In the case of persons’ identification data, it 
pointed out, “Where data from such registers is available to a law enforcement 
officer domestically without judicial authorisation, the transmission of such data 
overseas should not be subject to judicial authorisation. In the longer term those 
Member States who require judicial authorisation should revisit this requirement 
in light of the principle of availability.”572 In the case of direct access to ballistics’ 
databases, it is proposed as a long-term objective due to lack of the evaluation of 
the current state of play. 
At the same time after experiencing terrorist attacks, Member States preferred to 
enjoy the immediate effect of the principle of availability, even if in limited scope; 
and that is why the Commission’s Proposal were left without deeper analysis, and 
                                                        
571  Council document 13558/1/05. 
572  Ibid, p. 40.  
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came back to a draft proposed by Sweden in 2004. As Jonathan FAULL (at that 
moment the Director General of the Commission’s JHA Directorate General) said, 
“Our proposal [...] is seen by delegations [...] as a longer–term project which will 
provide for a wider sharing of information between law enforcement authorities of 
the Member States in the future.”573  
Seeing from another perspective, it was possible to reduce the number of 
categories of the exchanged information at the first stage, leaving, for example, 
ballistics and telephone numbers and other communications data for later. 
Especially taking into account that in the end, in a little bit more than one year, at 
the beginning of 2007, during the German Presidency of the Council, a draft on the 
automated access to national DNA, dactyloscopic and vehicle registration files was 
proposed; and approved in 2008 (see the following Chapter). Essential difference 
from that proposal was envisaging mutual evaluation of legal and technical, data 
protection readiness as a pre-condition to direct access. 
Curiously, a suggestion made in the Report about the possibility of the effective 
application of the principle of availability to data related to explosives, synthetic 
drugs profiling and trade registers has never been taken into account by the 
Member States; although after the terrorist attack in London in 2005, the Ministers 
of the Interior agreed on a need to improve information sharing on explosives.574  
Thus instead of the ambitious and comprehensive Commission’s Proposal, the 
Member States had chosen much more simplified and more easily implemented 
legislation on information exchange and implementation of the cornerstone 
principle of police co-operation – the principle of availability. 
2. Swedish Initiative – compromise on information 
availability  
Instead of the unsuccessful Commission’s Proposal, the Council went back to the 
Swedish proposal from June 2004, and after multiple rounds of discussions and 
numerous compromises on 18th December 2006, adopted the Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA, previously mentioned in section 3 of the Chapter III, also 
popularly called the “Swedish Initiative”. As this legal act modifies some provisions 
of the Schengen Acquis, Norway, Island, Lichtenstein and Switzerland also joined it. 
                                                        
573  HEMPEL, Leon; CARIUS, Michael and ILTEN, Carla, “Exchange of information and data between 
law enforcement agencies within the European Union” (Discussion paper Nr. 29/09, Zentrum 
Technik und Gesellschaft, 2009), p. 28, https://www.tu-berlin.de/uploads/media 
/Nr_29_Hempel_Carius_Ilten.pdf. 
574  See Council document 11116/05, p. 7.  
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Martínez Pérez and Poza Cisneros define it as “The first approximation in the 
implementation of the principle of availability that gets beyond the primitive 
bilateral stage.”575 
The Swedish Initiative, like the Commission’s Proposal, foresees broader scope of 
information availability than only combatting terrorism and it includes other 
crimes as well.576 As noticed by Hempel, Carius and Ilten, “In the Framework 
Decision the key concern of the proposal has been made invisible: the phrase 
referring to terrorism in the title is deleted. Terrorism is now seen — so to say, 
normalised — as one serious offence among others.”577 
Article 1(4), 1(5) of Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA establishes what is not 
covered and what is not required by this instrument: to collect and store 
information for its transmission, to obtain it by coercive measures or provide it as 
evidence. As stated by Mitsilegas, “These provisions can be seen as an attempt to 
safeguard national autonomy in not requiring national authorities to be proactive 
in obtaining information or intelligence on behalf of their counterparts in other 
Member States.”578 
Differently from the Commission’s Proposal, Article 3(2) of the Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA establishes: 
 Information exchange on the basis of requests, i.e. Indirect exchange 
without the possibility to access other Member States’ databases;  
 Spontaneous information exchange possibility for prevention, detection 
and investigation of crimes listed in the previously mentioned Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JAI.579  
As correctly pointed out by Leinius, “This system of indirect access and case-
specific requests does not completely abolish the autonomy of law enforcement 
authorities in deciding whether to transfer data, but nevertheless, the Swedish 
Framework Decision constitutes an important first step towards realizing the 
principle of availability.”580 
                                                        
575  MARTÍNEZ PÉREZ, Fernando and POZA CISNEROS, María, “El Principio de Disponibilidad: 
Antecedentes Penales y Convenio de Prüm”. In CARMONA RUANO, Miguel; GONZÁLES VEGA, 
Ignacio U. and MORENO CATENA, Víctor, Cooperación Judicial Penal…, op. cit., p. 420.  
576  See HEMPEL, Leon; CARIUS, Michael and ILTEN, Carla, “Exchange of information and data…”, loc. 
cit., p. 25. 
577 Ibid. 
578  See MITSILEGAS, Valsamis, EU Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 254. 
579  See footnote 382. 
580  LEINIUS, Katharina., An Imbalance between Security…, loc. cit., p. 11. 
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2.1. Scope of information exchange 
Although the Swedish Initiative is quite a short legal document (13 articles in 
total), it is not as simple as it may look at first. For example, in order to identify its 
scope, four articles should be taken into account: 
 Articles 1 and 3(2) that establish as a purpose for information exchange, 
“Conducting criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations.” 
 Article 5 that foresees information requests for the “Purpose of detection, 
prevention or investigation of offences.” 
 Article 7 that limits the spontaneous sending of information to assist, “In 
detection, prevention or investigation of offences to referred in Article 
2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.”  
This variety of definitions can lead to misunderstandings among law enforcement 
agencies at the time of practical information exchange, because requesting the 
country can base its request on the basis of Article 5, and ask the information for 
crime prevention for non-serious crime, and the requested country can base its 
answer on Article 3(2) that obliges it to provide information only for the purpose 
of ongoing investigations or intelligence operations. Thus as a general rule, 
information will be provided only for the purposes established in the Article 1 and 
3(2), but problems can arise in cases of crime prevention. The prevention purpose 
established in Article 7 does not coincide with Article 1 and 3(2), but limitation to 
crimes listed in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA in Article 7 
can be justified, as here, the legislator refers to spontaneous submission of 
information, and in order to make this flow proportionally, it is allowed only in 
cases of more serious crimes. 
2.2. Deadlines for reply 
Article 4 of the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA foresees deadlines in cases of 
urgent information requests, limiting answers to:  
 8 hours in urgent cases when it is related with the crimes listed in the Art. 
2.2 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, and when 
requested information is directly accessible by the requested law 
enforcement institution. This time limit can be extended to 3 days when 
replies would represent a disproportional burden. 
 One week in non-urgent cases under the conditions of the previous indent. 
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 Fourteen days in any other cases, i.e. Crimes not included on the list 
provided in the Art. 2.2 of the Council Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA, and with irrelevance to the request’s urgency. 
Unfortunately, apart from the very detailed examination of the draft Swedish 
Initiative in the Council’s preparatory body, the notion of urgency was not 
determined. 
To avoid totally different interpretations of this important term, the Member 
States tried to establish some framework of urgency in the Guidelines on the 
implementation of the Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18th 
December 2006, on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence 
between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European 
Union581 (hereinafter – the Guidelines). They foresee that urgency has to be 
established on a case by case basis, but taking into account whether it is related to: 
 Prevention of risk of death / harm to persons or serious damage to 
property; 
 Short-term decisions about deprivation of liberty; 
 Prevention of information loss that can affect the investigation. 
Let’s analyse how this system of information exchange would work in the case of a 
person’s identity check on his arrival from a third country at Adolfo Suárez 
Madrid–Barajas Airport.582 Based on the pre-established criteria or unusual 
behaviour of a person, a border guard officer can suspect that the presented 
identification document belonging to another state of the Schengen area is false. A 
check in SIS does not give a positive result on matching with lost or stolen 
documents, but it does not eliminate the possibility that the document is misused 
as there are cases when identification documents are sold by the legal owners and 
of course, such documents are not declared either as lost or stolen, and will never 
appear in SIS. In this case, there is a need to check in the database of the country 
that has issued the document, whether the identity of the person registered in the 
database matches the identity of the person that presenting the document at the 
airport, e.g. Coincidence of names and surnames, date of birth, photo and other 
elements.583 The person concerned can be detained for identity misuse, or use of 
                                                        
581  Council document 9512/1/10. 
582  That means that a person has crossed an external border of the Schengen area and despite 
whether he or she is a national of one of the countries forming Schengen area or not, an identity 
check has to be performed.  
583  In some cases, none of this information is altered, but the ID is misused and only on the basis of 
answers to additional questions about the person’s identity (such as names, dates of birth of 
family members, place of issue of the ID document, etc.) is it possible to verify the misuse. The 
performance of this questioning is possible only by having accessible data from the Civil Registry 
or equivalent database. 
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false documents and according to the criteria of urgency established in the 
Guidelines, it should be treated as urgent. But on the other hand, the use of false 
documents is not included in the list of Art. 2.2 of the Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA (only falsification and trafficking of administrative documents, but 
not their incidental use) and thus the situation does not match the legal 
requirements for urgency, established in the Article 4(1) of the Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA. What should prevail in this case: obligatory provision of 
the Article 4(1) or non-obligatory Guidelines that refer to the protection of a 
fundamental human right - liberty? 
Of course, limitation of urgency to more serious crimes can be justified by limited 
resources of every state, to provide information on any kind of investigation or 
intelligence operation within 8 hours. Another consideration that has to be taken 
into account is the “fairness” of the state in using urgency, or, in other words, 
abusing the label of urgency in cases that really can wait. 
From another point of view, this problem would not appear in cases of direct 
access to databases, which would be established as it was foreseen in the 
Commission’s Proposal. 
This uncertainty about urgency plays an even bigger role in information exchange, 
taking into account that according to the Council’s Working Party’s on Data 
Protection and Information Exchange (hereinafter – DAPIX group) Report from 
2012, participating states use this instrument mainly for urgent information 
requests and for the rest of the cases, other information exchange instruments are 
used.584 With respect to its compliance, the Commission’s Staff Working Paper on 
the implementation of the Swedish Initiative indicates that “Member States do take 
urgent requests seriously. 26% of Member States report that such requests have 
always been complied with while 62% of Member States report that they have 
often been complied with. On the negative side, 9% of Member States see no 
compliance at all while 3% see compliance as a rare occurrence.”585 
The problem of deadlines only occurs in case of implication of judicial 
authorisation for information exchange.586 
2.3. Data exchange and reasons for denial 
Article 2(d) of the Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA establishes that the object 
of exchange could be any type of data held directly by the law enforcement 
                                                        
584  See Council document 14755/1/12, p. 19-21. 
585  SEC(2011) 593 final, 9. 
586 See Council document 14755/1/12, p. 4. 
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authorities, or by public or private authorities and available for law enforcement 
purposes. But on the other hand, unlike the Commission’s Proposal, no minimum 
categories of information that must be exchange are envisaged; i.e. There is no 
assurance that at least some minimum categories of information and data will be 
available across the whole EU. It leads to great differences of information 
availability between countries, as some of them will be obliged to provide many 
categories of information (everything available), while others would provide very 
few of them as only those categories are available to law enforcement institutions. 
It definitely will not help to build common trust and readiness to share 
information, taking into account that as feedback, very few categories can be 
received. 
As in the Commission’s Proposal, Article 3(4) foresees that when judicial 
authorisation to supply requested information is needed, the requested authority 
shall apply for it. 
In comparison with the Commission’s Proposal, Swedish Initiative foresees 
different motives to withhold information. 
Article 14 of the Commission’s proposal 
Article 10 of Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA 
- Dispositive 
- To protect the security of persons and their 
fundamental rights 
- To protect sources of information or 
confidentiality 
- Not to prejudice the on-going investigation 
- Obligatory 
- Lack of judicial authorisation 
- Dispositive  
- Damage of national security interests of the 
requested MS 
- Prejudicing the success of ongoing 
investigation or intelligence operation in 
requested MS 
- Individual’s safety 
- Disproportion with the purpose of request 
- Request on offence with the imprisonment 
punishment of one year or less in requested 
MS 
Table 19: Obligatory and dispositive reasons to deny provision of information according to 
the Commission’s proposal and Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. 
Both provisions have their advantages and disadvantages: 
 The Commission’s proposal foresees broader protection of the person and 
is not limited to safety only. It also foresees the possibility to protect 
information by itself (confidentiality, sources). 
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 The Swedish initiative envisages proportionality of information for the 
purpose and possibility, and to deny provision of information if it 
jeopardises national security. 
Half of the motives foreseen in the current legislation are related to requested 
Member States and reflect the tendency of protection of its interests. It can be 
understandable in cases of damage to national security, but it raises doubts about 
linking availability of information to crimes with punishment of imprisonment of 
more than one year. It makes investigation, or other actions of the requesting 
party, conditional to punishments foreseen by legislation of the requested Member 
State. And as it is a dispositive provision, again it shows disproportion between 
information that will be provided by different Member States. Besides, all or part of 
dispositive refusal reasons can be established in national law as obligatory ones. 
But if such rules are equally applied to information transmission at national level, 
it does not mean the breach of the principle of availability, as national law 
enforcement authorities and those of other Member States are put under the same 
legal requirements.587  
In relation to reasons of ongoing investigation, the wording of the Commission’s 
proposal was more precise as a request can jeopardise not only investigation 
carried out by the requesting party, but also by another Member State, and on 
some occasions the requested Member State can be aware of that (for example 
when it already provided information to another state). 
Despite quite superficial regulations in general, Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA contains two Annexes that provide the forms that have to be used 
as requests and as denial. The form of request includes twelve comprehensive 
fields to be filled in. On the one hand, it allows assurance in relation to the purpose 
of request, but on a the other it discourages the use of this basis of co-operation, 
especially in non-urgent cases as it is much easier to write a free-text request and 
to send it through INTERPOL channels. 
2.4. Practical use 
Despite the hurry of Member States to have a universal instrument allowing 
information availability, the implementation of the Swedish Initiative took much 
longer than had been foreseen. As an established indirect information exchange 
does not suppose complicated and expensive implementation measures, the 
                                                        
587  As happened, for example, when implementing Swedish Initiative in Germany. See more. 
BOERGER, Björn, "The transmission of personal data as part of the police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matter in the EU: German experience” in COLOMER HERNÁNDEZ, 
Ignacio and OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, Sabela, La transmisión de datos personales…, op. cit., p. 252, 266. 
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reason should be to its disadvantages, or lack of strong added value in comparison 
with the already used information exchange mechanisms. 
Article 12(6) envisaged the deadline of the implementation as19th December 
2008. Nevertheless, even now, nine years after its adoption, some Member States 
(Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) are lacking national implementation. 
Even Germany, always being the pioneer in police and judicial co-operation 
measures, only finalised adoption of implementing rules in 2012.588  
As stated in the Council’s Report from 2011, “The general standards for cross-
border information exchange asked for by the Decision were often already in place. 
Therefore, it was stated that the process had not notably been improved. From a 
specific technical point of view, it has to be noted that the required use of form A 
and B for submitting and requesting information, complicates information 
exchange as they are deemed to be cumbersome. [...]”589 
On this basis, the following question can arise: does the Swedish Initiative really 
have added value in information exchange and implementation of the principle of 
availability? Or was it a measure adopted just to demonstrate European political 
concern about information exchange, and to somehow fulfil tasks established by 
The Hague Programme?  
Of course any draft that needs a unanimous agreement of 25 Member States590 can 
be much diluted from content and obligations, and that probably happened with 
the Swedish Initiative. But is it possible to regulate such broad scope of 
information exchange by the legal act of 13 articles in total, with 10 of them 
dedicated to regulate this process?  
From another perspective, such aspects as uncertainty of the purpose of its use, or 
tremendous form for the simplest information request force us to think whether 
the Council and preparatory body really took their task to facilitate information 
availability seriously. And should it be implemented by the indirect information 
exchange that has existed ever since, but now using complicated request forms 
instead of the free-text messages that every law enforcement agency was used to? 
What added value does a three-page form have, furthermore, one that has more 
similarities with European Arrest Warrant that with simple information exchange?  
This has made the Swedish Initiative a limited used mechanism only for situations 
of urgency and additionally, not in all States. Only Slovenia and Sweden use this 
                                                        
588  See BOEGER Björn, "The transmission of personal data…”, loc. cit., p 252. 
589  Council document 15278/11, p. 6. 
590  At the moment of its adoption, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia were not EU Member States yet. 
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instrument frequently and other Member States “do not draw on it on a regular 
basis.”591 But even in this case, Swedish law enforcement authorities use the form 
only when it is specifically indicated by the requested Member States.592 
As pointed out in the Study of the International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development, “Users prefer free text reporting, instead of filling in several pages of 
modular information, increasing time spent handling the requests. Even the 
simplified version of form B, developed during the Czech Presidency, has not 
brought the expected results.”593  
DAPIX group has agreed on the possibility to use a simplified request form that in 
any case has to include data on:  
 Requesting authority and Member State, requested Member States, date 
and reference number;  
 Level of urgency and in cases of urgent request – the reasons for that;  
 Indication of what information is requested and for what purpose;  
 Crime commission circumstances, identity of persons and the main objects 
of the investigation (if known);  
 Link between requested information and investigation;  
 Reasons to believe that the requested Member States may have requested 
information;  
 Limitation on information provided in the request use. 
But these modifications were not formally introduced into the Council Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA, so the question of their legality stands. From another 
angle, some States (Spain, Switzerland, Lichtenstein) literally implemented the 
official text of the Swedish Initiative in the national legislation and have foreseen 
obligatory use of the request form and cannot use the simplified one. 
In addition to all practical inconveniences and unlike the Commission’s Proposal, 
the Swedish Initiative does not foresee any obligation to gather statistics on its use, 
and therefore there is no way to measure its real (even little) effectiveness and to 
identify areas of improvement. As indicated by the Council, “It has to be stated that 
the majority of Member States does not produce complete and comparable SFD 
statistics: 14 MS of those having implemented the SFD clearly have no such 
                                                        
591  SEC(2011) 593 final, p. 6. 
592  Council document 14755/1/12, p. 17. 
593  INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT, “Study on the status of 
information…”, loc. cit., p. 40. 
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statistics, 5 indicated to keep annual statistics and 5 do so only with regard to 
information shared with Europol.”594 
In non-automated information exchange, the collection of statistics is an additional 
burden for law enforcement institutions; in cases of automated information 
exchange (access to databases) it would be a technical solution that does not 
require any further efforts and can be used additionally for supervision of data 
protection. 
3. Data protection 
As the Swedish Initiative by itself is a very laconic legal instrument, provisions on 
data protection tend to be too, and are regulated by Articles 8 and 9. 
Article 8 foresees a double data protection regime: 
 For information exchange as such, data protection rules applied to the 
channel of communication are used. Thus if information is requested 
through SIENA, Europol’s data protection rules will be obligatory. 
 Use of received information, as a general rule, is regulated by the national 
law of the receiving Member State that must be in conformity with the 
European Convention on Data Protection, and should take into 
consideration Recommendation (87) 15. 
Nevertheless, the requested Member State can foresee conditions on its use and 
reporting results. But such special conditions will not be applied to judicial, 
legislative and other institutions performing supervisory functions of law 
enforcement authorities. In any case, the opinions of transmitting Member State 
have to be taken into account as far as possible. 
Transmitted information can be processed only for the purpose for which it was 
transmitted. Its use for other purposes has to be authorised by requested Member 
State, and envisaged by the national law of receiving one. 
With respect to confidential information and intelligence, Article 9 only entails the 
application of relevant national provisions. Even if the legislator does not explain 
whether it is applied only in order to reply or also in order to request, it should be 
applied to both, as request can also contain confidential information in relation to 
the investigation performed. 
                                                        
594 Council document 14755/1/12, p. 4. 
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As already mentioned, the Commission had had an intention to present a package 
of information availability tools, accompanied by its proposal on data protection, 
but due to the terrorist attack of 2005 in London, it was encouraged to present just 
the proposal on the implementation of the principle of availability leaving the data 
protection proposal for later. 
Thus lex generalis of data protection for Swedish Initiative Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA was adopted just one month before the deadline of the 
implementation of the Swedish Initiative, but with its own implementation 
deadline until November 2010. Thus the Commission’s concept of a package of 
principle of availability and data protection only became real, at least in its form, at 
the end of 2010. 
4. Brief summary and evaluation 
The Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA was the first attempt to implement the 
principle of information availability, where Member States, after sound declaration 
of the need to significantly improve information exchange, have chosen quite 
superficial mechanism for its implementation. Regulation does not provide clarity 
of purpose; it includes very few provisions on data protection and establishes 
complicated data exchange forms. 
The only advantage can be considered an obligatory timeframe to provide 
information for urgent requests. Notwithstanding, it also has its problems as the 
definition of urgency is not provided and its misuse cannot be controlled. 
Additionally, some of the existing information exchange tools can also be 
effectively used for urgent information exchange. For example, Europol is usually 
used to getting urgent information as it hosts liaison officers from all Member 
States, and they normally have access to national data bases; bilateral agreements 
regulating PCCC and also foresee exchange of any information, and, as they are 
usually working 24/7, there is no problem in getting information urgently. 
As a result, even after almost a decade the information exchange background is not 
widely used, and instead of being a universal law enforcement information 
exchange tool, the Swedish Initiative is treated as “an optional / supplementary 
legal instrument for sending requests for information.”595 
                                                        
595  Ibid, p. 16. 
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Thus to make the principle of availability work effectively, an innovative and open-
minded approach is needed596 and it seems that it had been followed in the 
Commission’s Proposal, but Member States were not ready to accept it. 
                                                        
596  VERMEULEN, Gert; VANDER BEKEN, Tom; VAN PUYENBROECK, Laurens et al. Availability of law 
enforcement information in the European Union. Between mutual recognition and equivalent right 
of access. Antwerp: Maklu Publisher, 2005, p. 47. 
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CHAPTER 6:   
EXAMPLE OF NETWORKING: FINANCIAL 
INTELLIGENCE UNITS AND ASSET RECOVERY 
OFFICES 
he analysis would not be overall without the study of such information 
exchange tools as networks. 
Although the word “network” can appear not to be very serious in the 
context of law enforcement authorities, well defined and regulated networks are 
very useful tools to put specialised experts in contact; furthermore, in cases of 
necessity they can make contact directly and exchange information according to an 
agreed legal basis. As examples of such network the European Network for the 
Protection of Public Figures, the European Network of National Officials to Detect 
and Combat New Cases of Cross-Border VAT Fraud, Contact-Point Network Against 
Corruption can all be mentioned. 
Regarding the EU primary law, Article 85 of the TFEU expressly mentions only 
European Judicial Network, leaving the rest of the networks up to the necessity of 
co-operation. 
Among different existing networks, as objects for further analysis, the following 
have been selected: 
 Network of FIUs (network of Financial Intelligence Units for the 
information exchange on suspicious transactions, that can be related to 
money laundering or terrorism financing) officially created by the Council 
Decision 2000/642/JHA of 17th October 2000 concerning arrangements 
for co-operation between the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) of the 
T 
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Member States in exchanging information597 (hereinafter – Decision 
2000/642/JHA) 
 Network of AROs (network for the tracing and identification of ill-gotten 
gains598) officially created by the Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6th 
December 2007 concerning cooperation between the Asset Recovery 
Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identification of 
proceeds from, or other property related to, crime599 (hereinafter – 
Decision 2007/845/JHA). 
These networks were elected for several reasons; first of all, because their aims are 
directly related to the fight against illegal proceeds that circulate around the world 
as a side effect of free financial markets. Money laundering was mentioned as one 
of the factors that gave raise to international police co-operation as it is a “global 
business” and “The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates 
that the sum of money laundered globally amounts to between 2 and 5% of global 
GDP or between EUR 615 billion and EUR 1.54 trillion each year.”600  
Secondly, because the final goals of FIUs and AROs networks are the same, 
although they have different regulations and different information exchange rules 
(for example, in Denmark both units are situated in the State Prosecutor for 
Serious Economic Crime, but different regulation to their co-operation is 
applied).601 
Thirdly, the FIU network has a new regulation that is one of the last legislative 
developments. 
1. Network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) 
Although the first anti-money laundering regulation within the European 
Communities was adopted in 1991 as Council Directive 91/308/EEC, with the aim 
of establishing links between suspicious financial transactions and underlying 
criminal activity, in order to prevent and to combat money laundering,602 (the so 
called First AML/CFT Directive), at that moment its focus was on obliging credit 
and financial institutions to identify suspicious financial transactions without any 
reference to cross-border information exchange. 
                                                        
597  OJ L 271, 24.11.2000, p. 4-6. 
598  Council document 9741/13, p. 50. 
599  OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 103-105. 
600  EUROPOL, “EU Serious Organised Crime Threat…”, loc. cit., p. 27.  
601  Council document 9741/13, p. 27. 
602  OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p. 77-82. 
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Within the following decade, Member States established FIUs or endowed already 
existing competent authorities with this function. 
At global level, in 1995 the Egmont Group, as an informal group to facilitate 
international co-operation in the fight against money laundering and terrorism 
financing was established. Currently, this group unites FIUs from 151 countries 
and has stable structure with division by topics and regions. Nevertheless, 
information exchange within its framework takes place under the principle of 
reciprocity, which does not always ensure effectiveness.603  
Therefore, within the EU Decision 2000/642/JHA was made. It provides us with 
the following FIU definition: “A central, national unit which, in order to combat 
money laundering, is responsible for receiving (and to the extent permitted, 
requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures 
of financial information which concern suspected proceeds of crime or are 
required by national legislation or regulation.”604 According to its Article 3, 
depending on national structure, it can be an administrative, police or judicial 
entity, but its national status does not have to be an obstacle for effective co-
operation. 
Its Article 1 established possibilities to exchange information on request, or 
spontaneously between the FIUs of Member State. The scope for information 
exchange is defined very broadly foreseeing that it is, “any available information 
that may be relevant to the processing or analysis of information or to 
investigation by the FIU regarding financial transactions related to money 
laundering and the natural or legal persons involved.”  
Requests shall provide requesting Member States with the facts related to the 
investigation or suspicions, as well as with information on how the received 
information will be used. For requests sent on the basis of this Decision, relevant 
information shall be answered without any additional requirement to send 
another request on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements. The receiving 
Member State has to follow the limitations of use of data, foreseen by the 
requested Member State. 
To make this information as available as possible, Decision 2000/642/JHA 
establishes only three backgrounds of denial: ongoing criminal investigation in the 
requested Member State, disproportion between the revealing of information and 
the legitimate interests of person (data subject) or requested Member State; 
disagreement with other crucial legal principles of the requested Member State. 
                                                        
603  See The Egmont group of Financial Intelligence Units, accessed August 2, 2015, 
http://www.egmontgroup.org/membership. 
604  See Article 2 of the Decision 2000/642/JHA. 
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In the same year France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom started a FIU.NET project that became operational in 2002, and its 
development will be finished in 2016. 
FIU.NET first of all is a secure system connecting all FIUs and allowing di-
personalised searches for information through “Ma3tch” tool (Autonomous 
Anonymous Analysis) and allows data from different FIUs to be matched, retaining 
its anonymity, detecting similarities and interrelation.605 Nevertheless, there is no 
regulation on post-hit information exchange in relation to what conclusion can be 
made about any of the established information exchange tools being used: 
information exchange through Europol, on the basis of the Swedish initiative, 
through liaison officers, and so on. . 
Although it was mentioned that the First AML/CFT Directive had not regulated 
cross-border co-operation and FIUs, the following AML/CFT Directive606 actually 
did. 
The last one, the Fourth AML/CFT Directive (Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20th May 2015 on the prevention of the 
use of financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC)607 provides very 
comprehensive regulation of FIUs; first of all drawing attention to their operational 
independence, i.e., “The FIU has the authority and capacity to carry out its 
functions freely, including the autonomous decision to analyse, request and 
disseminate specific information.” It also lays down extensive regulation of co-
operation between FIUs. 
Thus Article 52 establishes that “Member States shall ensure that FIUs cooperate 
with each other to the greatest extent possible, regardless of their organisational 
status.” 
Unlike Decision 2000/642/JHA, exchanged information is not only related to 
money laundering, but to terrorism financing as well. Maintaining requirements to 
provide investigation facts, and how data will be used, it is required to mention 
reasons for requests being made. Nevertheless, if the type of offence implied is not 
yet determined, this is not a reason to deny the request. 
                                                        
605  See FIU-net, accessed August 2, 2015, https://www.fiu.net/fiunet-unlimited/match/match3. 
606  See Chapters III and V of Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15-36.  
607  OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73-117. 
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With regard to the co-operation channel, FIU.NET is mentioned in particular; but it 
does not impede the use of others. 
Article 53.2 includes a provision that reiterates principles of information 
availability by establishing that, “Member States shall ensure that the FIU to whom 
the request is made is required to use the whole range of its available powers 
which it would normally use domestically for receiving and analysing information 
when it replies to a request for information [...] from another FIU.” 
The fourth AML/CFT Directive remains only one reason for the denial of 
information that is “Fundamental principles of its national law.” 
Summing up, it can be said that the latest developments related to the FIU network 
comprehensively cover legal aspects of co-operation and give state-of-the-art 
technical background to its implementation. 
2. Network of Asset Recovery Offices (AROs) 
If FIUs are dedicated to analytical, intelligence-led work, specialising in identifying 
suspicious transactions that can be related to money laundering or the financing of 
terrorism, AROs are oriented to looking for criminal proceeds, their seizure and 
confiscation. Thus if the FIUs role is more proactive or warning, the AROs role is 
more reactive, designed to deprive criminals from benefit, and to ensure that 
“crime does not pay”. 
The origins of co-operation in tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscating criminal 
proceeds can be found in the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (CETS 141) of the Council of Europe. 
Within the European Communities, one of the first legal acts on this topic was Joint 
Action 98/699/JHA of 3th December 1998 on money laundering, the identification, 
tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds 
from crime608 (hereinafter – Joint Action 98/699/JHA). It entailed an obligation to 
establish national legal provision that would allow, upon request from other 
Member States the identification and tracking of criminal proceeds, and foreseeing 
the necessity of approximation of laws on criminal assets seizure and confiscation. 
Later, a range of political declarations strengthened the importance of this issue. 
For example, the Tampere Conclusions envisaged that money laundering “should 
                                                        
608  OJ L 333, 9.12.1998, p. 1-2. 
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be rooted out wherever it occurs”, the Hague Programme pointed out, “The 
monitoring of suspicious financial flows and the freezing of assets” 609  
In September 2004, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom established CARIN – a global network for the purpose of exchange 
of experience and best practice in order to deprive illicit proceeds.610 Nowadays, it 
associates more than fifty national authorities from Europe and the United States, 
nine international organisations and is linked with equivalent networks in Asia 
Pacific, Latin America and South Africa.611 Nowadays its Secretariat is hosted 
within the Europol Criminal Asset Bureau.612  
The CARIN network is not authorised in case-related data exchange, and therefore 
within the EU613, in 2007 Decision 2007/845/JHA was adopted. It has emphasised 
the need for effective tracing of assets, that can be reached by rapid and direct 
information exchange between competent authorities. From its Article 2 a 
conclusion can be made that, depending on peculiarities of national systems, ARO 
can be within an administrative, law enforcement or judicial authority. Each 
Member State can nominate up to two AROs. Thus, for example: 
 France, first nominated the Central Department of Judicial investigation 
and later Agency for Administration and Recovery of Seized and 
Confiscated Assets as an ARO; managed by the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Finance; 
 The United Kingdom nominated the Serious Organised Crime Agency (for 
England, Wales and North Ireland) and Scottish Crime and Drug 
Enforcement Agency (for Scotland) as AROs.614 
According to Article 3 of the Decision 2007/845/JHA, information requests to 
AROs of other Member States can be sent either by national ARO or another 
authority “charged with the facilitation of the tracing and identification of proceeds 
of crime”. Thus the requested authority will always be an ARO, but the range of 
requesting authorities is wider. 
                                                        
609 OJ C 53, 3.3.2005, p. 8. 
610  See “Camden Asset Recovery Inter-agency Network (CARIN)”, Europol, accessed August 2, 2015, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/camden-asset-recovery-inter-agency-network-carin-
leaflet. 
611  Ibid. 
612  See EUROPOL “Camden Assets Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN): the History, Statement 
of Intent, Membership and Functioning of CARIN. Manual”, 2012, p. 3, accessed August 3, 2015, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/camden-asset-recovery-inter-agency-
network-carin-manual-1665 
613  See EUROPOL. “Camden Assets Recovery…”, loc. cit., p. 3. 
614  See CORRAL ESCARIZ, Vicente, “La nueva estrategia económica contra la delincuencia organizada 
y la corrupción: comiso y recuperación de activos. XXIV seminario “Duque de Ahumada” in La 
Guardia Civil en la lucha contra la Delincuencia Económica (Madrid, 2013), p. 105, 108.  
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As the legal basis for request Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA was established, 
from Decision 2007/845/JHA, a conclusion can be made that use of the request 
form of the Swedish Initiative is obligatory, and shall include reasons for the 
request, as many details as possible, details on the property looked for and the 
persons presumed to be involved (or to whom the property could belong). 
As reference is made to the Swedish Decision, for denial of information, 
backgrounds established in its Article 10 are applied, i.e. Offence punished with 
less than one year of imprisonment, risk to national security, undergoing 
investigation or intelligence operation in the requesting Member State, 
jeopardising individuals’ safety or disproportionality. 
Decision 2007/845/JHA also allows the spontaneous provision of information 
between the aforementioned authorities when it is considered useful for the 
performance of the ARO functions of the receiving Member State. 
In relation to the recuperation of crime benefits, in 2008, a Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “Proceeds of 
organised crime: Ensuring that “crime does not pay”, was issued. It emphasised the 
importance of “national agencies charged with tracing assets are a precondition for 
a successful confiscation, as well as for international cooperation.”615 It also 
pointed out access to relevant databases, granting of coercive and provisional 
freezing powers to AROs and effective co-ordination (with suggestion to endow it 
to Europol) as indispensable elements for effective asset recovery.616 
Later, illicit proceeds were the object of the Stockholm Programme that called 
upon their more effective identification and seizure (but within the context of 
combatting terrorism)617 ,and an Internal Security Strategy that foresaw the 
involvement of information from private sector for the tracing of assets.618 
Although according to Decision 2007/845/JHA, Member States had to establish 
their ARO until the end of 2008, in 2010 the Council Conclusions on Confiscation 
and Asset Recovery619 and in the Communication on Implementation of ISS, 
obligation to establish fully functioning ARO was still reiterated.620  
                                                        
615  COM(2008) 766, final, p. 3. 
616  COM(2008) 766, final, p. 9. 
617  OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. P. 23.  
618  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, “Internal Security Strategy…”, loc. cit., p. 23. 
619  Council document 7769/3/10.  
620  Ibid, p. 6. 
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In 2011, ARO were not still notified by Malta, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia.621 In the 
case of Italy, creation of ARO (National Agency for the Administration and Use of 
Seized and Confiscated from Organised Crime) was established by the Law 
50/2010, but at the moment of the Commission’s Report, it was not yet 
functioning. 622 
In October 2012, there were still two Member States without ARO, and the Council, 
in its Final report on the fifth round of mutual evaluations - "Financial crime and 
financial investigations" stated that Member States were still encouraged to 
promote efficient co-operation through AROs and “when possible, pro-actively and 
exclusively use this channel in the fight against financial crime as regards asset 
recovery.”623  
3. Data protection 
As both networks have different legal bases. Their data protection regimes are also 
different. 
Decision 2000/642/JHA makes a reference to the European Convention on Data 
Protection, its Protocol and Recommendation R(87) 15 as principles that have to 
be followed in information exchange between FIUs. The only specific rule foreseen 
by Decision 2000/642/JHA prohibits access to submitted information by any other 
authority than FIU. 
The fourth AML/CFT Directive is less strict and foresees the possibility of access to 
other competent authorities, but only with the prior consent of the requested FIU 
that can refuse such consent only for the same reasons as applied to information 
denial for requests for information. 
It also established that lex generalis applied to the co-operation of FIUs and the 
implementation of this directive in general is Directive 95/46/EC, and the 
Regulation is Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18th December 2000, which focused on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies, and 
on the free movement of such data624 (hereinafter – Regulation 95/46/EC). That 
means that the European legislator did not treat the Fourth AML/CFT Directive as 
one falling into the category police and judicial co-operation, because in such cases 
                                                        
621  See COM(2011) 176, final, p. 2. It also mentioned Romania among those who had not been 
notified about the national ARO, but the notification was sent in May. See Council document 
10218/11. Brussels, 19 May, 2011. 
622  See CORRAL ESCARIZ, Vicente, “La nueva estrategia económica…”, loc. cit., p. 107. 
623  Council document 12657/2/12, p. 27. 
624  OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1-22. 
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it would be established as lex generalis Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. The 
inertia probably arose previously, as the First AML/CFT Directive formed a part of 
the former First Pillar, and did not even mention FIUs. But the actual scope of 
regulation is different, and includes issues of the former First and Third Pillars. 
Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC allows exceptions from data subject right to be 
informed, to access and to publicise processing operations in cases where its 
processing could prevent, investigate or prosecute a crime. Thus in the case of 
information exchange between FIUs, these exceptions could be applied. 
As noticed by the Commission, the application of such data subject’s rights “would 
be particularly contradictory with pursued objectives as it would oblige the FIU to 
inform the person concerned that a suspicious transaction report concerning them 
has been integrated in a data processing exercise whose objective is to combat 
money laundering and terrorism financing.”625 
In the case of AROs, Article 5 of the Decision 2007/845/JHA also makes reference 
to the principles of the European Convention on Data Protection, its Protocol, 
Recommendation R(87) 15, as well as to national data protection rules of the 
Member States and received data has to be protected in the same way as national 
data related to the same topic. 
But as information exchange between AROs takes place under the Swedish 
Initiative, data protection provisions of the latter shall be applied as lex specialis. 
As already mentioned, information received under Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA can be processed only for the purpose for which it was transmitted 
and its use for other purposes has to be authorised by the requested Member State 
and envisaged by the national law of the receiving one. 
Additionally to lex specialis, the Swedish Initiative also has lex generalis that is 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (analysed in subsection 4.3.3 of the Chapter 
II). Thus it shall also be applied to information exchange between AROs. 
4. Brief summary and evaluation 
Although functioning under different legal bases and using different information 
exchange tools, networks of FIUs and AROs aims to combat illicit proceeds by their 
elimination from legal financial markets. 
                                                        
625  EU FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS’ PLATFORM, “Report on Confidentiality and Data 
Protection in the Activity of FIUs”, April 2008, p. 4, accessed August 1, 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/financial-crime/fiu-report-confidentiality 
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The European legislator leaves it up to Member States to decide whether national 
FIUs and AROs are administrative, police or judicial entities. The only requirement 
is to ensure that the nature of the unit will not prejudice effective co-operation. 
In different ways, both networks contribute to the implementation of the principle 
of availability: in the case of FIUs, they are directly established in the Fourth 
AML/CFT Directive and in the case of AROs – indirectly, through the Swedish 
Initiative. Nevertheless, the difference lies in time limits for response. In cases of 
information exchange through AROs, in urgent cases related to serious crime 
mentioned in Article 2.2 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, the response shall 
be given within eight hours. In cases of co-operation through FIUs, no deadlines 
are given. From one angle, this can give an impression of less importance being 
given by the European legislator to intelligence related to money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism, but looking at the scope of requests in both cases, it is 
obvious that requests to FIUs can be much broader than asking for any available 
information and not for precise criminal proceeds. 
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CHAPTER 7:   
INFORMATION EXCHANGE UNDER PRÜM 
DECISIONS 
n the initiative of the German Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union in 2007, in a surprisingly short time, 27 EU Member States 
unanimously adopted the previously mentioned Decision 2008/615/JHA 
and Council Decision of 23rd June 2008, on the implementation of Decision 
2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism and cross-border crime626 (hereinafter –Decision 
2008/616/JHA) also called Prüm Decisions. 
As stated by Bellanova, Prüm Decisions “suppose to offer legal and technological 
instruments for fight terrorism and international crime more efficiently, 
compensating potential negative spill-overs of the Schengen area.”627  
Besides updated regulation of “traditional” methods of police co-operation and 
information exchange (such as the spontaneous provision of information, joint 
operations), they have also given a legal basis for one of the newest information 
exchange mechanism, i.e. Direct access to national DNA, dactyloscopic and vehicle 
registration data bases among EU Member States.628  
                                                        
626 OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12-72. 
627  BELLANOVA, Rocco, “The “Prüm Process”: The Way Forward for EU Police Cooperation and Data 
Exchange?” in GUILD, Elspeth and GEYER, Florian (eds.), Security versus Justice?…, op. cit., p. 204. 
628 European criminal record exchange system (ECRIS) based on the Council Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA on the organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from 
the criminal record between Member States and Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6th April 
2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA (OJ L 93, 7.4.2009 ,p. 23-348); it 
is also a system of direct access and was launched in April 2012. It is a decentralised system 
based on the criminal records databases in each Member State, linked with the common software 
and communication infrastructure and accessible by judges and prosecutors of all EU Member 
States. In addition to data about criminal records, transmission of other personal data such as 
O 
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This chapter reveals the origins of the Prüm Decisions and analyses its content as 
far as it is related to the object of this investigation – information exchange, 
focusing on automated exchange, as they are crime investigation tools and non-
automated information exchange will be overviewed more briefly, as it stands only 
for crime prevention but not investigation. 
1. From multilateral convention to European 
instrument 
Prüm Decisions take their origin in the multilateral Convention between the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration 
signed on 27th May 2005 in the German town of Prüm (and therefore called the 
Prüm Treaty) and considered as, “the maximum possible level of police 
cooperation.”629 
The initiative came from the German Ministry of the Interior, Otto Schily, who in 
spring 2003 proposed to his counterparts from France, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands (lately joined by Austria and Spain). 
Factual similarities between the development of the Schengen Agreement and the 
Prüm Treaty can be noticed as both of them were led by Germany and all the 
primary parties of the Schengen Agreement (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) later made up five of the seven signatures of the 
Prüm Treaty. Therefore, it is sometimes called “Schengen III”. 
1.1. Between Multilateral and Enhanced Co-operation 
But unlike the Schengen Agreement, adoption of the Prüm Treaty has raised grand 
discussion about the disobedience of the enhanced co-operation procedure.630  
As the Prüm Treaty was signed by seven Member States and almost immediately 
joined by seven more (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia), it has raised a lot of doubts about “sincerity” in the use of the 
intergovernmental agreement of the seven Member States, instead of more 
                                                                                                                                                                  
fingerprints, amongst others, is allowed which makes it possible to identify the subject, and so 
this is a possibility with regard to DNA profiles. This system was launched in April 2012. 
629  CALESINI, Giovanni, European Police Law..., op. cit., p. 193. 
630  See section 3 of the Chapter I. 
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complicated enhanced co-operation procedure that should be used with the 
implications of eight Member States.631  
It could be justified if the content and the purpose of the agreement would be 
outside EU policy, but the content of the Prüm Treaty was in line with EU policies 
in the security area, as it: 
a) Corresponded to the general objective to strengthen internal security;  
b) Foresaw measures in line with the objective of the Hague Programme, to 
intensify co-operation in combatting terrorism, cross-border crime and 
illegal migration; 632 
c) Made an allusion to the general principle of the Hague Programme on 
information availability by establishing the goal of “better information 
exchange” 633 (although availability was limited only to the signatory states 
instead of all EU Member States). 
Mr Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection Supervisor, directly described this 
situation as evasion of the substantive and procedural requirements of enhanced 
cooperation.634 
Other scholars called it a contribution to the “patchwork” legal system and 
strengthening of a two speed Europe, for example: 
 Guild defended the position that “setting up exclusive and competitive 
measures that seek to address threats that affect the EU as a whole, [...] 
                                                        
631 See ZILLER, Jaques, “Le traité de Prüm. Une vraie-fausse cooperation renforcée dans l’Espace de 
sécurité de liberté et de justice” (Working Paper, LAW No. 2006/32, European University 
Institute, 2006), p. 3, accessed October 2, 2013, http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/6401; DE 
HOYOS SANCHO, Montserrat, “Obtención, registro e intercambio de perfiles de ADN de 
sospechosos en el espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia” in CABEZUDO BAJO, María José, Las 
bases de datos …, op. cit., p. 67-68. CÁMARA VILLAR, Gregorio, “La garantía de los derechos 
fundamentales afectados por la Convención de Prüm” in Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, 
Enero-Junio 2007, no 7, p. 98-100; FREIXES SANJUÁN, Teresa, “Protección de datos y 
globalización. La Convención de Prüm” in Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo, Enero-Junio 
de 2007, no 7. P. 11. 
632  See OJ C 53/1, 3.3.2005, p. 7-11.  
633 See MARTÍNEZ PÉREZ, Fernando and POZA CISNEROS, María, “El principio de disponibilidad: 
Antecedentes…”, loc. cit., p. 425; BURGESS, Mark, “The Prüm Process: playing or abusing the 
system?” in European Security Review, 2007, no. 34, accessed April 13, 2014, p. 3, 
http://esdpmap.org/pdf/2007_artrel_17_esr34prum-process.pdf; KIETZ, Daniela and MAURER, 
Andreas. “From Schengen to Prüm”, loc. cit., p. 2. 
634  HOUSE OF LORDS. “Prüm: an effective weapon against terrorism and crime?” (Report with 
Evidence, May 2007), p. 31, accessed July 13, 2014, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007 
/may/eu-hol-prum-report.pdf. 
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blurs the coherence of EU action in these fields.”635 And excludes 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
 Balzacq, Bigo, Carrera as well as Guild considered it as a significant 
countervailing political force against the European Union’s area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice as “signatories do not value the EU as the 
primary unit for the production of security.”636 
 Even more hard and direct criticism came from Guild and Geyer, as they 
pondered that “Seven Member States free to turn their backs on eighteen 
others, to decide among them-selves on a model of police cooperation and 
data exchange only to return to the originally excluded rest to sell their 
product as the latest innovation in managing threats, a product that no 
responsible European government could nowadays afford to miss.”637 
 Ziller drew attention to the fact that the Prüm Treaty was signed two days 
before the French referendum and four days before the Dutch referendum 
on the Treaty that established the Constitution for Europe638, and from 
this perspective, it can be treated as an additional outrage to the EU and its 
policies. 
All these concerns and criticisms are acceptable and have their grounds, because 
the Prüm Treaty was not created only as a set of mechanisms of intergovernmental 
co-operation that were not possible to establish within the EU framework, but as 
an instrument that in the future, was intended to be compelled on all EU Member 
States, as its Article 1(4) foresees that “within three years at most following entry 
into force of this Convention, on the basis of an assessment of experience of its 
implementation, an initiative shall be submitted, in consultation with or on a 
proposal from the European Commission, in compliance with the provisions of the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
with the aim of incorporating the provisions of this Convention into the legal 
framework of the European Union.” 
                                                        
635 GUILD, Elspeth, “Merging Security from Two-Level Game: Inserting the Treaty of Prüm into EU 
law?”, (CEPS Policy Brief, March 2007, no. 124), p. 1, accessed April 16, 2014, 
http://ceps.be/book/merging-security-two-level-game-inserting-treaty-prüm-eu-law. 
636 BALZACQ, Thierry; BIGO, Didier; CARRERA, Sergio et al., “Security and the Two-Level Game: the 
Treaty of Prüm, the EU and the Management of Threats” (Working Document no. 234, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, January 2006), p. 3, accessed April 16, 2014, 
http://www.ceps.be/book/security-and-two-level-game-treaty-prüm-eu-and-management-
threats. 
637 GUILD, Elspeth and GEYER, Florian, “Getting local: Schengen, Prüm and the dancing procession of 
Echternach. Three paces forward and two back for UE police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters” (Commentaries, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006), p. 2, accessed April 16, 2014, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591 =0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-
2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122940. 
638 See ZILLER, Jaques, “Le traité de Prüm. Une vraie-fausse… “, loc. cit., p.1. 
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This indicates deliberate following of the scheme of adoption of the Schengen 
Agreement and its further incorporation into European acquis. However, the 
institutional and political preconditions of 1985 and 2005 were totally different. 
The Schengen Agreement and Schengen Convention were adopted out of the 
framework of the European Communities due to significant delays in the creation 
of the free movement area by all EC, and they had never included any allusion 
about its imposition on the EU. It was created as a consequence of an institutional 
vacuum639 and when, “the European Communities were still far from being able to 
agree upon the concept of an area of Freedom, Security and Justice.”640 
Nevertheless, the Prüm Treaty was adopted after the tabling by the Commission 
comprehensive of a proposal on automated information exchange, that also 
included DNA profiles, dactyloscopic and vehicle registration data. 
But to be objective, it should be mentioned that there were also some defenders of 
conventional regulation instead of European. For example:  
 Franklin and Sifflet pointed out that the adoption of the Treaty was a 
signal of ill-working EU decision making in the Third Pillar.641  
 Kietz and Maurer argued that “despite some important exceptions, the 
progress in the sub-area of police and judicial co-operation in criminal 
matters, however, remains limited due to the unanimity rule in Council 
decision making ... Therefore, cooperation below the EU-25 threshold 
continues to play an important role in combatting cross-border crime and 
terrorism.”642 
 Bulmer stated that the number of signatories together with the provision 
of the afore-mentioned Article 1(4) had indicated explicitly the intention 
to circumvent the slow EU procedures.643  
1.2. Transformation into EU instrument 
Special attention deserves the rapidness of the Prüm Treaty’s transposition into 
the EU framework deserves special attention. Although it came into force on 23rd 
                                                        
639  See BALZACQ, Thierry, “From a Prüm of 7 to a Prüm of 8+: What Are the Implications?”, (Briefing 
Paper, DG Internal Policies, Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2006), p. 4, accessed April 
14, 2014, http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1189.html. 
640  GUILD, Elspeth and GEYER, Florian, “Getting local: Schengen…”, loc. cit., p. 4. 
641 DEHOUSSE, Franklin and SIFFLET, Diane, “Les nouvelles perspectives de la coopération de 
Schengen: le Traité de Prüm”, Egmont European Affairs Publication, 2006, p. 13, accessed April 
17, 2014, http://aei.pitt.edu/9091/1/Prum.pdf.  
642 KIETZ, Daniela and MAURER, Andreas, “From Schengen to Prüm”, loc. cit., p. 1. 
643 BULMER. Simon, “Shop till you drop? The German executive as venue-shopper in Justice and 
Home Affairs” in ENDEL. Petra; ETTE, Andreas and PARKES, Roderick, The Europeanization of 
Control. Venues and Outcomes of EU Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 
2011), p. 63-65. 
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November 2006644 and only between Austria, Germany and Spain, it was already 
presented at EU level at the beginning of 2007. On 1st January 2007, Germany had 
taken over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and within one 
month, in February 2007, its Minister of Interior Dr Wolfgang Schäuble presented 
the Prüm Treaty at an informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, as 
an instrument that was ready to be transplanted into EU law. He also confirmed 
deliberate avoidance of the enhanced co-operation procedure by saying that it was 
an example of avoidance of the bottlenecks of usual EU procedures. Four days 
later, the Council Secretariat officially published “European-wide Prüm Treaty” as 
the initiative of fourteen Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.645  
The political agreement of the ministers on the proposal was reached in less than 
half a year - on 12th June 2007 and the Council of the European Union adopted its 
final version on 23rd June 2008. 
From another perspective, as many EU Member States had expressed the wish to 
join the Convention, it was better to move it to the EU framework and to ensure 
that EU warranties would be applied to information exchange.646  
In these circumstances, in May 2007, the European Parliament expressed its 
regrets that it had not had time for an appropriate review of the proposal, and 
drew the attention to the absence of an explanatory memorandum, the evaluation 
of future costs, comprehensive impact assessment and an evaluation of the 
multilateral agreement, as well as lack of an adequate data protection 
framework.647  
By Decision 2008/615/JHA and Decision 2008/616/JHA the Prüm Treaty was not 
literally integrated into the framework of the EU. Both experts and politicians had 
expressed concerns about some of its aspects and finally, a compromised text that 
differs from the original was adopted. 
                                                        
644  The same year, parties signed an Administrative and technical implementing Agreement to the 
Prüm Convention. See Council document 5473/07.  
645  BURGESS, Mark, “The Prüm Process: playing…”, loc. cit., p. 2. 
646  See DE HOYOS SANCHO, Montserrat, “Obtención, registro e intercambio…”, loc. cit., p. 67. 
647  See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, “Report on the initiative by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic 
of Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the 
Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Finland, the 
Portuguese Republic, Romania and the Kingdom of Sweden on the stepping up of cross-border 
cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (6566/2007 – C6-
0079/2007 – 2007/0804(CNS))”, p. 6, accessed June 20, 2014, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2007-
0207+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=hr>; O’NEILL, Maria. “The Issue of Data Protection…”, loc. 
cit., p. 227. 
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Both the Treaty and the Decisions seek the same general aim: to step up cross-
border cooperation, in particular law enforcement information exchange.648 
Comparing the areas of co-operation covered by the two instruments, the Prüm 
Treaty foresees more co-operation instruments than Prüm Decisions; this is 
presented in the table below. 
Areas covered by Prüm Treaty Areas covered by Prüm Decisions 
Creation of national DNA, dactyloscopic data bases649 
Automated searching in national DNA, dactyloscopic and vehicles’ registration databases and 
further information exchange 
Supply of personal and non-personal data for crime prevention, maintenance of public order and 
security for major events with a cross-border dimension 
Assistance in connection with major events, disasters and serious accidents 
- Combatting terrorism by information supply 
and exchange, giving the possibility to deploy 
“air marshals” on the aircraft registered in the 
deploying country 
- Cross-border police co-operation through 
provisional measures necessary to preclude 
imminent danger to the physical integrity of 
individuals; common patrols and other joint 
operations when officers from one 
Contracting Party should perform their duties 
within the territory of another 
- Combatting illegal migration by secondment 
of document advisers, assistance in 
repatriation measures 
- Other co-operation upon request 
- Prevention of terrorist offences by 
information supply 
- Common patrols and other joint operations 
when officers of one Contracting Party should 
perform their duties within the territory of 
another 
Table 20: Co-operation areas covered by Prüm Treaty and Prüm Decisions. 
Both the multilateral convention and the EU legal instrument include provisions on 
their interrelationship. 
 Article 47 of the Prüm Treaty foresaw that its provisions shall apply only 
in so far as they are compatible with the EU law. 
 Article 35 of the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA established that for 
contracting parties of the Prüm Treaty, the relevant provisions of the 
Decision shall be applied instead of the corresponding provisions 
                                                        
648  Although the purposes of different categories of information exchange vary and are not equal. 
See following sections.  
649 At the beginning, there was an idea to create centralised DNA, dactyloscopic and vehicle’s 
registration databases, but it was declined at the ministerial meeting on 26th November 2004 
opting for decentralised data bases. See LUIF, Paul, “The Treaty of Prüm: A Reply of Schengen?” 
(deliverable of the Project within the framework EU-CONSENT “Wider Europe, Deeper 
Integration? Constructing Europe Network”, May, 2007), p. 8-9, accessed, June 25, 2014, 
http://www.eu-consent.net/library/deliverables/D38c.pdf. 
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contained in the Prüm Treaty. But any other provisions of the latter shall 
remain applicable between the contracting parties. 
2. Prüm Decisions: possibilities given and benefit 
made 
Decision 2008/615/JHA justifies its development and necessity by referring to 
different strategic and political statements. Its recitals point out a need to improve 
information exchange, declared by the Tampere conclusions, as well as the 
principle of availability, innovative approach to the cross-border exchange of law 
enforcement information, use of new technologies and reciprocal access to 
national databases established in the Hague Programme.650  
As has already been presented in Table 20, the Prüm Decisions foresee the 
exchange of different categories of data:  
a) Data related to personal characteristics such as DNA and dactyloscopics;  
b) Vehicles’ registration data;  
c) All data important in prevention of terrorism;  
d) All data important in prevention of offences and threats to the security in 
major events with a cross-border dimension. 
With regard to the first two categories, a State has DNA samples, a profile, 
fingerprints, palm prints, a vehicle registration number or chassis, and is looking 
for its “owner”, or wants to find out more information. Regulation on this kind of 
data (Articles 3, 9 and 12 of the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA) allows Member 
States to perform an automated search in the relevant national databases of other 
Member States. 
In the following two categories, the State faces a potential threat and is looking for 
any information that can prevent it. In this case, a non-automated information 
exchange takes place and the State under threat, sends a request for any 
information or to see if another State is aware of the existing threat and can 
therefore supply information without a previous request. 
It should be noted that Prüm Decisions, as well as the Framework Decision 
2066/960/JHA, do not oblige States to collect any information, but solely make 
                                                        
650  As Council Decision 2008/616/JHA deals with technical implementation of the Council Decision 
2006/615/JHA, it refers only to the latter.  
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available already existing information.651 The only exception is Article 7 of the 
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA that foresees the possibility of requesting 
assistance on collection of cellular material and supplying DNA profiles when they 
are needed for on-going investigations or criminal proceedings. 
For the time being, in addition to the 28 EU Member States, Iceland and Norway 
signed the agreement on the application of certain provisions of Prüm Decisions in 
November 2009.652  
2.1. Automated data search 
For automated data exchange, Decision 2008/615/JHA obliges the States to 
establish national databases and provide the search rules in national DNA, 
dactyloscopic (fingerprints, palm prints or soleprints) and vehicle registration 
databases by competent authorities of other States, and further information 
exchange. 
Two categories of data are personal characteristics that could lead to the 
identification of persons involved, and the third can serve as a facilitator or a direct 
tool in crime commissioning (robberies, assassinations, traffic crimes, trafficking, 
terrorist attacks, etc.). 
Justification for strengthened measures to exchange dactyloscopic data and DNA 
can be found in forensic science, as both of them are reliable person identification 
tools:653  
 Dactyloscopic data is used traditionally as the method to individualise a 
print as having been made by one and only source,654 and nowadays it is a 
leader in persons identification markers;655 
 DNA, due to its “slight characteristic variances”656 can conclusively 
establish the identity of biological fluids and trace substances that are 
almost inevitably found at crime scenes.657  
                                                        
651  See AGUILERA RUIZ, Luis, “La protección de datos de ADN en la Unión Europea y en España” in 
CABEZUDO BAJO, María José, Las bases de datos policiales..., op. cit., p. 34. 
652 COM(2012) 732 final, p. 2.  
653  See SOLETO MUÑOZ, Helena, La identificación del imputado: Rueda, fotos, ADN…De los métodos 
basados en la percepción a la prueba científica (Valencia: Tirant lo blanch, 2009), p. 89; 
ASHWORTH, Mike and REDMAYNE, Mike, The criminal Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, 3rd ed.), p. 124; FRÍAS MARTÍNEZ, Emilio, “AND y privacidad en el proceso penal” in Diario 
La Ley, September 30, 2013, no 8159, p. 17. 
654  See MOENSSENS, Andre A.; HENDERSON, Carol E. and PORTWOOD, Sharon G., Scientific Evidence 
in Civil and Criminal Cases (New York: Foundation Press, 2007, 5th ed.), p. 620.  
655  See HOUCK, Max M. and SIEGEL, Jeffrey A., Fundamentals of Forensic Science (Oxford: Elsevier, 
2010, 2nd ed.), p. 474.  
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Although the general aim of the Prüm Decisions is to step up cross-border 
cooperation, in particularly law enforcement, information exchange and its 
provisions foresee different information access purposes, depending on the 
category of data subject to automatic search. Thus according to Article 3, national 
DNA databases can be accessed and reference data can be obtained only for the 
investigation of a criminal offence. Article 9 allows automated search and access to 
the reference data in fingerprint identification systems for the prevention and 
investigation of criminal offences. Vehicle registration data can be searched and 
accessed for the prevention and investigation of criminal offences, other offences 
under the jurisdiction of the courts, or the public prosecution service of the 
searching Member State and for the maintenance of public security. 
The deadline to implement these measures expired on 26th August 2011. 
2.1.1. Data search and access 
Three categories of automatically searched data are regulated in the same Chapter 
2 of the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA. Regulation of DNA profiles and 
dactyloscopic data is almost the same, but access to vehicle registration data is 
handled in a different way. 
Thus in cases of DNA profiles and dactyloscopic data, the search is directly 
performed in the national database of the other country and in cases of vehicle 
registration – access is through centralized European Vehicle658 and Driving 
Licence Information System (Eucaris)659 which offers a multilingual web client, 
enabling enquiries to other countries to be sent via national web browser.660  
                                                                                                                                                                  
656 MOENSSENS, Andre A.; HENDERSON, Carol E. and PORTWOOD, Sharon G., Scientific Evidence in 
Civil..., op. cit., p. 1020.  
657 It is not only a feature of violent crimes such as rapes, murders, etc., but also while committing 
property crimes, offenders usually leave their biological evidence: sweat, hair, etc. and despite 
being careful and not leaving dactyloscopic prints, reveal their identity. Thus DNA samples 
recovered from crime scenes in France, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates 
revealed links between three different types of crime (armed robbery, prison escape and the use 
of forged travel documents) and between a group of individuals known as the ‘Pink Panthers’, an 
organised gang. See more “Forensic”, Interpol, accessed July 1, 2015, 
http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Forensics/DNA. 
658  It should be noted that Prüm Decisions use a term “vehicle” although officially Eucaris stands for 
“European Car and Driving Licence Information System”. See European Car and Driving Licence 
Information System, https://www.eucaris.net.  
659  Eucaris was established in 1994 by the initiative of 5 European countries (Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) in order to support data 
communication between vehicles’ registration authorities and to combat exportation of stolen 
cars as well as driving licence “tourism”. Currently Eucaris is expanded with other forms of 
information exchange between countries, e.g. Prüm Treaty and Prüm Decisions and in 2012, it 
was appointed as the technical platform for the cross-border exchange of information under 
Directive 2011/82/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
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To carry out queries in relation to DNA profiles and dactyloscopics, reference data 
is entered. For DNA profiles it means non-coding part of the DNA and reference 
number, and for dactyloscopics – the dactyloscopic data and reference number. It 
is disassociated from any data that can lead to direct identification of a person in a 
search. Both the non-coding part of DNA and fingerprints, palm prints and 
soleprints help to identify a person and to distinguish them from another. The non-
coding DNA part also indicates the gender, but does not provide any other type of 
genetic information, such as race, ethnic group, diseases, and so on. 661  
While performing an automated search of DNA profile or dactyloscopic data, data 
stored in databases is not accessed directly. State A can only find out whether 
there is DNA profile or dactyloscopic data in the relevant database of State B, 
corresponding to the searched data, and will only receive an automated answer on 
positive or negative search result. In the case of a positive result together with an 
automated reply the reference data of the stored DNA profile or dactyloscopics 
that resulted in match will be sent. Providing personal data and other information 
will be performed on the basis of the further request of the searching State 
(Articles 5 and 10 of the Decision 2008/615/JHA), i.e. State A will send a request to 
state B, indicating reference data of the stored DNA profile or dactyloscopics 
received with answer on coincidence and explaining the purpose for which the 
data is requested. 
That means that: 
 The DNA or dactyloscopic database searching State will never obtain data 
that does not match that submitted for the search;  
 The establishment of separate ‘hit’ and ‘post hit’ (data exchange) stages 
allows absolute control of the possessed data to be maintained and 
evaluated, whether the reason for the search and other conditions meet 
the requirements to give the data.662 
It should be mentioned that in this process, different legislation is used: a search is 
performed in compliance with the national law of the searching party, an 
                                                                                                                                                                  
facilitating cross-border exchange of information on road safety and related traffic offences (OJ L 
288, 5.11.2011, p. 1-15). See Council document 13127/13, p. 12. 
660  All connected Member States communicate directly with each other, without any central 
application or central hub. See Council document 13127/13, p. 12. 
661 See DE HOYOS SANCHO, Montserrat, “Profundización en la cooperación transfronteriza en la 
Unión Europea: obtención, registro e intercambio de perfiles de ADN de sospechosos.” In 
ARANGÜENA FANEGO, Coral (dir.), Espacio Europeo de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia: Últimos 
avances en cooperación judicial penal (Valladolid: Lex Nova, 2010), p. 161-162; DE HOYOS 
SANCHO, Montserrat, “Obtención, registro e intercambio…”, loc. cit., p. 74. 
662 See AGUILERA RUIZ, Luis, “La protección de datos ADN…”, loc. cit., p. 35. 
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automated answer on match is regulated by EU law, and the request for further 
data shall be in accordance with the requested State’s national law. 
Moreover, it should be taken into account that national rules of DNA and 
dactyloscopic collection, use and processing can differ among States and affect data 
exchange and its further use in the process. In many European countries 
dactyloscopic data is concerned as police data663 and its collection is treated as not 
affecting either the fundamental right of physical and moral integrity, or the right 
of privacy.664 But talking about DNA profiles and related data, the situation is more 
complicated as its collection has different restrictions, due to the possible affects of 
fundamental rights: 
 In some States, a judicial authorisation to collect DNA samples is needed 
(e.g. Spain) and in others, the police can do it without judicial 
authorization (e. G. The United Kingdom).665  
 National law differs in relation to categories of crimes in which collection 
is permitted. For example; in Finland collection is permitted only for 
crimes with a punishment of imprisonment higher than 6 months. In 
Netherlands – 4 years.666 
 Storage and further use of data. It is forbidden to store and use data 
without conviction in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the Netherlands. 667 Other States make 
some exception from this general rule, for example “Finland [...] which 
requires the destruction of suspect profiles within one year of criminal 
acquittal, permits the retention of suspect profiles for ten years if the 
suspect is deceased. Germany allows the retention of some suspect 
profiles by the police in cases where an individual is suspected of a serious 
crime (particularly sexual or homicide) or where they have a previous 
criminal records for serious crime.”668 
Due to the different rules of legitimacy, DNA collected in the United Kingdom will 
not always serve as evidence in the Netherlands, or DNA stored in Finland as 
evidence in Sweden. 
                                                        
663  See MCCARTHNEY, Carole I.; WILSON, Tim J. and WILLIAMS, Robin, “Transnational Exchange of 
Forensic DNA: Viability, Legitimacy, and Acceptability” in European Journal on Criminal and 
Research, 2011, vol.17, no. 4, p. 310. 
664  See SOLETO MUÑOZ, Helena. La identificación del imputado…, op. cit., p. 83. 
665  See more ALCOCEBA GIL, Juan Manuel, “Tratamiento y transmisión de datos genéticos con fines 
de la investigación penal en la UE” in COLOMER HERNÁNDEZ, Ignacio and OUBIÑA BARBOLLA, 
Sabela. La transmisión de datos personales…, op. cit., p. 624-635; SOLETO MUÑOZ, Helena and 
ALCOCEBA GIL, Juan, “Protección de datos y transferencia…”, loc. cit., p. 338-340.  
666  WILLIAMS, Robin, “Making Forensic DNA Databases: Global Themes and Local Variations” in 
CABEZUDO BAJO, María José, Las bases de datos policiales..., op. cit., p. 366. 
667  See WILLIAMS, Robin, “Making Forensic DNA…”, loc. cit., p. 367. 
668 Ibid. 
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In the case of vehicle registration data, full chassis number or full registration 
number shall be used for automated search and of course, by itself it does not 
contain any personal data. In this case, there is no two stages procedure, as the 
answer for the search (vehicle and insurance information together with the 
respective vehicle owner and/or holder) is returned directly in encrypted form. 
This difference in procedure can be defended by the fact that the backgrounds for 
vehicle registration search are much broader than for “bio information”, and the 
flow of searches is more intensive. From another angle, data on the vehicle’s owner 
or operator is usually basic: name and surname. 
2.1.2. Granting access to national databases 
An automated search carried out in the data base of another State means that the 
searching authority has previously been given access to it. It is a sensitive issue as 
it supposes actions on law enforcement or the judicial “virtual territory” of another 
State, and demands strong trust in the partner, its legal system and professionals. 
Doubts can arise at every stage, for instance: how will the searching State ensure 
that only authorised staff will have access? Whether data protection rules of 
another country will guarantee the same protection level as national ones? Are 
information search and use rules strict enough? Without answering these 
questions and the disappearance of these doubts mutual access to national 
databases is hardly imagined. 
Therefore, Prüm Decisions establish mechanisms that allow strengthening mutual 
trust and making information exchange effective and free of mutual suspicions. 
Article 25(2) of Decision 2008/615/JHA establishes that access to another State’s 
databases is granted when the Council decides that the country has met all the 
technical, legal, data protection requirements applied to every category of data 
exchanged (DNA, dactyloscopic and vehicles’ registration data).669 The evaluation 
mechanism is not applied for Member States where the supply of personal data has 
already started, pursuant to the Prüm Treaty. According to Article 20 of the Council 
Decision 2008/616/JHA, the Council’s decision is taken on the basis of an 
evaluation report, developed by the experts of already operational Member States, 
and based on information from the questionnaire answered by the evaluated State, 
its evaluation visit and pilot run of the relevant database. 
Thus before granting access to the national database, all Member States have the 
opportunity to assess the State’s readiness in this regard. Although evaluation is 
                                                        
669  It should be noted that this requirement is not applied to Member States that started to exchange 
data under the Prüm Treaty. 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
~ 234 ~ 
performed and a report is drafted by a limited number of persons representing 
already operational countries (3-4 persons), other countries can acquaint 
themselves with the whole evaluation process and documentation through the 
different bodies of the Council of the European Union, i.e. Through the Working 
Party on Data Protection and Information Exchange, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER 2) and Justice and Home Affairs Council. 
Unlike Schengen evaluation mechanism, Prüm evaluations are performed only 
with regard to automated data exchange and only once, i.e. In order to grant 
access. It does not have any follow-up as in the case of periodical Schengen 
evaluations. 
2.1.3. Implementation measures 
As already mentioned, Prüm Decisions’ implementation deadline for automated 
data search expired on 26th August 2011. The earliest available statistics on this 
issue present the figures of the state of play on 31st December 2011670, when: 
 14 Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain) were entitled to exchange DNA related data and twelve of 
them were already operational;  
 10 Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain) were operational for 
fingerprint related data exchange; 
 10 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Spain) were operational 
for vehicles registration data exchange. 
Although at the beginning, the United Kingdom expressed her wish to participate 
in the implementation of Prüm Decisions, in 2014 she was not included in the list 
of acts in which the United Kingdom continues to participate.671 
Even now, some Member States are still not operational. According to the data 
from July 2015: 
 22 of 27 Member States (not including the United Kingdom) were 
operational for DNA related data exchange. Denmark, Greece, Croatia, 
Ireland and Italy were still in the process of preparations. 
                                                        
670  See Council document 11367/12, p. 2. 
671  OJ L 345, 1.12.2014, p. 6-9. 
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 18 of 27 Member States were operational for exchange of dactyloscopic 
data. Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal 
and Sweden remain non-operational. 
 20 of 27 Member States exchange data on vehicle registration and Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Greece, Croatia, Ireland, Italy and Portugal are still at 
the preparatory stage.672  
From all non-operational Member States, justification is possible for Croatia who 
only joined the EU on 1st July 2013. 
Nevertheless, there is no information about Island and Norway, as the agreement 
has been signed, but not entered into force. 
As Home Affairs Ministers gather for the Council at least every 2-3 months, and the 
Council’s preparatory bodies meet almost every month, decision-making processes 
(i.e. Council Decision on granting of access) are not the reason for delays. Problems 
lie in Member States who face different obstacles to establish or modify databases 
and to create appropriate legal and data protection regimes. As stated in the 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, and the Council on the 
implementation of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23rd June 2008, on the 
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and 
cross-border crime (hereinafter – Implementation Report 2012), the main reasons 
for the delay are technical in nature and caused by a lack of human and financial 
resources in the Member States.673 
In 2010, observing Member State’s preparations for the implementation, the 
Belgian Presidency of the European Union made a short study on the state of the 
implementation of Prüm Decisions and identified the main problems which are 
presented in the chart below:  
                                                        
672  See Council document 5010/5/15, p. 11-14, 17-21, 23-25. 
673  COM(2012) 732 final, p. 5. 
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Chart 1: Aspects affecting the implementation of Prüm Decisions. 
The above-mentioned Belgian Study also revealed that the average “rough 
estimation” for a country to access the Prüm network approximates 2 million 
euros.674 For countries that had no national DNA database in operation before 
2008 – such as Italy, Greece, Malta, or Ireland – the costs are likely to be much 
higher.675  
The British Government (which was still considering participation) has estimated 
that “the total start-up cost for the United Kingdom will be in the region of 31 
million pounds for the exchange of fingerprints, DNA and vehicle registration 
data.”676  
Thus the automated data exchange mechanism is quite expensive and the question 
stands, whether its use and effectiveness for crime investigation compensates such 
expenditures. For the time being there are two sources that can reveal, at least 
partly, the effectiveness and use of the instrument: 
 The Implementation Report 2012;  
 Annual statistics that must be submitted under Article 21 of Decision 
2008/616/JHA and relevant provisions of its Annex (paragraph 2.1 of the 
Chapter VI). 
                                                        
674  Council document 14918/10, p. 6.  
675  See PRAINSACK, Barbara and TOOM, Victor. “Performing the Union: The Prüm Decision and the 
European dream” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2013, 
44(1), p. 76, accessed April 7 2014, http://www.sciencedirect.com/ 
science/article/pii/S1369848612001033.  
676  HOUSE OF LORDS, “Prüm: an effective weapon…”, loc. cit., p. 24.  
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The Implementation Report 2012 is based on the States’ answers to the 
questionnaire disseminated by the Commission, and reveals that States have “quite 
positive attitude” towards the Prüm Decisions, with satisfaction of exchange of 
VRD related data, but in the case of DNA and dactyloscopics “efficiency is 
considered only acceptable or even inadequate by about 30% [of States].”677 
States also pointed out the need to improve the follow-up of hits (the stage of 
personal data exchange) in cases of DNA related data and dactyloscopics without 
which hits by themselves are useless for the investigation. 
Referring to the statistics, it should be pointed out that not all States provide them, 
or some of them provide incomplete data. 
In 2013, operational Member States had made 3,492,601 searches of vehicle 
registration data that resulted in 1,498,663 hits. Thus more that 42 % of searches 
were successful. In the case of dactyloscopic data, 128,494 searches gave 4,621 
matches, i.e. 3.5 %. 
In the case of DNA, statistics providing rules were changed in 2012, requesting 
Member States to provide an overview of the national situation concerning 
matches from the owner’s point of view. Thus the number of searches is not 
provided, but only the number of matches. These statistics should coincide in case 
of cross-checking, i.e. The figures from A and B involved in a match should be equal 
for stain-stain matches, person-person matches, A stain-person with B person-
stain matches and A person-stain with B stain-person matches.678 Nevertheless, 
making this analysis in almost all cases, the difference between the data of 
countries involved is found. Therefore, analysis of these statistics does not 
contribute too much to this analysis. 
In general, the majority of Member States have opted for a statistics model 
focusing on the number of hits, but not on the data of the influence of this 
information exchange on the final result of investigation and prosecution. Thus it is 
not clear what percentage of hits was really significant in finding offenders and 
bringing them to justice; e. G. Spain’s search of DNA profile had resulted in a hit in 
the German DNA database and was reflected in the statistics, but there is no 
information on the level of its importance in comparison with other data related to 
the investigation or on its use as evidence in the trial.679  
                                                        
677  COM(2012) 732 final, p. 6.  
678  See Council document 14383/2/12, p. 2. 
679  Such data had been collected, implementing a pilot project in Denver, USA related to DNA evidence 
use in the investigation of burglaries. From all cases where DNA extraction was possible (about 
7% of all burglaries) in 76 %, the crucial element for prosecution was DNA analysis. ASHIKMIN, 
Simon; BERDINE, Susan G.; MORRISSEY, Mitchel R. et al., “Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of 
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The European Commission considers the current situation as an interim solution 
and encourages Member States to improve statistics and reports including data 
exchange weight for the final result of investigation and prosecution; 680 but due to 
different Member States’ legal systems and the variety of protagonists involved in 
investigation and prosecution, it is very difficult to find a common solution suitable 
for everyone and it demands sometimes unreasonable administrative efforts. 
And finally, as noted by Topfer in relation to DNA exchange “Although the 
establishment of the network was justified by the need to combat serious crime, 
interim reports reveal another story: most hits on the DNA database relate to 
property crime and often to anonymous “stains” (DNA from unidentified persons 
left at a crime scene). [...] Thus, European data exchange has not changed the 
balance of the national databases: the quantitative criminalistics value lies in the 
domain of property crime.”681 
2.2. Non-automated data exchange 
As mentioned, Decision 2008/615/JHA also establishes some rules on traditional 
information exchange on request or by own initiative. Its Chapters 3 and 4 regulate 
such information exchange for: 
 Terrorism prevention;  
 Prevention of criminal offences and maintaining public order and security 
in major events with a cross-border dimension. 
These provisions are not widely analysed, either by experts or by scholars as all 
their attention is focused on revolutionary automated data exchange. 
Before getting into the analysis of these Chapters of Decision 2008/615/JHA, it is 
worth trying to find out if there are any other EU legal instruments that regulate 
exchange of the same categories of data, and to make their comparison. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
DNA Evidence in Volume Crime. Denver Colorado Site Summary”, p. 2, accessed April 24, 2014, 
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/DNABurgrCostEfficiency 
Reserch1.pdf. 
680  See COM(2012) 732 final, p. 6, 11.  
681  TOPFER, Eric, “Searching for Needles in an ever expanding haystack: Cross-border DNA data 
exchange in the wake of the Prüm Treaty” in Statewatch Journal, 2008, vol 18, no 3, p. 14-15, 
accessed may 3, 2014, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/eu-dna-statewatch-
article.pdf.  
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2.2.1. Relation with other EU legal instruments 
Decision 2008/615/JHA is surely not the first one that regulates information 
exchange in such important issues as combatting terrorism or events of cross-
border dimensions (summits of heads of states, important international sport 
events, etc.). 
Such information can be exchanged on the basis of Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA as general background to any information exchange, as well as on 
specific bases , such as Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20th September 2005 
on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning 
terrorists682(hereinafter – Decision 2005/671/JHA) or Council Decision 
2002/348/JHA of 25th April 2002 concerning security in connection with football 
matches with an international dimension683 (hereinafter – Council Decision 
2002/348/JHA). 
Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA covers information exchange related to any 
criminal investigation or criminal intelligence operations, including terrorism. 
From first sight, Council Decision 2008/615/JHA regulates information exchange 
for terrorism prevention and differs from the Council Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA that covers information exchange on any crime, including 
terrorism, in the case of criminal investigation or criminal intelligence operations. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the scope of the Swedish Initiative differs in its 
articles: 
 Article 2(c) defines criminal intelligence as a procedural stage in which 
information about a crime or criminal activities is gathered in order to 
establish whether concrete criminal acts have been committed or may be 
committed in the future. This gives reason to believe that the Swedish 
Initiative also covers crime prevention matters when it has the form of a 
criminal intelligence operation; 
 Article 5(1) establishes that information and intelligence may be 
requested for the purpose of detection, prevention or investigation of an 
offence. 
Furthermore, Article 7(1) which has already been mentioned, obliges spontaneous 
information and intelligence supply to other Member States’ law enforcement 
authorities, where there are factual reasons to believe that the information and 
intelligence could assist in the detection, prevention or investigation of offences 
                                                        
682  OJ, L 253, 29.9.2005, p. 22-24. 
683  OJ L 121, 8.5.2002, p. 1-3. Partly amended by the Council Decision 2007/412/JHA (OJ, L 155, 
15.6.2007, p. 76-77). 
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referred to in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the 
European arrest warrant, and the surrender procedures between Member States 
which, among other crimes, also includes terrorism. 
Regarding specialised regulation, Article 2(6) of Decision 2005/671/JHA foresees 
that “each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any 
relevant information included in documents, files, items of information, objects or 
other means of evidence, seized or confiscated in the course of criminal 
investigations or criminal proceedings in connection with terrorist offences can be 
made accessible as soon as possible, taking account of the need not to jeopardise 
current investigations, to the authorities of other interested Member States.” 
Additionally, as mentioned previously, Europol also carries AWF CT where all 
relevant information can be submitted, and in cases of urgency, request or 
provision of the information network of liaison officers can be used. 
In case of major events, Article 3 of Decision 2002/348/JHA establishes that 
“before, during and after a football event with an international dimension, national 
football information points shall engage, at the request of a national football 
information point concerned or on its own initiative, in mutual exchange of general 
information and [...] personal data.” 
This indicates that Decision 2008/615/JHA is partly overlapping already existing 
legislation. It would make more sense to expand application of Decision 
2002/348/JHA to other sorts of events that establish separate overlapping 
regulations. In cases of major meetings, such as the European Council, it would be 
more appropriate to foresee information exchange amending Council Decision 
2002/956/JHA of 28th November 2002 setting up a European Network for the 
Protection of Public Figures684 as its Article 4 (e) as one of the objective 
establishes, “Favouring the exchange, in accordance with the national legislation, of 
operational information, either through the contact points or by means of direct 
contacts between the responsible services.” 
This being said, the provisions of Chapters 3 and 4 of Decision 2008/615/JHA 
seem to be redundant, and do not contribute too much added value in EU 
regulation regarding information exchange. It is also reflected in the 
Implementation Report 2012, as Chapter 3 is often used only by eight Member 
States and Chapter 4 only by five of them.685  
But given that the regulation is in place, it deserves some analysis. 
                                                        
684  OJ L 333, 10.12.2002, p. 1–2; OJ L 283, 30.10.2009, p. 62–62. 
685  See COM(2012) 732 final, p. 9-10.  
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2.2.2. Information supply and exchange  
With respect to information exchange and supplying security at major events, 
Articles 13 and 14 of Decision 2008/615/JHA make a difference between the 
supply of personal and non-personal data; but in the case of terrorism prevention, 
Article 16 refers to information as such, without making a previously mentioned 
division. 
Personal data exchange or supply for the security of major events is permitted 
when there is a reason to believe that, due to conviction or other circumstances, 
the data subject will commit criminal offences at the events or pose a threat to 
public order and security. 
In the case of terrorism prevention, information (without specifying whether it is 
personal data or not) exchange and supply is conditioned to the reason to suspect 
that a person could commit the crime of terrorism.686  
Article 16(2) foresees that data supplied for terrorism prevention shall comprise 
surname, first names, date and place of birth and a description of the 
circumstances giving rise to the belief that a person will commit a crime of 
terrorism. From the text, it is not clear whether it is minimum or maximum data 
that is supplied in such circumstances; i.e. Whether supplying a Member State is 
restricted to providing only the personal data mentioned above, or facilitating 
other related data as well. Taking into account the information exchange purpose, 
there should be the possibility to provide any other meaningful data, especially 
taking into account that surname, name, date and place of birth could be the result 
of identity fraud. Supplying photos, dactyloscopic and DNA data should be allowed 
in these cases as well. 
                                                        
686  For the unified understanding of terrorism, the European legislator makes a reference to the 
crimes listed in Articles 1-3 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism. (O J L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3) Those crimes are: attacks upon a person’s life which may 
cause death; attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; kidnapping or hostage taking; 
causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an 
infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental 
shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic 
loss; seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; manufacture, 
possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological 
or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical 
weapons; release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of 
which is to endanger human life; interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any 
other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life; threatening to 
commit any of above listed acts. To be recognized as crime of terrorism, the have to be committee 
with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or 
international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously 
destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures 
of a country or an international organization. As well crime of terrorism is directing or 
participating in activities of a terrorist group. 
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When regulating information supply (without a previous request) on terrorism 
prevention and security at major events, in the first case the legislator uses the 
term “may” and in the second – “shall”. This brings us to the conclusion that in the 
case of major events, the requested Member State or Member State possessing 
information is obliged to share it, and in the case of terrorism prevention has the 
right to do so. Such regulation does not make too much sense taking into 
consideration the seriousness of both issues. 
In summary, the provisions of Chapters 3 and 4 on information exchange and 
supply are not very comprehensive and leave some question marks on their use 
and usefulness. 
3. Data protection 
As in case of Schengen Acquis and Europol’s regulation, Prüm Decisions also 
establish their individual data protection regime instead of applying the lex 
generalis Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI. Unlike the data exchange tools 
mentioned above, Prüm Decisions’ data protection rules do not regulate any 
central data processing, but establishes minimum standards that have to be 
applied by Member States that remain data processors and responsible at all 
stages.687  
Article 25 of Decision 2008/615/JAI establishes that national rules are applied to 
the processing of received data and shall ensure at least the data protection level 
foreseen in the European Convention on Data Protection, its Protocol and 
Recommendation (87) 15. 
As already mentioned in subsection 2.1.2 of this Chapter, before granting access to 
data bases in other States, and before data processing is started, the application of 
relevant data protection requirements in each State is evaluated. Thus there is a 
real control measure to verify the application of relevant data protection 
principles. 
Article 26 of Decision 2008/615/JAI envisages that data processing by the 
requesting State shall be performed only for the purposes that it was provided. 
Proceeding for other purposes is subject to the authorisation of the requested 
Member State and is possible only if its national law permits such use of data. 
                                                        
687  As mentioned in section 2.1 of this Chapter, the search is performed in compliance with the 
national law of searching party, an automated answer on match is regulated by EU law and 
request for further data shall be in accordance with the requested State’s national law. 
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Prüm Decisions also establish that data provided at the first automated 
information exchange stage (verification of hit / no hit), can be processed by the 
searching State only for establishing the existence of a match, preparation and the 
sending of a request for personal data related to the match, and for recording that 
will be used only for data control. The searched State can process data received as 
a result of comparison only for this purpose and delete it immediately after 
comparison has taken place. Exception is made only when it is necessary for the 
preparation of a request or recording for the control, and the data is deleted after 
such action. 
Such detailed provisions are quite unusual, because in search and automated 
responses on match, no personal data is involved, but nonetheless , the European 
legislator has established its special treatment.688  
Unlike Europol and Schengen Acquis, Prüm Decisions do not establish any precise 
term for received data deletion, but envisage that it shall be carried out as soon as 
the data is no longer necessary for the aim that it was submitted, or when the 
storage term is over, according to the national law of the submitting State. There is 
also the possibility to block data instead of its deletion if the latter would affect the 
data subject. 
Despite including regulation on information exchange with respect to terrorism, 
Prüm Decisions do not make any reference to classified information, although 
theoretically it could also be the object of exchange. 
3.1. Persons included 
According to Articles 2 and 8 of Decision 2008/615/JAI, a national DNA data base 
shall be created to investigate criminal offences and a national dactyloscopic data 
base – to prevent and investigate them. 
There is no reference to categories of persons that shall be included or excluded 
from them, and it is left up to national legislation. 
Thus depending on the State, data of convicted persons, suspects, victims and 
other categories of persons (the examples of such diversity were given in 
subsection 2.1.1 of this Chapter) can be legally stored and processed. The only 
supranational criteria in this regard is the case law of the ECtHR, although it does 
not cover all sensitive aspects. 
                                                        
688  The same rule was established in the Prüm Treaty. See ACED FÉLEZ, Emilio, “Ejercicio y garantía 
del derecho…”, loc. cit., p. 84, 85.  
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As a general rule, in the case Van der Velden v the Netherlands ECtHR recognised 
that, “the Court further has no difficulty in accepting that the compilation and 
retention of a DNA profile served the legitimate aims of the prevention of crime 
and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This is not altered by the 
fact that DNA played no role in the investigation and trial of the offences 
committed by the applicant. The Court does not consider it unreasonable for the 
obligation to undergo DNA testing to be imposed on all persons who have been 
convicted of offences of a certain severity.”689 
Thus ECtHR does not insist on DNA collection and storing of DNA profiles during 
the investigation, but it could be done at any time when the convicted person is 
concerned. Nevertheless, it is not precise when DNA can be collected from other 
persons, for example suspects. In this respect it has been established on different 
occasions that there is a risk of stigmatisation690 and: 
 No systematic data retention shall be done. 
 Data processing shall maintain proportion between public and private 
interests. 
 Collected and stored data shall match its purpose, i.e. Be relevant and not 
unreasonably excessive. Distinctions between data storage related to 
minor and similar offences shall be made.691 
 Different treatment of data of convicted and non-convicted persons shall 
be introduced, especially taking into account data of minors.692 
3.2. Access 
As Prüm Decisions envisage rules for automated and non-automated data 
exchange, as a consequence different rules of access are applied. 
In cases of automated data search and its double stage procedure, two types of 
access have to be taken into account: 
 At the stage of automated comparison (direct access to depersonalised 
data in national data bases of other States), access is granted only to 
national contact points designated by each State. It means access very 
limited in terms of numbers of authorities and persons. According to 
Article 30(2), every State shall have a list of persons authorised to make 
                                                        
689  ECtHR, Van der Velden v the Netherlands [2006]. 
690  ECtHR, M. K. V France [2013], paragraph 36; S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008], para 122.  
691  ECtHR, S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008], paragraph 103.  
692  ECtHR, M. K. V France [2013], paragraph 36, 42; S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008], 
paragraphs 22, 124.  
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searches and every search has to be recorded, including an entry giving its 
reason. National contact points make searches on requests of other 
national authorities responsible for crime investigation in cases of DNA 
search, for crime prevention and investigation in case of dactyloscopic 
data search and crime prevention, its investigation and maintaining public 
order in cases of vehicle registration data. 
 At the stage of receiving data related to an automated match, first of all it 
is available to a national contact point that lately transmits it to the 
authority that has requested a comparison. 
In case of non-automated data exchange, for each category of data (terrorism, 
public order and security) a network of contact points is also established and every 
data exchange shall be recorded according to Article 30(1) of Decision 
2008/615/JAI. National contact points make further transmission of data to 
requesting authorities or in case of spontaneous data supply – to the authority that 
could be interested. In these circumstances, it is very important to forward 
information to the right institution and to avoid any unnecessary data (including 
personal) diffusion. Nonetheless, this aspect is not regulated by the Prüm 
Decisions. 
3.3. Third Parties and onwards transmission 
Unlike the Europol Decision, Prüm Decisions do not foresee the possibility of data 
transmission to third parties or onwards transmission to other than requesting 
institutions, to other Member States or to third parties. 
Such restriction allows the identification at any time of an institution that has 
misused data, as the circle of subjects that process the data is very limited. It is 
important with respect to any data and in particular to that related to DNA. 
Comparing the “destiny” of data related to terrorism and processed under Prüm 
Decisions and in AWF, the same data in the first case will never be transmitted 
onward or to the third party and in the second case – it will be. 
This is one of the examples when competent institutions would prefer to use 
Decision 2008/615/JHA than submit information to Europol and lose control over 
it. 
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3.4. Data subject’s access right 
Article 31 of Decision 2008/615/JAI includes a data subject’s access right without 
unreasonable expenses, within “comprehensible” terms and “without unacceptable 
delays”. The scope of the access right is not precisely defined, but bearing in mind 
the established right to obtain information about data origin and receiving 
authorities, it seems to be limited to the data received from other Member States; 
as a consequence, the data of a search and not access to data on a national data 
base. In addition, it is not clear whether the data subject can make a general 
request about all processed data according to Prüm Decisions, or shall specify 
whether it concerns DNA, dactyloscopic or other data. Article 31 envisages an 
obligation to ensure effective judicial protection for data subjects whose data 
protection was violated. Thus in comparison with the right of access regulated by 
Europol Decision, it is a big step forward. 
Establishing these minimum guarantees of access right, the regulation of the whole 
process is left to the national law of every country, meaning that different 
procedures, authorities, appeal systems and reasons for denial will be applied.693 
Without any doubt, that would place the data subject in a discriminated position, 
and condition his or her right to access, depending on the State where the request 
is be made. 
Prüm Decisions do not foresee any rules on consultation with the States from 
which data was received, although as previously mentioned, the data subject has a 
right to know about the origin of his or her data. Thus situations where the State of 
the data’s origin has a reason not to reveal information to the data subject (such as 
an ongoing investigation, public or state security) are not taken into account. 
According to Article 28(2), the data subject can ask to flag his or her data when the 
accuracy or inaccuracy of data cannot be established. 
3.5. Supervising authorities 
Unlike Europol and Schengen Acquis, Prüm Decisions do not foresee any Joint 
Supervision Body, leaving control to the independent national data protection of 
competent judicial authorities. They are authorised to perform checks of legality of 
data submission to other States on their own initiative, and of the legality of 
processing on requests of the data subject. 
                                                        
693  See ACED FÉLEZ, Emilio, “Ejercicio y garantía del derecho…”, loc. cit., p. 91. 
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No existence of a central data supervision body makes sense taking into account 
the decentralised nature of data exchange under the Prüm Decisions and the 
States’ responsibility for data at every stage of its processing. 
4. Brief summary and evaluation 
The Prüm Treaty and Prüm Decisions are very controversial instruments of 
information exchange. On the one hand, they establish direct access to certain 
national data bases, creating in this way, new information exchange methods and 
contributing to the principle of availability. On the other hand, they were adopted 
in such a hurry and in the process, disrespecting the applicable legislative rules of 
the EU that raise the question of their legality; first of all, with respect to the 
procedure of enhanced co-operation, deliberately omitted by seven States and then 
the “pushing of drafts” in record time, and without even giving enough time for the 
European Parliament to formulate its opinion. Thus such a restriction of 
fundamental rights is questionable, due to the lack of a fair and transparent 
legislative process. 
New information exchange methods require at least full compatibility of national 
databases, legislation on minimum standards on data protection and legalization of 
foreign searches, trust in searching States, authorized and trained human 
resources responsible for information searches and exchange. These requirements 
brought together technical, legal, financial and human resources problems, that 
States are overcoming at different paces and with varying success and until now, 
not all States have implemented them. 
If automated searches for DNA profiles, dactyloscopics or vehicle registration data 
represent a new tool for competent authorities, non-automated information 
exchange on terrorism and major events with cross-border dimension is repetitive 
and brings about confusion among its users. 
Despite the declaration of quantities of hits produced in automated data exchange, 
nobody can estimate its real added value in investigation, as no such statistics 
exist. In these circumstances, a question of proportionality should be raised. 
In respect to proportionality of purpose, its differentiation in each category of data 
(only crime investigation, crime investigation and prevention, etc.) shows that 
both in Treaty and Decisions, it was considered carefully enough and took into 
account the speciality and sensitiveness of each data base. 
From a positive angle, strict prohibition of information transmission to other an 
authority other than requesting one should be appreciated.
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CHAPTER 8:   
PROJECTS IN THE PIPELINE 
fter the first decade of the century, where initiatives on information 
exchange were springing up like mushrooms, with the Stockholm 
Programme and the IMS came an attitude to first evaluate already existing 
co-operation possibilities and only then look for new ones. Thus in Stockholm 
Programme the Council recognised “the need for coherence and consolidation in 
developing information management and exchange.”694 
Following this idea, it can be noticed that currently, apart the Draft Directive on 
Data Protection and Draft Europol Regulation (that are foreseen by the Lisbon 
Treaty and therefore obligatory) only a few weighty initiatives are under 
consideration. 
The first, the European Passenger Name Record (hereinafter – PNR) takes its 
inspiration out of the EU borders and is a very controversial initiative. The second 
– Information Exchange Platform is a pragmatic attempt to put in order everything 
carried out so far. And the third one is a long lasting discussion on the 
improvement of the principle of availability for which Member States seem not to 
be ready even more than 10 years after the establishment of this principle. 
1. Data protection 
In 2010, the Commission, in its Communication “A comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the European Union”, analysed the established data 
protection system and as deficiencies of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
indicated its application only to cross-border data exchange, too wide exceptions 
of purpose limitations, fragmentation of regulation by exceptions for Europol, 
                                                        
694  OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. 18. 
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Eurojust, the Schengen Information System and other mechanisms.695 Additionally, 
it can be said that due to the legislative form of framework decision, there is no 
effective tool to ensure its proper implementation and application across the EU. 
A need for new data protection provisions has also been taken into account in the 
previously mentioned Article 16 and Declaration 21 of the Lisbon Treaty; this 
foresees that due to the specific nature of the police and judicial co-operation, 
separate data protection regulation in this area may be needed.696 The need for 
separate legislation in this area was also reiterated by the Commission, 
emphasising that application to police and judicial co-operation in the criminal 
matters data protection regime, equal to other areas could jeopardise police and 
judicial work.697 And as has been pointed out by the Committee of Legal Affairs of 
the European Parliament, “It should also be borne in mind, in the field of police and 
judicial cooperation, that legal traditions have developed very differently in the EU 
Member States in the course of the centuries, and any alteration to well-
established national structures and traditions in this sensitive area through 
European rules should therefore be introduced cautiously and gradually.”698 
Bearing this in mind, on 25th January 2012, the Commission adopted a data 
protection package that consists of:  
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World a European 
Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century”; 699 
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data700 (hereinafter – Draft Data 
Protection Regulation),  
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
                                                        
695  See COM(2010) 609 final, p. 13-14. 
696  See OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 345. 
697  See COM(2010) 609 final, p. 14. GONZÁLEZ FUSTER¸ Gloria. “Protección de datos y cooperación 
policial y judicial en material penal en la UE”. In PÉREZ GIL, Julio. El proceso penal en la sociedad…, 
op. cit., p. 595. 
698  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs “Report on the 
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data (COM(2012)0010 – C7-
0024/2012 – 2012/0010(COD))”, p. 114, accessed September 4, 2015, http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0403&language=EN. 
699  COM(2012) 9 final. 
700  COM(2012) 11 final. 
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data by competent authorities, for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, or the 
execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data701 
(hereinafter – Draft Data Protection Directive). 
Deliberations on the Draft Data Protection Regulation are more advanced than on 
the Draft Data Protection Directive, as its first draft is already subject to a dialogue 
between the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission. The 
trialogue is expected to be finalised before the end of 2015 and to adopt the 
legislative act in 2016, establishing transitional period of two years.702 In the case 
of the Draft Data Protection Directive, the European Parliament issued its 
Resolution on 14th March 2014703. The Council agreed on its negotiating position 
with the European Parliament on 9th October 2015, and now trialogues will be 
started. Nevertheless, the text presented to the ministers still contains 129 
comments and reservations, including eight Member States (Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom) that have 
general reservation about the whole text.704  
1.1. Novelties of Data Protection Directive 
The Commission with the Draft Data Protection Directive “aims to ensure a 
consistent, high level of data protection to enhance mutual trust between police 
and judicial authorities of different Member States, thus contributing further to a 
free flow of data, and effective cooperation between police and judicial 
authorities.”705 
Thus the proposed text is more ambitious, solid and comprehensive than current 
regulations provided by the Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI. 
Regarding the scope of the proposal, the Commission has proposed applying the 
EU data protection rules, not only to cross-border information exchange, but also 
                                                        
701  COM(2012) 10 final. 
702  See EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, “Europe’s big opportunity. EDPS 
recommendations on the EU’s options for data protection reform” (Opinion 3/2015), accessed, 
September 4, 2015, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared 
/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2015/15-07-27_GDPR_Recommendations_EN.pdf. 
703  See European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and the free movement of such data, accessed, September 2, 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0219 
+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
704  See Council document 12643/1/15, p. 2. 
705  COM(2012) 9 final, p. 10. 
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to intra-state.706 Some Member States707 question whether this does not contradict 
the principle of subsidiarity and still keep this question open for further 
considerations. In October 2015, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom were still opposing to it.708 According 
to Article 2, it is not applied for data exchange in activities that are outside EU law 
(such as national security), data exchange of EU institutions and its other entities. 
In respect to subject matter, it is the same as the Framework Decision 
2008/977/JAI, i.e. Prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences and 
execution of criminal penalties. But the Council proposed broadening the scope 
and including prevention of threats to public security. 
Article 4 of the Draft Data Protection Directive foresees the following protection 
principles: fair and lawful processing, collection for legitimate and specified 
purposes, relevance and minimum data necessary for the purpose, accuracy and 
updating, storage limitation, responsibility and liability of controllers. 
Equal to the proposal of the Framework Decision, this time the Commission again 
included a provision on differentiation between distinct data subjects’ categories: 
(suspects, convicted persons, victims, third parties (as witnesses) and other 
persons). But having previous experience with the position of Member States, this 
time it added a clause “as far as possible”. Nevertheless, in the last version of 
Council amendments, this article and its division into different categories of data 
subject has been deleted.709 
It would not be surprising if such a proposal would be revolutionary, but the same 
principle of differentiation is foreseen in the Recommendation (87)15 and applied 
in Europol and Eurojust. 
The Draft Data Protection Directive envisages, as a general rule, the prohibition of 
processing the following categories of special data, “Revealing race or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religion or beliefs, trade-union membership, of genetic data or of 
data concerning health or sex life.” Exceptions are permitted only when they are 
foreseen by law and with the application of the necessary safeguards or in order to 
protect a person’s vital (data subject’s or other) interests, or when the data subject 
has made it public. 
An important novelty is the inclusion of genetic data into special data. The Council 
proposes to change general prohibition in order to process this data with strict 
                                                        
706  It had been initially included in the draft of the Framework Decision as well, but rejected by the 
Member States. 
707  Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, the United Kingdom. 
708  See Council document 12643/1/15, p. 33. 
709 See Council document 10335/15, p. 54. 
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permission under EU or national law and with the application of relevant 
safeguards as well. On the other hand , the Council modifies a person’s vital 
interests into the broader concept of the prevention of the immediate threat to 
public security.710  
The Council also seeks to increase the flexibility of an obligation to every controller 
or processor to appoint data protection officers, foreseen in Article 30 of the Draft 
Data Protection Directive in the same way as it has been made in Europol. Such an 
officer would have monitoring, advising and contacting functions with supervisory 
authority. 
In relation to the information transfer to third countries, the Commission has 
proposed maintaining the same transfer purpose as previously711, and with the 
fulfilment of the following alternative conditions: 
 The European Commission has issued a Decision on the adequacy of data 
protection in the third country, territory or processing sector; 712 
 The Member State transferring the data provides the information on the 
third country, territory or organisation, binding law with satisfactory data 
protection level or control on the basis of performed assessment can 
confirm the existence of such safeguards. 
 In exceptional cases, when it is necessary to: protect any person’s vital 
interests or legitimate interest of data subject; prevent an immediate 
threat to public security; in individual cases for prevention, investigation 
or prosecution of crimes or execution of criminal penalties or for legal 
claims related to these activities. 
It has to be taken into account that unlike the Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI, 
it regulates not only onward information transmission to the third country (i.e. 
Transmission by one Member State of information received from another Member 
State), but any transmission of data, meaning both proper and that received from 
another Member State. The Council considers the inclusion of provision on transfer 
only to those institutions of the third country that are responsible for crime 
prevention, detection, investigation or execution of penalties (equally as in the 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI), as well as to maintain the requirement of the 
consent of the Member State, where data originated for onward transmission (with 
the exception of cases when it is necessary to prevent an immediate threat to 
public security or essential interests). It also suggests that the Commission’s 
                                                        
710  See Council document 10335/15, p. 62. 
711  Prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties. 
712  It has also to evaluate third countries and to publish a list of those that do not provide an 
adequate level of data protection. 
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decision on adequacy would be approved, taking into account the opinion of the 
European Data Protection Board, i.e. A body envisaged in the Draft Data Protection 
Regulation to replace the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data established by Directive 95/46/EC and 
consisting of a head of a supervisory authority of each Member State.713 
1.2. Weaknesses and critics 
The Commission’s Proposal in general puts forward quite a rational, effective and 
balanced set of data protection measures which, due to the proposed scope would 
ensure more protection than current the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
Nevertheless, a “patchwork” or “kaleidoscope” system still remains, as exceptions 
of regulation for SIS, Europol, Eurojust and other data protection mechanisms are 
foreseen.714  
The main horizontal criticisms from the European Data Protection Supervisor 
about the proposal, concern the form of the legislative act directive. The EDPS 
agrees that Declaration 21 has foreseen that for data protection in the area of 
police and judicial co-operation, special rules can be established, but it has not 
foreseen their legislative form. Therefore, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor is of the opinion that the form of regulation would be much more 
effective than directive, as it would be the act of direct application and would not 
depend on implementation measures. 
Additionally, it underlines that “whilst the law enforcement area requires some 
specific rules, every departure from the general data protection rules should be 
duly justified based on a proper balance between the public interest in law 
enforcement and citizens’ fundamental rights.”715  
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights acknowledges such a position 
and on this basis builds its own.716  
                                                        
713 See Council document 9565/15, p. 59, 174 (Recital 110, Article 64).  
714  PEYROU, Sylvie, “Algunas reflexiones sobre la protección de datos en el ELSJ o la crónica de una 
esperanza frustrada” in GOIZUETA VÉRTIZ, Juana; GONZÁLEZ MURUA, Ana Rosa and PARIENTE 
DE PRADA, Iñaki, El Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad…, op. cit., p. 148-149.  
715  EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, “Executive summary EDPS Opinion of 7 March 
2012 on the data protection reform package”, OJ, C 192, 30.6.2012, p. 8 
716  EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, “Opinion of the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights on the proposed data protection reform package”, October 2012, 
p. 2, 7, accessed September 3, 2015, http://fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2012/fra-opinion-
proposed-eu-data-protection-reform-package. 
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Of course, in the case of non-implementation or incorrect implementation of the 
directive, the previously mentioned infringement procedure can be started. But it 
takes a lot of time and it means that in one or more Member States, relevant data 
protection measures would not be in place and would not guarantee equal rights to 
data protection across the whole of the European Union. 
Guasch Portas additionally reminds us that the Commission itself has criticised 
Directive 95/46/EC for its indirect application. 717  
Bearing in mind that data protection is a fundamental right, it would be more 
reasonable to approve a directly applicable regulation, especially taking into 
account that the legislative procedure would be similar. 
The European Parliament has gone even further, declaring that is in favour of 
regulating all data protection (including the area of police and judicial co-
operation) within the unique regulation. Such a position is not lacking reasons, 
because there are some areas in which both new draft regulations and draft 
directives could be applied, such as customs, immigration or environment.718 
Regarding precise modifications, the three aforementioned subjects have proposed 
the following main modifications:  
 The European Data Protection Supervisor has insisted on the 
establishment of the obligation (not only foreseeing the possibility) to 
make differences in distinct categories of persons. 
It has suggested introducing periodic evaluation mechanisms on how the 
provisions on data protection are applied. It should be appreciated as a 
very useful tool that would ensure that data protection rules are not only 
transposed, but also effectively applied on a daily basis. 
In the case of data transfer to a third country, it has pointed out the 
weakness of the provision in relation to the assessment performed by the 
Member State. It has advised to specify that for such an assessment, it is 
obligatory to receive an opinion of the supervisory authority of that 
Member State. If such a suggestion would not be admissible by Member 
States, then it proposes to delete all provision on assessment.719 
 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights has proposed explicit 
prohibition of the transmission of data to third states, where, on the basis 
                                                        
717  See GUASCH PORTAS, Vicente, Las transferencias internacionales de datos…, op. cit., p. 293. 
718  Ibid, p. 294. 
719 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, “Executive summary EDPS…”, loc. cit., p. 13-14. 
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of human rights records, it can be concluded that transferred data could be 
used to interfere in human rights.720  
 The European Parliament has adopted 98 amendments721 and the most 
significant of them are the following: 
a) To include Europol and Eurojust under the regulation of this legal act;  
b) To introduce provisions on data storage terms and revision;  
c) Similarly to the European Data Protection Supervisor, to make 
obligatory differentiation between distinct categories of persons;  
d) To establish separate article regulating processing of genetic data;  
e) To strengthen requirements of data transfer to the third countries. 
These criticisms were addressed to the Commission’s proposal. Supposedly, 
criticisms of the modifications that take place in the Council would be much 
stronger as in general, they do not carry any advance, but try to maintain the 
current status quo. Thus the time will show the results of trialogues. 
In the light of the amendments proposed by the Council, it has even more sense to 
keep Europol and Eurojust outside of the scope of the Draft Data Protection 
Directive as these agencies have more restrictive data protection rules than the 
ones proposed by the Council, for example, the agencies already have rules on 
differentiation between distinct categories of persons. Adoption of the Draft Data 
Protection Directive as proposed by the Council would mean that different data 
protection rules would be applied to the same information, depending on whether 
it is transmitted through Europol (it would be categorised) or directly (it would 
not pass any process of categorisation). In such a situation, it would be more 
beneficial for victims or witnesses that Europol would process their data instead of 
direct transmission between national competent authorities. 
2. The future of Europol 
As already mentioned, Article 88(2) of the TFUE envisages that Europol has to be 
regulated by means of regulations adopted by applying ordinary legislative 
procedure. 
The TFUE foresees Europol’s: 
                                                        
720  EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, “Opinion of the European Union…”, 
loc. cit., p. 11.  
721  See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “Report on 
the proposal for a directive…”, loc. cit.  
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 Possibility to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange of information;  
 Possibility to coordinate, organise and implement investigative and 
operational actions carried out jointly with the Member States;  
 Scrutiny by the European Parliament;  
 Impossibility to apply coercive measures. 
Following the TFEU, as time dictated necessities, the Draft Europol Regulation 
foresees 5 goals: 
a) To fulfil the requirements of the Lisbon Treaty of parliamentary control,  
b) To implement the provision of the Stockholm Programme, making Europol 
“a hub for information exchange between the law enforcement authorities 
of the Member States”722; 
c) To ensure more comprehensive support for the Member States by over 
taking functions of CEPOL, and the elaboration of specialized expertise in 
certain types of crime (such as the establishment of European Cybercrime 
Centre);  
d) To improve data protection regime;  
e) To improve governance. 
It has to be stressed that both the Council and the European Parliament rejected 
the idea to merge the two agencies (Europol and CEPOL), and therefore this aspect 
will not be analysed further. At the end of June, the Council of the European Union 
and the European Parliament reached a compromise on the Proposal of the 
Regulation of European Parliament and of the Council, by establishing a European 
Union agency for law enforcement training (Cepol), repealing and replacing the 
Council Decision 2005/681/JHA723 presented by the Commission on 30th 
September 2014, to be voted in Plenary of the European Parliament and adopted 
by the Council.724  
One of the most important changes that has been raised for years is Europol’s 
democratic control by the European Parliament. The first time it was mentioned 
was in 1999, and as Puntscher Riekmann states, “Developments [...] from an initial 
focus on specific crimes towards organized crime in general, and from an initial 
role of handling information towards operative powers. In view of these 
                                                        
722  OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. 20. 
723  COM(2014) 465 final/2. 
724  See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. “CEPOL: Council and Parliament agree on updated 
rules” (Press release 30 June 2015), accessed, September 3, 2015, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/30-cepol-updated-rules/.  
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developments, and due to the important and sensitive nature of Europol’s 
activities, the question of its accountability seemed unavoidable.” 725 
In the context of the scrutiny of Europol’s activities, the Draft Europol Regulation 
established the European Parliament’s right: 
 To receive organisational documents, such as multi-annual and annual 
working programmes, activity reports, budget accountability reports; 
 To receive strategic products: threat assessments, strategic analyses and 
general situation reports, agreements with third parties, reports on 
quantity and quality of information provided by Member States; 
 To invite candidates for the Director and for his or her Deputies for 
hearing, as well as the Director to reply to the questions; 
 To discuss with the Executive Director and the Chairperson of the 
Management Board matters relating to Europol. 
For the effectiveness of these contacts, a working arrangement between Europol 
and the European Parliament on access to confidential information has to be 
concluded. 
Corresponding to this proposal, the European Parliament has proposed 
establishing a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group to perform a review of Europol’s 
activities and added more documents that have to be submitted to parliamentary 
control.726 
In order to enhance Europol’s role as an information hub, it is proposed to 
strengthen Member States’ obligations to provide information and to establish 
monitoring mechanisms of their contributions. 
Another novelty related to the processing of information was the elimination of 
provisions on pre-defined information systems and adopting a “privacy by design” 
approach and full transparency towards the Data Protection Officer at Europol and 
the European Data Protection Supervisor.727 
To improve data protection regime, the Commission offered to strengthen the role 
of external supervision of data protection by granting more direct supervision 
functions. 
                                                        
725 RUIZ DE GARIBAY, Daniel, “Coordination Practice in the Parliamentary Control of Justice and 
Home Affairs Agencies: The Case of Europol” in CRUM, Ben and FOSSUM John Erik, Practices of 
interparliamentary coordination in international politics (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2013), p. 89-
90. 
726  The annual report of the European Data Protection Supervisor in relation to Europol, the 
Commission’s report on the effectiveness and efficiency of Europol as well as any other 
document necessary for the fulfilment of the control task. 
727  COM(2013) 173 final, p. 8. 
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With respect to the main changes in management, according to the Draft Europol 
Regulation, a representative of the Commission would take a place on the 
Management Board. The latter would have the right to establish its Executive 
Board that “could be more closely involved in the monitoring of Europol’s activities 
with a view to reinforcing supervision of administrative and budgetary 
management, in particular on audit matters.”728 
The following subdivisions will analyse in more depth the Draft Europol 
Regulation, and the positions of the Council and the European Parliament on 
questions related to changes of Europol’s status in general, and information 
exchange in particular. 
2.1. Strengthening Europol’s role 
As already mentioned, the Draft Europol Regulation has a goal to strengthen 
Europol’s role as an information hub, by imposing a strong obligation to provide 
information on Member States, and giving it powers to coordinate investigations. 
Moreover, Europol’s possibility to provide not only technical, but also financial 
support to cross-border operations and to maintain direct contacts with 
competent authorities and not only ENU is also foreseen. That supposes making 
co-operation with Europol more attractive to national law enforcement 
institutions, and guarantees its involvement in more operations. On the one hand, 
it could be treated as a positive development that will ensure Europol’s visibility 
and “closeness” to national competent authorities (that not always shows total 
trust to the Agency), as well as one more step towards real support to Member 
States in their fight against serious crime. On the other hand, it can be treated as an 
attempt “to buy” the trust and co-operation of sceptical law enforcement 
institutions by the scheme: direct contact, financing of operations and as a 
consequence – obtaining its coordination. This novelty also diminishes the role of 
the ENU that until now, was a unit aware of all on-going operations of the Member 
States considered with Europol. With direct contacts in the way, as proposed by 
the Commission, this thread is lost. 
Such a development can be appreciated by those Member States that have many 
separate police authorities (like France, Italy or Spain), and due to the requirement 
of a single ENU per Member State, only one of them has to be included in its 
structure. Thus the rest of the authorities, in order to get involved in co-operation 
with Europol, have to reveal their operations to one which has an ENU, and not in 
every case are they ready to do that; this is due to competitiveness or other 
                                                        
728  Ibid, p. 12. 
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reasons. In such situations, they prefer to use other co-operation tools such as 
bilateral agreements, liaison officers, and so on. But for these Member States, a 
better solution would be allowing the establishment of an ENU in every police 
force, and not to maintain the current model of a single ENU allowing direct 
contact with national authorities. 
The proposed decentralisation of co-operation at the level of direct contacts with 
law enforcement institutions can be considered as a perverse development, and 
could even provoke negative consequences to investigation. Not all competent 
authorities (especially at territorial level) are properly aware of the peculiarities 
and limitations on cross-border co-operation, and can agree on actions that in the 
end, in the best case scenario, will not serve for the prosecution and in the worst 
case scenario, could ruin the investigation. Let’s take as an example crown 
witness’s protection, or use of undercover officers and the involvement of the local 
competent authority (not the central one). The legislation of every country 
regulates these actions and will be perfectly known to local authorities; Europol 
can inform them about the existence or not of EU level regulations; but what about 
bilateral and multilateral agreements? The situation with bilateral agreements will 
be perfectly known to the central competent authority, and to units dealing with 
international co-operation (including ENU), but not necessarily to the local 
authority. Without such knowledge, the local authority could agree to measures 
that are not allowed in cross-border co-operation between some states. Let’s 
imagine that an undercover officer is sent to a country where his status is not 
regulated by bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the best case scenario, 
information gathered by him or her will not have evidential power in the process, 
in the worst case scenario, if he or she were discovered by the criminal 
organisation, who would be responsible for his or her security, and on which 
basis?  
The Council, in its first reading, has changed Article 4, proposing Europol’s 
coordinating role, into a supporting role 729, and has modified strong wording 
about the financing of operations into a position of possibility; it has also 
established that Europol’s direct contacts with competent authorities can take 
place with prior authorisation by ENU, and can be subject to other conditions 
foreseen by the national legislation of involved Member States. The European 
Parliament also has suggested leaving co-operation through ENU as a general rule. 
                                                        
729  Even if the term of coordination is established in Article 88 of the TFEU, it does not have an 
obligatory nature.  
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Following Article 88(3) of the TFEU, the Council and the European Parliament have 
agreed on the inclusion of a clear general statement of non-application of coercive 
measures by Europol.730  
Article 7 of the Draft Europol Regulation also includes a controversial statement, 
“Member States shall cooperate with Europol in the fulfilment of its tasks.”731 It 
goes against the wording of the Article 88(1) of the TFEU that is clearly supportive 
of Europol’s position in relation to Member States’ law enforcement agencies and 
not the contrary. Therefore, the Council has changed this wording into cooperation 
in the fulfilment of the tasks of Member States and Europol. The position of the 
European Parliament in this question is ambiguous because in general, it considers 
Europol as “back-up for national law enforcement bodies”732, but on the other 
hand, has not proposed any amendments to the proposed Article 7. 
The Council and the European Parliament also softened Member States’ obligation 
to provide information to Europol with foreseeing exceptions in following cases 
“(a) harm national security interests; (b) jeopardise the success of a current 
investigation or the safety of individuals; or (c) disclose information relating to 
organisations or specific intelligence activities in the field of national security.”733 
It can be concluded that having an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as 
supranational, and no longer intergovernmental, the Commission decided to try to 
give to Europol maximum of prominence, in some cases going even beyond and 
against the provisions of the TFEU. 
2.2. New legislative approach to regulate Europol’s data 
bases  
As already mentioned, the Draft Europol Regulation does not regulate specific 
Europol databases, but just establishes the purposes for which the information can 
be processed. After some Council’s suggestions, the purposes are the following “(a) 
Cross-checking aimed at identifying connections between information; (b) 
Analyses of a strategic or thematic nature; (c) Operational analyses in specific 
cases; (d) Facilitating the exchange of information between Member States, 
Europol, other Union bodies, third countries and international organisations.”734 
                                                        
730  In Europol Decision, as well as in the Draft Europol Regulation, such prohibition refers only to 
participation in joint investigation teams. 
731  COM(2013) 173 final, p. 29. 
732  Council document 6745/1/14, p. 2. 
733  Council document 10033/14, p. 38. 
734  Ibid, p. 64. 
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The European Parliament has considered that for cross-checking, only information 
about persons suspected of already having committed a crime, or of its future 
commission should be processed. It makes perfect sense, because the current 
Europol Decision establishes the same limits for the content of EIS, whose function 
by its nature is similar to cross-checking. The European Parliament has also 
proposed that the European Data Protection Supervisor should draft guidelines in 
respect of the first three information exchange purposes. 
From one angle, it is reasonable to establish only information processing purposes, 
leaving out the regulations of EIS, AWF and other possible systems, as they depend 
on the necessity of changing the situation or new technological developments, and 
can need some modifications or new solutions. Envisaging their rules in Regulation 
would mean a need for its modification every time a need to develop or change the 
system occurs. 
From another angle, it is surprising that support for modifications did not foresee 
any rules at all on the creation of such systems: neither in relation to who has to 
take the decision, nor which criteria have to be taken into account in this process. 
It seems that Europol has “untied hands” to decide when and what system to 
create, and it is totally contrary to IMS, discussed in section 3 of Chapter I. As in the 
creation of any new information processing system, not only the business needs 
have to be defined; the involvement of Member States and multidisciplinary 
coordination (with other bodies and systems) has to be respected. Without clear 
rules, direct parliamentary control would also be diminished as it could lead to 
influence only through the budget (that is indispensable for the creation of any tiny 
system). 
In order to avoid unilateral decision in this respect, the Council at least has 
introduced into the tasks of the Management Board the adoption of “procedures 
and business processes required for the processing of information by Europol [...] 
having obtained the opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor.”735 
Supposedly, such procedures can previse criteria and steps to establish any new 
system. 
The European Parliament has proposed an assessment, not from the perspective of 
coherence with IMS, but from data protection, “Prior to any set of processing of 
personal data, Europol shall carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged 
                                                        
735  Ibid, p. 48. 
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processing systems and procedures on the protection of personal data and notify it 
to the European Data Protection Supervisor.”736 
Regarding the processing of the personal data of victims, witnesses, contacts, 
associates, informers and minors (that under Europol Decision (except minors) is 
possible in AWF, i.e. For the purpose of analysis), Article 38 of the Draft Europol 
Regulation prohibits it, with the exception “strictly necessary cases”. But the 
Council has proposed to change this wording to make it more flexible and to allow 
it, not only for the purpose of analysis, but also to facilitate the exchange of 
information.737 Such position has double aspect: on one hand it is understandable 
wish to make the biggest benefit from Europol as information hub, from another 
side the question of proportionality and conformity with fundamental rights 
occurs. In this respect, the wording proposed by the Commission seems to be more 
appropriate. 
2.3. Co-operation with the EU bodies and third parties 
The Draft Europol Regulation foresees that for the exchange of non-personal data 
Europol can conclude working arrangements with EU bodies and third parties that 
do not bind the EU or its Member States. Nevertheless, no regulation of processing 
of classified information between these entities is foreseen. 
It also envisages granting Eurojust and OLAF with hit/no hit based access to 
information, including personal data, processed by Europol. But the European 
Parliament considers that only Eurojust should have such access, and it can be 
justified by the existence of the operational work arrangement between only 
Europol and Eurojust. As far as OLAF is concerned, the co-operation is based on 
strategic working arrangement that do not foresee personal data exchange.738 The 
Council considers the possibility of hit/no hit access of both EU bodies “while such 
access would by technical means be limited to information falling within the 
respective mandates of these Union bodies.”739 Taking into account that OLAF’s 
task is to investigate fraud, corruption and other crimes related to the financial 
interests of the EU, it cannot be discarded that OLAF’s investigation would be 
related to some organised group, and that Europol has information on it. It would 
help to co-ordinate actions and to avoid redundant use of human resources. 
Article 30 of the Draft Europol Regulation expressly permits personal data 
transmission to the EU bodies, although previously it was allowed only under 
                                                        
736  Ibid, p. 61. 
737  Ibid, p. 137. 
738  See Subsection 2.2.1 of the Chapter IV. 
739  Council document 10033/14, p. 67. 
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operational working arrangements that Europol, for the time being, only has with 
Eurojust. Such transmission shall be related to the competence of Europol or other 
participating EU bodies, and concern a person suspected or convicted of a crime, or 
the commissioning of a suspect of future commission. The personal data of other 
categories of persons, as well as special categories of data can be revealed to other 
EU institutions only if it is necessary to prevent or combat a crime. Subject to 
Europol’s competence. 
In relation to third parties, new regulations foresee three backgrounds for 
personal data exchange:  
 The commission’s decision that the data protection level of the third state 
or a territory is adequate; 
 EU agreement with a third party; 
 Europol’s and third parties’ already existing operational agreements. 
As the first two bases would include very general provisions, Europol and the third 
party concerned can conclude administrative arrangements that would specify 
rules on information exchange and its further processing. 
In addition to the already applied reasons for personal data transmission to a third 
state without relevant agreement, new regulations specify what necessity means in 
individual cases740; it widens the motives of imminent terrorist attack threat on 
Member State into “immediate and serious threat to public security of a Member 
State or a third country”, and envisages new reasons for transfer: 
 In order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person; 
or 
 To safeguard the legitimate interests of the data subject where the law of 
the Member State transferring the personal data so provides.741 
A big novelty is the establishment of the possibility of the Management Board with 
the authorisation of the European Data Protection Supervisor, in order to allow a 
set of transfers during one year. It can be done in cases of where the above 
mentioned reasons exist and permit data transmission without agreement, or the 
Commission’s Decision, and if third states apply rules safeguarding data protection 
and fundamental rights. Although this solution is not perfect, it is at least more 
objective and reasonable that Europol’s unilateral decision to transfer data to third 
                                                        
740  Purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal sanctions; or the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims related to 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of a specific criminal offence or the 
execution of a specific criminal sanction. 
741  Council document 10033/14, p. 74.  
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states, especially taking into account that the biggest part of data processed by 
Europol comes from Member States, and they keep responsibility for it use and 
misuse. 
2.4. European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) 
Unlike the current regulation, the Draft Europol Regulation in its Article 4 
expressly mentions EC3, defining it as one of Europol’s task developments of 
“union centres of specialised expertise for combating certain types of crime falling 
under Europol’s objectives, in particular the European Cybercrime Centre”.742  
Additionally, in 2013, the Proposal of the Draft Europol Regulation was 
complemented with the Commission staff working document “Ex-Ante Evaluation: 
Resources needed to fulfil the tasks set forth in the Commission's Communication 
on the establishment of a European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)”743 (hereinafter – 
Working Document on EC3) that among the specific objectives of EC3 foresees 
“more extensive, faster information exchange among all stakeholders (Member 
States, third countries, leas, industry etc.) And more effective management of 
information flows (i.e. data fusion, helpdesk and reporting mechanisms)”.744  
Nevertheless, no more clarity on rules of information exchange within EC3 is 
provided, and that again leads to the conclusion that it works on the same 
information exchange basis as Europol in general. 
In the Draft Europol Regulation, it is foreseen that information from private parties 
and persons is received by Europol trough ENUs. Notwithstanding, in the Working 
Document on EC3, it is already considered that such an information delivery chain 
results in substantial delay, an additional burden to the private sector, and is “a 
potential stumbling block” and the flexibility of such data exchange should be 
considered.745  
For the time being, the Council has not made any differences in the regulation of 
data exchange with the private sector, but it has not approved its final position 
either. 
                                                        
742  COM(2013) 173 final.  
743  SWD(2013) 100 final.  
744  Ibid, p. 9. 
745  Ibid, p. 7, 11, 12. 
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3. Passengers Name Records (PNR) 
An indispensable element of free movement of persons is the abolishment of 
controls on internal borders and the strengthening of external ones. As already 
explained, at every crossing point of the external border of the Schengen area it is 
obligatory to use SIS. To review its functions it should be said that it works on the 
basis of alerts in relation to some categories of persons and objects.746 That means 
that previous to placing an alert, a competent authority of a Member State should 
have information in relation to that person or object. But what to do with those 
crimes that remain undetected, and those persons that commit them, but do not 
fall under suspicion due to lack of information? In these cases, the active 
intelligence work of competent authorities can be more helpful; and to some extent 
the use of PNR, i.e. Data possessed by air carriers related to bookings, carrying out 
the check-in process and used to control flows of passengers. In particular, it 
includes personal data, means of payment, passengers’ meal and other 
preferences. 
PNR use for law enforcement purposes is based on the transmission of data related 
to passengers obtained from air carriers by national passenger information units, 
where it is evaluated on the basis of the risk criteria, and transmitted to the 
competent law enforcement institution. Air carriers do not have to collect any 
additional data, only that which they have been collecting until now. Their 
additional expenditures would only be related to the transmission of collected data 
to law the enforcement authority competent to carry out its processing. 
As a general rule, it is applied for the processing of information of air travellers, 
but it does not eliminate the possibility to apply it to railway or water transport. 
It can be used as a pro-active, real-time and re-active measure. Its biggest 
advantage would be pro-active and real-time use.747 When it stands for re-active 
measures, without denying the importance that PNR can have in some specific 
cases, on a large scale it would not be such an effective investigation tool as others 
(for example biometric data). 
                                                        
746  Persons wanted for extradition or surrender, sought to assist with a judicial procedure, missing 
persons, persons and objects for discreet and specific checks, objects for seizure or use as 
evidence. 
747  According to the information presented by Belgium in 2009, 95% of all drugs seizures in airports 
were made thanks to PNR data. See COM(2011) 32 final, p. 6. Nevertheless, this data is 
questionable by the European Data Protection Supervisor, as at that moment Belgium had not 
finished the implementation of systematic PNR collection scheme. See EUROPEAN DATA 
PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, “Opinion of the European Data Protection...”, loc. cit., p. 25. 
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To apply it at EU level, on 6th November 2007, the Commission presented a 
“proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) for law enforcement purposes”.748 
As Member States had not found a common agreement on this proposal until the 
entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission had to present a new 
proposal according to the requirements of the new legislative procedure. It was 
achieved on 2nd February 2011 by presenting the “Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data 
for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
and serious crime”749 (hereinafter – Commission’s Proposal on PNR). 
In respect to the progress of legislative procedure of this draft, the Council of the 
European Union has not issued yet a text as an outcome of the first reading, but on 
April 2012 reached general approach with numerous reservations of Member 
States. 
On 24th April 2013, LIBE had rejected the Commission’s Proposal on PNR, but then 
the Plenary returned the file to LIBE. 
This initiative is included in this work because after the terrorist attacks in France 
in January 2015, and taking into account recruitment by the so called Islamic State, 
the Council declared its determination “to create without further delay an effective 
EU PNR framework in line with Council general approach and at the same time 
ensuring solid data protection safeguards”.750  
On 11th February 2015, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on anti-
terrorism measures and declared its commitment to work in order to finalise the 
PNR legal act until the end of 2015, and encouraged the Council to make progress 
on the Data Protection package in order to have trialogues on both initiatives in 
parallel. 
3.1. Commission’s Proposal on PNR 
As the main reason for the proposal, the Commission took the political will 
expressed in the Stockholm Programme “to propose a Union measure, that ensures 
a high level of data protection, on PNR for the purpose of preventing, detecting, 
                                                        
748  COM(2007) 654 final. 
749  COM(2011) 32 final. 
750  Riga Joint Statement following the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga 
on 29 and 30 January, p. 2, accessed 5 September 2015, https://eu2015.lv/images 
/Kalendars/IeM/2015_01_29_jointstatement_JHA.pdf. 
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investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences and serious crime, based on an 
impact assessment.”751 
Within the scope established by the Stockholm Programme, the Commission’s 
Proposal on the PNR aim is to apply its processing from flights between a third 
country and a Member State (from Member State or to Member State) or so called 
extra-EU flights. Thus at least at this stage, only air carriers are considered. This 
provision was the subject of numerous discussions. 
The opinion of the European Parliament and European Data Protection Supervisor 
differ about including intra-EU flights, as the latter is concerned it represents an 
even bigger limitation of privacy and data protection. 
The Council’s preparatory bodies have included a provision on the possibility of 
using it for all intra-EU flights, or selected ones if a Member State so wishes. 
On the one hand, only controlling extra-EU flights does not mean the full use of the 
system for the prevention of and combatting terrorism and crime, as monitoring 
intra-EU flights can also serve for these purposes. Additionally, a person can face 
different treatment from his or her PNR travelling from the Canary Islands to 
Amsterdam (which is one of routes used for drug trafficking) and from the Canary 
Islands to Monaco. Additionally, the creation of such a system is costly752 and the 
question of economic efficiency should be taken into account: to use it to its full 
potential or not to start at all. 
On the other hand, the Commission’s Proposal is totally understandable and the 
position of EDPS as a collection of PNR data of intra-EU flights would not only 
mean a disproportionate limitation of privacy and data protection, but it also 
contradicts to the essence of free movement. 
The Commission proposed the following information processing scheme: 
 Each Member State (or a few of them) has to establish a Passenger 
Information Unit (hereinafter – PIU) that will be responsible for receiving 
information from the air carrier and its processing. 
 As the main method to receive information was elected “push”, meaning 
that air carriers transfer it to PIU, leaving the “pull” method (the extraction 
                                                        
751  OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. 19. 
752  For the time being it is possible to apply to the EU for funds and this has been done by Austria, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the total amount granted reaches 50 million euros. See BĄKOWSKI, 
Piotr and VORONOVA, Sofija, “The Proposed EU Passenger Name Records (PNR) Directive: 
Revived in the New Security Context” (Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, April 
2015), accessed July 14, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-554215-
The-EU-PNR-Proposal-FINAL.pdf. 
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of information from the air carriers’ data bases) only in exceptional cases. 
According to Article 6(1), if the flight is co-shared between different air 
carriers, the airline that operates the flight has to ensure information 
transmission. In this manner, PIU will not have direct access to all 
information processed by air carries, but only to the one sent to it. On the 
one hand, it strengthens the right to privacy and data protection, but on 
the other hand requires the establishment of an electronic system that 
would not allow air carriers to delete information on certain passengers 
and transmit it to PIU only on behalf of them. This observation should not 
be understood as general mistrust of air carries, but nobody can be sure 
that a person responsible for data transmission is not involved in a 
terrorist organisation or does not form part of a drug or human trafficking 
network. Therefore, there should be technical means that do not allow the 
manipulation by the air carrier of the received PNR. 
 It always has to be transmitted immediately after the flight closure and 
when the air carrier agrees to do so, before the scheduled departure 
(within 24-48 hours). 
PIU, applying assessment (risk) criteria, determines suspicious movements, 
repetition of the same itinerary, and so on. And in the case of their detection, 
transmits the relevant information to national competent authorities753 and when 
there are links with other Member States and it would help it to prevent, detect, 
investigate and prosecute terrorist offences and serious crime - to its PIU. The PIU 
is also authorised to request information from other PIUs. Direct contact between 
the PIU of one Member State and the competent authorities from another, are 
allowed only in urgent cases. 
Talking about the scope of the Commission’s Proposal on PNR, it has continued to 
state that it is terrorism, serious crime and serious transnational crime within the 
scope of the already mentioned Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, and the 
maximum sentence is at least three years’ imprisonment. The fact that it refers not 
only to international (different states involved), but national serious crime as well 
deserves special attention. Nevertheless, the Council’s preparatory organs have 
added Annex II with the explicit list of offences in which PNR can be used.754 A 
                                                        
753  According to Article 5 of the Commission’s Proposal on PNR, those authorities which are 
competent for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences or 
serious crime. 
754  Participation in a criminal organisation, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 
illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives, fraud, laundering of the proceeds of crime, 
computer-related crime, environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal 
species and in endangered plant species and varieties, facilitation of unauthorised entry and 
residence, illicit trade in human organs and tissue, kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-
taking, organised and armed robbery, illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and 
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discussion remains as to whether a requirement of a three year sentence should be 
applied or not, due to differences in national legislations. 
Article 8 of the Commission’s Proposal on PNR also foresees possibilities (although 
limited) to transmit data to third countries. It can be done on a case-by-case basis 
for the same purposes as PNR processing within the EU, and respecting the data 
protection rules established in Article 13 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
(see Chapter II, Subsection 5.3). 
In addition, there is also provision on onward transmission for the same purpose 
and with the authorisation of Member States, where PIU has processed the data. 
According to Article 18, Member States are obliged to collect statistics at least 
about the total number of collected and exchanged PNR, the number of persons 
elected for scrutiny and further actions of competent law enforcement institutions. 
As indicated by Bąkowski and Voronova “The proposed EU PNR scheme departs 
from the widely accepted form of using personal data for law enforcement 
purposes whereby data transfer is requested [...] for a specific person, suspected of 
a specific crime, or at least representing a specific threat. The PNR scheme enables, 
on the contrary, proactive systematic checks on large sets of data concerning all 
passengers.”755  
Regarding storage rules, the Article of the Commission’s Proposal on PNR foresees 
that from air carriers, received data is stored in the PIU data base for 30 days. 
Afterwards it is masked out from data that can reveal the identity of a person and 
stored for five years. The storage term can be extended only if the data is used for 
crime investigation or prosecution. Only a limited number of PIU officers can have 
access to masked data and access to full data (revealing identity details again) is 
only possible with the permission of the Head of PIU, and only on a case-by-case 
basis in order to answer the request of the competent authority for the purpose for 
which the PNR is processed. 
The Commission’s Proposal on PNR for data protection dedicates only two articles. 
Articles 11 and 12 provide only the general framework that shall be forwarded, but 
as PIU and data processing will take place in each country separately without any 
centralised data base, it is left up to the national legislation of each Member State. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
works of art, forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein, illicit trafficking in 
hormonal substances and other growth promoters, illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive 
materials, unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships, sabotage and trafficking in stolen vehicles. Council 
document 8448/2/12, p. 36-37. 
755  BĄKOWSKI, Piotr and VORONOVA, Sofija, “The Proposed EU Passenger Name…”, loc. cit. 
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Article 11 foresees the obligatory application of Articles 17-22 of the Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA that establishes rules on the data subject’s right to access, 
rectification, deletion, blocking and rectification as well as rules on data 
confidentiality and security. 
As specific data protection rules are established: 
 Prohibition to process sensitive data (although as already mentioned, the 
categories do not coincide fully with the ones established in Article 21 of 
the EU Charter). 
 Lodging or documentation of all data processing and keeping it for 5 years. 
If PNR data is not deleted after 5 years, the logs will be kept until the 
deletion of that data. 
 Proportioning of information to each passenger, about PNR processing for 
law enforcement purposes. 
 Prohibition of transmission of data to private parties. 
The Commission’s Proposal on PNR foresees the deadline of its implementation 
two years since its coming into force. It seems to be unrealistic that all Member 
States would put in place the whole system, especially taking into account that two 
parts of them have never used PNR on a daily basis, and do not have either 
technical or expert preparation. 
3.2. Weak points and critics of the proposal 
As previously indicated , in 2013, the LIBE rejected the Commission’s Proposal on 
PNR voting 30 to 25,756 although the Rapporteur did not propose that in its 
Report.757 The Rapporteur proposed only 35 amendments, recognising the added 
value of the initiative and pointed out that the Commission had taken into account 
recommendations made by the Parliament in its Resolution of 20th November 
2008, on the proposal for a Council framework decision on the use of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes758, even if that Resolution had 
considered, in general, that while combatting crime “the same or even better 
                                                        
756  See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, “Civil Liberties Committee rejects EU Passenger Name Record 
proposal Fundamental rights” (Press release 24 April 2013), accessed September 2, 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BIM-
PRESS%2B20130422IPR07523%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN&language=EN. 
757  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “Report on the 
proposal for a directive…”, loc. cit. 
758  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, “Resolution of 20 November 2008 on the proposal for a Council 
framework decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes”, 
OJ C 16E, 22.1.2010, p. 44-50. 
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results could be obtained by improving mutual legal assistance between law 
enforcement authorities.”759 
Nevertheless, the same Resolution did not eliminate the possibility of the PNR 
system, but with much more limited scope and purpose, a strong data protection 
regime and establishing that “Profiling based on PNR data should only be 
intelligence-led, based on individual cases and factual parameters”.760 
The Resolution also envisaged a sunset clause in which national parliaments would 
participate, the European Parliament, the EDPS, the Article 29 Working Party and 
the FRA. 
To return to the Commission’s Proposal on PNR, after the Resolution of 11th 
February 2015, the Rapporteur increased its amendments from 35 to 47 retaining 
his initial position, but the rest of the Members of Parliament proposed 789,800 
amendments761, starting from the proposal to the rejection of the initiative, 
proposing the inclusion of intra-EU flights, limiting the purpose to certain types of 
serious crimes, strengthening data protection and access provisions, etc.762  
The EDPS has noticed the improvement of data protection regulation in the 
Commission’s Proposal on PNR, compared with the draft from 2007;, reduction in 
the scope of the instrument and better impact assessment for example, but it has 
highlighted that it “still fails to find in these new justifications a convincing basis to 
develop the system, especially with regard to large scale ‘prior assessment’ of all 
passengers.”763 
The PNR is in use, or prepared to be use, in only six Member States, thus it is not 
data usually gathered at national level and that means that: 
 Crime prevention and prosecution can be performed by using other 
means;  
                                                        
759  Ibid, p. 45. 
760  Ibid. The same was pointed out in the opinion of the EDPS, See EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION 
SUPERVISOR “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record 
data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious 
crime” OJ C 181, 22.6.2011, p. 26. 
761 With 179 amendments only on recitals. 
762  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “Amendments 
48-329 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use 
of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, accessed September 6, 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/am/1058/1058388/10
58388en.pdf. 
763  EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, “Opinion of the European Data Protection…” 
(2011), loc. cit., p. 25. 
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 Member States that do not use PNR and do not have such a system will be 
obliged to establish it. 
In these circumstances, a question of necessity and proportionality to limit 
passengers’ privacy becomes more and more relevant. 
In the use of PNR for law enforcement purposes, the FRA sees the limitation of the 
fundamental right to privacy, to data protection and to non-discrimination. With 
respect to non-discrimination, it indicates that even not processing sensitive data 
does not eliminate non-discrimination as the list of sensitive data presented in the 
Commission’s Proposal on PNR is shorter than the one foreseen in Article 21 of the 
Charter.764 It also refers to the sunset clause foreseen in the Resolution of the 
European Parliament from 2008 and stresses that for this purpose, not only 
statistics on all collected data, persons identified for scrutiny and further law 
enforcement action, but also the number of persons “unjustifiably flagged as 
suspicious” by the PNR system has to be part of it. 
When it comes to proportionality and necessity, the FRA notices that examples 
provided by the Commission on different occasions do not prove its 
indispensability to terrorism and all serious crime, but only a few of them: drug 
trafficking and trafficking in human beings. 
In these circumstances, a question occurs: is PNR use for law enforcement 
purposes proportional and indispensable?  
From the examples provided by the Commission, itis not clear where the PNR data 
helped more, in investigations of drug or human trafficking or through advanced 
passenger information (hereinafter – API), collected and transmitted to law 
enforcement agencies as well. The Commission states that API is more limited than 
PNR as it is “the biographical information taken from the machine-readable part of 
a passport and contain the name, place of birth and nationality of the person, the 
passport number and expiry date.”765 
What is even more appealing is Europol’s position on this issue, given that it offers 
its infrastructure to “help national competent authorities to maximise their use of 
targeted PNR information, to achieve a better intelligence picture and ultimately to 
                                                        
764  See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, “Opinion of the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal for a Directive on the use of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime (COM(2011) 32 final)”, p. 7, accessed September 5, 2015, 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1654-FRA-PNR-Opinion-June2011.pdf.  
765  COM(2011) 32 final, p. 6-7. 
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close security gaps which purely national PNR systems would fail to address (by 
making links and obtaining additional transnational information).”766 
This proposal seems to be very provocative, because on the one hand, it impugns 
the effectiveness of “purely national PNR systems” and on the other it proposes 
“maximising “the use of target information that goes absolutely in contradiction to 
fundamental rights, especially taking into account that among targeted PNR 
information will be information about persons who have never been under none 
suspicion. What can be allowed in this case is checking by competent authorities 
on hit / no hit basis information of some of the targeted PNR with Europol’s data 
bases, and only in cases of a match, to proceed with finding out links. Nevertheless, 
not all targeted PNR information should be checked, but only that which gives 
sufficient background to suspect a person’s involvement into terrorism or serious 
crime; for example, repetitive itineraries on dates that coincide with repetitive 
crimes that have the same modus operandi. 
Such PNR data as frequent traveller or billing address do not constitute obligatory 
information to be supplied about a passenger. It means that a passenger that 
supplies it runs more probability of being subject to scrutiny. Also, information on 
travel agencies is not as reliable as the majority of reservations are made through 
Internet. As pointed out by Brouwer, PNR data “are less reliable, being dependent 
on what the traveller submitted him- or herself when making a reservation. In 
addition, as has been pointed out by the Association of European Airlines, with 
respect to the identification of passengers the PNR data are not always consistent 
with the persons actually on board the air carrier.”767 
Some other categories of information that have to be transmitted to PIU also raise 
questions of their necessity, for example providing an e-mail address or telephone 
number. What advantage can a person’s telephone number or e-mail offer for risk 
assessment? It can be useful only in cases of coincidence with a number or email 
already discovered in another investigation. But by putting together such 
information, it is impossible, without previously informing PIU of such a number 
or e-mail. But in such cases it will not be PNR analysis on that basis, or risk criteria, 
but a precise information search. 
However, already mentioned, after the terrorist attacks in France, there is a high 
probability of agreement on the EU PNR mechanism. Thus if it is not unavoidable, 
and in any case it means limitations of fundamental rights, at least it has to be well 
balanced. 
                                                        
766  Council document 9422/1/15.  
767  BROUWER, Evelien, “Ignoring Decent and Legality. The EU’s proposal to share the personal 
information of all passengers” (Paper, Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2011), p. 3, 
accessed July 14, 2015, http://aei.pitt.edu/32073/1/No_40_Brouwer_on_PNR_Directive.pdf. 
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In 2014 the FRA issued “twelve operational fundamental rights considerations for 
law enforcement when processing Passenger Name Record (PNR) data” which 
points out the twelve elements needed to create a proper European PNR system.768 
This document basically reflects its opinion issued in 2011. As one of the elements 
is emphasised: foreseeing a clear definition of terrorism and serious crime that 
should be made with reference to: 
 The Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13th June 2002 on 
combating terrorism; 769 
 Europol Decision:  
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Even presuming that the scope of the Commission’s Proposal on PNR would be 
reduced, and it would be used only for individual cases, uncertainties remain about 
the data assessment criteria that, according to Article 4(3) shall be established by 
PIUs with cooperation with national competent authorities. As the EDPS indicates, 
“The development of such a system on a European scale, involving the collection of 
data on all passengers and the taking of decisions on the basis of unknown and 
evolving assessment criteria, raises serious transparency and proportionality 
issues.”770 
In addition, it is not clear whether such criteria have to be established by all PIUs 
as general ones and applicable at EU level or if it is left to each PIU. In the first case, 
no mechanism of PIUs meetings or decision making process is foreseen. For 
example; Should PIUs meetings mean meetings of their chiefs? What should the 
voting procedure be (unanimity, qualified, absolute or simple majority)? Any term 
for reviewing established criteria? The second case would mean different use of 
PNR systems in Member States that is contrary to equality, non-discrimination and 
                                                        
768  1. Use PNR data only to combat terrorism and serious transnational crimes.  
2. Limit access to the PNR database to a specialised unit.  
3. Do not request direct access to airlines’ databases.  
4. Delete sensitive PNR data.  
5. Set strict security and traceability safeguards against abuse.  
6. Reduce the likelihood of flagging false positives.  
7. Be transparent towards passengers.  
8. Allow persons to access and rectify their PNR data.  
9. Do not permit identification of data subjects or retention of data for longer than necessary.  
10. Transfer data extracted from PNR only to competent national public authorities.  
11. Only transfer data extracted from PNR to third countries under strict conditions. 
12. Carry out objective and transparent evaluation of the PNR system. 
See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, “Twelve operational fundamental 
rights considerations for law enforcement when processing Passenger Name Record (PNR) data”, 
p. 2, accessed September 4, 2015, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-fundamental-
rights-considerations-pnr-data-en.pdf.  
769  OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3-7. 
770  EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, “Opinion of the European Data Protection…” 
(2011), loc. cit., p. 26. 
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difficulties in the control of legality and the proportionality of use of PNR. For 
example, the same person traveling from Brazil to Spain or from Brazil to Germany 
would be the object of an application of different risk assessment criteria, even if 
his or her PNR data was be the same (except itinerary) in both cases. From the 
opinion of Brouwer, it can be assumed that the Commission’s Proposal talks about 
the second option as “the PNR proposal allows variations among the member 
states with regard to the assessments carried out on passenger data, the use and 
new creation of “pre-determined criteria” for the PNR assessments.”771  
What could be done in this situation is the establishment of criteria by already 
existing formats for police co-operation; this could be Europol’s Management 
Board or the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security. 
These high level formats are proposed because of the sensitivity of the issue with 
respect to human rights. 
Article 7 of the Commission’s Proposal on PNR establishing information exchange 
is also criticised due to its ambiguity and lack of clarity. As a general rule, 
information requests and exchanges have to take place through the PIU’s of 
Member States. Information can be provided without any request when it is 
considered necessary “for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution 
of terrorist offences or serious crime.”772 
In case of requests, the purpose is almost the same, but for a “specific case”. This is 
understandable as requests for the purpose mentioned above would, in general, be 
disproportionate l and have s to be linked to a specific case under consideration of 
PIU or the competent authorities. 
The real confusion appears in the regulation of exceptions where different terms 
such as “exceptional circumstances”, “specific and actual threat” and “immediate 
and serious threat” are used without specification of their content. 
What should be done in this respect is to clarify or unify the conditions for 
information exchange. 
3.3. Agreements between the European Union and third 
states on PNR  
After the terrorist attack of September 2001 in the United States, the national 
legislation of some countries was supplemented by provisions that put an 
obligation on air carriers flying to, from or through their territory, to provide their 
                                                        
771  BROUWER, Evelien, “Ignoring Dissent and Legality…”, loc. cit., p. 5. 
772  COM(2011) 32 final, p. 24. 
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competent authorities with access to PNR for law enforcement purposes. Thus the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act from 19th November 2001 established 
that not providing of PNR data would mean a fine of $ 6000 per passenger or the 
loss of landing rights in territory belonging to the USA. 
Under these circumstances, air carriers had two options: to agree with such an 
obligation or, not to operate flights in those countries, and as a result to see a 
decrease in their profits and competition capabilities. Consequently, a lot of air 
carriers have fulfilled this obligation.773 
Bearing this in mind, and not too many other options, the Commission and the 
Council decided to sign the agreement with these countries to regulate this data 
flows, at least to some extent. As noticed by Heisenberg, “Power disparities had 
forced the EU to accede to an agreement that did not reflect many of its 
fundamental demands. Even the language of negotiation was brusque on the US 
side.”774 
This received a lot of reasonable criticism, as a step back from the protection of 
privacy and data, but looking at it from another angle, it was the best of the worst 
options, because laws adopted by third states would be applied anyway, both to 
carriers and all passengers, including EU citizens. 
The first agreement on PNR was concluded with the United States of America in 
2004 by approval of: 
 Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17th May 2004 on the conclusion of an 
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of 
America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the 
United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection,775  
 Commission Decision 2004/535/EC of 14th May 2004 on the adequate 
protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air 
passengers transferred to the United States Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection.776  
                                                        
773  See more CATALINA BENAVENTE, María Ángeles, “La transmisión de datos PNR entre la Unión 
Europea, Estados Unidos, Canadá y Australia” in COLOMER HERNÁNDEZ, Ignacio and OUBIÑA 
BARBOLLA; Sabela, La transmisión de datos personales…, op. cit., p. 306-307. 
774  HEISENBERG, Dorothee, Negotiating Privacy: the European Union, the United States and personal 
data protection (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), p. 141. 
775  OJ L 183, 20.5.2004, p. 83. Corrigendum at OJ L 255, 30.9.2005, p. 168. 
776  OJ L 235, 6.7.2004, p. 11. 
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Both acts were annulled by the European Court of Justice due to the lack of 
Communities’ competence in this field,777 but the application of the latter 
Commission Decision was maintained until 30th September 2006. In the judgment 
of 30th May 2006, in joint Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 brought by the European 
Parliament it was stated that: 
 Even if primary PNR collection is made by private operators and air 
carriers’ activities fall within the scope of Community law, the purpose of 
agreement is public security that which is outside of the Community 
competence and the Commission could not base its Decision in Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24th October 
1995, on the protection of individuals, with regard to the processing of 
personal data, and on the free movement of such data that is applicable to 
the First Pillar. 
 As the purpose of the agreement and use of PNR is public security, the 
Council incorrectly based its Decision in Article 95 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community that is devoted to the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market. 
Thus the problem was related to data the processing purpose (security), different 
from the original purpose of its collection (commercial). 
In 2006, a provisional Agreement between the European Union and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) 
data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security,778 was 
signed and in 2007779 replaced by another provisional agreement, finally 
substituted by the permanent version in 2012.780 
In the context of the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-362/14 
that recognised Decision 2000/520/EC as invalid and in a such way disclaiming 
evaluation of data protection level in United States as adequate the future of the 
PNR agreement and other data transmission mechanisms is under the question 
mark. 
                                                        
777  In the case of the Commission’s Decision, the European Parliament pleaded ultra vires to 
Directive 95/46/EC breach of its fundamental principles, breach of fundamental rights and 
principle of proportionality. For annulment of the Council’s Decision it pleaded incorrect choice of 
Article 95 of the Treaty establishing European Community for its decision, breach of its Article 
300(3), Article 8 of the ECHR, principle of proportionality and statement of reasons and principle 
of co-operation in good faith. Nevertheless, conforming ultra vires and incorrect choice of Article 
95 the European Court of Justice did not analyse other pleas. 
778  OJ L 298, 27.10.2006, p. 27–31. 
779  OJ L 204, 4.8.2007, p. 16–25. 
780  OJ L 215, 11.8.2012, p. 4–14. 
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In 2012, the new Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the 
processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to 
the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service also entered into force.781 
On 25th June 2014, a new Agreement between Canada and the European Union on 
the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Records was signed but still needs 
the approval of the European Parliament in order to enter into force. Nevertheless, 
the European Parliament, before final voting, asked for the preliminary opinion of 
the European Court of Justice on its compatibility with the EU Charter.782 
These agreements are based on Communication from the Commission on the global 
approach to transfers of Passenger Name Records (PNR) data to third countries: 
the key objective of this communication is to establish, for the first time, a set of 
general criteria which should form the basis of future negotiations on PNR 
agreements with third countries783 that, in 2010, decided to establish common 
criteria and negotiable areas concluding new agreements on PNR: 
 Limitation of the use of data: fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime, clearly established key notions of these crimes. 
 Scope of data: minimum, proportionate and with an exhaustive list of 
categories. 
 Sensitive data: not used, only well-defined exceptions with appropriate 
safeguards and authorization of higher authority are possible. 
 Data Security: appropriate legal, technical and organisational guarantees 
in place. 
 Supervision: by independent data protection authority. 
 Transparency, access, rectification, deletion, redress: information about 
gathering and use of PNR, access right with rectification, deletion and 
redress. 
 Data retention: no longer than necessary for the established purpose. 
 Onward transfer to other authorities or third countries: on a case-by-case 
basis to the third country that provides with the same data protection 
level as foreseen in the agreement. 
                                                        
781  OJ L 186, 14.7.2012, p. 4-16. 
782  See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. “Resolution of 25 November 2014 on seeking an opinion from the 
Court of Justice on the compatibility with the Treaties of the Agreement between Canada and the 
European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data. Available at 
European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2014 on seeking an opinion from the Court of 
Justice on the compatibility with the Treaties of the Agreement between Canada and the 
European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data”, accessed 
September 6, 205, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2014-0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
783  COM(2010) 492 final, p. 3. 
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 Restrictions on onward transfers to other government authorities: on a 
case-by-case basis, only purposes established in agreement and with 
guarantees to apply the same protection level.784  
Of course, depending on the third state involved, the results of negotiations could differ, 
but either way, all negotiable agreements have the same pattern and equal primary 
position of the EU. 
The table below presents comparisons of the main provisions of three concluded 
agreements; even if the entrance into force of the agreement with Canada is still under 
the question mark. 
 USA Australia Canada 
Method used 
to transmit 
PNR data 
from air 
carries 
Push  Push  Push  
Use of PNR Prevention, detection, 
investigation and 
prosecution of: 
- Terrorism and related 
crimes, 
- Other transnational 
crimes punishable by 
three years of 
imprisonment at least. 
Also may be used: 
- Case-by-case for the 
protection of vital 
interests of any 
individual (when there 
is obvious threat) or in 
case of court order. 
- To identify persons 
subject to closer 
examination upon 
arrival to or departure 
the US. 
Prevention, detection, 
investigation and 
prosecution of: 
- Terrorism,  
- Serious transnational 
crime. 
Also may be used: 
- To protect the vital 
interests of any individual 
(with not exhaustive list 
that includes risk of 
death, serious injury or 
threat to health), 
- To supervise misuse of 
data on a case-by-case 
basis foreseen by 
Australian law. 
 
Prevention, detection, 
investigation and 
prosecution of: 
- Terrorism,  
- Serious 
transnational crime. 
Also may be used: 
- To protect the vital 
interests of any 
individual (with not 
exhaustive list that 
includes risk of 
death, serious injury 
or threat to health, 
public health risk), 
- To supervise 
accountability of the 
public 
administration, 
- To fulfil court order. 
 
Sensitive 
data 
Use on a case-by-case 
basis with the approval of 
Department of Homeland 
Security senior manager 
in case of danger to life of 
an individual. 
As a general rule is 
Prohibition of use and 
processing. 
Deletion once received. 
Masked, not further 
processed. 
Exception: use not by 
automatic systems, but 
by specifically 
authorised official on a 
case-by-case basis with 
                                                        
784  Ibid, p. 9-10. 
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 USA Australia Canada 
deleted after 30 days 
from the last receipt. 
the approval of Head of 
the Canadian 
Competent Authority 
in case of danger to life 
of an individual. 
As a general rule it is 
deleted after 15 days 
from the last receipt. 
Decision 
taken on 
PNR basis 
No decision of significant 
adverse action based only 
on PNR. 
 
No decision of significant 
adverse action based only 
on PNR. 
No automated processing 
based on sensitive data. 
No decision of 
significant adverse 
action based only on 
PNR. 
 
Data 
retention 
Active period: 5 years, 
depersonalisation and 
masking after 6 months. 
Dormant database: 10 
years. 
5.5 years: years 0-3 all data, 
years 3-5,5 masking out 
personal data. 
5 years: after 30 days 
masking out names, 
after 2 years masking 
out other personal 
data. 
Domestic 
sharing 
With governmental 
authorities only for the 
purpose foreseen in the 
agreement and to support 
investigation or 
examination, following 
internal laws and 
agreements on 
information exchange and 
ensuring the same or 
comparable safeguards. 
 
With governmental 
authorities only for the 
purpose foreseen in the 
agreement, ensuring the 
same or comparable 
safeguards. 
If it is not depersonalised, 
only on a case-by-case basis. 
Before sharing the 
Australian Customs and 
Border Protection Service 
assesses the relevance 
sharing and its scope 
(minimum data). 
Further sharing by the 
receiving authority is 
prohibited without the 
permission of the Australian 
Customs and Border 
Protection Service. 
On a case-by-case basis 
minimum data with 
governmental 
authorities whose 
functions are related to 
a purpose of the 
agreement and only for 
these purposes, 
ensuring the same or 
comparable 
safeguards. 
Further sharing by the 
receiving authority is 
prohibited  
I without the 
permission of the 
Canadian Competent 
Authority. 
 
Onward 
transfer 
Following the conditions 
of the agreement in 
support of those cases 
under examination or 
investigation and 
informing Member State if 
information shared is 
about its citizen or 
resident. 
If it is not an urgent case 
On case-by-case basis only 
to authority directly 
involved in prevention, 
detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorism 
and serious international 
crime for these purposes 
and that ensures the same 
safeguards. Before sharing 
the Australian Customs and 
Minimum data on case-
by-case basis for the 
purpose foreseen in 
this agreement to 
authority that 
performs functions 
related to that purpose 
and that ensures the 
same safeguards as 
established in this 
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 USA Australia Canada 
and understanding 
agreement with proper 
safeguards is concluded 
between the US and the 
third state. 
Border Protection Service 
assesses the relevance of 
sharing and its scope 
(minimum data). 
If information shared is 
about citizen or resident of 
Member State, this state is 
informed. If it is 
appropriate, the passenger 
is informed as well. 
The receiving state has to 
agree to delete data as soon 
as it is not necessary for the 
purpose that it has been 
transmitted and do not 
make any further 
transmission. 
agreement or applied 
in the EU. 
If information shared is 
about a citizen of a 
Member State, this 
state is informed. 
Supervision  Department Privacy 
Officers, 
The DHS Office of 
Inspector General, 
The Government 
Accountability Office,  
The US Congress. 
Australian Information 
Commissioner 
Not specified, just 
indicated as “an 
independent public 
authority”. 
In force 7 years with reviews and 
evaluations. 
Reports on review are 
presented to the 
European Parliament. 
7 years with renewal for 
same periods, unless 
specific notification 
envisages a different 
solution. 
7 years, automatic 
renewal for the same 
period unless specific 
notification envisages a 
different solution. 
Table 21: Comparison of main provisions of EU agreements on PNR with USA, Australia and 
Canada. 
From three agreements, the one with Australia has more safeguards and stricter rules on 
data use as established: prohibition of sensitive data, stricter rules on transferring to 
other national competent authorities and third countries, although the time of retention 
of personal data (without masking out) is longer than in other agreements. 
The agreement with Canada has more flexible rules which are found on use, sensitive 
data, but stricter rules on transferring and retention than the agreement with United 
States. 
3.4. As a summary 
As third states had adopted laws obligating air carriers that operate flights to or 
from their country, to provide them with PNR data for public security reasons, it 
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seems that the European Union had no other choice but to conclude agreements 
with them in order not to harm the competition of European air carriers and to 
some extent, protect the data of travellers. 
On the other hand, once having once established this agreement, the question 
arises, why not use it as well within the EU where stricter data protection rules can 
be ensured? It would be dishonest towards EU internal law enforcement 
authorities not to endow them with a new tool that the EU has already given to law 
enforcement authorities of some third states and is negotiating with others. 
Thus the EU is in a trap from it which has to get out, in order to achieve maximum 
possible benefit. 
Due to the fact that there is even a lack of proof that PNR data is indispensable for 
the fight against terrorism and serious crime (although its added value cannot be 
denied), and there is a collection of “everyday personal data”785, most probably the 
Commission’s Proposal on PNR will be adopted. 
That would mean mass data processing and a disproportionate limitation of the 
right to privacy. Comparing personal data processing in existing systems and PNR, 
the differences will be immense: if SIS has 1 million new records annually, PNR will 
have 500 million. 786 
Nevertheless, the process of adoption seems to divert away from the IMS 
established practice, firstly to in order to evaluate the real need of the new 
instrument before its development. 
4. Information Exchange Platform  
In 2010, following the provision of the Stockholm Programme to make better use 
of existing information exchange tools, the Spanish Presidency of the Council 
proposed creation an Information Exchange Platform. The specificity of this 
proposal is not in the establishment of a new information exchange mechanisms or 
granting broader access to existing ones, but in the centralization of all of them in 
one platform, as, for the time being they “are disparate in every way, displaying 
major differences in their nature (e.g. Database, communications system, network 
of contact points), legal basis (e.g. International treaty, European legislation, 
                                                        
785  MITSILEGAS, Valsamis, EU Criminal Law, op. cit., p. 279. 
786  See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Directorate General for Internal Policies, “Developing an EU 
Internal Security…”, loc. cit., p. 143. 
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bilateral agreement) scope (e.g. Terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, 
violence in sport), technical characteristics, etc.”787 
This initiative had been included as one of the measures of the implementation of 
IMS and has received approval for its development from all Member States and is 
in line with the strategic guidelines. In addition to Spain in the development of the 
project Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
the Commission are participating.788  
Proposed by the Spanish Presidency, the leadership of this action was taken by 
Europol that concluded that, “the establishment of the IXP will make it easier for 
end-users to benefit from the existing opportunities for cross-border law 
enforcement cooperation, while respecting the national and international 
processes in place.”789 
Initially it was proposed to develop at least three levels of platform: 
 “Bookshop” that would contain basic information on all information 
exchange tools: legislation, manuals, guidelines, procedures, national 
contact lists and fact sheets, where necessary – national legislation, 
training materials, and so on. At this level the end-user would get a picture 
of all the possibilities of international cooperation. 
 "Communications" meaning a secure e-mail system that could be used 
between all authorised users. Europol considered it has “huge advantages 
from a business perspective. It enables the user to go (in accordance with 
his access rights) to all relevant sources, tools and platforms.”790 
 “Queries” or “Gateways” to various databases according to existing access 
rules and without any type of interconnection of existing databases, if they 
are separated under current legislation. It was foreseen that large scale 
systems, such as SIS, VIS and EURODAC will not be integrated into the 
platform.791 But Europol proposed at the last stage of the project, to 
integrate search functions across the SIS, Europol systems and Interpol 
databases, provided that the user in question is authorised to query these 
sources with a so-called single sign-on.792 Such a proposal would be 
acceptable so far as access rules would remain the same, as it would mean 
only a technical solution to facilitate the daily work of the competent 
authorities. 
                                                        
787  Council document 5281/10, p. 2 
788  Council document 13032/14, p. 4  
789  Council document, 11117/3/10, p. 5. 
790  Council document 7840/13, p. 6. 
791  See Council document 7819/13, p. 2. 
792  Council document 7840/13, p. 2, 7. 
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As there would be three levels of platform, three categories of users are 
distinguished: 
 The general user (every law enforcement official) with access to non-
restricted data, meaning open resources of “Bookshop”, 
 The law enforcement officials with access to “Bookshop” and other levels if 
he or she already has such authorisation, 
 The international coordination staff that have access to all levels. But each 
access will depend on individual authorisations obtained previously, for 
example a person can be authorised to search in SIS, but not Europol’s 
databases. 
Bearing in mind the complexity of the project and the need for human and financial 
resources, a step by step approach is applied with a provision to finish the first 
stage (Bookshop) at the end of this year. The following term of development will 
depend on human and financial possibilities. 
As Jones points out, “The idea that individual rights to privacy and data protection 
will be better safeguarded through the use of a single website in some ways makes 
sense, allowing as it does one route through which data protection authorities can 
monitor access and usage logs for each individual instrument. However, the 
technical hurdles that would need to be overcome in order for such a project to 
work –let alone to work securely– are vast.”793 
5. European Police Records Information System 
(EPRIS) 
Following the initiative of the European Criminal Records Information System 
(ECRIS), in April 2007 during the Police Chiefs Task Force meeting, the German 
Presidency raised the idea of a European Police Records Information System that 
would allow access to databases run by police in performing their functions. 
This initiative was taken on the agenda of different Council preparatory groups, 
but as to date, it has not resulted in a clear project. Some Member States were not 
totally convinced of its necessity, due to already existing mechanisms but finally, in 
the Stockholm Programme, the Commission was called to present a feasibility 
study in 2012. 
                                                        
793  JONES, Chris, “Implementing the “principle of availability”: The European Criminal Records 
Information System, The European Police Records Index System, The Information Exchange 
Platform for Law Enforcement Authorities” (Statewatch analysis, September 2011), p. 31, 
accessed May 19 2015, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-145-ecris-epris-ixp.pdf. 
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The Commission ordered a comprehensive study that was presented in October 
2012 with the main conclusion-suggestion, “If the need for a more efficient 
exchange of police records related information is not fully addressed by the better 
use of the existing systems and tools in the course of three years, then a pilot 
project should be initiated with the aim to evaluate the technical feasibility and 
impact of a new, specific EPRIS system.”794 
In December 2012, the Commission in its Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council, “Strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the 
EU: the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM)” recognised that at that 
moment creation of the EPRIS was unjustified.795  
This discussion and decision seems to be quite complicated, as to start with, there 
is no single or approximate understanding of what a “police record” is. 
Going back to the findings of a Study on possible ways to enhance efficiency in the 
exchange of police records between the Member States, by setting up a European 
Police Records Index System EPRIS (hereinafter – Feasibility Study) made with 27 
Member States796 only thirteen have a legal definition of “police record”, the rest 
have only a functional one, or none at all. 
For the sake of continuation of a Feasibility Study, it was suggested that police 
record should be understood as “any information available in the national register 
or registers recording data of competent authorities, for the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of criminal offences.”797 
In these circumstances, it is not clear at all what data and its categories would be 
accessible through EPRIS. Any at all? It would mean total disproportion and inequity 
as far as the data subject is concerned, as the police record of one Member State would 
include only suspects, and in another, any questioned person, witness and victims. 
Thus without a clear and explicit definition of police record, a discussion cannot go 
forward as this is a key issue on which to take a decision of its necessity. 
The Feasibility Study indicated that a majority of Member States would stick to 
inclusion of suspects and perpetrators. In this case, EPRIS would partially overlap with 
EIS and AWF and would have added value only in relation to those crimes that are out 
                                                        
794  EUROPEAN COMMISSION. DG Home “Study on possible ways to enhance efficiency in the 
exchange of police records between the Member States by setting up a European Police Records 
Index System EPRIS” (Final Report, 8 October 2012), p. 2-3, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/police-
cooperation/general/docs/epris-final_report_en.pdf.  
795 COM(2012) 735 final, p. 9.  
796  At the time of the study, Croatia was not yet an EU Member State.  
797  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG Home, “Study on possible ways…”, loc. cit., p. 38. 
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part of Europol’s competence. But is it really worth establishing a new system for the 
remaining criminal offences? As was pointed out at an Expert Meeting on EPRIS, if it 
would be established, then the question of EIS’s added value should be 
reconsidered.798  
In the same Study, four technical solutions for EPRIS were proposed: no new system, 
decentralised (as in case of Prüm Decisions), semi-centralised, centralised system. 
Fourteen Member States have pronounced in favour of a semi-centralised system 
that would mean that all data would remain in Member States’ data bases, but at 
central level, would be in index data bases.799 That would allow optimising query, 
i.e. To make a single one to all Member States, and not one by one as in the case of a 
decentralised system. From a technical point of view, it is a complicated structure, 
as Member States will need to create an index system or interface and to ensure its 
compliance with the central one. Additionally, maintenance of the central system 
will be needed. 
According to a very preliminary estimation, the interface at central level would 
cost 2,000,000 euros and the connection of national databases and data extraction 
from 250,000 to 1,000,000 euros for each Member State, depending on its size.800 
As the current situation shows, there is no agreement about the content of the 
central system, should in include only indexes or some basic data categories as 
well?  
In the first case, the added value of such a system can be questioned. Only two 
advantages of it can be identified: the single query to all Member States and the 
work burden for requesting Member States. 
France and Finland expressed the same idea in their joint document from 2012, “It 
is estimated that currently 65% of the requests are not replied to at all and only 35 
% get a positive or negative answer [...] However, if it is proven that information on 
the person in question is available from a law enforcement authority in certain 
Member States, a well-directed request would be made. It is most likely that a 
positive answer would be given to these requests and that in this respect the 
activities in all Member States concerned would have been worthwhile.”801 
But after the automatic index query, personal data would be received on the basis 
of already existing Swedish Initiative as is the case with DNA and dactyloscopic 
                                                        
798  See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG Home, “Summary Report of Expert Meeting on EPRIS, 
19.04.2012”, p. 6, accessed June 3, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert 
/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=6238&no=1. 
799 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG Home, “Study on possible ways…”, loc. cit., p. 28-29. 
800  See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG Home, “Summary Report of Expert…”, loc. cit., p. 5. 
801  Council document 14944/12, p. 3. 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
~ 290 ~ 
data under the Prüm Decisions. It raises a question of proportionality of creation of 
such a system to its practical efficiency. 
In the second case a concern would be about the new legal basis and data 
protection. Including real data into central system, Member States would have to 
agree what categories of data would be included, who would be responsible for 
data security, deletion, and so on. This brings us to the question: what is the ratio 
between results that will be achieved in the fight against crime and the necessity 
and proportionality to limit privacy and data protection?  
Although one can argue that creation of EPRIS will not mean gathering different 
data from an already available one, but harmonisation or at least approximation of 
the definition of “police record” could force some Member States to collect new 
categories of data. Without definition of the term police record again, data that 
could be accessed by different Member States could vary a lot. It should also be 
borne in mind that national information of police interest is not usually centralized 
and different law enforcement institutions have different access rights and their 
own databases.802 
In both cases it is not clear what would be the search criteria, for instance: name 
and surname? ID Number? Any other criteria? 
In comparison with other initiatives, although it would much less intrusive as the 
initiative on PNR, it also lacks added value that would compensate for other 
limitations of fundamental rights and the costs of its implementation. 
Besides, until now nobody has declared the impossibility of obtaining this 
information. Under current legal and technical solutions such information can be 
queried on the basis of the Swedish Initiative and using SIENA, or any other co-
operation channel. It is true that the requesting Member State would have to ask 
all Member States separately, but from a technical point of view, it does not mean 
sending 27 separate requests, just to use one channel and send it with one mailing 
list as is done with other requests. 
But the solution of co-operation gaps or inefficiency cannot be solved every time 
by the creation of a new database and spreading access rights. These problems 
have other solutions from addressing them in proper meetings, or finally, as a last 
case scenario, filing a case to the European Court of Justice for non-fulfilment of 
obligations foreseen in EU law. 
Although for the time being no clear statement on insufficiency of actual 
information exchange mechanisms has been made, in April 2015, the Commission 
                                                        
802  See DEL MORAL TORRES, Anselmo, Cooperación policial en la Unión…, op. cit., p. 495. 
Information Exchange Efficiency in Criminal Investigation in European Union 
 
~ 291 ~ 
committed itself to supporting the pilot project where a group of Member States 
would create national index systems and give access to other participating 
Member States for automated searches on a “hit / no hit” basis.803 
                                                        
803  COM(2015) 185 final, p. 8. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
he security of modern society is threatened by such direct threats as 
terrorism, and indirectly by the spill over of technological progress and 
facilitated cross-border movement that have resulted in moving criminality 
into virtual space, and easier meeting in the international environment. 
This challenged a need for approximation of ius puniendi, to free movement as well, 
and to change to some extent, general perception of the limits of competence of 
law enforcement and judicial authorities, although their functions generally were 
treated as an indispensable element of state sovereignty. 
With respect to information exchange between law enforcement authorities for the 
purposes of investigation, the EU took this topic onto its agenda very actively, 
firstly by the establishment of compensatory mechanisms for the abolition of 
control of internal borders, and later by opposing to intensified criminal mobility 
and increased terrorism threats. 
In these endeavours to protect persons, ensure their safe movement and stay in 
the EU, different initiatives saw daylight. Mechanisms analysed in this work allow 
the conclusion that the provenance of initiatives in this area, and the “engine” of 
their promotion is Germany, with political ideas to approximate co-operation to 
the functioning of the federal model of police forces. Nevertheless, it faces a 
cautious position from some Member States who do not oppose to co-operation as 
such, but pronounce for its moderate development and use. 
Many (but not all) legislative acts on information exchange were created in an 
atmosphere that mixes political obligation with reaction to some threat, rapid 
preparation of legislative draft, political and time pressure for its analysis, 
necessity to conciliate different and sometimes contrary positions of Member 
States. That resulted in some deficiencies outlined below. 
T 
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1. Conclusions about the regulation of each 
information exchange instrument that has been 
analysed 
Each analysed instrument has its advantages and problems, but in the light of 
effectiveness, precision of regulation and balance with human rights some are 
more successful than others. Thus: 
 SIS II (and previously SIS) is a data base that includes quite precisely 
defined categories of persons and objects. Being a centralised data base it 
allows: quite comprehensive access control as each search (check) has to 
be logged, automated data deletion after the term of storage expires (if no 
actions on extension of storage has been taken) and avoidance of storage 
of excessive information, collection of precise statistics. 
A comprehensive lex especialis on data protection is applied to SIS II, 
including the establishment and functioning of supervising authorities. 
Nevertheless, the regulation of actions on alerts on discreet or specific 
checks as well as Europol’s and Eurojust’s access to SIS are not precisely 
regulated, leaving possibilities to redundant intervention into a checked 
person’s privacy in the first case, and overuse of search possibilities in the 
second. 
 PCCC is an entity used as a general rule for the investigation of crimes in 
states’ border areas. It is does not have detailed regulation at EU level, 
leaving it to neighbouring Member States’ that establish such PCCC on 
their borders. 
That results in a lack of common provisions on the working scheme and on 
the control of data flows. On the other hand, it can be justified by the 
peculiarity of each EU region that provokes difficulties in establishing the 
same framework across the EU. 
 EU regulation of liaison officers is also quite general. The two most 
important provisions concern the common use of the liaison officers 
posted abroad and prohibition to perform operational activities on the 
territory of a hosting country. Information exchange takes place within the 
limits of national law of the hosting country and of the competence of the 
liaison officer established by its national law. From the perspective of the 
dispositive nature of this instrument (Member State has freedom to post 
liaison officers abroad or not) and bearing in mind differences of bilateral 
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relations that can result in more restrictive or more flexible regulation, it 
would be difficult, as in the case of PCCC established EU level detailed 
rules. Nevertheless, due to the lack of general lines about competence, it is 
not clear to what extent a hosting country can limit it and make the figure 
of liaison officer ineffective. 
 Europol is comprehensively regulated by EU legislation, with a quite 
precise definition of purpose of information exchange between Europol 
and Member States. Nevertheless, it gives unlimited flexibility to Member 
States to use their liaison officers posted in Europol and SIENA for other 
information exchange between Member States that is outside of Europol’s 
mandate. 
Despite comprehensive rules on data protection, the biggest criticism is 
reserved for the transmission of personal data to third parties as an 
exception, when Europol does not have operational agreements. 
Regulation of onwards information transmission is even more fragmented 
as it has different regulations depending on the agreement concluded 
between Europol and the third party and in addition, exceptions to make 
such transmission without concluded agreement were also allowed. 
 The Swedish Initiative that sets out to be a flagship of the implementation 
of the principle of availability, in the end merely has added value by the 
establishment of deadlines for reply. But even in this respect, it does not 
provide the content of urgency. 
It is full of question marks and ambiguities, beginning with the lack of a 
clear definition of the purpose for which information can be exchanged, 
and finishing with the complicated request form that discourages 
competent authorities to use it as a legal basis for requests, and limits use 
of this instrument only to cases of urgency. 
 Despite being brief, the regulation of FIUs and AROs is quite clear with a 
well-defined but narrow purpose as well as a limited list of authorities that 
participate in information exchange. Nevertheless, with respect to data 
protection rules, reference to different legal acts is confusing to competent 
authorities and makes the effectiveness of data protection difficult. 
 As compensation for giving direct access to national data bases, Prüm 
Decisions foresee quite extensive guarantees to their proper use, such as 
evaluation of each Member State before authorising access of its national 
contact points. By giving hit / no hit access, it is ensured that data not 
matching search criteria will never be seen by the searching authority and 
in cases of hit, personal data will be provided only after proper checks of 
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the basis of the request. Nevertheless, having 28 separate data bases in 
case of DNA for the moment, it is impossible to gather coherent statistics. 
Provisions of non-automated data exchange on terrorism prevention and 
security of major events with a cross-border dimension are redundant, 
due to the existence of other legislative tools. 
On this basis, as a general conclusion, it can be said that despite some 
disadvantages, the best regulated option is SIS II. It is merited by both the 
European legislator and the nature of the tool itself, as a centralised data base 
(despite its expense) its equivalent use across all countries, equal control and 
supervision of data protection requirements is ensured. 
Giving access to national data bases on a hit / no hit basis also results in the 
establishment of quite high standards of their use, as each Member State seeks the 
best possible protection of its data base. 
2. Conclusions about clarity on use of totality of the EU 
information exchange tools 
The analysis carried out has revealed that the EU pool of information exchange 
mechanisms is fragmented and incoherent. As a summary, it is presented in the 
following tables which show the purpose of each tool, data subject and data 
categories included, with special mention of sensitive data, possibilities of 
transmission to third parties or forwarding, and the data protection regime 
applied. 
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PURPOSE 
CISA SIS 
- General: To ensure a high level of security in the territories of the Member 
States. 
- Special: Each category of alert has its own purpose depending on category of 
person or object. 
PCCC 
Individually established by bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
As a general rule should: 
- include prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of petty crime 
committed at border area, 
- not interfere with the competence of central information exchange units. 
Liaison Officers 
Individually established by bilateral or multilateral agreements or on the basis 
of the national law of hosting country and competence of liaison officer 
established. 
Europol Prevention and combatting of organised crime, terrorism and other forms of 
serious crime affecting two or more Member States. 
Swedish 
Initiative 
As it is not defined unambiguously, the broader provision is  
Detection, prevention or investigation of offences. 
Use for other purposes it has to be authorised by requested the Member State 
and envisaged by the national law of the receiving one. 
FIUs and AROs FIUs 
Money laundering and financing of terrorism. 
AROs 
Tracing and identification of crime related property for its further freezing, 
seizure or confiscation. 
Prüm Decisions - DNA databases: investigation of criminal offence. 
- Dactyloscopic databases: prevention and investigation of criminal offences. 
- Vehicle registration data: prevention and investigation of criminal offences, 
other offences under the jurisdiction of the courts or the public prosecution 
service of the searching Member State and for the maintenance of public 
security. 
- Non-automated data exchange: prevention of terrorism, prevention and 
security of major events with a cross-border dimension. 
Table 22: Purpose of information exchange within the analysed information exchange tools.
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DATA SUBJECT 
CISA SIS 
- Wanted for surrender, i.e. Prosecuted or convicted; 
- Missing or in need of special protection due to their physical or mental 
conditions; 
- Sought for assistance in judicial procedure; 
- Needed to be checked; 
- Not allowed to enter one of the members of the Schengen zone; 
- Persons whose identity is misused (with previous consent). 
PCCC 
Depends on bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
Liaison Officers 
Depends on bilateral and multilateral agreements and national law of sending 
and hosting countries. 
Europol EIS 
- Persons suspected of already committed a crime, being accomplices or, of its 
future commission when crime is subject to Europol’s competence; 
- Convicted persons. 
AWF 
- Persons suspected of already having committed a crime, being accomplices, 
or of its future commission when crime is subject to Europol’s competence; 
- Convicted persons; 
- Witnesses; 
- Victims; 
- Contacts and associates of suspects; 
- Informers. 
Swedish 
Initiative 
Not specified.  
FIUs and AROs Not directly specified, but a conclusion can be made that they are natural, legal 
persons involved in money laundering or terrorism financing.  
Prüm Decisions Subject to national legislation. 
Table 23: Data subjects whose information exchange within the analysed information 
exchange tools.
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DATA CATEGORIES 
 CISA SIS 
- Surname and forenames, any aliases possibly entered separately; 
- Any specific, objective physical characteristics not subject to change; 
- First letter of second forename; 
- Date and place of birth; 
- Sex; 
- Nationality; 
- Whether the persons concerned are armed and/or violent; 
- Reason for the alert; 
- Action to be taken; 
- Photographs; 
- Fingerprints; 
- Authority issuing the alert; 
- A reference to the decision giving rise to the alert; 
- Links to or alerts in SIS II; 
- The type of offence. 
PCCC 
Depend on bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
Liaison Officers 
Depends on bilateral and multilateral agreements and the national law of the 
sending and hosting countries. 
Europol EIS 
- Surname, maiden name, given names, alias, assumed name;  
- Date and place of birth; 
- Nationality; 
- Sex; 
- Where necessary other characteristics likely to assist in identification as 
dactyloscopic data and DNA profiles; 
- Place of residence and whereabouts;  
- Profession; 
- Social security numbers; 
- Driving licences; 
- Identification documents. 
AWF 
General to all data subjects:  
- Present and former surnames (i.e. Real and alias, nickname, residence, 
nationality, parents (if it necessary, etc.); 
- Physical description; 
- Identification means (i.e. Documents, ID and other official numbers, images, 
fingerprints and DNA profiles, etc.). 
Additional data categories: 
Differ depending to data subject and are provided in the Table 15. 
Swedish 
Initiative 
Any type of information or data which is held by law enforcement authorities. 
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FIUs and AROs FIUs 
Any available information useful for FIU for analysis and investigation of money 
laundering and financing of terrorism. 
AROs 
Any information considered necessary for the execution of the tasks of another 
ARO.  
Prüm 
Decisions 
- Data related to personal characteristics such as DNA and dactyloscopics; 
- Vehicles’ registration data; 
- All data important in prevention of terrorism;  
- All data important in prevention of offences and threats to the security in major 
events with a cross-border dimension. 
Table 24: Data categories that can be exchanged within the analysed information exchange 
tools. 
SENSITIVE DATA 
 CISA SIS 
Transmission prohibited 
PCCC 
Depends on bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
Liaison Officers 
Depends on bilateral and multilateral agreements and national law of sending 
and hosting countries. 
Europol AWF 
Permitted if it is strictly necessary for the purposes of the file concerned, and 
unless such data supplements other personal data already input in that file. 
Swedish 
Initiative 
Not specified. 
FIUs and AROs Not specified, but by the nature of purpose, not very relevant. 
Prüm Decisions Does not occur in automated data search, because in cases of dactyloscopic or 
vehicle registration, data is not collected and in cases of DNA non-coding part of 
DNA is used that allows identification of sex, but not any other sensitive data. 
Nevertheless it is not specified for non-automated data exchange and data 
transmission after hit. 
Table 25: Possibilities to exchange sensitive data within the analysed information exchange 
tools.
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ACCESSING AUTHORITIES 
CISA SIS 
- Police; 
- State Border Guards; 
- Customs; 
- Vehicle registration entities; 
- Europol and Eurojust (access limited to alerts related to their mandate); 
- When it is allowed by the national legislation, also judicial authorities 
participating an in investigation and their coordinators can be granted an 
access. 
PCCC 
As a general rule, police and customs authorities or other authorities 
performing their functions (i.e. State Border Guard). 
Liaison Officers 
Not defined, depends on bilateral and multilateral agreements and the national 
law of sending and hosting countries. 
Europol EIS 
- Duly empowered Europol staff (including the Director and his Deputies); 
- Liaison officers;  
- ENUs. 
- Member States can decide to give an access to EIS to other competent 
authorities, but it will be limited to the possibility of verifying whether 
requested information exists (hit / no hit). 
AWF 
Participants of AWF after Europol’s accreditation and special training. 
The Director, his or her Deputies, Europol staff, liaison officers and ENUs that do 
not participate in AWF are authorised to access only index of the AWF and 
make a search on hit / no hit basis. 
Swedish 
Initiative 
- Police; 
- Customs; 
- Other authorities that are authorised by national Law to detect, prevent and 
investigate offences or criminal activities. 
FIUs and AROs FIUs 
- FIUs; 
- Other authorities combating money laundering. 
AROs 
- AROs; 
- Other authorities with the competence of tracing and identification of 
property obtained as a result of crime. 
Prüm Decisions At the stage of automated comparison: 
- National contact points designated by each State. 
At the stage or receiving data related to automated matches: 
- Firstly, is available to national contact point that lately is transmitted to the 
authority that has requested a comparison. 
In case of non-automated data exchange: 
- Network of contact points for each for each category of data (terrorism, 
public order and security). 
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- National contact points make further transmission of data to requesting 
authority or in case of spontaneous data supply – to the authority that can be 
interested in it. 
Table 26: Authorities that have access to information within the analysed information 
exchange tools. 
DATA PROTECTION REGIME 
CISA SIS 
Lex generalis: 
- For all alerts except on persons not allowed to enter the Schengen zone – 
European Convention on Data Protection. 
- For alerts on persons not allowed to enter the Schengen zone - Directive 
95/46/EC and Regulation 45/2001. 
Lex especialis: 
- Decision 2007/533/JHA and Regulation 1987/2006. 
PCCC 
- Lex generalis: Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
- Lex especialis: provisions of bilateral or multilateral agreements if applicable 
and national law of sending and hosting country. 
Liaison Officers 
- Lex generalis: Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
- Lex especialis: provisions of bilateral or multilateral agreements if applicable 
and national law of sending and hosting country. 
Europol Individual set of provisions established by Europol Decision and other 
complementary decisions.  
Swedish 
Initiative 
- Lex generalis: European Convention on Data Protection, its Protocol, 
Recommendation (87) 15, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and national 
law. 
- Lex especialis: rules applied to data transmission channel. 
FIUs and AROs FIUs 
- European Convention on Data Protection, its Protocol and Recommendation 
R(87) 15. 
- For AML/CFT: Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation 45/2001. 
AROs 
- European Convention on Data Protection, its Protocol, Recommendation 
R(87) 15 as well as to national data protection rules of Member States. 
- Also rules applied to Swedish Initiative (as it serves as the basis for 
information exchange). 
Prüm Decisions Lex especialis: Decision 2008/615/JHA and national law. 
Table 27: Data protection regulation within the analysed information exchange tools.
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TRANSMISSION TO THIRD PARTIES 
CISA SIS 
Not permitted. Foreseen exception of data submission to the Interpol database 
on stolen or missing travel documents is not applied. 
PCCC 
Depends on bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
Liaison Officers 
Depends on bilateral or multilateral agreements of sending and hosting Member 
States. 
Europol Allowed on the basis of agreement between Europol and Third party with the 
consent of the Member State that has provided information. 
In certain circumstances (defined by the law) data transmission is possible 
without afore mentioned agreement. 
Swedish 
Initiative 
Not foreseen. 
FIUs and AROs Not foreseen. 
Prüm Decisions Not foreseen. 
Table 28: Possibility to transmit information to third countries within the analysed 
information exchange tools. 
ONWARD TRANSMISSION, USE FOR OTHER PURPOSES 
CISA SIS 
Use for other purposes is possible only to prevent serious threats to public 
policy or security, to national security or to prevent serious crimes. In such 
cases consent from the Member State that has issued the alert has to be 
obtained. 
PCCC 
Depends on bilateral or multilateral agreements that can permit so called “chain 
requests”. 
Liaison Officers 
Information related to serious criminal threats can be requested on behalf of 
other Member States or Europol that do not have their liaison officers in that 
country. 
Europol Depends on provisions of agreement between Europol and third party. 
In certain circumstances (defined by the law) data transmission is possible 
without afore mentioned agreement. 
Swedish 
Initiative 
Not foreseen. 
FIUs and AROs Not foreseen. 
Prüm Decisions Not foreseen. 
Table 29: Possibilities of onward transmission and other use of information within the 
analysed information exchange tools. 
This comparison brings us to the conclusion that law enforcement authorities as a 
rule, face dilemmas in which tools should be used; as for the same purpose to 
obtain information related to a committed robbery as when there are indications 
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of involvement of nationals or residents of other Member States, a choice between 
simple use of the Swedish Initiative, PCCC, a liaison officer posted in that country 
or Europol, shall be made. In those cases, when it would be a single (the first and 
the last) request, the choice maybe will not be so important because the 
information could probably be obtained using any tool, and the difference could be 
noticed only at the time of the response. But when the possibility of further 
requests exists, there is no warranty that further information could be obtained 
using the same tool or channel. For example, primary information was obtained on 
the basis of an automated search in a dactyloscopic data base; to get personal data, 
the Swedish Initiative was used; received information revealed a person’s 
involvement in organised crime and after checking in the index system of AWF, a 
hit was received, the competent authority joined AWF, and further information 
was exchanged through Europol. Having all the pieces of data on one person 
received using different tools of law enforcement, an officer should be very careful 
taking decisions on possible onward transmission, transmission to a third party 
and use of sensitive data. And the most important question is which data 
protection regime has to be applied to data related to one investigation, but 
received using different information exchange tools, in order to ensure its further 
effective use by obeying the requirements of the due process. 
Comparing all the above mentioned aspects of information exchange, deficiency of 
provisions of some mechanisms on sensitive data, and transmission to third 
parties and forwarding deserve special attention. Such a lack of clear regulation 
can easily result in violation of fundamental rights. 
3. Proposals 
As the main problem of the current information exchange tools is their overlapping 
and confusion at the time of their use, there is a need of revision of the whole data 
exchange acquis and of its consolidation. In those areas where consolidation is not 
possible, a more comprehensive handbook on information exchange than current 
one has to be elaborated. It should not be structured according to existing 
information exchange tools, but to data categories, for example instead of 
description of what can be obtained using SIS or EIS, an explanation about all 
possible mechanisms to obtain DNA related data or data related to terrorism 
should be given.     
The general proposal for the future initiatives of information exchange would be 
maintance of coherence with the existing ones and when possible going back to 
abandoned provisions of Commission’s proposal from 2005.  
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In respect to the data protection, the proposal totally coincides with the comments 
of the European Parliament, EDPS and FRA on the need for a single data protection 
regime for all exchanged data, as it is an indispensable condition in avoiding 
confusion on data protection regimes that have to be used on data received, using 
different information exchange mechanisms. 
And finally the following improvements of the existing tools could be considered as 
contributing added value and quality to information exchange within EU:   
 European ”information hub”, i.e. Europol, which should remain 
“European”, as far as possible, by the prohibition of personal data 
transmission to third parties with whom it does not have operational 
agreements. If it would significantly damage efforts to maintain security, 
only limited categories of personal data should be subject to such 
transmission, and in any case should not include transmission of sensitive 
data or data on victims and witnesses. Such data exchange could take place 
only between Member States that have submitted it to an AWF and a third 
party. 
 Europol’s access to SIS II shall be limited only to the necessity to obtain 
information for AWF with the establishment of access of a limited number 
of staff and the possibility of the effective supervision of use of data by 
Europol. 
 In order to avoid duplicity, provisions of Prüm Decisions on non-
automated data exchange shall be merged with the relevant legislative 
acts, regulating the fight against terrorism and public security in relation 
to mass events of a transnational nature. 
 With respect to liaison officers posted within the EU there should be EU 
level minimum requirements on the activities of liaison officers in order to 
avoid inequality in their actions, depending on the posting and hosting 
Member States, and allowing the possibility to establish by bilateral 
agreements with more favourable conditions to perform their functions. 
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crossborder crime (the ‘Prüm Decision’)”, 7 December 2012, COM(2012) 
732 final. 
 Communication to the Council and the European Parliament “Tackling 
Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre”, 28 
March 2012, COM(2012) 140 final. 
 Commission Staff Working Paper. “Commission Operational Guidance on 
taking account of Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact 
Assessments”, 6 June 2011, SEC (2011) 567 final. 
 Staff working paper “Operation of the Council Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 (Swedish Initiative”)”, 13 May 2011, 
SEC(2011) 593 final. 
 Staff working paper “Operational Guidance on taking account of 
Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact Assesment”, 6 May 2011, 
SEC(2011) 567 final. 
 Report to the European Parliament and the Council. “based on Article 8 of 
the Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning 
cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices of the Member States in th 
field of tracing and identification of proceeds from, or other property related 
to, crime, 12 April, 2011, COM(2011) 176 final. 
 Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. “The EU 
Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure 
Europe”, 22 November, 2010, COM(2010) 673 final. 
 Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. “A 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
~ 328 ~ 
comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European 
Union”, 4 November, 2010, COM(2010) 609 final. 
 Communication “On the global approach to transfers of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data to third countries”, 21 September 2010, COM(2010) 492 
final. 
 Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. “Overview of 
information management in the area of Freedom, security and Justice”, 20 
July 2010, COM(2010)385 final. 
 Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
“Delivering an area of Freedom, security and Justice for Europe’s citizens. 
Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme”, 20 April 2010, 
COM(2010) 171 final. 
 Communitacion to the European Parliament and the Council. “Proceeds of 
organised crime: ensuring that “Crime does not pay”, 20 November 2008, 
COM(2008) 766, final. 
 Communication to the Council and the European Parliament. “The Hague 
Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for 
European renewal in the field of Freedom, security and Justice”, 10 May 
2005, COM(2005)184 final. 
 Communication to the Council and the European Parliament. “Towards 
enhancing access to information by law enforcement agencies”, 16 June 
2004, COM(2004) 429 final. 
 Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. “Enhancing 
police and customs co-operation in the European Union”, 18 of May 2004, 
COM(2004) 376 final. 
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITS. “Lessons from the European Commission’s 
development of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS 
II)” (Special Report, 2013), accessed July 16, 2014, 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ecadocuments/SR14_03/SR14_03_EN.p
df. 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR. “The European Data Protection 
Supervisor Strategy 2015-2019”, accessed September 30, 2015, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared 
/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Strategy/15-02-26_Strategy_2015_2019 
_EN.pdf 
 “Europe’s big opportunity. EDPS recommendations on the EU’s options for 
data protection reform” (Opinion 3/2015), accessed, September 4, 2015, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/D
Information Exchange Efficiency in Criminal Investigation in European Union 
 
~ 329 ~ 
ocuments/Consultation/Opinions/2015/15-07-27_GDPR_Recommendati 
ons_EN.pdf. 
 “Executive summary EDPS Opinion of 7 March 2012 on the data protection 
reform package”, OJ, C 192, 30.6.2012, p. 8. 
 “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of 
Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime” OJ C 181, 
22.6.2011, p. 24-30. 
EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTER FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, EUROPOL. 
“Cocaine: A European Union Perspective in the global context”, 2010, 
accessed, June 7, 2015, https://www.google.es/#q=analytical+work 
+file+Cola. 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 
“Amendments 48-329 on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data 
for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime, accessed September 6, 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/
am/1058/1058388/1058388en.pdf 
 “Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data 
(COM(2012)0010 – C7-0024/2012 – 2012/0010(COD))”, accessed 
September 4, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do 
?type= REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0403&language=EN 
 “Report on the initiative by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of 
Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak 
Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Portuguese 
Republic, Romania and the Kingdom of Sweden on the stepping up of 
cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-
border crime (6566/2007 – C6-0079/2007 – 2007/0804(CNS))”, p. 6, 
accessed June20, 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2007-0207+0+DOC+XML+V0/ 
/EN&language=hr. 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
~ 330 ~ 
 Directorate General for Internal Policies “Developing an EU Internal 
Security Strategy, fighting terrorism and organized crime” (Study, 2011), 
accessed August 13, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/ac 
tivities/cont/201206/20120627ATT47777/20120627ATT47777EN.pdf 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE. “Twelve operational fundamental rights considerations for law 
enforcement when processing Passenger Name Record (PNR) data”, 
accessed September 4, 2015, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-
2014-fundamental-rights-considerations-pnr-data-en.pdf.  
 “Handbook on European Data Protection Law”, 2014, accessed October 30, 
2014, http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2014/handbook-european-
data-protection-law. 
 “Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the 
proposed data protection reform package”, October 2012, accessed 
September 3, 2015, http://fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2012/fra-opinion-
proposed-eu-data-protection-reform-package. 
EUROPOL. “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015”, accessed August 10, 
2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-
terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2015. 
 “The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2015”, 
accessed October 9, 2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content 
/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2015. 
 “TE-SAT 2014 - European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 
2014”, accessed August 10, 2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu 
/content/te-sat-2014-european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-
report-2014. 
 “Operation Archimedes infographics”, September 2014, accessed July 6 
2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/operation-archimedes-
infographics “EU Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA 
2013)”, accessed September 30, 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/ 
content/eu-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-socta. 
 “Worldwide Operation against Cybercrime”, May 2014, accessed July 6, 
2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/worldwide-operation-
against-cybercriminals  
 “OCTA 2011: EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment”, accessed 
September 26, 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content 
/publication/octa-2011-eu-organised-crime-threat-assesment-1465 
Information Exchange Efficiency in Criminal Investigation in European Union 
 
~ 331 ~ 
 “OCTA 2009: EU Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment”, accessed 
September 30, 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content 
/publication/octa-2009-eu-organised-crime-threat-assessment-1463 
JOINT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF SCHENGEN. “Report of the Schengen Joint 
Supervisory Authority on an inspection of the use of Article 99 alerts in the 
Schengen Information System” 2007, accessed January 14, 2013, 
http://schengen.consilium.europa.eu/media/135672/07-
02%20draft%20report%20article%2099.en08.pdf. 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT. “Study on 
the status of information exchange amongst law enforcement authorities 
in the context of existing EU instruments”, 2010, accessed 12 September, 
2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/police/docs 
/icmpd_study_lea_infoex.pdf. 
INTERPOL. “Annual Report 2014”, accessed May 17, 2015, http://www.interpol.int 
/News-and-media/Publications. 
HOUSE OF LORDS. European Union Committee Report. “Schengen Information 
System II (SIS II)” (Report with Evidence, 2007), accessed January 18, 
2013, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/lde
ucom/49/49.pdf 
 “Prüm: an effective weapon against terrorism and crime?” (Report with 
Evidence, May 2007), accessed July 13, 2014, http://www.statewatch.org 
/news/2007/may/eu-hol-prum-report.pdf. 
SCHENGEN JOINT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY. “Eight Activity Report – December 
2005 – December 2008”, accessed January 16, 2013, http://schengen 
.consilium.europa.eu/media/135384/8th%20schengen%20act.report%2
02005-08.en.pdf. 
SIS SUPERVISION COORDINATION GROUP. “A Guide for Exercising the Right of 
Access”, October 2014 (updated October 2015), accessed November 3, 
2015, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite 
/shared/Documents/Cooperation/Large_IT_systems/SIS/15-1012_SIS_II 
_GUIDE_OF_ACCESS _UPDATED_2015_EN.pdf 
THE LISBON NETWORK. “The Right to a Fair Trial: Analysis of the Condemnations 
of the Portuguese State due to the Violation of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, Council of Europe, 2008, accessed October 
Anna Fiodorova 
 
~ 332 ~ 
30, 2014, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/Themis/
ECHR/Paper4_en.asp. 
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME. “Estimating Illicit Financial 
Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized 
Crimes: Research Report (Vienna, October 2011)”, accessed September 20, 
2013, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_ 
financial_flows_2011_web.pdf. 
 “The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat 
Assesment. 2010”, accessed September 27, 2013, https://www.unodc.org 
/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf. 
 
